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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to compile a glossary of technical term relevant to stock 
exchange mergers and alliances. Since technical communication can only be 
described meaningfully in the context of technical information, technical 
knowledge, and terminology, judgmental analysis will be applied to the literature 
on stock exchange mergers and alliances to identify management theories that are 
able to explain stock exchange mergers and alliances. One aim is to find out 
which general theories on mergers and alliances have a high explanatory value for 
stock exchange cooperation. In the first part of the thesis, the stock exchange 
world is examined. First a general overview of the theory of corporate growth is 
given, next the changes in the environment of stock exchanges are examined. In 
the analytical part, fourteen general management theories are applied to stock 
exchange cooperation. The criteria used to identify the explanatory value of the 
different theories are the critical success factors of stock exchanges identified in 
the first part of the thesis. A point system is introduced in order to make the 
results of the analysis of the different theories more comparable. The final part of 
the paper consists of an English-German glossary containing the relevant 
technical terms of stock exchange mergers and alliances. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
The history of mergers and alliances dates back a long time. The first merger 
wave was observed after the Civil War in the US. Cornelius Vanderbilt made a 
takeover attempt of the Erie Railroad by his company Basic Industries Vanderbilt 
and transportation in 1866 and in this way triggered the first merger wave. Since 
then several periods with increased merger activity followed until in the 1990s the 
first stock exchanges also started to ride the merger wave. The reason is that stock 
exchanges nowadays have to cope with a radically and rapidly changing 
environment. They have lost their former local and regional monopoly position 
through global capital market liberalisation, new regulation, and European 
integration. The advent of the Internet has accelerated communication around the 
globe. Technicalisation of and the disintermediation in financial markets, the 
consolidation of institutional investors, and the development of Alternative 
Trading Systems (ATSs), which are trading platforms for financial instruments on 
the Internet, have led to fundamental changes in the stock exchange world. 
Competition among stock exchanges and alternative trading venues has become 
global, as investors as well as issuers can choose the stock exchange offering the 
most favourable conditions for investments and offerings. As a result, even minor 
cost-disadvantages can become a life-threatening weakness for an exchange. 
Moreover, stock exchanges in Europe are struggling with a loss of business 
compared to their US counterparts. This is evidenced by the fact that the outflow 
of portfolio investments from the euro area was about three times as high as that 
from the US between 1999 and 2001. Outflows of portfolio investments from the 
US are defined as the purchase of foreign equity or debt securities outside the US 
by US market participants. On the other hand, portfolio investment outflows from 
the euro area are purchases of foreign securities outside the euro area by market 
participants from the euro area. As outflows from the euro area are substantially 
higher than those from the US, US stock exchanges win over business from their 
European competitors. The difference in 1999 was 214.9 bn dollars, in 2000 186 
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bn dollars, in 2001 91.5 bn dollars and in 2002 it increased again to 176.5 bn 
dollars. Absolute figures have decreased steadily from 2000 on in both areas, in 
2002 even turning positive in the US (IMF 2004: 177). Another reason for the 
weakness of European exchanges compared to the NYSE is the huge current 
account deficit in the US, which leads to an increase in capital imports by the US, 
which are financed to a considerable extent via stock exchanges. The current 
account deficit of the US amounted to 5.06 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 
2004 and experts expect it to increase even further in future, with major factors 
being a surging dollar and high oil prices. In contrast, the current account deficit 
in the euro area is expected to be only around one percent in 2004. That hints at a 
much larger demand for financing in the US than in Europe (Shapiro 2004, OECD 
2004). 
 
At the same time, credit markets are also a potential source of danger, as 
commercial banks compete directly with investment banks to satisfy the financing 
needs of businesses. This is particularly eminent in Europe, where equity culture 
is less developed than in the US, something that becomes obvious when one looks 
at ratio of the market capitalisation to GDP of the EU, which is significantly lower 
than in the US. In 2003, stock market capitalisation to GDP ration amounted to 
116 percent in the US, compared to 67 percent in the EU-15, and only 54 percent 
in the euro area) (Fink, Haiss and Kirchner 2005). In order to be better armed for 
the battle for survival, stock exchanges have begun to team up. The rate of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances has reached unprecedented heights in the past 
couple of years. This thesis will examine this very trend.  
1.2 Objectives of the thesis and research question 
The aim of this thesis is to compile an English-German glossary containing the 
technical terms relevant to stock exchange mergers and alliances. For this 
purpose, judgemental analysis will be applied to the literature on stock exchange 
mergers and alliances. One aim is to find out which general theories on mergers 
and alliances have a high explanatory value for stock exchange cooperation.  
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The focus will be on European stock exchanges, as firstly, this is a 
manageable geographic area and secondly, European integration and Monetary 
Union are expected to have considerable impact on the consolidation process 
among European stock exchanges. Although mergers and alliances between 
derivative exchanges are much more common, the thesis will focus on stock 
exchanges. The justification for concentrating on stock exchanges is that a 
derivative can only be as liquid as its underlying (Olsen & Associates 2000). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to deal with trade in underlyings.  
 
Although there are manifold management theories of mergers and 
alliances and a wide-range of literature dealing with mergers and alliances in the 
stock exchange world, up until now no attempt has been made to examine these 
theories in view of stock exchange mergers and alliances. Furthermore, noone has 
yet made the effort to take a more detailed look at the technical terms used in this 
context. Resulting from this research gap the main research question to be 
answered is  
 
"Which technical terms are important in the context of stock exchange 
mergers and alliances?" 
 
In order to be able to answer this question, the relevant literature on stock 
exchange mergers and alliances in Europe will be analysed, as technical 
communication can only be described meaningfully in the context of technical 
information, technical knowledge, and terminology. Therefore technical 
communication is interdisciplinary and polycentric (Budin 1996: 3). On the other 
hand, terminology helps to improve the organisation of technical knowledge. That 
is also the  reason why the compilation of the glossary would not be possible 
without the preceding analysis of literature on stock exchange mergers and 
alliances. For this reason the second research question to be asked is  
 
"Which fundamental management theories can be identified as applicable to 
stock exchange mergers and alliances on the basis of the relevant literature?" 
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The reason why this question is interesting is that stock exchange mergers and 
alliances in many cases face a lot of scepticism and resistance, and many of them 
have failed in the past. This, apart from other factors, is due to the fact that each 
country considers its stock exchange to be a national symbol of pride, the 
independence of which is hard to give up for many. In this respect stock 
exchanges can be compared to airlines:  
 
"Both have traditionally been symbols of national identity to which every 
western economy has felt it has had a natural right. And yet both will be 
under threat in a Europe without borders" (Moore 1990: 53).  
 
In order to analyse the applicability of general theoretical paradigms 
explaining mergers and alliances to stock exchanges it will be determined whether 
the basic assumptions and main conditions of these theories hold true for the 
particular case of a stock exchange or if there are conflicts with the criteria for 
success of stock exchanges as well as other main factors (such as European 
integration and the emergence of Alternative Trading Systems). One section will 
contain prospects for the future development of the stock exchange world: Is the 
vision of a global stock exchange realistic? Finally, a glossary will be compiled on 
the basis of the elaborations on stock exchange mergers and alliances. It will 
define the relevant technical terms in English and German and highlight 
contrastive aspects. The technical language used in this context is particularly 
interesting with regard to changes in the stock exchange environment, since some 
of the new developments show different concepts in English and German. 
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1.3 Structure 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis . 
 
1. Introduction 
 
2. Methods and methodology 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
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1.4 Definition of important terms 
In this section I have decided to define key terms of my thesis which do not have 
one single unique definition across different contexts in order to clarify which 
meaning will be used in this thesis. Since their usage and meanings can be 
inconsistent across different authors, I have decided that they need separate 
elaboration up-front. Many other concepts which are less diverse in usage will be 
explained in context and  for more definitions of technical terms please also refer 
to the glossary. Below, however, the two most troubling technical terms in this 
thesis will examined in more detail, since it is of critical importance for further 
reading to define their boundaries. 
1.4.1 Mergers  
In literature, mergers are defined in many different ways. Generally speaking, 
some authors use this term in a very narrow sense, whereas others subsume a lot 
of different modes of cooperation under it. The first definition given here is very 
narrow, describing the term merger in its strictest sense.  
 
"A true merger takes place when two corporations combine so thoroughly 
that neither of the participants survives legally. What emerges is an 
entirely new entity, with a new name, structure, line of products and 
services, culture, and so on" (Arsenault 1998: 84). 
 
In the narrower sense, the term merger indicates that two or more firms are unified 
in a new one, whereas acquisition denotes the purchase of a majority of shares of 
one company by another. In most cases, however, a wider concept of mergers is 
used, comprising other forms of cooperation as well. 
 
"The word can also apply to the situation … where two organizations 
come together and one is absorbed into the other, a process sometimes 
called consolidation and … sometimes called acquisition. One corporation 
legally disappears and the other remains, clearly made larger" (Arsenault 
1998: 84). 
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If this second concept is followed, the differentiation between mergers and 
acquisitions is lost. However, as the focus with most intercompany cooperations is 
not on the legal but rather on the financial aspect, the two terms are used 
interchangeably (Bressmer, Moser and Sertl 1989: 5 and Hagemann 1996: 53-54). 
A third term that comes into play in this context is takeover. Although a takeover 
is the same as an acquisition, it is frequently referred to as a hostile acquisition. 
 
"As is true of many terms in the field of business combinations, 'merger' 
and 'acquisition' – the amalgamation of two legally separate corporations – 
can be used interchangeably. The acquired company often considers the 
alliance a 'merger', while the acquiring company considers it an 
'acquisition', or perhaps a 'takeover' if the transaction is hostile" (Gaughan 
2000: n.p.). 
 
The term merger sometimes even refers to a much wider range of activities 
in connection with the buying and selling of a company, such as classical mergers, 
acquisitions, management buy-outs or management buy-ins, minority equity 
purchases, divestitures, spin-offs, and joint ventures. Additionally, some authors 
use the term for other forms of cooperation, such as strategic alliances or networks 
(Frank 1993: 6-7, Bressmer, Moser and Sertl 1989: 35-36 and Gösche 1991: 11). 
For the purpose of this thesis  merger will refer to all those forms of intercompany 
relationships which involve the exchange of equity between two or more firms in 
a way that the financial independence of the partners is lost, i.e. mergers in the ir 
narrow sense, acquisitions, and hostile takeovers. 
1.4.2 Alliances 
In a very general meaning alliances are "association(s) to further the common 
interests of the members" (Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary). The terms 
alliance and strategic alliance are interchangeable, and both will be used 
throughout this thesis. One characteristic feature of strategic alliances most 
researchers agree upon is their linkage to a company's long-term strategic plan. As 
the goal is to improve a company's competitive position, a strategic alliance can 
be defined as a close, long-term, mutually beneficial agreement between two or 
more parties with the intent to improve the competitive position of each partner. 
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The strategic objectives of the alliance are achieved by combining complementary 
strengths as well as sharing resources, knowledge, and capabilities. Frequently, 
the partners will be actual or potential competitors (Spekman et al. 1998: 748, 
Schaper-Rinkel 1997: 26 and Devlin and Bleackley 1988: 18). 
 
Alliances can take many different forms, ranging from joint ventures, 
which involve the creation of a new entity in which the partners have a share of 
equity, to forms with no separate legal entity involved, such as long-term 
purchasing agreements, co-marketing and licensing agreements, R&D 
collaboration teams, or consortia (Gulati and Singh 1998: 781, Child and Faulkner 
1998: 5-7 and Bucklin and Sengupta 1993). In order to further distinguish an 
alliance from other forms of corporate cooperation, certain criteria are needed: 
§ The companies which form the alliance remain independent. 
§ An alliance generates or fosters competitive advantages. 
§ The benefits of the alliance as well as control over the performance of the 
agreed upon goals are shared among the partners. For this reason, the strategic 
goals of the alliance must be compatible with and directly related to those of 
the individual partners. This is probably the most characteristic feature of a 
strategic alliance. 
§ The core competencies of the partners are taken into account and combined 
with the aim of creating synergies. The partners are expected to contribute 
continuously in one or more key strategic fields, e.g., research and 
development, technology, products, etc., with each partner having access to 
the resources of the other partners. Alliances generally represent an 
opportunity for organisational learning.  
§ Alliances are mainly strategically oriented and limited to a predefined set of 
activities (Jansen 1998: 105-106, Yoshino 1995: 4-5, Hamel 1991, Parkhe 
1991 and Lei and Slocum 1992). 
 
Now that the key terms of the thesis have been clarified, the next part will 
deal with the methodology and research methods of this thesis.  
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2 RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
The research strategy of this dissertation is twofold: deductive multi-paradigm 
research (applying fourteen different theories) using judgmental analysis is 
combined with terminological research identifying the main concepts in this 
research field. This research approach is in conformity with the concept of critical 
rationalism, which postulates that insight does not necessarily have to be gained 
through empiricism, but also through intellectual effort (Schülein and Reitze 
2002: 54). Critical rationalists, such as Popper, rely on deduction rather than 
induction and stress that empiricism and intellectual effort are equally important.  
 
Multi-paradigm research is a means of fostering greater insight and 
creativity by applying different paradigms to analyse phenomena (Gioia and Pitre 
1990). Multi-paradigm research "is most appropriate for studying multifaceted 
phenomena characterized by expansive and contested research domains (i.e., with 
numerous, often conflicting theories)" (Lewis and Grimes 1999: 678). This is 
certainly the case if one looks at the large number of different theories on 
interfirm cooperation. Fourteen different theories (for more details see Section 5) 
will be used here to examine the theoretical background of stock exchange 
mergers and alliances. According to Gioia and Pitre (1990: 584), the view derived 
from the application of a single research paradigm is too narrow to reflect 
multifaceted organisational reality.  
 
In accordance with the research strategy, the thesis will be built on 
judgmental analysis of technical literature. Literature will be used not only as a 
secondary source (in the majority of cases literature reviews are mainly used to 
provide an overview of the state of the art or to identify gaps in the body of 
knowledge), but as the main basis for theory analysis. First, the environment and 
critical success factors of stock exchanges are analysed on the basis of existing 
relevant technical literature. In a second step, the theories relevant to stock 
exchange mergers and alliances are derived through deduction, i.e. the application 
of laws of logic to derive new insights for a particular case from an already 
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existing general principle, using judgmental analysis (Schülein and Reitze 2002: 
227). "Deduction moves from the general to the specific. It moves from (1) a 
pattern that might be logically or theoretically expected to (2) observations that 
test whether the expected pattern actually occurs" (Babbie 2001: 35) by applying a 
theory or general law to a particular case. Judgmental analysis is one method of 
deduction.  
 
Deductive research is concerned with practical issues and is in line with 
Popper's view, who introduced the concept of falsifiability and stated that science 
progresses through trial and error. Falsifiability acknowledges that theories are 
fallible. Theories can be tested and falsified, but never logically verified. The 
main purpose of theory-testing is not to show whether a theory is true or false but, 
in the ideal case, that a theory is better than its predecessor. In this way 
falsifiability tries to achieve scientific progress rather than arrive at absolute truth 
(Chalmers 2001: 71-71).  
 
The main method applied in this thesis, judgmental analysis "is based on a 
logical analysis conducted by interested people" (Jamieson and Chapelle 2004: 
180). The strategy of judgmental analysis is to define and operationalise variables 
(which are in this case the success factors of stock exchanges plus the influence of 
Alternative Trading Systems and European integration) to determine if there is a 
link between the theories and the variables (Jamieson and Chapelle 2004: 180). 
Judgment derives from the interpretation of objective data. Judgment is "a 
cognitive or intellectual process in which a person draws a conclusion, or an 
inference, about something…on the basis of data" (Hoffman and Franke 1986). 
According to Evans (1987: 32), judgmental analysis is conducted in three stages: 
1. Formation of theories and assumption on which analysis is based.  
2. Generation of hypothesis and predictions. 
3. Search for evidence. 
All three steps will be performed in this thesis. The theories on which the analysis 
is based are fourteen general management theories of mergers and alliances. The 
hypothesis is that these management theories are highly relevant for stock 
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exchange mergers and alliances. Finally, the interpretation of the literature and the 
judgmental evaluation of different theories with regard to the critical success 
factors of stock exchanges as well as important developments in their 
environment will result in an assessment of the explanatory value of the different 
theories.  
 
Bunn and Wright (1991: 503) present a best-practice guide for judgmental 
analysis: 
§ The analysis has to be coherent and defensible. An audit trail should explain 
verbally the reasoning behind the judgment process. This will be done by 
verbally justifying the evaluation of each success and environmental factor.  
§ Judgment should rather be an aggregation than individual. The usual reason 
put forward for group judgments is that outcome is improved, as by taking 
into account a wider range of outcomes judgment may be revised and 
optimised (Lock 1987: 110). This point will be neglected in this thesis, as the 
main goal is the compilation of a glossary of relevant technical terms of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances based on the analysis rather than absolute 
validation of the analysis results.  
§ Judgment should be derived through decomposition rather than via a holistic 
approach. Decomposition will take place by firstly analysing each of the 
fourteen management theories separately, and secondly, by individually 
looking at each critical success factor and environmental factor. 
§ Judgment should not be influenced by reward structures associated with the 
judgmental analysis. As the researcher is not involved in the stock exchange 
business and as there is no "desirable result", no reward structure is to be 
expected. 
 
Several researchers (e.g. Armstrong 1985, Makridakis 1988) argue against 
the general use of judgmental analysis, except in special circumstances, such as 
major environmental or organisational change. This is certainly the case for stock 
exchange mergers and alliances, if one looks at all the major recent changes (for 
an extensive description please see Section 4) in the environment of stock 
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exchanges. On the other hand, empirical studies (e.g. by Edmundson et al. 1988 or 
Larence et al. 1985) show that a well-structured judgmental process can be as 
reliable as statistical analysis and in some cases even outperform it.  
 
One frequently used method to improve the validity of judgmental analysis 
is expert interviews where participants follow iterative processes to arrive at an 
ordering of or choosing from a finite number of decision alternatives which are 
explicitly described in terms of their alternatives (Frandel and Spronk 1985: 2 and 
Da Silva, Davies and Naude 2002: 245). The experts involved should conduct 
analyses in their area of expertise and if the process has some formal structure 
(such as decomposition), judgmental analysis tends to yield very reliable results 
(Bunn and Wright 1991: 505). For the reasons stated above, expert interviews will 
not be used in the course of this research.  
 
One potential source of mistakes and biases is the mental processes 
involved in deducing conclusions (Evans 1987: 33). As high level cognitive 
processes have a substantial element of automaticity, judgments, including expert 
judgments, are likely to show subtle biases which people are unaware of. If people 
are aware of the basis upon which their judgments are made and realistically 
appraise the accuracy with which they can make such judgments, the likelihood of 
a valid judgment is much greater. This is not the case, however, with a large part 
of judges. People usually construct theories to account for what they have done 
but do not have any direct access to their own mental processes. Therefore, the 
opportunity to reduce error by self-criticism is limited (Evans 1987: 41-42).  
 
Moreover, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) point out the problem of 
"framing", which describes how a problem is presented. Even minor changes in 
framing can strongly influence the outcomes of judgmental analysis. In addition, 
the fact that the outcome of judgemental analysis in economics and business 
administration is usually tested against real world events rather than laboratory 
simulations makes it more difficult to obtain objective and clear-cut evidence. 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
Confirmation of an analysis does not necessarily verify a judgment, as also many 
other facts might change which might influence the result (Evans 987: 44).  
 
In this thesis, the theories which are applicable to stock exchange mergers 
and alliances will be derived through judgmental analysis: Firstly, the general 
management theories of mergers and alliances will be analysed in view of the 
critical success factors as well as environmental factors. If we assume these 
criteria to be relevant to stock exchanges and if a theory on mergers and alliances 
supports them, then the theory will also be applicable to stock exchange 
cooperations, i.e. it will be assumed relevant (Chalmers 2001: 36). Möller (1985: 
8) states that the different criteria on the basis of which judgmental analysis takes 
places are usually not equally important. Therefore the criteria can be assigned 
weights which reflect their relative importance for analysis (Möller 1985: 8). This 
will be done in this analysis, the justification will be given in the introduction to 
the analysis system at the introduction to Section 5. 
 
The next section of this thesis will deal with the theory of corporate 
growth. It attempts to explain why companies seek to grow in the first place. The 
main body of part one will contain an overview of the changes in the stock 
exchange world and the critical success factors of stock exchanges, which will 
then form the basis for analysis in Part II. 
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PART I: THE STOCK EXCHANGE WORLD 
3 CORPORATE GROWTH 
Just like corporations in general, stock exchanges enter into mergers and alliances 
in order to grow. Growth at a certain level is necessary in order to survive and to 
adapt to changes in environment. On the one hand, the access to resources has to 
be maintained and improved to strengthen the company's competitive position. On 
the other hand, the company must seek to use its competitive advantages as 
efficiently as possible. In both cases, growth requires access to complimentary 
resources (Taylor and Cosenza 1997 and Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 65). These 
resources are used to discourage  competitors from investing in the company's 
main fields of business. What companies must seek to achieve is to serve 
customers by creating differentiated goods and services tailored to the customers' 
needs by employing different types of resources (Canals 2000: 2). According to 
Zook, Allen and Smith (2000), a successful growth strategy is characterised by 
two features: 
§ A strong competitive position in the company's core business. 
§ A sensible investment programme that reinvests in the company's core 
businesses.  
Companies that grow at an above-average rate over several years are characterised 
by the ability to handle the life cycle of their core businesses and continuously 
develop new businesses for the future. That means that the pipeline needs to be 
organised in a way that activities with a declining growth potential are smoothly 
replaced by others which show a high potential for growth (Rall 2002: 10).  
 
When a company has not grown for many years this may be a signal of a 
lack of either innovative power or connection to the needs of current or 
prospective customers. Corporate growth can, however, also be financially 
unhealthy. The main reason is often unreflected diversification or increasing sales 
or market share at any cost through measures such as price wars, indiscriminate 
promotions, or unreasonable marketing expenses aiming at an increase in short-
term revenues. For this reason, growing revenues are not automatically equivalent 
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to successful growth, as only a small percentage of companies manage to really 
create shareholder value in the long run (Zook, Allen and Smith 2000 and Canals 
2000: 2-3). 
3.1 Forms of growth 
Generally, one can distinguish between two forms of growth, internal and external 
growth. The figure below systematises the different strategies: 
 
Figure 2: Alternative ways of corporate growth. 
 
Source: Adapted from Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 55 and Duberman 1990:24. 
 
The decision between internal and external growth has to be continuously 
adapted to the growth strategy and stage of the enterprise. The two possibilities do 
not exclude each other and there are many successful examples of combined 
strategies (Rall 2002: 16). Internal growth results from the isolated sourcing of 
different resources which are then combined to form a new factor combination. 
The characteristic feature is that these new combinations are combined 
independently by the firm itself (Kogler 1992: 13 and Hätscher 1992: 84). If the 
necessary resources for growth already exist outside the company und if they have 
Alternative ways of corporate growth 
Internal growth External growth 
Creation of new 
products  
Adaptation or upgrading 
of existing products  
Expansion into 
new markets Merger Alliance Other forms of 
cooperation 
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been combined already by other companies in a way which leads to the desired 
factor combination, external growth will be most likely. External growth is 
defined as growth through cooperation between companies which allows them to 
gain access to complementary resources necessary for growth. (Wittek 1980: 120) 
The decision to take a certain growth path is made on the basis of the cost 
associated with the possible paths, i.e. the cost of access to the complementary 
resources necessary for growth. Of course the cost must always be compared with 
the expected profit resulting from the growth strategy. In order for a growth 
strategy to be profitable, the present value of the cost of growth must be lower 
than the present value of the additional profit expected from the expansion 
(Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 56 and Porter 1987b: 34-35). 
3.1.1 Internal growth 
Internal growth, or internal expansion as it is also sometimes called, can be 
achieved by companies in three different ways:  
§ By creating new products internally. 
§ By adapting or upgrading existing products. 
§ By expanding into new markets (Duberman 1990: 24). 
 
Nowadays more and more firms are returning to internal growth strategies. 
The reason is that external growth did not turn out to be as successful as expected. 
Instead of spending a lot of money on a merger, companies develop several new 
products internally. Internal growth can be encouraged through the establishment 
of a research and development department. The main advantage of internal growth 
is that it "is less risky and yields higher return on invested capital than 
acquisitions" (Gertz 1995: 47). Furthermore, internal growth is much less 
complicated in terms of organisational questions, since no integration process has 
to take place and organisational culture and informal networks remain unchanged 
(Rall 2002: 17). Mergers frequently result in cultural clashes, particularly during 
implementation, which may lead to unsatisfactory performance in this period. On 
the other hand, there are also considerable costs associated with internal growth. 
The main cost will result from the recruitment of new personnel, the sourcing of 
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production facilities, and marketing (such as the introduction of brand names) 
(Harrison 1987: 80-81, Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 56 and Vermeulen and Barkema 
2001). Moreover, the resources and abilities to fully exploit attractive growth 
possibilities need to be built up systematically, which is usually a lengthy process 
(Rall 2002: 18). Finally, another potential danger of internal growth is the risk of 
failure of innovations. One prerequisite for successful innovations is innovative 
spirit within the organisation as well as a close link between R&D and corporate 
strategy. Since the process of innovation usually requires the involvement of 
different corporate units, process-oriented and interdisciplinary organisational 
structures are of major importance. Even if all these prerequisites are met, 
innovations might still fail, however. Innovations bring about changes, which are 
often not welcomed by members or stakeholders of the organisation 
(Thomaschewski 2002: 184).   
3.1.2 External growth 
External growth is characterised by the extensive and, in many cases, systematic 
deployment of so-called external resources – assets over which the firm has no 
direct ownership. External growth is a typical pattern of growth for young 
companies. Its characteristic feature is that these companies are mainly driven by 
available opportunities for growth rather than by the resources the company itself 
controls (Stevenson and Gumpert 1985 and Jarillo 1989: 135). The advantages of 
external growth are that it is unlimited (except for the ability to absorb and 
integrate new enterprises), permits firms to increase their market power, to avoid 
market entry barriers, to enter new markets more quickly, and to gain access to 
new knowledge and resources (Vermeulen and Barkema 2001: 457 and Rall 2002: 
18). 
 
The main costs associated with external growth are licence fees (in the 
case of licensing agreements), the cost of usage of the firm's equipment by the 
partner, or the cost of setting up a joint venture. In the case of external growth 
through a merger, the purchase price for the acquired firm represents the cost. 
(Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 65-67) The higher cost compared to internal expansion – 
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takeover premiums average 20 to 40 percent and also the cost of integrating an 
acquired firm must not be neglected – is the major disadvantage of external 
growth. Also the time and attention of the top managers required by mergers 
during which they are diverted from day-to-day business as well as the fact that a 
series of problems might evolve, particularly during implementation, has to be 
taken into account. Another limitation is the scarce supply of suitable partners – 
high-quality companies which are active in the same or a related product line. In 
contrast to external growth, internal growth strategies bear the advantage of 
usually contributing to progressing simplicity, but at the same time "acquisitions, 
in contrast, revitalize a firm and enhance its ability to react adequately to changing 
circumstances" (Vermeulen and Barkema 2001: 458). It is assumed that 
companies prefer internal to external growth. They usually first exploit all 
possibilities of internal growth and only turn to an external growth strategy when 
there are insurmountable barriers to internal growth (Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 59-60, 
Eckbo and Langohr 1989 and Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel 1996). 
3.1.2.1 Mergers 
Mergers are the result of a certain business strategy of a company. Generally, one 
can distinguish between three broad categories of business strategy through which 
external growth is pursued:  
1. Portfolio strategy  
The goal of this strategy is to achieve a reasonable balance and stability 
within the firm by combining a set of interrelated businesses. The portfolio 
strategy may refer solely to the financial basis or also take into account 
technological, market know-how, or product-market niche relationships.  
2. Business family strategy 
The strategy at this level is to develop related new business activities by 
combining business activities based on a common technology or know-how. 
This allows the firm to exploit synergies in technology, product markets, or 
distribution. It might also result in new businesses set up by combining 
existing units. 
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3. Business element strategy 
At this level the firm focuses on its main competitor or competitors. The 
challenge is to formulate a product/market strategy that is competitive in 
regard to winning a particular customer (Lorange, Kotlarchuk and Singh 
1987: 4). 
 
Mergers themselves are usually classified on the basis of the direction of 
the merger, denoting the way the partners are related to each other. Most 
commonly, one distinguishes between horizontal, vertical, concentric, and 
conglomerate mergers. Horizontal mergers refer to cases when the partner firms 
are active in the same market segment. As a result, a horizontal merger leads to 
economies of scale in production and distribution, and frequently to an increase in 
market share or an extension of the companies' product line. In a vertical merger, 
two or more firms of preceding or succeeding stages in the production chain are 
combined, the firms having a customer-supplier relationship. This type of merger 
is usually undertaken when the market for the intermediate product is imperfect. 
Depending on whether the acquired firm is in a preceding or succeeding stage one 
speaks of a forward vertical merger or a backward vertical merger respectively. 
Concentric mergers are formed for the know-how potentials of the companies 
concerned. The result is an extension of product lines, market participations, or 
technologies. The main focus is on technology or research and development 
activities. Finally, all those cases where there are no obvious connections between 
the buyer and seller firm are subsumed under the term conglomerate or 
diversification merger. The reason for these mergers is in most cases a 
diversification or portfolio strategy and they are intended to enhance the firm's 
overall stability (Hermsen 1994: 35-36 and Lorange, Kotlarchuk and Singh 1987: 
5-6). 
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3.1.2.2 Alliances 
In accordance with the definition of alliances given above, alliances comprise a 
strategic element and are built on the basis of major strategic challenges or 
opportunities of the cooperating companies. Alliances usually serve one or more 
of the following three purposes: 
§ Co-option: Potential competitors are neutralised by integrating them in an 
alliance and the combination of complementary goods and services leads to 
economies or the development of new businesses. 
§ Co-specialisation: Synergies are created through the combination of 
previously separate resources, such as skills or knowledge.  
§ Learning and internalisation: Alliances help companies to develop new skills 
by learning from a partner and internalising these skills (Doz and Hamel 
1998: 5). 
 
There are two managerial dimensions a firm seeking to enter into an 
alliance must consider, cooperation and competition or, more generally, 
cooperation and conflict. It is management's task to optimise along these two 
dimensions. The two elements of cooperation are 
§ adding value to an activity, i.e., the cooperative activity generates more value 
than going alone and  
§ learning from the partner and in this way enhancing the company's strategic 
competencies, which should strengthen the company's competitive position. 
The competitive challenges of an alliance comprise 
§ maintaining strategic flexibility so that the firm does not become totally reliant 
on an interfirm link and management must not be restricted in its strategic 
options and 
§ protection of core competencies, i.e. the firm must protect itself against the 
partner firm appropriating its core competencies or strategic advantages. 
The individual optimisation strategy of each firm eventually depends on the 
strategic goals of the partner firms. 
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The advantage of alliances over mergers is their flexibility. Alliances are 
particularly useful when entering new geographic regions or new businesses. 
When expanding the company's core business, alliances and mergers are equally 
suitable. In a merger companies in many cases acquire more of a company than 
they actually need. However, if only part of a business is acquired, the value of a 
business unit may be dimished as it is disconnected from its supporting 
competencies. Moreover, the value of a merger is often difficult to estimate in 
advance due to uncertainties in market conditions or new developments (Doz and 
Hamel 1998: 3 and Bleeke and Ernst 1993: 19). 
3.2 Driving forces behind external growth 
When talking about the driving factors behind corporate growth, many authors 
distinguish between internal drivers and external drivers. External drivers are also 
described as "changes in the company's environment". These changes require the 
adaptation of the company to the new conditions (Levitt 1983: 92-95). In 
literature, the following external drivers are mentioned as reasons for the external 
growth boom in recent years: 
§ Globalisation, which means similar developments around the world. This 
trend is reinforced by a high degree of trade liberalisation together with the 
foundation and development of economic and monetary unions, which 
harmonise the transfer of goods and capital. On the other hand, technical 
progress leads to steadily decreasing transport and communication cost 
(Meffert 1989: 448-454). 
§ Turbulent world markets and uncertain economic conditions (Ohmae 1993: 
36-41 and Child and Faulkner 1998: 71). 
§ Hand in hand with globalisation goes "the globalization of needs", as Ohmae 
(1993: 37) calls it. This includes the assimilation of consumer needs and 
preferences, which is expressed by the fact that such things as the life-style, 
the information received, or the kind of products preferred are similar for most 
consumers around the world. Everybody wants the best available products at 
the lowest price. In a figurative meaning the result is that everyone wants to 
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"live and shop in California" (Levitt 1983: 92-95). Capitalising on this fact, 
companies can market the same standardised products all over the world. 
§ Globalisation of technologies (Child and Faulkner 1998: 71). 
§ Products today rely on many different technologies. As a result, most 
companies are unable to remain competitive in all these different technologies 
and have to seek cooperation (Ohmae 1993: 36-41 and Child and Faulkner 
1998: 71). 
§ Shorter product life cycles, fast technological change and quick changes in 
trends in demand require high investments. The enormous competitive 
pressure to develop new cutting-edge technology leads to skyrocketing R&D 
costs. Due to the fact that the time between the development of a new product 
and its obsolescence is getting ever shorter, time has become a crucial 
competitive factor. Consequently, many companies generate more than half of 
their turnover with products which are younger than five years. Due to the 
shortening of the whole life cycle, companies also feel the pressure to market 
their products more quickly. High development costs have to be covered 
through a high sales volume in the marketing phase as quickly as possible. For 
this reason quick market penetration and the introduction in a broad spectrum 
of markets have become key factors, which makes corporate cooperation more 
and more important (Rumelt 1987: 137-141). 
 
The second category of driving factors is internal drivers, also referred to 
as synergistic potential. Synergistic potential is derived if a combination of single 
enterprises or parts of enterprises results in a higher profit in the long run than 
their isolated existence. Synergistic potential can be utilised by bundling or 
exchanging resources or abilities of the combined companies, in this way 
decreasing costs or increasing profits. Synergistic potential is a necessary 
prerequisite for a successful merger or alliance (Salter and Weinhold 1994: 117) 
In general, one can distinguish between the following types of synergistic 
potential: 
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§ Volume advantages, which are derived through the bundling of similar 
resources and which can again be split up into economies of scale, learning 
curve effects and coinsurance effects.  
- Economies of scale are cost advantages which lead to a reduction in cost 
per unit resulting from a higher number of units produced. Larger 
companies therefore usually have cost advantages compared to smaller 
competitors, which is a major motivation for cooperation, leading to 
higher production volumes. 
- Learning curve effects refer to the fact that certain activities are being 
performed more efficiently over time due to individual or organisational 
learning.  
- Coinsurance effects result from the fact that increased volume decreases 
the margin of fluctuation of streams of revenue from high-risk activities. 
For this reason coinsurance effects are especially important in technology 
intensive or extractive industries where risks are particularly high. 
Coinsurance effects are a major motive for alliances, as through a 
network of alliances the risk can be spread much more broadly than 
through a merger (Gullander 1976: 104-105). 
§ Economies of scope: If existing resources or abilities (such as management 
know-how, customer relations) can be used for new activities, economies of 
scope may be derived. In other words, the cost of performing different 
activities concertedly is lower than their isolated performance (Panzar and 
Willig 1981: 269-271). Again there are different types of economies of scope: 
- A more efficient use of assets through a better utilisation of tangible or 
intangible assets. An example would be the use of a brand, which is very 
costly to build up, for more than one product. 
- A better utilisation of external relations can be achieved when existing 
relations to customers, suppliers, or governmental agencies are used for 
new products or new geographical markets. For example, new products 
could be offered to existing customers. 
- Economies of scope can also be realised by utilising knowledge more 
effectively. One example is R&D knowledge, as R&D activities 
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frequently lead to a generation of knowledge which can be used for 
several products and markets. The same applies to knowledge about 
foreign markets. The most remarkable economies of scope can be 
achieved if the company possesses unique knowledge in the form of 
critical abilities or core competencies which can also be used in new 
operating areas, in this way generating sustainable competitive advantage 
in the new fields as well. 
 
§ Monopoly advantages 
Explaining the formation of mergers and alliances on the basis of monopoly 
advantages mainly rests on two pillars: market power and price effects. By 
cooperating with competitors, market competition is reduced and market 
power increased. In this way the price can be raised to a level that is above 
the equilibrium price under perfect competition so that monopoly rents can be 
generated (Thomaschewski 2004: 34).  
 
In most cases external stimuli are responsible for the formation of 
intercompany cooperation. An internal resource imbalance occurs which needs to 
be evened out to maintain the company's competitive advantage. If two firms with 
complementary resources and imbalances meet, a merger or an alliance will result 
(Child and Faulkner 1998: 69 and Nelson 1995). In recent years the phenomenon 
of external growth has become more and more common. According to Spekman 
(1998: 749), the reason is that external growth is frequently desired to understand 
and cope with uncertainty. 
 
After this general introduction to the theory of corporate growth, the next 
section will give an overview of the major changes in the stock exchange world 
that led to the emergence of the phenomenon of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances.  
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4 CHANGES IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE WORLD 
4.1 The former monopoly position of stock exchanges 
Until a few decades ago stock exchanges held a quasi-natural monopoly position. 
Their monopoly was based on geographical limitations, as the physical presence 
of all financial intermediaries was necessary for trading, information and 
decision-making were concentrated at a central location. "Without telephones, 
telegraphs, or teletypes, face-to-face bargaining was essential in effecting 
securities sales" (Arnold et. al 1999: 1085). The need for face-to-face contact 
between buyers and sellers of securities led to the creation of regional exchanges, 
which were the result of financing needs in regions with growing industries. Their 
original function was to provide a market and liquidity for relatively small 
regional companies. At the time of foundation of these exchanges, a single, 
central trading floor would not have been accessible to all market participants and  
before the computer and telecommunications revolutions it was cheaper to trade 
stocks on regional exchanges (Gerke and Rapp 1994: 15, Arnold et. al 1999: 
1086, Von Rosen 1992: xvii and Brennan 1993). 
 
It was only in the 20th century that the importance of regional exchanges 
began to shrink due to reduced communication costs. At the beginning of this 
century, about one hundred local stock exchanges could be found in the US. In the 
1920s and 1930s the amalgamation of stock exchanges went along with the 
development of telecommunications and in the 1940s legislative changes led to 
additional pressure. As a result merged stock exchanges typically increased their 
trading volumes whereas local exchanges constantly lost liquidity to the pan-
continental New York Stock Exchange (Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 18).  
 
In Europe the overall number of stock exchanges has increased, however, 
in the past few decades. This was due to the special conditions in Former 
Communist Countries, such as Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Russia, etc., which urgently needed well- functioning capital markets to guide their 
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privatisation programs after the fall of Communism. This increased the 
fragmentation of the capital market in Europe, leading to a situation with 35 stock 
exchanges and 23 futures and options exchanges in 1996 (Benos and Crouhy 
1996: 38). In the meantime, this number has risen further to 39 stock exchanges. 
The number of stock exchanges in Western Europe has decreased however, in 
particular due to consolidation of regional stock exchanges within countries. The 
number of derivatives markets fell to only 7, because of consolidation and 
mergers with national stock exchanges (FESE 2004). These figures show that the 
regional monopoly position of stock exchanges was quite imminent in Europe, 
whereas in the US stock exchanges started to compete with each other much 
earlier. One reason for this fact is that  
 
"nationalism is a powerful factor having a distinctive impact at least on 
political decision. National stock exchanges, in particular, are seen as 
symbols of national identity, thereby providing strong support for the 
existence of national infrastructure. National marketplaces and other 
market infrastructure can also be regarded as an issue of national industrial 
policy" (Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 17). 
 
Nationalism helped small national stock exchanges in Europe to survive much 
longer than small regional ones in the US, as each country is interested in 
maintaining at least one national exchange. On the other hand, European 
integration and liberalisation of financial markets within the EU are forces that are 
working against nationalism. The fact that many attempts of stock exchange 
consolidation have failed in the past shows, however, that centrifugal forces are 
still relatively strong.  
4.2 The new environment of stock exchanges 
As we have seen, exchanges were once cushioned from competition by 
geographical limitations and also regulatory barriers. But both technology and the 
deregulation of national markets are battering ancient monopolies as networked 
computers provide far-flung investors with a wide range of investment 
opportunities in different markets. Generally, one can say that globalisation is 
driving the trend towards internationalisation of investment. English has become 
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the official language in finance and although the harmonisation of international 
accounting standards is still lagging behind, certain conventions and in particular 
disclosure standards are becoming internationally standardised and widely 
recognised. This leads to increasing cross-border investment and the emergence of 
a handful of international financial centres (Gaa et al. 2001: 46). According to 
Havens, Shteyman and Saber (2000: 3), no previous evolution in financial market 
has been so rapid. Change towards the structures we observe today started in the 
1980s, when the role of traditional intermediaries was significantly reduced by the 
introduction of automation on exchange floors. In order to retain their customer 
base, exchanges must cut cost and compete with others today. Competition among 
markets led to an increase in volumes and a reduction in brokers' commission 
fees. Furthermore, cross-listing became common for large companies (although 
the number has declined by more than fifty percent from 4700 in 1997 to 2300 in 
2002 which is explained by a general decline in the ability of stock exchanges to 
attract new listings), particularly multinationals, and the advance of 
telecommunications and techno logy added to the mobility of capital ("The market 
goes to market", Benos and Crouhy 1996: 37, and Ramos 2003).  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
 
The figure below gives an overview of the drivers of change which 
characterise the new environment of stock exchanges: 
 
Figure 3: Drivers of changes in international financial markets. 
 
Source: Adapted from Gerke and Rapp 1994: 5. 
 
Globalisation refers to the fact that capital flows are becoming more and 
more international due to deregulation, which describes the liberalisation of 
national markets. This process is also referred to as capital account liberalisation. 
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The first step in this direction was the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements, which deals with the liberalisation of all capital flows and which is, 
apart from regional agreements such as within the EMU, "still the single 
multilateral legal instrument that requires its adherents to open up their capital 
markets and refrain from discriminating against foreign investors" (Schuijer 
2002). Although it is legally binding, it is not enforceable and there are no 
sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Nevertheless, there is considerable 
progress to be reported. The Code, which was established in the 1960s, originally 
covered only transfers related to foreign direct investment, trade credits, and 
certain longer-term securities. It took until the 1990s until short-term capital 
movements of speculative nature were also included, which substantially 
increased the importance of the Code. Today, the main provisions of the code are: 
§ Rollback: The progressive liberalisation of cross-border capital flows.  
§ Reservations: A country is allowed to lodge reservation against obligations it 
feels it cannot meet immediately. 
§ Ratchet: It is impossible to reimpose restrictions which have already been 
lifted, except in a few exceptional cases. 
§ Non-discrimination: The obligation not to discriminate among OECD 
members.  
§ Notification: The OECD must be notified of  any restrictions on cross-border 
capital flows. 
§ Examination: The OECD examines restrictions and by exerting peer pressure 
aims to limit them to a minimum (Schuijer 2002).  
In the meantime, most members have realised the benefits of liberalisation, such 
as access to a global pool of savings, fiercer competition among financial 
institutions, which improves their efficiency, more options of portfolio 
diversification and risk-reduction, as well as the worldwide dissemination of 
proper disclosure and corporate governance standards (Schuijer 2002). Without 
capital account liberalisation, the globalisation and amalgamation of financial 
markets would not have been possible. Increasing securitisation means that debt is 
increasingly backed by securities, meaning that securities exchanges are gaining 
importance. The three factors just mentioned (globalisation, deregulation and 
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securitisation) led to a consolidation of institutional investors as well as 
technicalisation and disintermediation. Consolidation of institutiona l investors 
results in the fact that investment capital is more and more concentrated in the 
hands of only a few institutional investors which have significantly increased their 
bargaining power. Furthermore, new regulations favour insurance companies over 
banks through tax incentives in connection with private pens ion funds. This has 
become a major issue since state pension systems have come more and more 
under pressure. This fact might trigger mergers between banks and insurance 
companies. By technicalisation and disintermediation we understand the steady 
progress of investment methods and strategies through automation (the use of 
modern computer technologies), which in turn leads to the middle-man (broker) 
frequently being cut out of the investment process (Gerke and Rapp 1994: 5 and 
Amati 2001: 5). New regulations in the EU enforce disintermediation, such as 
Basel II, which puts stock exchanges at an advantage compared to banks. In the 
US, disintermediation has been supported for many decades by several banking 
acts, with the most well-known being the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Until 1999, 
the 1933 Glass-Stegall act restricted commercial banks from providing investment 
banking services in the United States. This changed when the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act came into force in 1999, permitting mergers between banks, insurance 
companies, and stock brokerage companies (Griffin and Pustay 1996: 183 and 
"The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act"). 
 
In the next section the two most important developments will be described 
in more detail: technicalisation and disintermediation on the one hand and 
concentration of institutional investors on the other, with both factors also being 
linked together. The third factor, namely the emergence of Alternative Trading 
Systems (ATSs), is rather an outcome of the first two developments than 
something to be seen separately. However, as it is a main driver of the changes in 
the stock exchange world it will be looked at separately. 
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4.2.1 Technicalisation and disintermediation 
Rapid technological progress is a very powerful force for driving change in the 
stock market. Together with the removal of restrictions on movements of capital 
and multinational harmonisation of securities laws, automation has considerably 
contributed to the globalisation of financial markets. New trading mechanisms 
have already and will transform traditional exchanges even further into highly 
automated, global, and floorless cyber markets ("Internet securities"). One of the 
most important drivers of change was the advent of the Internet. Due to its 
development stock exchanges in the United States, in Europe and Asia have to 
meet the challenge of a revolution in securities trading. Firstly, it facilitates 
information exchange, dissemination, and evaluation (e.g. of analysts' reports). 
The major advantage of the Internet is the high speed with which information is 
processed and can be disseminated to market participants around the world. 
Secondly, it also permits interaction among economic agents. The Internet is also 
increasingly used to exchange financial instruments, create markets, route orders 
to the market or match or execute trades. Electronic trading systems are powerful, 
sophisticated, match buyers and sellers who do not have to be physically present, 
and therefore "allow agents to make trades via computer, without the 'open outcry' 
or pit auction system" (Scarlata 1992). In this way much greater trading volumes 
can be handled and processes can be adapted to customers' wishes. For this 
reason, more and more online accounts are being opened. Furthermore agents get 
direct access to more financial markets, which makes the cost of electronic trading 
by far lower than on traditional exchanges. This is due to the fact that the Internet 
does not only permit trade without the services of intermediaries such as brokers 
or dealers, but also investment decisions to be made by an automated portfolio 
management system. All of this can be done across borders and different 
jurisdictions, as the physical limitations on trading arrangements have been 
removed (Economides 2001: 8-9, 11, "Good-bye to all that", Scarlata 1992, Von 
Rosen 1992: xvii, "Internet securities" and Allen and Hawkins 2002: 50). Another 
important effect is that the playing field between traders has been levelled, as 
nowadays all investors have access to tools formerly only available to 
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professionals or wealthy investors. In summary, important contributions made by 
the Internet include that 
§ it provides a lost-cost infrastructure which is accessible on a broad basis 
through a PC and browser software. 
§ it permits liquidity even though there may be only fewer users.  
§ it provides a platform investors can directly trade on with each other, thus 
lowering commissions and spreads and in this way getting better prices 
("Internet securities"). 
 
As mentioned above, automation also permits trading across countries and 
nationalities. It is not surprising therefore that cross-country activity has increased 
sharply due to technicalisation. Cross-border trading in Europe showed a five-fold 
increase between 1985 and 1995 ("Global equity markets") and US transactions in 
foreign securities have risen from $17.85 billion in 1980 to $253.4 billion in 1990. 
One major trend of the 1990s was cross- listing, which facilitated access to foreign 
markets. In the meantime, the number of companies listing on several exchanges 
has decreased by more than 50 percent compared to its high in 1997. Obviously 
cross- listing did not pay-off for companies. Another development is called 
"passing the book". This permits 24-hour trading of financial instruments by 
passing control of trading between traders at different exchanges around the 
world. The third trend is underwriting of securities through offices other than the 
domestic (Scarlata 1992). 
 
The major effect, however, of technicalisation and trading securities over 
the Internet is a trend called disintermediation. This implies direct transactions 
between issuers and investors on the primary market, and between investors on 
the secondary market respectively. The result is a reduction in traditional financial 
intermediaries. This is particularly notable as since the Buttonwood Agreement, 
signed in March 17921, brokers  
 
                                                 
1 The Buttonwood agreement was a forerunner to the New York Stock Exchange. 24 brokers 
organised a stock market at the Buttonwood tree in what is Wall Street today (Havens, Shteyman 
and Saber 2000: 9). 
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"have given preferential treatment to each other fixing commissions and 
restricting access to information about executed trades…Throughout that 
time, the club of brokers has been increasingly criticised for its monopoly 
on access to and information about the stock market" (Havens, Shteyman 
and Saber 2000: 5).  
 
Due to the introduction of electronic trading systems, the future role of brokers in 
equity markets is insecure, as they are sidelined by investors who are provided 
direct market access through electronic order books. The greater the access 
possibilities through electronic trading, the more the role of intermediaries is 
questioned. Furthermore, the shift from a pure dealer structure to auction systems 
implies that users can directly transact with one another. However, this is only 
possible in very large and liquid markets (Boland 1999: 18 and "The changing 
capital markets" 1991: 74). One major effect of disintermediation is a lot of 
pressure on intermediaries – brokers, dealers, market makers, or exchanges – to 
cut their cost. They are forced to focus more on value adding services, such as 
advisory service, risk management, or corporate finance, as in the long run there is  
not much money to be made with simple execution of trades, as this process is 
becoming automated (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 40, Amati 2001: 5 and Gaa 
et al. 2001: 52). 
 
At the moment stock exchanges do not yet sell their services directly to 
customers, but only to those investment banks which hold membership. This 
might however change in the future. Stock exchanges might permit investors to 
use their electronic trading systems directly. In this way they would circumvent 
investment banks, which in turn would prove to be an even greater threat to the 
existence of brokers. On the other hand, brokers could start matching trades 
among their own customers, in turn circumventing the stock exchange, provided 
that clearing and settlement institutions permit it. The result would be a 
convergence of the two functions, with brokers becoming more like stock 
exchanges and vice versa (Gaa et al. 2001: 34). However, traditional brokers will 
not disappear totally due to the following factors: 
§ Wealthy investors need personal service due to the complexity of managing 
their investment. 
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§ Monitoring their portfolio personally the entire day is something many 
investors do not have enough time for.  
§ The information overload requires professionals who filter out and interpret 
the essential pieces of information. 
§ High market volatility requires professional advice and continuous adaptation 
of strategies ("Internet securities"). 
 
Despite the numerous advantages of the advent of the Internet and 
technicalisation and disintermediation going hand in hand, the quick emergence of 
Internet securities also increases the risks of market volatility and fraud. The ease 
with which information can be spread over the Internet makes it prone to fraud: 
price manipulation, fraudulent offerings of securities, broker misconduct, false 
and misleading statements, fraudulent advice, etc. are typical examples of 
problems involved in Internet securities trading. Other risks frequently associated 
with Internet-trading are credit or counterparty risk, liquidity risk, replacement 
cost risk, and systemic risk ("Internet securities" and Scarlata 1992).  
 
Europe is more cautious than the US regarding Internet trading. Progress is 
being made though, as the number of people with Internet access and the number 
of people owning shares is sharply on the increase. Inter-market trading shows 
that investors are flexible in their choice of stock exchange for transaction. This is 
beneficial for the efficiency of capital markets, as cross-border arbitrage 
operations lower valuation differences and increase liquidity (Von Rosen 1992: 
xvii and "Internet securities"). 
4.2.2 Consolidation of institutional investors 
In the case of stock exchanges, the customers (investors) have always determined 
which suppliers (companies) would have their shares listed at a particular 
exchange. The reason is that investors determine the liquidity of an exchange and 
companies have their shares listed at the exchange with the deepest liquidity. In 
recent years, the negotiation power of investors has been increased further by the 
fact that only a few globally acting institutional investors have decided over the 
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turnover. This was the result of massive competitive pressure among banks, 
resulting from such factors as technicalisation and European integration. Although 
the retail banking sector in the EU is still relatively fragmented (consolidation has 
mainly taken place within national boundaries), the investment banking sector is 
highly integrated, with business being conducted on a pan-European or even 
global basis. (Cabral, Dierick and Vesala 2002). Through consolidation of 
institutional investors, relative order size has increased. The result is that 
exchanges increasingly face an oligopolistic demand structure. This is due to 
declining investment banks' margins, so that they are forced to cut costs. At the 
same time, large players are better able to charge higher prices for their services 
("Good-bye to all that" 1999 and Loistl 2000: 98). Many do so by joining forces. 
According to Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999), the number of US banks fell 
by almost 30 percent between 1988 and 1997 due to financial consolidation. At 
the same time, the 8 largest banking organisations held a share of 35.5 percent of 
total nationwide assets in 1997, compared to only 22.2 percent in 1988. 
Underwriting, for example, is dominated by a small number of leading 
institutions. As a result, a general tendency towards the emergence of an 
oligopolistic market structure can be observed (Group of Ten 2001: 3). 
 
In the past few years, large investment banks have urged stock exchanges 
to rationalise the value chain of securities trading from order placing to clearing 
and settlement. Investors today expect low cost, as well as fast and flexible (24 
hour) execution. Moreover, institutional investors seek high liquidity and easy 
exchange access, as well as anonymity. At the same time, investment banks are 
placing even more pressure on exchanges today by becoming active themselves 
and setting up and investing in ATSs (for further details see Section 4.2.3). In this 
way they circumvent traditional exchanges by using competitive and cost efficient 
trading platforms (Loistl 2000: 102). A side-effect is that as institutional investors 
consolidate, their in-house research capabilities increase, which makes them less 
reliant on brokers in this respect. This further endangers the future role of brokers, 
already weakened by the ongoing trend towards disintermediation (see also 
Section 4.2.1.) (Boland 1999: 18). 
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4.2.3 The development of Alternative Trading Systems 
As can be seen in Section 4.1., stock exchanges held a monopoly position until the 
beginning of the twentieth century and later they were not-for-profit organisations 
competing only with one another. Today, however, they need to handle 
competition from new private trading systems which aim to make a profit. These 
trading systems are referred to as Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) or 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), private trading systems, proprietary 
trading systems ("Internet securities"), or MONSTERs (Market-Oriented New 
Systems for Terrifying Exchanges and Regulators) (Lee 1998: 1). The two most 
frequent ly used terms are ATS and ECN. They are sometimes used 
interchangeably, with ECNs more often denoting a class of ATSs used for US 
equities, notably those listed on NASDAQ (Financial Internet Working Group: 
"Glossary"). The European definition of ECNs is different, however, and 
describes them as ATSs on which securities can be bought directly from issuing 
houses (Groß 2002: 41). More precisely, all ECNs are ATSs, but not vice versa. 
For this reason, the SEC in the US and the FESCO in Europe have decided to 
officially stick to the term Alternative Trading System in their regulations. An 
Alternative Trading System is officially defined by the SEC as any system that  
 
"(1) constitutes, maintains, or provides a marketplace or facilities for 
bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise 
performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed 
by a stock exchange under Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 and (2) does not set 
rules governing the conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such 
subscribers' trading on such organization, association, person, group of 
persons, or system, or discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from 
trading" (SEC 1998). 
 
The definition of the European securities market regulators is almost identical to 
that of the SEC (European Commission 2001a). As the distinction between ATSs 
and ECNs is in many cases blurred, especially when taking into account the 
different definition of ECNs in Europe, it seems reasonable to refer to trading 
systems operating outside the auspices of traditional exchanges as ATSs, except 
when talking about a specific system operating in the US which explicitly calls 
itself ECN. The crucial point for users is that ATSs, whichever form they may 
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take, are "electronic systems that operate as exchanges, matching buy and sell 
orders automatically, without human intervention, for a low fee" ("Internet 
securities"). Their most important characteristics are technical efficiency and price 
and the fact that they are privately owned. They do not make money on the spread 
between bid and ask price, but charge a fee when a transaction is effected. In most 
cases, buyer and seller remain anonymous. Many ATSs do not have their own 
trading and settlement system, but use that of exchanges ("Internet securities", 
Von Rosen 1994: 1214 and SEC 2000). 
4.2.3.1 Reasons for their emergence 
The first ATSs were launched after the introduction of new rules on handling 
orders at the antitrust investigation in 1997 by the SEC, reacting to the scandal on 
NASDAQ stock exchange in 1996 when market makers were accused of illicitly 
widening their trading spreads. The new rules permitted non-traditional exchanges 
to set up trading platforms (Allen and Hawkins 2002: 51). ATSs emerged to offer 
trading off traditional exchanges, as most exchanges have problems in adapting to 
the demands of investors. At its beginning the development of ATSs went hand in 
hand with the development of e-commerce. Today, most online marketplaces 
offer far better services than traditional commerce, as buyers can connect to many 
sellers without having to connect point-to-point to each. The sophistication of 
trading systems has accelerated substantially over the past few years and the 
financial services industry is one of the drivers of the technological revolution 
(Korhonen 2001: 7). One of the original motivations for the establishment of 
ATSs was after-hours trading. Although the vast majority of trading on ATSs is 
done during regular trading sessions, the after-hours market has played an 
important role in the development of ATSs. Instinet, the first ECN, established its 
market niche providing after-hours trading to institutional and professional traders 
as early as the 1970s (SEC 2000). The majority of ATSs were set up in the 1990s 
and one of the major growth periods of ATSs was between 1997 and 2000. In 
general it must be noted, however, that the emergence of additional trading 
systems is not necessarily economically logical, as it is generally an advantage to 
the users of a trading system if there are as many participants as possible, as 
system-liquidity is believed to increase with the number of participants. This 
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effect is also referred to as the network effect. The result is lower spreads as well 
as buying and selling without market impact, which is responsible for investors 
tending to use the large, well-established marketplaces. On the other hand, there 
used to be substantial establishment costs before the advent of electronic trading, 
which, together with the network effect, substantially impeded competition. All 
these competition-restricting factors made and still make stock exchanges slow to 
invest in and introduce new technology and fulfil customers' needs and wishes. 
The largest stock exchanges, for example, were the last ones to introduce 
automatic trading systems and the NYSE, the biggest stock exchange, has still not 
yet done so (Jensen and Natorp 2000).  
 
In order to become more independent from stock exchanges, institutional 
investors as customers of traditional services of exchanges have started obtaining 
a stake in the substitutional products offered by private suppliers. Some ATSs, 
such as Instinet or Island, even "were established by their main shareholders to 
cross-match their order flow and to benefit from their order flow without having 
to pay dealers" (Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 15). As will be elaborated on 
in more detail in Section 4.2.3, this became possible as a result of the Order 
Handling Rules of 1996 passed by the SEC (Nextrade: "Company Information"). 
As a result of the regulatory changes, market entry barriers to the market of 
products and services traditionally offered by exchanges have decreased 
substantially and regulators welcome the competition triggered by the newcomers. 
Financial barriers are comparably low and the technical know-how for the 
establishment of a trading platform is not lower with newcomers than with 
traditional exchanges. This combination of technical know-how of newcomers on 
the one hand and financial strength and market power of institutional investors on 
the other, is a severe threat to traditional exchanges (Loistl 2000: 99). The fact 
that equity markets are relatively homogeneous and liquid makes them even more 
suitable for implementing electronic trading in a cost-efficient way "Typically, 
deep, liquid markets, with broadly standard asset classes and straightforward trade 
types are 'easiest' to migrate to electronic trading" (Allen and Hawkins 2002: 51). 
There are hardly any direct costs of providing customers with automated services. 
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In particular so-called distance costs are small or non-existent in connection with 
automated trading services, they increase, however, with distance from the 
customer in connection with access to floor systems (Domowitz and Steil 1999).  
 
The advantage for investors today is the possibility of choosing between 
markets on the basis of different infrastructure criteria. They can select networks 
with the highest liquidity, adequate transparency and low transaction costs 
(Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 7). Institutional investors prefer the lower trading 
costs and anonymity of ATSs to the instant execution normally provided by 
traditional stock exchanges. Some ATSs already have enough trading volume to 
accommodate all except the largest block trades (Gaa et al. 2001: 49)  
 
The first reaction by European countries to the emergence of the first 
ATSs in the US was to push for rules that would ban the trade in securities via 
systems other than recognised exchanges. This approach failed, as it would have 
driven business out of Europe. In a second attempt to fend off foreign 
competition, established exchanges took considerable steps to modernise systems, 
provide better services, and reduce costs. The result was investment in new 
trading and settlement systems. This strategy proved to be successful, as ATSs 
have not yet really gained a foothold in Europe, as will become evident in Section 
4.2.3.4 ("Too many trading places": 22). 
4.2.3.2 The regulation of ATSs 
Regulation was and sometimes still is a substantial obstacle to the emergence of 
new trading platforms. The reason is that "in many countries, traditional 
exchanges have taken their financial supervisors hostage" ("Good-bye to all that" 
1999). In other words, regulation was designed in a way to shield off competition, 
which was justified by investor protection and liquidity. The SEC, for example, 
made it difficult for trading networks to register as exchanges. It has taken years 
for the private trading platforms to convince the SEC of the necessity of changing 
its rules to encourage electronic exchanges ("Good-bye to all that" and "Internet 
securities"). Finally, however, the competitive forces driving changes in financial 
markets also led to changes in regulatory oversight of the markets (Abken 1991: 
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19). The first step in this direction was the adoption of Order Handling Rules in 
1996 by the SEC, as mentioned earlier. The aim of the Order Handling Rules was 
to ensure a fair and orderly alternative securities market. Market makers and 
specialists had to "reflect in their quote the price of any orders they placed in an 
ECN if the price was better than their own public quotation" (SEC 2000). In 
general, one must say that securities regulators have recognised the substantial 
benefits ATSs can bring to markets and investors. They are expected to reduce 
transaction costs (directly for system participants by increasing the speed of 
execution and by providing new liquidity pools for selected securities and 
indirectly by increasing competition among exchanges and brokers) and to 
increase the chance of best execution (Collins 2002). The result of the upswing of 
ATSs was a dramatic decline in spreads between bids and offers, which benefited 
investors through lower costs. Moreover, ATSs were integrated into the national 
market system through the ECN Display Amendment, which made market maker 
and specialist orders entered into ATSs accessible to the public, as it allowed 
ATSs to voluntarily communicate to the public quotation system the best price 
and size of orders entered by a specialist or market maker for each security. The 
new Order Handling Rules did not address, however, how ATSs should be 
regulated (SEC 2000). 
 
New rules became necessary, though, since market participants have 
developed a range of ATSs which provide services on which registered exchanges 
formerly used to have a monopoly. These ATSs are direct competitors to 
traditional exchanges and might even become the primary market for selected 
securities in the future. As a result, the traditional definition of stock exchanges is 
no longer up-to-date. For this reason, the SEC found a new definition in its Rule 
on Alternative Trading Systems in 1998 (see Section 4.2.3), which became 
effective in 2000, to allow ATSs to choose between registering as a national 
securities exchange or as a broker-dealer. The purpose was to integrate the 
increasing number of ATSs more effectively into the national market system. 
Furthermore, the SEC wanted to give ATSs the chance to register as exchanges 
and at the same time give existing exchanges the chance to better compete with 
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ATSs. Another purpose was to strengthen the public securities markets while at 
the same time encouraging innovative new markets. In this way they gave room to 
the development of new trading systems without pinning them down to the 
organisational structure of traditional exchanges (SEC 1998).  
 
As mentioned above, under the new regulations, most ATSs are allowed to 
choose whether they want to be regulated as exchanges or as broker-dealers. 
However, systems which exercise self-regulatory powers, such as the regulation 
of their members' or subscribers' conduct in the course of activities outside the 
trading systems, are obliged to register as an exchange or must be operated by a 
national securities association (SEC 1998). Today, some ATSs are seeking to be 
regulated as exchanges instead of trading systems for manifold reasons: 
1. It provides them with the benefit of being able to list all conventional stock 
exchange stocks, to be a self-regulated company, and to have linkages to other 
international exchanges. 
2. Access to the Intermarket Trading System at the NYSE, which would allow 
them to trade formerly exclusive NYSE listed stocks. 
3. The advantage for US-based ATSs is that they are no longer regulated by 
NASDAQ, their competitor.  
4. The option to charge money for market data services (Amati 2001: 7 and 
Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 17). 
The disadvantage is that as an exchange ATSs also have to fulfil the task of 
market-regulation, something they would like to leave to traditional exchanges. 
The first exchanges that have registered as a regulated exchange are Archipelago, 
Island, Tradepoint, and NexTrade ("Farewell to the floor?" 1999). 
 
One problem with ATSs not being registered as an exchange is that they 
are private, available only to selected subscribers, and regulated as broker-dealers 
and are therefore not obliged to provide equal access to all investors or to treat all 
participants fairly. Moreover, these systems are not adequately supervised for 
market manipulation and fraud and market participants are able to manipulate the 
prices of public securities markets by using ATSs. Another flaw is that ATSs do 
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not have to ensure that rapid increases in trading volume (such as in times of high 
volatility) can be handled. The resulting disparities have a negative impact on 
investor protection and the market as a whole, and call into question the fairness 
of current regulations (SEC 1998). In general, authorities must be careful to avoid 
a market architecture which gives strategic advantages to certain players and 
anticompetitive practices (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 48). Traditionally, 
exchanges were seen as markets rather than market participants. Therefore 
securities regulators focused on supervising trading behaviour to promote orderly 
interaction between buyers and sellers. The most important points were efficient 
execution and public dissemination of trading information. Furthermore, 
exchanges were used to monitor market participants to prevent market abuse or 
manipulation and promote centralisation and liquidity of the markets. Exchanges 
were therefore expected to exercise self-regulatory functions over their members 
and to provide access to markets to all participants. In connection with brokers, 
dealers, and other intermediaries the main concern was investor protection. The 
choice for ATSs between registering either as exchanges or broker-dealers has 
therefore not eliminated all concerns, as there are certain gaps in the regulatory 
structure. If ATSs are regulated as broker-dealers they are not required to grant 
fair access and price transparency. On the other hand, if registered as an exchange, 
a number of unnecessary requirements are applied (such as member governance 
and regulation) (Collins 2001).  
 
Although ATSs fulfil the same function as exchanges, there is no level 
playing field between them. The tendency of some European countries to require 
all marketplaces to be registered as regulated markets seems reasonable, in 
particular when considering that otherwise major exchanges may eventually seek 
to be regulated as ATSs. At the moment there seems to be more pressure for ATSs 
to become exchanges than vice versa, as can be seen from the examples of 
Archipelago, Island, Tradepoint, and NexTrade (Korhonen 2001: 39).  
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4.2.3.3 Organisation 
According to FESCO (2000), ATSs can be broadly classified into five types of 
systems according to the way prices are determined. 
1. Active Bulletin Boards 
They invite offers to be made to the system operator, who then hands them on to 
many potential pre-registered clients. The offeror is then informed whether the 
offers have been accepted or not (Korhonen 2001: 14).  
2. Order-driven automated trade matching systems 
In order-driven systems prices follow orders. There are two types, continuous 
matching and auction matching. Auction matching systems accept limit orders 
entered by participants; these are stored, and at the end of the auction period 
(usually one day) the single price that maximises the number of orders executed, 
the number of securities, or the total trade value is calculated for each security 
(Korhonen 2001: 14). That means that these systems cannot provide immediacy, 
though, which is the main advantage of large exchanges. Immediacy does not 
come for free of course. Transaction costs are higher with large exchanges, as the 
market makers need to be reimbursed. The question about the optimal 
organisation of the market therefore depends on the liquidity preference of the 
market participants. Continuous matching systems, in contrast, match orders 
automatically in time and price priority without time delay (Korhonen 2001: 15). 
Some matching systems are organised as so-called hit-or-take systems. Under 
these systems, buy- and sell-offers are shown on a screen, and clients can simply 
execute a transaction by clicking on an offer. Matching systems enable investors 
to trade anonymously with multiple partners. Sometimes matching systems also 
route orders to other execution centres if there is no matching order available in 
the system ("FESCO's attempts", Gaa et al. 2000, Financial Services Authority 
2000 and "Securities Law Institute-Glossary"). 
3. Quote-driven systems 
Thirdly, these systems assume that orders follow prices. They display quotations 
of dealers and provide automatic execution based on them. Clients can choose 
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between accepting the prices published by dealers and trade or wait for better 
quotes (Korhonen 2001: 15). 
4. Crossing systems 
Crossing systems accept orders for securities which are executed in a batch run at 
a reference price from another market (usually the primary market where the 
security is listed). Orders entered do not contain a specified price but clients agree 
to trade at prices based on the primary market, in many cases the mid-point of the 
bid-ask spread at the time of order matching or at the opening or closing price of 
the primary market. Consequently these systems do not engage in price discovery 
and are therefore also referred to as price-taking systems or passive or derivative 
pricing systems (Korhonen 2001: 15). The advantage is that there is no market 
impact on the trades. Big orders are crossed at the closing price, which remains 
unaffected by the unfavourable price movement such a trade would otherwise 
cause. As the price does not adjust to supply and demand, some orders will remain 
unmatched (Abken 1991: 10). 
5. ECNs are a special case as they usually fall in between some of the above 
definitions. As mentioned above, the European definition of ECNs and the one 
used in the US show substantial differences. In European terms, ECNs are ATSs 
on which securities can be directly bought from issuing houses (Groß 2002: 41). 
In the US, ECNs are usua lly defined as "trading systems that automatically 
distribute participants' orders to third parties and permit full or partial execution of 
those orders. Hence most of them could be categorised as order-driven automated 
trade matching systems" (Korhonen 2001: 16). ECNs are purely order driven, i.e. 
no participant undertakes to provide liquidity for the securities traded. Their main 
strength is effective price formation, therefore crossing-systems do not qualify as 
ECNs. Some ECNs act as destination-only markets, i.e. trades are matched 
internally, while others scan the market with high-speed communications 
technology to find the best prices. The participants of ECNs are usually 
professional financial intermediaries, few systems have started to accept orders 
directly from institutional investors. However, orders have to be sponsored by a 
professional intermediary, i.e. a broker-dealer takes the responsibility for trades 
executed by the investor (Korhonen 2001: 16-17). In order to avoid confusion the 
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term ATS will be used here for all non-exchange trading systems, except for those 
explicitly calling themselves ECNs, as stated in Section 4.2.3. 
 
After the design and organisational forms of ATSs have been clarified, a 
short description of the largest and most important ATSs will be given:  
 
1. United States: 
§ Island Systems is a US-based ECN which was created by Datek Online Inc., 
one of the most successful US online brokerage firms, and gets much of its 
revenue from day-traders. Each time Island receives an order the system is 
scanned to find a match. If there is a matching order execution is carried out 
immediately, otherwise, the order is displayed in its real-time limit order book 
available on the Internet until a matching order comes in or the order is 
cancelled. Island was the first ECN to file for stock exchange status. In some 
high-tech stocks it had a share of up to 20 percent in 2000. In the near future, 
Instinet and Island are going to be combined into one electronic marketplace 
called INET. INET will offer US broker-dealers access to both NASDAQ and 
exchange- listed US securities. Clients will be agency brokers, market makers, 
retail brokers, and program traders, who will be able to trade anonymously 
("About INET", Korhonen 2001: 64 and Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000; 
33). 
§ BRUT was founded in 1998 in the US as an ECN and functions as a 
combination of broker, stock exchange, and market maker, matching orders 
for certain stock. It provides an electronic trading platform for brokers and 
institutional investors and tries to achieve best execution for both NASDAQ 
and exchange- listed securities ("Overview"). BRUT is an anonymous trade 
match system for broker-dealers and institutional investors (Korhonen 2001: 
63).  
§ Archipelago was founded in December 1996 and filed for US exchange 
status in August 1999. In 2000 it announced plans to create a fully electronic 
national stock exchange for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks. 
Archipelago is an out-bound routing ECN. It aims to find the best internal and 
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external price by routing orders directly to the markets offering the most 
competitive prices (lowest price and best order/execution ratio). Its main 
users are large institutions, hedge funds, online brokers, and market makers. It 
was authorised by the SEC to become Archipelago Exchange (operating 
together with the Pacific exchange in San Francisco) in 2000 (Korhonen 
2001: 62 and Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 28).  
§ JIWAY was one of the more recently set up ATSs. Launched in 2000, it 
offered trading in 6,000 US and European blue chips but had to close down 
its operations at the end of 2003 (Jensen and Natorp 2000).  
§ NexTrade  was founded in 1998 and was the first ECN to offer 24-hour 
trading for broker-dealers in the US. Subscribers are institutional investors 
(broker-dealers, hedge funds, or market makers). For orders not matched 
internally, prices of other ECNs and market makers are scanned. NexTrade is 
currently applying to the SEC to become a registered, fully electronic 
exchange (Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 35 and Korhonen 2001: 65) 
(Nextrade: "Company Information"). 
§ Market XT is a US broker dealer, founded in 1997, providing extended-hour 
trading in NYSE and NASDAQ stocks for individual investors through its 
subscribing brokerage partners. Its order routing technology continuously 
scans different markets, such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, regional exchanges, as 
well as other ATSs searching for the best price for each security. Trading is 
anonymous and the order book is displayed on the Internet (Havens, 
Shteyman and Saber 2000: 28 and Korhonen 2001: 65).  
§ Attain was founded in 1998 and uses NASDAQ's Small Order Execution 
System to execute trades of about 1000 AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE shares 
as well as exchange-traded options without the use of brokers. It "is an order 
display alternative to the traditional market making price quote system on the 
NASDAQ" ("ATTAIN ECN Features"). 
§ Posit is a US crossing system that matches orders of institutional investors 
anonymously at a price taken over from the stocks' primary markets, the mid-
point of the bid/ask spread. Posit also provides sophisticated tools for 
executing complex automated transactions, such as for portfolio management. 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
If a match is found, the order is executed automatically. If no internal match 
is found, clients can decide whether to route them to other systems or keep 
them unmatched in the system. POSIT offers trading in NASDAQ and NYSE 
stocks (Korhonen 2001: 66).  
 
2. Europe: 
§ Bloomberg Tradebook was founded in 1998 and is an agency broker. 
Clients are institutional traders, broker-dealers, hedge fund managers, as well 
as market makers and portfolio managers worldwide. It provides execution 
together with access to news, equity information and analyst reports. 
Bloomberg offers its clients the possibility of connecting directly to more 
than 28 markets and provides access to trading capabilities on 65 markets in 
54 countries (Bloomberg: "About us"). Tradebook is an ATS which matches 
and order-routes incoming orders. It operates a continuous order-driven 
market with anonymous trading. Tradebook grants access to listed stocks in a 
wide range of countries, such as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden and the UK (Korhonen 2001: 68).  
§ E-Crossnet is an automated crossing system operated in the UK and was 
launched in March 2000. Its focus is on European equities (14 markets) and it 
provides anonymity. There are six daily crossing runs (Korhonen 2001: 63).  
§ Tradepoint is a British electronic exchange which tries to divert business 
from the LSE. It trades in most UK-listed stocks and also offers European 
debt securities. Tradepoint was established in 1992 in the UK. It became 
approved as a stock exchange in 1995. Its two advantages are that it is fully 
electronic and that costs are minimal. The entire system is run in a few rooms. 
It is an automatic matching system to which professional dealers and 
institutional investors can enter orders anonymously ("Shaping up" 1996).  
 
§ Finally, Instinet is by far the biggest and one of the most popular ATSs and 
is active in both the US and Europe. It is a division of Reuters founded in 
1969 as "a limit order book where market makers or institutional investors 
can negotiate in private or trade automatically the best bid and offer orders 
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displayed through the system" ("Internet securities"). Instinet also acts as a 
global agency broker on traditional exchanges and competes with other 
brokers for business, without trading for its own account. Apart from 
providing access to more than 40 equity markets worldwide, Instinet mainly 
trades stocks listed on the NYSE. Professional dealers and institutional 
investors can access the sell and buy orders for the different shares and 
subsequently decide to accept an order, start anonymous price negotiations 
with the orderer, or place a sell or buy order. The price is generated by the 
system, which means that after-hours trading is also possible. Instinet is also 
an example of an ATS where participants can trade stocks among themselves 
directly and anonymously without intermediation. Its main success is its 
global strategy. In April 2001, Instinet was listed on NASDAQ. At the 
beginning of 2000 it had about 18,400 users and around 3,000 international 
clients. It has recently purchased a controlling interest in Tradepoint, the UK 
electronic exchange and also acquired a stake in Archipelago. Instinet has no 
plans to register as an exchange, it emphasises that it is primarily a broker-
dealer ("Shaping up", Jensen and Natorp 2000, Korhonen 2001: 64, and 
McIntyre 2004).  
 
Experts expect the large number of ATSs to decrease in future, since this 
market does not have unlimited potential. Therefore, it is likely that the wave of 
mergers and alliances among stock exchanges will also spill over to ATSs. Recent 
examples are the merger between Archipelago and RediBook and Instinet 
purchasing a majority stake in Tradepoint.  
4.2.3.4 The extent of off-board trading in Europe 
Stock exchange trading has experienced quite an upswing over the past decade in 
Europe. Due to privatisation and liberalisation, equity supply has more than 
doubled. Additionally, the single currency has boosted corporate restructuring 
while at the same time issuers are becoming more active (Amati 2001: 85). 
 
Despite the fact that European financial markets have generally developed 
at relatively high speed in the past few decades, ATSs are much more wide-spread 
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in the US than in Europe. According to Malkamäki and Topi (1999: 23), about 30 
to 40 percent of all securities transactions and 15 percent of all equity trades in the 
US are done via the Internet. As mentioned above new trading systems such as 
Tradepoint, which undermine traditional markets, have also been established in 
Europe. In 2000, FESCO identified 27 trading systems in Europe fulfilling the 
ATS definition. Most ATSs were active in the UK (16) and Germany (6) (FESCO 
2000). However, ATSs still have not managed to acquire more than five percent 
of overall equity trading turnover in Europe. The reasons are that European stock 
exchanges are already to a large extent based on electronic trading systems, they 
have created common trading platforms across European exchanges, and stocks 
are traded in auctions rather than through market-makers, which seems to make 
them less vulnerable to competition from new trading platforms than their US 
counterparts. Electronic trading systems are in the majority of cases incorporated 
within mainstream exchanges, as many existing exchanges in Europe have 
developed their own such systems as a result of competitive pressures (such as 
from demutualisation). Competitive pressures are higher among European 
exchanges, as regulation is less influential in Europe than in the US and in 
particular due to competitive forces within the single market (Allen, Hawkins and 
Sato 2001: 35). In turn, this has meant less opportunity for off-exchange 
electronic trading systems, as it is harder for them to offer a particular advantage 
over what the traditional exchanges offer (Allen and Hawkins 2002: 51). This is 
evidenced by the fact that it is not to be expected that these systems will gain 
enough market share to pose a real threat to exchanges, since traditional stock 
markets will remain popular due to their liquidity. For example, Tradepoint is the 
only serious electronic competitor of the LSE to date (Sales 1999). Although 
ATSs have been less successful in Europe than in the US, they have pushed 
established exchanges to extend trading hours to offer evening sessions 
(Korhonen 2001: 33). It is to be expected that ATSs will not be able to compete 
solely over price in the long run, as existing exchanges will also become low-cost 
producers. For the same reason, many ATSs in the US are also expected to 
disappear again (Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 3, Malkamäki and Topi 
1999: 27, Committee of Wise Men 2001: 81 and Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 
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35). On the other hand, as trading costs on traditional exchanges are currently still 
above those of ATSs, competitive pressure from ATSs is expected to increase in 
the short term (Gaa et al. 2001: 49). The crucial point for European stock 
exchanges is to find an efficient structure for trading European blue chips to be 
able to compete. In future, European ATSs will mainly be a threat to smaller 
electronic exchanges which have to carry the burden and cost of stricter regulation 
than ATSs and at the same time have to compete with large exchanges (Korhonen 
2001: 35).  
4.2.3.5 Advantages and disadvantages of ATSs 
In this section I will try to point out possible advantages and disadvantages of 
ATSs for the main stakeholders, investors, and traditional exchanges. First, I am 
going to look at the advantages of ATSs: 
§ Execution is faster in interactive electronic exchanges, which leads to 
improved transparency (Keeler 2000). This is a major advantage for small 
investors  which favour higher transparency.  
§ The major advantage of ATSs is the low fees charged. Island, for example 
charges between $0.001 and $0.0035 per share compared to about $0.06 
per share charged for orders executed through a traditional broker (Allen, 
Hawkins and Sato 2001: 34 and Domowitz and Steil 2001). According to 
Domowitz and Steil (2002), trading costs at ATSs are between 28 and 33 
percent lower than those of the NYSE and NASDAQ. In Europe, fees can 
be up to 70 percent below those of traditional exchanges in Europe, when 
taking cross-border transaction fees into account. Low trading costs are an 
advantage for investors . 
§ New trading platforms offer new trading possibilities, e.g. matching or 
crossing, which suit the needs of institutional investors (Loistl 2000: 99). 
Crossing systems furthermore facilitate trading of large blocks, as they are 
in general less transparent than continuous trading systems, which gives 
participants more protection. If the full interests of market participants 
meet simultaneously, the market impact of block trades is much smaller, 
furthermore, they do not require market participants to continuously 
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monitor the market, which is of course costly (Korhonen 2001: 31). This 
constitutes an advantage particularly for large institutional investors .  
§ Another strength is longer trading hours. The fear of lower liquidity in 
after-hours trading is avoided by quickly matching orders electronically. 
This keeps spreads low and private investors in particular benefit from 24-
hour service (Amati 2001: 7). ATSs also had a major impact on the length 
of the trading day. They have improved access to US markets for overseas 
investors and speeded up trading as well as clearing and settlement 
(Korhonen 2001: 30-31). Longer trading hours are an advantage for all 
groups of investors, in particular for overseas investors . 
§ ATSs are able to eliminate intermediaries. Many institutional investors 
claim that once an order is placed with a broker there might be a certain 
degree of information leakage. This might result in adverse price quotes, 
which negatively influence execution costs for the original investor. As 
human intermediation is unnecessary in fully automated trading systems, 
investors are reluctant to pay for the services of a traditional broker. 
(Domowitz and Steil 1999: 24). This is an advantage for investors  in 
general, but obviously a major disadvantage for intermediaries. 
§ ATSs offer anonymous trading. In this way they also press traditional 
exchanges to change their transparency rules ("Internet securities"). The 
reason why traders favour anonymity is that information about how often 
and how much a trader is buying or selling could move prices 
unfavourably for the investor (Abken 1991: 10). Anonymity is an 
advantage for large investors , small investors, however, favour more 
information transparency.  
§ The absence of license fees for trader firms and fast order execution 
through the Internet allows savings to be passed on to customers (or kept 
as profits). Most ATSs charge a small fee per executed trade (Amati 2001: 
6). If savings are passed on to customers, it is an advantage for investors , 
otherwise it is advantageous for the owners of the ATSs. 
§ ATSs put pressure on traditional exchanges to reduce the cost of search 
and execution and increase the efficiency of markets for large investors. 
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Furthermore they provide additional services such as research and 
analytical data to all potential market participants and fostered competition 
in general. ATSs compete with exchanges as well as broker-dealers and 
investment banks (Korhonen 2001: 18-19). This is an advantage for 
investors . 
§ ATSs have substantially contributed to the demutualisation of exchanges 
by focusing on profit themselves (Korhonen 2001: 28). This is an 
advantage for investors  as it makes exchanges cheaper and more flexible, 
but a disadvantage for exchange members . 
§ ATSs improve liquidity by creating niche markets to large market 
participants. During system-outages of exchanges ATSs can even act as 
back-ups in providing liquidity. An ATS could theoretically maintain the 
market as long as the trades can be cleared and settled without problems 
(Korhonen 2001: 28-29). This function of ATSs is an advantage for the 
economy as a whole. 
§ ATSs enhance the efficiency of price formation, as they provide the 
possibility of trading between bid and offer prices of the established 
markets. They were also the first to adopt decimalised price conventions, 
which permitted a further reduction in spreads (Korhonen 2001: 29). This 
is an advantage for investors , but a disadvantage for market makers  and 
others benefiting from bid-ask spreads. 
§ ATSs offer more flexible trading by creating and using new types of 
orders, such as good-till-cancelled orders2 or all-or-none orders for 
example 3 (Korhonen 2001: 30). This is particularly beneficial for large 
institutional investors  since they are most likely to make use of such 
instruments. 
                                                 
2 Good-till-cancelled orders are valid until they are executed or cancelled (Korhonen 2001: 30).  
3 All-or-none orders are either entirely executed or not at all (Korhonen 2001: 30).  
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At the same time ATSs might pose several disadvantages for investors: 
§ The main disadvantages of ATSs is low liquidity compared to large 
established exchanges ("Good-bye to all that"), which is a disadvantage for 
investors .  
§ The systemic risks might increase due to the economic globalisation of 
financial exchanges. Moreover, cross-market spillovers will be more likely as 
the new exchanges contribute to the unification of world financial markets. 
Such spillover effects are particularly strong in times of high volatility 
(Abken 1991: 17). This might be disadvantageous to the stability of the 
world economy.  
§ The success of ATSs might result in liquidity dispersion between different 
trading systems. Increased market fragmentation could lead to an increase in 
costs of execution. Higher trading volumes lead to higher operating margins 
for market operators and in this way to declining spreads for customers (Allen 
and Hawkins 2002: 54). 
"It is unclear whether the benefit of anonymous trading is worth the 
negative aspects of fragmented market places. Proponents of 
fragmentation believe it ensures competition and therefore makes best 
execution the more likely outcome" (Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 
20).  
Empirical evidence suggests that competition has always benefited investors 
so far (Amati 2001: 7). A dispersion of liquidity would be a disadvantage for 
investors , however. 
§ Execution might even become more important for institutional investors than 
best price. Best price is considered a balance between immediacy, speed of 
execution, minimal market impact, and anonymity rather than a visible 
market quote (Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 8). Brennen4 (quoted in 
Sales 1999) believes that ATSs registering as exchanges will not have much 
of an impact on the large exchanges as  
"markets have only one function: to discover prices…[and] so far nothing 
the world has shown itself to be able to discover price for equities nearly 
                                                 
4 Brennan D.: Interview.  
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as effectively as the NYSE's auction sys tem" (Brennen5 quoted in Sales 
1999). 
One important issue for stock exchanges is, however, how ATSs free-ride on 
central price discovery. In other words, the question is whether price 
information is a public good or not (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 45). If the 
listing authority is removed from traditional stock exchanges, a level playing 
field will be established with an equal cost structure for all participants. If 
not, traditional stock exchanges will be at a disadvantage as the listing 
process is time consuming and costly. For this reason the accusation that 
ATSs are parasites on stock exchanges is justified as no ATS lists stock 
(Baker 2000). Since the listing of a stock is a precondition for the existence of 
ATSs, ATSs depend on the output from stock exchanges. For this reason 
ATSs are no serious competitors to stock exchanges in their present form 
(Jensen and Natorp 2000). The fact that ATSs free-ride on functions of 
traditional exchanges is a disadvantage for them. 
§ Barber and Odean (2001) argue that by enabling day-traders to directly trade 
via Internet, ATSs bolster the overconfidence of investors, who trade more 
actively and speculatively than without the Internet and in this way increase 
volatility. This is a disadvantage for the stability of an economy.  
4.2.4 European integration and the stock market 
The euro securities markets taken together are the second largest in the world 
behind the US market. The size of the market for euro-denominated securities 
however, is quite small relative to the size of the economy when compared to the 
US. Financial markets in Europe are smaller and less liquid, as exchanges are 
efficiently organised on a national level and investment is still regional (Havens, 
Shteyman and Saber 2000: 5). Since a positive relationship between finance and 
real economic growth has been found in a number of studies, growth of financial 
markets can also be expected to have a positive impact on the real economy. If 
one expects the financial markets to be endogenously determined by the real 
economy and its needs, however, the financial market of a country or region has 
the optimal size. If the financial market is considered supply- leading, i.e. if 
                                                 
5 Brennan D.: Interview.  
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finance positively influences the real growth of an economy, European integration 
can be expected to yield substantial benefits (Blum et al 2002: 6). Securitisation is 
expected to proceed in Europe however, due to the increased size and liquidity of 
the euro securities markets compared to the former separated national markets 
(McClauley and White 1997). Moreover, the number of shareholders in Europe 
has already increased significantly over the past few decades and the value of 
cross-border institutional trading rose five times between 1985 and 1995 ("Global 
equity markets"), although according to Harrison (1995: 99-100), it was not until 
the single market programme, that the creation of a unified securities market in 
Europe was pursued. The aim was to permit issuers to raise capital on a 
community-wide basis, intermediaries to offer services anywhere, and investors to 
choose from a wide range of investment opportunities. These benefits were the 
prime motivation for monetary and fiscal authorities to pave the way for European 
financial integration.  
 
"On a level playing field where equity prices and dealing commissions will 
be the same throughout Europe, competition means an investor's choice 
will depend on an exchange's capacity to add value" (Moore 1990: 53).  
 
It was only in 1993 that the Investment Services Directive (ISD) was adopted. The 
Directive had been held up for many years because of different views among 
member states on stock exchange structure. The ISD creates the regime for a 
single passport for securities firms other than banks which allows them to offer 
their services anywhere within the EU. Today, there are three fundamental factors 
which drive rapid change: 
§ Exchange rate risk has been eliminated with the introduction of the euro. 
§ The ISD has removed restrictions in European financial markets by providing 
financial intermediaries with a single passport. 
§ Advances in information technologies contribute to the reduction in trading 
costs and allow quicker access to financial services (Hasan, Malkamäki and 
Schmiedel 2001). 
These changes also stimulate competition among European stock exchanges. As a 
result, European financial services integration is expected to yield substantial 
long-term benefits, such as: 
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§ Improved investor protection. 
§ Lower cost of capital through competition and choice. 
§ Efficient matching of supply of and demand for capital and therefore 
improved capital allocation. 
§ An increase in intermediation efficiency as well as cheaper cross-border 
clearing and settlement. 
§ An overall strengthening of the EU economy through higher productivity of 
capital and labour (Committee of Wise Men 2001: 9 and Schmiedel 2001). 
 
Despite several measures on an EU-wide basis, most stock exchanges in 
Europe are still national institutions trading only local, country-specific stocks. 
Recently, increasing efforts have been made for stock exchanges to operate across 
national borders. Pan-European exchanges could bring about several advantages, 
such as standardisation of trading platforms across exchanges, higher market 
liquidity, and a lower degree of market fragmentation. All these effects could help 
to lower the costs and difficulties involved in cross-border trading in Europe. On 
the other hand, some market participants prefer the product differentiation offered 
by smaller exchanges. Moreover, different cross-country regulations and legal 
differences are still a large obstacle to cross-border trading. Another problem is 
the relatively high cost of obtaining information on foreign stocks. Finally, the 
consolidation of European exchanges will very likely have to be delayed until the 
fragmented landscape of clearing and settlement institutions is consolidated 
(McAndrews and Stefanadis 2002). A study by the European Commission at the 
end of 2002 concluded that the integration of European financial markets would 
raise the level of EU-wide real GDP by more than one percent (London 
Economics 2002). Another positive effect of financial market integration is the 
smoothing of consumption patterns over time by eliminating the impact of 
domestic shocks on domestic consumption, since investors who hold too many 
domestic assets in relation to international assets compared to an "optimal 
portfolio" suffer from a lack of risk-sharing across different countries (OECD 
2003: 100). Furthermore, financial integration is expected to promote financial 
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development by optimising the exploitation of economies of scale inherent in 
financial activity (European Commission 2001b).  
 
In the following subsections the history of moves towards a European 
financial market will be described in more detail. 
4.2.4.1 The first steps towards a unified European stock market 
Stock market integration has been pursued by the EU for more than 40 years now. 
This means that the EU leads the way in its effort to promote stock market 
integration compared to other regions in the world (Licht 1997: 1). The first 
important step to overcome barriers between European securities markets was the 
implementation of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (see 
Section 4.2.). The removal of economic barriers reduces the importance of 
physical location of market places, as services can be provided and accessed 
electronically (Malkamäki and Top 1999: 7-8). The first steps towards stock 
integration on an EU-wide basis were held back, as the intentions of the Treaty of 
Rome to create a single market failed. The first progress was made in 1985 when 
a white paper was prepared by the European Commission which mentioned 300 
action points for EU legislation to remove restrictions on the establishment of a 
single market for goods, services, capital as well as the free passage of people. 
The white paper then became the basis for an amendment to the Treaty of Rome. 
This legislative program was to be in place by the end of 1992. In regard to 
financial services, the following goals were identified in the white paper:  
§ Complete liberalisation of capital movements. 
§ Unification of national markets for financial services. 
§ Establishment of common regulations for financial institutions (Scott-Quinn 
1994).  
 
The overall goal of the EU was to achieve a single European market by 
harmonising regulatory requirements and in this way reduc ing disparities among 
national markets. The first approach of the EU was communality. This would 
have eliminated diverse regulatory systems, but the pressure on the decision-
making mechanism turned out to be too great. Therefore the mutual recognition 
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approach was adopted, which gave new momentum to regulatory harmonisation 
efforts. The first directives were relatively modest, allowing member states to 
prescribe stricter rules where applicable. However, as securities markets became 
more competitive though the advance of technology, issues became more 
contentious and directives had to become more detailed (Licht 1997: 21, 24). 
4.2.4.2 The European Investment Services Directive 
The European Investment Services Directive (ISD), which came into force on 
1 January 1993, was the first milestone in European financial integration. The 
ISD, which made it harder for regulators to protect their domestic exchanges, 
broke up monopolies and substantially increased competition among exchanges 
("Shaping up" 1996). 
 
The ISD was intended to contribute an essential instrument to achieve an 
internal market in which each investment firm has the right of establishment and 
provision of financial services. The two major issues of the ISD are regulation of 
investment firms and regulation of securities markets. Its most important aim is 
the harmonisation of the legal framework to the necessary level to ensure the 
mutual recognition of authorisation and supervision systems, so that a single 
authorisation would be valid throughout the Community and that only supervision 
principles of the Home Member State would be applied. It creates a single 
passport for businesses regulated in one member state, which permits them to 
conduct business in the whole community without having to fulfil further 
regulatory requirements. In this way the Investment Services Directive will ensure 
access for all market participants and products within Europe. Regarding stock 
exchange membership, the ISD is assumed to enable  firms and banks to trade in 
any regulated market in the community, e.g. by establishing remote access to 
foreign stock exchanges without further regulatory approval, provided they are 
authorised as such in their home country. Authorisation in the home country is a 
necessary requirement to protect the interest of investors and the stability of the 
whole financial system. At the same time, exchanges recognised in one member 
state would have unrestricted access to other member states, i.e. they would be 
free to set up terminals in any member country so that local participants should be 
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granted free access. The same applies to access to the clearing and settlement 
system of the host state. Any condition discriminating against a member of the EU 
will be penalised (Council Directive 93/22/EEC of May 1993 on investment 
services in the securities field: 1-2, Benos and Crouhy 1996: 38, Licht 1997: 29 
and Breuer 1993: 8 and Williamson 1997: 411, Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 9). 
 
The intention of the ISD was increased internationalisation. The success of 
the ISD can be recognised from the fact that several integration projects have been 
started in response to the major harmonisation efforts of the EU since then. An 
example of one of these projects was  EASDAQ, which was the first case of 
genuine regional stock market integration, or Euro NM (Licht 1997: 48-52 and 
Jensen and Natorp 2000). 
 
"The removal of important legal barriers to direct cross-border electronic 
trading since 1996, both within the EU and between the EU and the US, 
has allowed automated markets to expand their networks dramatically, 
attracting foreign traders whose cost of access to local floor market was 
much higher" (Domowitz and Steil 1999: 7). 
 
4.2.4.3 The introduction of the euro 
The introduction of the euro has added another integrative force and the single 
currency has also been a major catalyst of change in Europe ("Good-by to all 
that"). According to Gaspar (2000), the introduction of the euro has had a major 
direct impact on the ongoing process of financial market integration through the 
elimination of exchange rate risk. Also the integration of stock markets was 
speeded up by the single currency, which further added to the attractiveness of 
stocks and bonds as investments as markets have become deeper and transaction 
costs have been further reduced. As a result companies today are concentrating 
their listings on fewer exchanges and investors are changing their investment 
strategies from a country-based to a more sector-based approach (Gaa et al. 2001: 
50). Williamson (1997: 410) believes that the EMU decreases the distinctions 
between exchanges from the investors' point of view. This in turn might enhance 
cooperation between national equity exchanges since the introduction of the euro 
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has increased the tendency towards cross-border investment, which makes 
separate stock exchanges less useful. The euro will therefore result in less 
fragmentation of the market, because investors will not have to take currency 
fluctuations and development into account when undertaking cross-border 
investments within the EMU. In many cases, currency changes formerly played a 
key role in the failure or success of an investment. Even though shares are of 
national nature due to different taxation policies, European blue chips have 
become more attractive after the elimination of exchange rate risks. At the same 
time, the correlation between stock markets will increase due the effects of the 
single market and the single currency (Seifert 1995: 223 and Amati 2001: 5). 
 
"Development towards a single and fully contestable European market for 
financial services seems obvious. It also implies that location will 
gradually lose some of its importance for marketplaces and that 
competition between financial centres, marketplaces and securities firms 
will intensify…The trend seems likely to be towards larger unit size and 
more integrated infrastructure" (Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 7-8). 
 
Abaham and Pirard (2002: 13) summarise the major effects of the euro as 
follows: 
§ Reduction in transaction costs by elimination of exchange costs within the 
euro area.  
§ Lower market risk and volatility due to the absence of internal foreign 
exchange risks and costs. 
§ Larger markets with higher liquidity due to increased transparency, as well as 
reduced fragmentation and transaction costs 
§ Stronger tendency towards convergence of national equity markets within the 
euro area. 
§ Enhanced spread of equity culture. 
§ Sectoral investment approach instead of country approach, and reduction of 
home-bias. 
§ Concentration of trading in blue chips at large financial centres. 
§ As a result, more pressure on small exchanges which will have to find niche-
markets or merge in order to survive. 
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§ Intense competition among markets and need for cooperation, which will 
eventually lead to consolidation among European exchanges. 
 
Melle (2002) conducted a study on the effects of the euro on European 
stock market integration. Her main conclusions show that although the European 
market already showed a high degree of integration and efficiency before the euro, 
integration has increased since its introduction. This is evidenced by the fact that 
correlation between the major markets (German, French, Italian, Dutch, and 
Spanish) has risen. The euro has accelerated the intensity of the integration 
process and added to the pressure of creating new alliances. Despite all progress, 
European exchanges still have difficulties in accessing the US market, which is 
mainly due to the fact that regulations an accounting standards are still not 
uniform.  
4.2.4.4 The Financial Services Action Plan 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was passed at the Lisbon European 
Council in March 2000 and is to be implemented by 2005. The FSAP was 
developed in order to decrease the high level of both economic and legislative 
fragmentation of financial services in Europe. According to the Committee of 
Wise Men (2001: 7-8), the regulatory framework of the EU was too slow, rigid, 
complex, and ill-adapted to the pace of change in global financial markets at that 
time. If the EU does not manage to capture the benefits of an integrated European 
market, economic growth, employment and prosperity will decrease and 
competitive advantage will be lost to countries outside the EU. The aim was 
therefore to eliminate the geographical dimension of investment, replacing it by a 
sector-based focus (Amati 2001: vii). Another goal of financial market integration 
is to benefit the financing of small and medium-sized companies and make the 
raising of capital cheaper for large companies by increasing liquidity and 
enhancing efficient pricing through lower transaction costs (Committee of Wise 
Men 2001: 75-76). Furthermore, financial services have a high potential for job 
creation. Yet the stock market capitalisation of the US is significantly higher than 
that of the EU (in 2001, stock market capitalization to GDP ration amounted to 93 
percent in the US, compared to 85 percent in the EU-15, and only 70 percent in 
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the euro area) (IMF 2003: 121). This can be seen as an advantage, since a large 
financial market is assumed to have a positive impact on the growth of the real 
economy (i.e. as supply- leading) (Blum et al. 2002). Moreover, cross-border 
trading is limited and private savings are not invested efficiently. All of the above 
factors limit job creation. One of the main concerns is easy market access as well 
as mutual recognition of prospectuses. The latter point is achieved by the 
European Prospectus Directive, which has to be implemented by all member 
states by 2005. Prudential and supervisory rules would also help encourage 
investors to trade across borders (Amati 2001: vii). 
 
Currently, the European financial market is still inefficient due to the 
following factors:  
§ The high number of independent national stock exchanges. 
§ Fragmented and therefore inefficient and expensive clearing and settlement 
systems. 
§ Few pan-European listings. 
§ Low investment in venture capital.  
§ New forms of trading platforms, such as ATSs, which require a new 
consumer protection framework as well as e-commerce security and fraud 
prevention rules.  
§ An inefficient regulatory system, such as a lack of clear Europe-wide 
regulation on many issues (e.g. prospectuses, market abuse, investment 
service provision) makes mutual recognition difficult. 
§ A lack of agreed interpretation of existing rules as well as different national 
regulators, which leads to varying applications of the same rules.  
§ Different legal systems as regards, for example, bankruptcy proceedings. 
§ Different taxation systems. 
§ Political barriers, such as creative techniques to protect national markets. 
§ External trade barriers (European trading screens are not authorised in the 
US).  
§ Cultural barriers, such as different approaches to corporate governance, 
competition policy, disclosure standards, or entrepreneurial cultures. 
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§ Absence of common principles guiding all financial services legislation. 
§ Outdated listing requirements. 
§ Lack of acceptance of the mutual recognition principle. 
§ Absence of a comprehensive market abuse regime. 
§ No set of common takeover rules. 
§ Inadequate level of consumer protection (Committee of Wise Men 2001: 10-
12, Amati 2001: 1 and Ernst and Young Switzerland n.d.). 
 
According to the Committee of Wise Men (2001: 67), the following 
benefits can be expected from full financial market integration in the EU: 
§ More efficient, deeper and broader securities markets. 
§ Lower transaction costs and higher market liquidity. 
§ Diversification and innovation in the financial systems. 
§ More possibilities of risk pooling. 
§ Fiercer competition between financial markets and intermediaries. 
§ Economies of scale and scope and an increase in efficiency. 
§ A strengthening of the economy so that the financial markets become a more 
attractive location for investment.  
§ Higher return on securities investments (Committee of Wise Men 2001: 73-
74). 
 
In order to reap all these benefits, the FSAP contains a list of measures to 
be implemented. These measures cover four strategic objectives (retail markets, 
wholesale, prudential rules and supervision, and wider conditions for an optimal 
single financial market). In more concrete terms, the major aims of the FSAP are: 
§ To eliminate all barriers to pension fund investments and cross-border 
marketing of investment services and products. 
§ To make financial statements of companies from different countries more 
comparable to ensure the transparency and disclosure needed to underpin 
cross-border securities trading. From 2005 on, the IAS and the IFRS will 
form the basis for comparable financial reports within Europe. 
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§ To increase the depth and functioning of the risk capital market by improving 
the possibilities of financing new companies. 
§ A review of the ISD to eliminate overlapping administrative formalities and 
impediments for investment service providers which operate across borders. 
§ A single passport for issuers. 
§ To modernise admission to listing. 
§ To introduce home country control for all wholesale members and define the 
status of professional investors. 
§ To introduce a single passport for recognised stock markets. 
§ To establish a central counterparty and to foster consolidation of clearing and 
settlement institutions in the EU.  
§ To improve cooperation among EU financial market regulators in order to 
solve cross-border problems and to establish common supervisory approaches 
(European Commission 2000b: 9). 
§ To speed up progress on the proposals on take-over bids and the restructuring 
and winding-up of credit institutions and insurance companies (European 
Commission 2000b: 2, 9 Committee of Wise Men 2001: 3, 16, and Amati 
2001:1). 
 
Despite all efforts, Seifert (1999: 25) still sees a lot of room for 
improvement. Due to the deficiencies mentioned above, there are overcapacities 
on European exchanges which make them too expensive. According to his 
estimates there were "redundant costs" of 10.9 billion euros at the German stock 
exchange in 1999 alone. Different fees at different exchanges cost market 
participants 2.9 billion euros.  
4.2.4.5 Basel II 
Basel II is one of the latest regulations of the BIS in the area of financial services 
and is to come into force by the end of 2007 (implementation was originally 
planned for the fourth quarter of 2006 but had to be postponed)  (European 
Parliament: "Sitzungsprotokoll des Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Währung vom 
10.9.2003"). The fundamental objective of Basel II is to set a framework that 
enhances the stability of the international banking system. At the same time, it is 
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meant to provide consistent capital adequacy regulation in order to avoid 
competitive inequality among internationally active banks. The framework is 
supposed to promote stronger risk management practices by the banking industry 
to reduce the risk of an international bank crisis. This systemic risk can be 
triggered by the bankruptcy of a single bank, however. To account for this risk, 
regulatory institutions stipulate a minimum equity to be held by banks. Although 
Basel I was generally considered to have an overall positive impact, it was heavily 
criticised for its low level of risk-sensitivity. For this reason Basel II was 
developed, the three pillars of which are minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review, and market discipline ("Basel II"). Pillar one entails modified 
regulations for calculating the minimum equity required for a certain level of 
credit risk. Pillar two introduces a supervisory review process under which the 
correct calculation of the amount of equity to be held by banks is supervised. 
Pillar three is meant to strengthen market discipline by forcing banks to disclose 
any information which might help market participants in estimating the specific 
risk of a bank. Furthermore, Basel II tries to level the playing field between banks 
from different countries (Buchmüller and Macht 2003).  
 
The main change prompted by Basel II under pillar one is that minimum 
capital requirements to be held by banks should now more closely aligned with 
the risks of credit portfolios held by banks. The regulations prior to Basel II stated 
that loans to domestic enterprises had to be secured by eight percent equity by 
banks. Each credit risk used to have the same price, differentiation therefore took 
place only on securities. From 2007 on, banks will be allowed to give out loans 
only after calculation of the individual risk of a company. Thanks to this 
procedure banks would be able to adapt their credit terms to individual risks. As a 
consequence, it is assumed that credit costs will rise for enterprises with low 
creditworthiness. The groups suffering most from the new regulations will be 
sovereigns and banks, whose risk weightings used to be very low as well as small 
and medium-size enterprises, whose lower credit quality will on average increase 
capital requirements. The reason is that small enterprises are considered less 
transparent and vested with relatively little equity. The equity rate among SMEs 
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was at an average of only seven percent in Germany in 2000. This is expected to 
put SMEs at a considerable disadvantage compared to large enterprises with an 
average equity rate of 23 percent. Banks could give fewer loans to SMEs and if 
they do so, interest rates will have to rise ("IPO/PRE-IPO-Partner, Capital-
Consultants und Going-Public-Beratung"). This could result in a credit crunch for 
SMEs. As a low equity rate obviously influences the rating in a negative way, one 
consequence would be the emergence of innovative credit products and a further 
boom in credit derivatives (Garside and Pedersen 2002). SMEs in particular will 
be looking for alternatives to credit financing, which are therefore expected to 
increase in importance in future. If the credit crunch cannot be evened out by 
other sources of finance, a collapse of GDP might result. If 50% of SMEs 
collapse, a systemic crisis will emerge affecting 15% of GDP. One of the main 
weaknesses of Basel II that policymakers worry about is that banks might be 
encouraged to lend too much in boom times (when ratings are good) and cut back 
on lending in times of a recession (when credit ratings fall), as this would require 
too much regulatory capital. However, borrowers need bank credit most in times 
of recession ("Full speed ahead for Basle"). As a result of Basel II, more 
companies are expected to try to raise capital rather via the stock exchange 
(Winkeljohann and Senczek 2002). In order to prevent financially weak 
companies from raising funds via the stock market and endangering its stability, 
listing requirements will have to be strict. 
4.2.4.6 Institutions regulating and supervising the securities market in 
the EU 
In this section, the most important institutions dealing with financial market 
regulation will be briefly introduced. 
§ The first committee to be set up was the Securities Contact Committee, which 
was established in 1979 and has helped to develop several EU directives on 
listing, as well as the directives on half-yearly reports, major shareholdings, 
insider dealing, and public offer prospectuses since then. Its members are 
nominated on a case by case basis depending on the meeting agenda. Its 
primary function is to facilitate the harmonised implementation of directives. 
The Securities Contact Committee has three main tasks: 
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- To facilitate the harmonised implementation of the directives mentioned 
above by regularly consulting and solving practical problems arising from 
their application.  
- To facilitate the establishment of a concerted attitude of member states on 
stringent or additional conditions and obligations which member states 
may lay down at national level. 
- To advise the Commission on any necessary supplements or amendment to 
the above-mentioned directives (European Commission 2000a: 32, 36). 
§ In 1985, both the High Level Securities Supervisory Committee (HLSSC) 
and the UCITS contact committee came into being.  
- The HLSSC is an informal group of high level representatives of member 
states' securities supervisory authorities, finance ministries, and central 
banks. It is chaired by the Commission and its main function is to assist in 
and advise the Commission on policy issues related to securities markets 
and the development of the relevant European legislation. It is not 
concerned with detailed technical questions though. Being an informal 
committee it has no formal tasks. Apart from the functions mentioned 
above, it also examines problems or disputes between member states 
regarding the implementation of existing legislation (European 
Commission 2000a: 32-33). 
- The UCITS contact committee consists of representatives from the 
member states' competent authorities and Ministries of Finance. Its tasks 
are to facilitate harmonised implementation, to create a forum for 
consultations between member states, and to advise the Commission on 
additions or amendments to the UCITS Directive (European Commission 
2000a: 32). 
§ In 1997 the FESCO (Forum of European Securities Commissions) was 
created by the chairmen of EU Securities Commissions. It currently 
comprises 17 statutory securities commission members of the EEA and is 
chaired by a representative of one of its members. It concentrates on the 
development of common regulatory standards and the enhancement of 
cooperation between members in such fields as enforcement and market 
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surveillance. According to the FESCO charter, the members have committed 
themselves to supporting the fair and efficient realisation of a single European 
financial market through close cooperation, to developing common regulatory 
standards for supervision of financial services and markets, and to improving 
market surveillance and enforcement by mutual assistance and cooperation. 
The three priorities of FESCO are investor protection, market integrity, and 
market transparency (European Commission 2000a: 32, 39). 
§ The IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commissions) is a 
worldwide organisation of securities regulators which issues authoritative 
recommendations on securities regulation and efficient surveillance of 
international securities transactions. Its main purpose is to maintain just, 
efficient and sound markets by promoting high standards of market 
regulation. The three priorities are: 
- To ensure effective surveillance of international securities transactions 
through common standards. 
- To exchange information. 
- To provide mutual assistance in promoting the integr ity of markets by 
rigorously applying standards and by effectively sanctioning offences 
(European Commission 2000a: 32, 44). 
 
As well as these official EU institutions, the stock exchanges have also 
joined forces by forming trade associations. The Federation of European Stock 
Exchanges (FESE) for example, is a trade association with 26 members which are 
large stock exchanges in each of the 25 EU member states plus Switzerland and 
Norway. Its primary purpose is to serve as a forum for information exchange and 
a means of joint presentation vis-à-vis other bodies such as the European 
Commission (Licht 1997: 55). The World Federation of Exchanges should also be 
mentioned. This is a private international organisation comprising the operators of 
the world's leading financial markets. Its main goals are the provision of a 
platform where stock exchange issues can be discussed on a regular basis. Such 
issues are the harmonisation of standards for business processes (particularly with 
regard to cross-border trading) in the exchange industry, the strengthening of 
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cooperative relationships with supervisory authorities, as well as the 
representation and development of organised and regulated markets ("The World 
Federation of Exchanges").  
 
Furthermore, the Committee of Wise Men proposes the establishment of 
two new committees: An EU Securities Committee (ESC) with primarily 
regulatory power and the EU Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC) with 
advisory functions. The ESC should act as a regulatory body in the securities field 
and advise the Commission on securities issues. Member states will nominate 
members to the ESC, which will be chaired by the Commission, i.e. by the 
European Commissioner responsible for securities matters. The ESRC would 
rather be concerned with ensur ing a more consistent implementation of 
Community Law and act as an advisor to the Commission. The ESRC should 
consist of one representative of each Member State who is designated by the 
national supervisory authority. Finally, a monitoring group should produce half-
yearly reports on the progress on and the problems of integration (Committee of 
Wise Men 2001: 28-29). 
 
Apart from fostering an internal market, one major point on the EU agenda 
is regulatory convergence between the US and the EU, as the capital raising and 
allocation process is becoming more and more global due to the growing 
interdependence of national economies. The US and EU equity markets together 
form 80 percent of global financial markets. Although they have decrease, cross-
listings are still important, with 255 EU companies listing in the US and 168 US 
companies listing on European exchanges (82 in Germany, 68 on the London 
stock exchange, and 17 in Paris). In 2002 European companies raised 15 percent 
of their capital raised via IPOs in the US and transactions in US equities between 
US and foreign investors have ranged between $3 and 5 trillion per year in the 
past few years (Draghi 2003: 1-2).. Despite this, EU-US regulatory divergence is 
still significant. For this reason, a convergence on particularly legal infrastructures 
of the market (company law, corporate governance, and accounting) as well as on 
the regulation and supervision of the financial markets has to take place (Draghi 
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2003: 1-2). The reasons why the SEC is currently still limiting access to the US 
market for European exchanges are concerns over the quality of European markets 
(trading systems, supervision, disclosure, etc. ) and the products offered (due to 
fears over European accounting and corporate governance). Common accounting 
standards in particular would be a great help to investors, enabling them to 
compare companies across borders. Even within the EU variations persist. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards will be required to be adopted by all 
listed companies in 2005, but they still leave ample scope for different 
interpretation and application, just like the IAS (Draghi 2003: 3, 8). 
4.3 Implications for the traditional stock exchanges 
4.3.1 Stock exchanges as competing suppliers in the services industry 
Stock exchanges are firms that compete on the provision of liquidity and price 
discovery. In the past few decades competition among exchanges and also ATSs 
has become fierce as investors have become more global in their perspective and 
therefore competition among exchanges for the listing of securities and new 
members is growing. In the course of this competitive process, exchanges try to 
exploit economies of scale and scope by listing new shares and by trying to 
increase volume in existing securities, the latter also being known as "competition 
for order flow" (Arnold et al. 1999: 1083). One very impressive example of the 
extent of competition is that the London Stock Exchange accounted for 20 percent 
of the turnover in Dutch equities as early as 1990, which made Amsterdam worry 
about its existence ("Good-bye to all that" 1999 and Moore 1990: 53). 
 
Traditional stock exchanges cannot rely on their sheer size today, as 
investors do not care about tradition. Their criteria are cost and volume. For large 
investment houses the different trading practices, trading hours, and settlement 
procedures are an obstacle to trading. Therefore stock exchanges must not try to 
protect their former monopolies, but rather focus on the necessary reforms. Only 
in this way can traditional exchanges develop in a way to meet the demands of the 
market. Today, exchanges have begun to behave more like regular firms. They 
have adjusted to their new environment by increasing automation, by adopting a 
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new corporate governance structure, the creation of alliances, the battle for market 
share, higher cost efficiency, and revenue maximisation. In doing so, exchanges 
have invested heavily in upgrading their technology and reformulating their 
business strategies (Loistl 2000: 107, Von Rosen 1992: xx and Hasan, Malkamäki 
and Schmiedel 2002: 7). 
4.3.1.1 The products and services of stock exchanges 
In order to determine the competitive challenges of stock exchanges, one first has 
to look at the products and services stock exchanges provide and compete on. 
Determining what constitutes the inputs and outputs of financial institutions is 
generally controversial. In the following, an overview of the main outputs of stock 
exchanges is given: 
§ The main product of a stock exchange is the official share price. It is derived 
by matching supply of and demand for capital. The market price of shares has 
an important impact on the capital market and the economy as a whole.  
§ The stock exchange enables market participants to trade titles at any time, in 
this way offering a liquid form of investment at low cost by providing a 
meeting place. When the market is geographically fragmented, traders may 
have to devote time to seeking counterparties and bid-offer spreads are 
therefore likely to be wider as a result. The marketplace must be highly 
efficient so that transactions can be effected as completely as possible, and 
under high legal security.  
§ Listing can be seen as a quality control function to ensure that companies 
meet the disclosure requirements on the basis of the market segment in which 
they are listed according to their size and age.  
§ In general the exchange provides regulations for and supervises the correct 
execution of trades. 
§ It provides a guarantee on concluded transactions as well as clearing and 
settlement of trades. 
§ Furthermore, the exchange regularly publishes prices and trading stories. 
§ The main advantage of an exchange is that it standardises products and 
sometimes also invents new securities to trade. 
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§ Finally, it provides dealers who bridge the gap between available buyers and 
sellers (Hasan and Malkamäki 2001, Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel 2002: 
9, Gerke and Hamann 1991: 1-16, Loistl 2000: 101, "Good-bye to all that" 
1999, Stoll 2002: 84, Von Rosen 1992: xvii-xviii, Steil 2002: 72). 
 
On the input side, there are computers, software and personnel for 
matching and processing trades, but also the personnel and regulations necessary 
for the maintenance of the market place, the communication with companies to 
handle the listing procedures and supervision of trading (dissemination of 
company-specific information and observance of marketplace regulations ). The 
input factors weighing most heavily are the trading system (technology and office 
expenses) and personnel costs. While the trading output is measured in terms of 
the number and value of executed transactions, the output related to the listing 
procedure and monitoring is difficult to measure. Therefore it is frequently 
proxied by the number and value of companies listed on a particular exchange 
(Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel 2002:15 and Hasan and Malkamäki 2001). 
 
Stock exchanges have historically had seven major sources of revenue: 
membership subscriptions, listing, trading (transaction fees), clearing, and 
settlement fees, and charges for providing company news as well as for quote and 
trade data. Lee mentions quote information as the main source of income for 
exchanges. 20-40 percent of the income is generated by price quotes. To open up 
another source, several exchanges have also tried to sell their technology, in this 
way creating additional revenues. In most of the areas mentioned above, stock 
exchanges face major competition and the opportunities for stock exchanges to 
increase their revenues are limited. If a stock exchange has no members, no 
membership fees can be collected. Most exchanges nowadays have customers and 
not members. At the same time, stock exchanges fiercely compete with each other 
for listings. For this reason, revenues from this service are limited. There is also a 
discussion going on about whether stock exchanges should continue to provide 
listing services, or if this is not best provided by an independent regulator so that 
the commercial interests of the exchange do not conflict with its regulatory 
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function. The only area in which stock exchanges still have a monopoly is price 
discovery. No dominant exchange has yet lost its functions as a price discoverer. 
Clearing and settlement as well as the sale of quote and trade data are other very 
stable sources of revenue for an exchange. Most securities exchanges do not 
provide clearing and settlement themselves, however, and there is a lot of pressure 
on those who do to reduce costs and charges. For this reason some exchanges try 
to cut costs by outsourcing major tasks. For example, many exchanges use IT 
software and hardware of other exchanges instead of building up the whole 
system on its own. For most exchanges, transaction fees are the most prominent 
source of revenues apart from price quotes. This might change however, as the 
cost of processing an extra marginal trade tends essentially towards zero through 
the use of automated trading systems. Competition among trading centres pushes 
transaction fees to almost the same level (Lee 2003: 5-7 and Lee6 quoted in 
Schmerken 1999: 82). 
 
According to Shirreff (1998), "exchanges no longer compete on products, 
but on the cost and efficiency of their systems, clearing and settlement, and their 
distribution network". Market participants are particularly interested in two things: 
value-oriented market participants want to achieve a good price on their 
transaction and time-oriented participants want to carry out their transactions as 
quickly as possible. The first group is made up of mainly institutional investors, 
the second of arbitrageurs (Loistl 2000: 104). As a result, "the quality of every 
stock exchange is measured in terms of transparency, liquidity, reasonable 
transaction costs, speed and reliability" (Von Rosen 1992: xviii).  
                                                 
6 Lee R.: Interview. 
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4.3.1.2 The threat by new competitors and substitute products 
As already mentioned, investors are most interested in cheap and quick trading, no 
matter through which facility. It must therefore  
 
"be pointed out that the customer, that is, the end user, is indifferent to the 
choice of system used, provided he gets the service he wants. He will 
choose the intermediary which produces the best price or the best 
execution. The intermediary must decide where and how to achieve that. It 
may be on- or off-exchange, electronic or open outcry" (Shirreff 1998).  
 
According to an article in the Economist ("Good-by to all that"), it would not even 
matter if traditional exchanges disappeared altogether. The reason is that 
electronics can take over all functions of an exchange, and carry them out more 
efficiently and more cost-effectively. Major advantages include a wider range of 
products and longer trading hours. The crucial point is to provide investors with a 
reliable price discovery system, i.e. a means of finding out what sellers are 
offering and what buyers are willing to pay (Sheeline 1990: 65-68). Buyers and 
sellers can find each other without gathering in the same place. Regulation is 
becoming easier because a clear trail is left in the electronic system. Other tasks, 
such as settlement, publishing information etc. can be fulfilled by third parties. 
This view is contested by other authors (e.g. Havens, Shteyman and Saber 2000: 
20) though, as they consider the stock exchange to still have an almost monopoly 
function on the most important task from which ATSs benefit: price finding. On 
the other hand, although pricing is generally considered as the most important 
function of a stock exchange, institutional investors are not really interested in it. 
They seek trading platforms which guarantee the execution of their orders at an 
externally given price without causing any market impact (i.e. without influencing 
the price with their own order). Crossing-networks, for example, match buy and 
sell orders directly at a certain price. The most prominent example is Instinet 
(Sheeline 1990: 65-68 and Loistl 2000: 108). The second function solely fulfilled 
by stock exchanges is listing. Steil (2002: 73-74) believes, however, that there is 
no logical necessity for exchanges to carry out listing themselves. This could be 
easily taken over by accounting firms or rating agencies on a competitive basis. 
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This would both drive down listing costs and help discover the optimal listing 
standards for different companies. Furthermore, markets in which trades are 
executed electronically require a much lower level of trading surveillance than 
those with human intermediation. 
4.3.1.3 The consequences for the role of stock exchanges 
Exchanges are considerably worried about the threats mentioned above. For this 
reason, exchanges have to adapt to the new demands, otherwise they run the risk 
of becoming extinct. In many cases decision-making is painfully slow and 
conservative though, because it is in the interest of most members to preserve the 
status quo for as long as possible ("Farewell to the floor?" 1999). In some way, 
stock exchanges can be compared to airlines.  
 
"Both have traditionally been symbols of national identity to which every 
Western economy has felt it has had a natural right. And yet both will be 
under threat in a Europe without borders" (Moore 1990: 53).  
 
Small countries are certainly at a disadvantage in this respect, as they are unable 
to provide deep and liquid markets (Gaa et al. 2001: 44). On the other hand, fierce 
competition among stock exchanges can improve their services and bring down 
prices, just as competition in other service sectors has resulted in better customer 
service (Von Rosen 1992: xviii).  
 
The OECD (2001) has identified four different strategies of financial 
exchanges to cope with investor demand for lower trading costs, improved 
liquidity, and immediate access to international trading floors. The first strategy, 
pursued by NASDAQ for example, involves establishing branches using local 
partners and a common technology. The goal is to gain access to local markets in 
order to ensure access to information on local companies. This strategy is 
intended to minimise information costs. A second type is based on the generation 
of economies of scale through mergers, such as in the case of Euronext, the 
merger between Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Lisbon. The third way is to 
attempt a hostile take-over, as the Swedish OM Group did in its attempt to take 
over the London Stock Exchange. The fourth strategy is that pursued by the 
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NYSE. It attempts to interconnect leading equity exchanges through a shared 
common electronic interface in a Global Equity Market (for more details see 
Section 5.3.3.1.2 ) (Schmiedel 2001: 12). As a consequence of rapid technological 
change and the threat by competition through other exchanges and ATSs, many 
exchanges have invested heavily in modern trading technology. Today in many 
exchanges everything except the final order execution is automated. At the same 
time, many exchanges have demutualised or merged with their derivative 
exchanges (for further details please see Section 4.3.2.3). In Europe, a vertical 
integration with many clearing and settlement platforms has taken place (please 
also see Section 4.3.2.2) (Gaa et al. 2001: 38). 
 
Automated trading is the factor that has called the traditional exchange 
model into question most. As the exchange is no longer a physical place and 
therefore the marginal cost of adding another member is close to zero, there is no 
need to ration access. Therefore some expect exchanges in future to no longer rely 
on membership fee revenue but on selling trade data, which, as can be seen from 
Section 4.3.1.2 is also a major source of income. In this field of business 
exchanges "will behave like media companies and attempt to charge for the 
provision of information" (Herring and Litan 2002). In any case it is believed that 
European securities markets will not be able to face the challenges from 
automated trading systems alone. Some suggest establishing a single European 
securities market as a network of the different trading and settlement systems 
linked via computer terminals. Regulation will have to take place on a European 
level so that uniform reporting is ensured. Some experts even talk of the need for 
a European SEC ("Too many trading places" 1993: 23). 
 
After this short general introduction to stock exchange competition, the 
next section is intended to provide an overview of the decisive success factors of 
stock exchanges when competing with others. The question is which criteria stock 
exchanges need to fulfil in order to survive. 
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4.3.2 Criteria for the success of competing stock exchanges 
In order to survive in the competitive environment exchanges are facing, they 
need to concentrate both on their strengths and on the critical success factors for 
exchanges. In this section those aspects vital for the survival and success of 
established stock exchanges will be identified. 
 
Stock exchanges pursue the following goals: 
1. Liquidity: This is the overarching goal of all exchanges. 
"Liquidity is essential for trading systems. It enhances the effectiveness of 
the market overall, reducing costs by narrowing spreads and giving depth 
such that prices are less affected by particular trades. Liquid markets are 
typically better placed to absorb shocks than less liquid ones, contributing 
to the robustness of financial systems. Moreover, as discussed in the 
previous section, liquidity is an essential ingredient of price discovery and 
hence price signals of the wider economy" (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 
2001: 45). 
As a result, all criteria for success mentioned below are only subordinate 
goals to enhance liquidity.  
2. Image: In order to protect the image of an exchange, strict insider regulations 
and an efficient securities and exchange supervision are absolutely crucial 
(Breuer 1993: 12).  
3. Technology: According to a survey by A.T. Kearney, institutional investors 
rely heavily on technology to increase the efficiency of transactions, place 
higher emphasis on commissions and transaction costs in general, change 
traditional trading practices and question the benefit of using brokers (Loistl 
2000: 100). The innovation in information systems provides stock exchanges 
with the opportunity to fulfil these new demands of investors by implementing 
totally new organisational structures which are more efficient. In the long run, 
transparency, service, and investor protection are major factors to ensure the 
survival of traditional stock exchanges (Von Rosen 1992: xvii).  
 
According to a study by Schmiedel (2001: 25), stock exchanges are still 
operating at quite a low efficiency level. Large exchanges, however, tend to 
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outperform their smaller competitors. The table below gives an overview of the 
inefficiency scores calculated by Schmiedel (2001: 24) for various European stock 
exchanges. The significant parameter in his model is costs. 
 
Table 1: Ranking of inefficiency scores of European stock exchanges7. 
 
Exchange Inefficiency score 
Swiss Exchange 0.0345 
Euronext Brussels 0.0408 
Euronext Amsterdam 0.0466 
Budapest Stock Exchange 0.0466 
Deutsche Börse AG 0.0719 
Barcelona Stock Exchange 0.0845 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange 0.1915 
Tallinn Stock Exchange 0.1955 
Bolsa de Madrid 0.2235 
Bourse de Luxembourg 0.2606 
Helsinki Stock Exchanges 0.3365 
Euronext Paris 0.3924 
OM Stockholm Exchange 0.4136 
Iceland Stock Exchange 0.4258 
Oslo Bors 0.4489 
London Stock Exchange 0.4629 
Wiener Börse 0.5288 
 
Source: Schmiedel 2001: 24. 
                                                 
7 "The estimates in this table are…individual inefficiency scores of European financial exchanges 
over the time period 1985-1999. The coefficients are listed in ascending order so that those stock 
exchanges with the lowest inefficiency level are ranked first" (Schmiedel 2001: 24). For further 
details on the methodology please see Schmiedel 2001. 
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The study suggests that operating efficiency is linked to size, ownership 
form, trading quality, market concentration, integration of other trading activities, 
exchange governance structure, and automated trade execution technologies. 
Cross-border trading facilities, though, did not result in efficiency gains. Mergers 
and alliances seem to have a beneficial effect in that exchanges can benefit from 
economies of scale or the sharing of the development cost of new electronic 
trading systems (Schmiedel 2001: 24-25). The Swiss exchange has mainly 
benefited from the integration of clearing and settlement transactions. 
Furthermore, Brussels and Amsterdam seem to have profited from the Euronext 
merger. Some of the young exchanges from former Communist countries 
performed very well, which can be explained by the negative relationship between 
the age of an exchange and its efficiency. The fact that the London Stock 
Exchange showed one of the worst results might serve as an explanation for the 
takeover attempt by the Swedish OM Group. 
 
The criteria for success listed below are the most important mentioned in 
the literature on this subject. Stock exchanges rely on them to increase their 
efficiency and ultimately achieve maximum liquidity. The criteria are dealt with 
in alphabetical order without weighting their importance. External growth is 
discussed separately in more detail after the other factors, as it is one of the central 
theses of this thesis that external growth has become crucially important for the 
survival of stock exchanges nowadays. 
4.3.2.1 Corporate governance and ownership structures 
In the past, exchanges have been run for the benefit of their members, but now 
emergence of international competition, the consolidation of investors, and 
technological change has led to a radical shake-up of the old structures (Davies 
1998). The reason why stock exchanges have not competed for market share like 
any other institution is that the owners of the exchanges were also its customers. 
For this reason, the owners were not the best profit maximisers (Hasan, 
Malkamäki and Schmiedel 2002: 9). The original reason for running exchanges as 
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mutual companies was rationing access to trading floors by charging substantial 
membership fees. As a result, only high-volume users would participate.  
 
"This evolved into a system of seats or the right to trade, which was 
essentially a system of self selection based on high initial and yearly 
membership fees. Organisational profit making was never the motive; the 
exchange required funds only to the extent of meeting its expenses. Any 
surplus made by the exchange resulted in reduced access fees for 
members. The accepted norms of behaviour of members and their self 
imposed rules for trading governed the markets. Members were 
responsible for their conduct with one another, with users of the exchange 
and other stakeholders. With securities law in place, the concept of self-
regulation under regulatory oversight emerged" (Ramaseshan 2002: 1). 
 
In return for benefiting from the liquidity created on stock exchanges, non-
members paid members to execute their orders on the exchange floor. In this way 
exchange members became intermediaries (brokers) for the transactions of 
investors (Steil 2002: 62). The fact that the marginal cost of adding a new member 
to an electronic trading network declines toward zero leads to the phenomenon of 
demutualisation. The central concept of demutualisation is the separation of 
ownership and membership. As there is practically no  cost involved in an increase 
in the number of participants, it does not make sense anymore to impose a 
membership fee (access fee). Transaction-based charging has become far more 
feasible. The transacting parties on an electronic network are much more like 
clients or customers of a firm than members.  
 
In general, stock exchanges are aware of the fact that they can only be 
successful in future if they demutualise. For this reason 79 percent of stock 
exchanges were considering demutualisation in 2001. The main reason is that 75 
percent of mutually-owned exchanges believe they are not free to pursue optimal 
profit maximisation strategy. For this reason, they want to separate ownership and 
control and reduce the control of intermediaries over the management of the 
exchange (Ramaseshan 2002:2)8. At the same time, demutualization puts pressure 
on stock exchanges to merge or form alliances, if such a move can be expected to 
                                                 
8 According to a survey of exchanges by the London-based BTA Consulting.  
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increase profits. Demutualisation takes place in different stages, as becomes 
obvious in the figure below: 
 
Figure 4: The process of exchange demutualisation. 
 
Source: Aggarwal 2002: 107. 
 
In the first phase of demutualisation, members are given shares and in this 
way become the legal owners of the exchange. Next, or in some cases in stage 
one, capital is raised through a private placement, usually to members as well as 
outside investors. Being now a demutualised privately owned company, 
exchanges can choose between staying privately owned and listing, which entails 
the removal of all restrictions on ownership and trading. One last option is to 
become a wholly-owned subsidiary of a publicly traded company, such as in the 
case of the Swedish Stock Exchange following its demutualisation in 1993 
(Aggarwal 2002: 107). 
 
The following potential benefits of demutualisation have been identified: 
1. The disadvantages of mutualised exchanges are efficiency costs, namely 
higher trading costs for investors and higher capital costs for companies listed 
on the exchange. According to a survey by the FIBV (Federation of 
International Stock Exchanges), the operating costs of demutualised 
exchanges rose by only eight percent compared to twelve percent of others. 
listed company 
listed company 
private company 
for-profit private company 
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The reason was that these exchanges were more customer- and profit-oriented 
and eventually also recorded a higher profit than the other exchanges. 
2. Demutualisation permits the exchange to bring its technology up-to-date. It 
leads to clearer commercial incentives for efficiency and innovations. A for-
profit exchange is therefore better able to meet the challenges of technological 
advances and changes in the regulatory and economic environment. Another 
reason why exchanges strive to demutualise is that members who derive 
profits from intermediating non-member transactions will resist innovations 
that reduce the demand for their services, despite the fact that these 
innovations might raise the economic value of the exchanges as a whole. 
Owners will therefore block disintermediation, as an increase in the value of 
the exchange would not be able to compensate them for their loss of brokerage 
fees. As electronic trading systems might weaken the position of 
intermediaries, mutualised exchanges might have problems introducing 
automated trading systems. The ability of mutual exchanges to protect 
investor interests and enforce rules is also viewed with suspicion. There are so 
many competing vested interests that it is difficult to keep pace with the speed 
of the market.  
"Internal conflicts often make traditional exchanges slow to embrace 
change. New, profit-seeking exchanges tend to be free of such wrangling 
and lighter on their feet. The old exchanges with the brightest futures 
may be those which abandon their mutual structure of ownership and 
become private companies, as the Milan and Sydney exchanges have 
done" ("Good-bye to all that" 1999).  
3. By offering equity to potential partners, international strategic alliances and 
acquisitions can be developed. In order to prepare for the merger wave among 
stock exchanges, many exchanges decide to list on the stock market 
themselves. The reason behind going public is that companies which are listed 
on the stock exchange and which have multiple owners are forced to work 
efficiently. This is seen as a good means of meeting ever- increasing 
competitive pressure ("Mutter aller Schlachten" 2001: 52). 
4. The governance and management structure has become more flexible, better 
able to respond to changes in the industry or market conditions, and less 
dependent on the interests of members and conflicts between classes of 
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members. Decision-making is improved, keeping the enhancement of 
shareholder-value in mind. According to a study by Schmiedel (2001: 22), 
ownership has a direct impact on the management of exchanges.  
5. Members' equity is unlocked and the vested interest of traders can be bought 
out. However, demutualising itself makes little difference if the former 
members of the mutual organisation end up owning a controlling interest in 
the publicly traded exchange. Therefore the crucial point is not the change to 
the for-profit status, but the shift in control from entrenched local brokers to 
other investors, otherwise the exchange might not be able to fully exploit the 
advantages of demutualisation. Examples of exchanges which were organised 
as for-profit companies, but were not effectively demutualised include the 
German Stock Exchange and the Paris Stock Exchange. Before their IPO in 
2001, these exchanges had the same incentive structure as a mutual exchange. 
This was due to the fact that ownership stakes, which were mainly controlled 
by members, could not be sold without the supervisory board's approval, 
which meant that it was virtually impossible to sell them. The essential point 
about demutualisation is therefore that non-members are free to buy equity 
stakes from cur rent owners. Only in this way is it possible to change the 
incentive structure (Steil 2002: 66). Another striking example is the Borsa 
Italiana, which is officially demutualised but where in fact 90 percent of 
stakes are still in the hands of Italian intermediaries. At the other end of the 
continuum we have OM Stockholm, which is self- listed and has a very diverse 
shareholder base, with about 25 percent of shareholders being foreign (Steil 
2002: 67). 
6. The exchange can avoid concentration of ownership power and risk. 
7. Appropriate incentives for management which also control them. 
8. Easier access to additional capital. 
9. By eliminating middlemen, access to markets is becoming easier (BTA 2001, 
Cameron 2002, Karmel 2002a and 2002b, Lee 1998, Sydney Futures 
Exchange, Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 35, Schmiedel 2001: 22, Steil 
2002: 63, 67, Ramaseshan 2002: 4 and Freedberg9 quoted in Sales 1999). 
                                                 
9 Freedberg H.: Interview.  
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The official reason why exchanges try to bring in non-members as owners 
is their need to raise capital for expansion and technology investment. 
Empirically, however, the primary function of demutualisation is to decrease the 
level of control of intermediaries over the exchange's strategy. Exchange members 
will only accept new outside ownership if there is a high degree of competition as 
competition makes it more difficult for them to protect their intermediation 
function. Another reason for the acceptance of outside ownership is if the largest 
member firms operate internationally; large international players have less 
motivation to defend mutualisation than local players. Demutualisation increases 
their strategic control over the exchange in relation to local members by 
modifying the one-member, one-vote system towards a system which is based on 
the size of the ownership stake (Aggarwal 2002: 107). 
 
There are also several counter-arguments against demutualisation. For 
example, "the commercial nature of the exchange, namely profit maximisation, 
may contradict its role as a public entity providing a service" (Ramaseshan 2002: 
5). Many stock exchanges used to be government-owned because they were seen 
as serving a public interest, since a fair and efficient capital market is considered a 
public good (IOSCO 2000). Stock exchanges therefore play an important role in 
not only the functioning of capital markets, but also of the overall economy. This 
is due to the fact that a functioning financial market is necessary for real-
economic growth (Blum et al. 2002). What would happen, for example, if a for-
profit exchange went out of business? This might result in serious trouble if listed 
companies found it difficult to raise capital elsewhere or if investors had to cope 
with reduced liquidity of their portfolios (Aggarwal 2002: 109). It should be 
noted, however, that concerns are similar in the privatised utilities sector. In most 
countries, the response has been the imposition of statutory duties on the directors 
of the utility "to act in the public interest" (IOSCO 2000). The same approach is 
taken with regard to stock exchanges by some countries. According to a model by 
Hart and Moore (1996), member-owners want low exchange costs and high 
exchange profits. Outside owners, on the other hand, only seek high profits. For a 
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wide group of shareholders it will be difficult to stop any anti-competitive 
activity, due to a lack of influence. As the shareholders of the exchange are not its 
users, they will also have no incentive to do so, in contrast to the members of a 
cooperative securities exchange (Lee 2003: 16). The problem is therefore that the 
interests of important stakeholders may not be adequately reflected due to the fact 
that former shareholders have become stakeholders (which has decreased their 
influence) and vice versa. Another question is what the consequences of freely 
transferable shares of listed exchanges are. What would happen if a hostile 
takeover led to a situation in which the interests of the new shareholders were not 
compatible with the role of the exchange as a public entity (i.e. if the exchange 
were controlled by one or more persons or if it were under influence of 
"inappropriate" shareholders)? In order to prevent such a situation most exchanges 
limit concentration of holding and control by imposing a shareholding limit. This 
limit is usually 5 percent, though at the Australian stock exchange it is 15 percent. 
Another concern is an appropriate governance structure to balance the interests of 
the public and shareholders. Another conflict of interest could arise through 
diversification. The financial viability of an exchange could be threatened if other 
commercial activities involved high financial risk (Ramaseshan 2002: 6 and 
IOSCO 2000: 9). One central problem in connection with demutualised exchanges 
occurs if the exchange is in a monopoly position. A for-profit exchange which is a 
monopolist will maximise profits by increasing price, reducing output, and 
decreasing expenditures. This is neither desirable for the users of the exchange 
nor for the general public. For this reason there are strong arguments against the 
tendency of trading in assets gravitating to a single exchange finally becoming a 
monopolist. Apart from regulatory worries, one must also not neglect the fact that 
there are significant costs involved in the process of demutualisation. On the other 
hand, not all of the potential benefits will really come into effect (Lee 2003: 13-
15).  
 
Despite all these reservations, there are numerous examples of successful 
demutualisations of stock exchanges. In 1993, Stockholm was the first exchange 
in the world to demutualise. Demutualisation was triggered by the fact that 
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Stockholm's turnover declined by a third between 1987 and 1990 due to 
competition from London's SEAQ International10. In the course of the 
demutualisation, 50 percent of the shares were retained by members and the other 
50 percent were allocated to listed companies. In 1994 the shares became freely 
tradable and were finally listed on the exchange itself in 1998. After 
demutualisation, the Stockholm exchange was the first in Europe to offer 
institutional investors remote cross-border membership and direct electronic 
access. Although the local Swedish members were reluctant to accept these 
measures, they were unable to block them due to their minority interest. It was the 
non-member owners who supported these measures. The success of demutualising 
is evidenced by the fact that in the first two years after demutualisation, turnover 
quadrupled and the share price rose nearly sevenfold. Helsinki and Copenhagen, 
which demutualisation in 1995 and 1996, applied a 60-40 split between members 
and listed companies when initially allocating the shares in the course of 
demutualisation. Amsterdam, in contrast, gave 50 percent to members and the 
other half to listed companies as well as institutional investors through an auction. 
Australia allocated all shares to its members, but on the day following 
demutualisation all shares were listed on the exchange (Domowitz and Steil 1999: 
15-16). The listing proved to be very successful.  
 
"Shares in the Australian Stock exchange, which are trading at three times 
their 1998 listing price, highlight the potential [of stock exchange IPOs]. 
They have been among the best performer on their own market" 
("Exchange casts off shackles" 2000). 
 
The reasons for the Toronto stock exchange to go public were the technological 
and regulatory changes, the launch of an ATS, and the resulting battle for market 
share in the Canadian stock market (Lorinc 2000: 23). Up to now the following 
exchanges have demutualised (Domowitz and Steil 1999: 43, Malkamäki and 
Topi 1999: 19 and "Mutter aller Schlachten": 52): 
                                                 
10 SEAQ is the London Stock Exchange's service for mid-cap securities and the most liquid AIM 
securities. 
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Table 1: Demutualised stock exchanges. 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (1993) Helsinki Stock Exchange (1995) 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange (1996) Borsa Italiana (1997) 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (1997) Australian Stock Exchange (1998) 
Iceland Stock Exchange (1999) Athens Stock Exchange (1999) 
Vienna Stock Exchange (1999) NASDAQ (2000) 
London Stock Exchange (2000) Hongkong (2000) 
Stock Exchange of Singapore (2000) Toronto Stock Exchange (2000)  
Euronext (2000) German Stock Exchange (2000) 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (2001) Chicago Mercantile Exchange (2002) 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (2002)  
 
 Based on Aggarwal (2002: 106) and Stamm (2004).  
 
A few stock exchanges also got listed:  
 
Table 2: Listed exchanges. 
OM Group (now OMX) (1987) Australian Stock Exchange (1998) 
Hong Kong (2000) Hellenic Exchanges (2000) 
Singapore Exchange (2000) Toronto Stock Exchange (2000) 
Oslo Exchange (2001) Euronext (2001) 
London Stock Exchange (2001) German Stock Exchange (2001) 
New Zealand Stock Exchange (2003)  
Source: Aggarwal (2002: 106). 
 
Due to the fact that the financial performance of demutualised and listed 
exchanges is more closely followed by shareholders and the market in general, 
demutualisation in general and listing in particular in many cases further increases 
the pressure on stock exchanges to form cooperations in order to maximise 
profits. All in all it can be said that up to now the evidence for the success of 
demutualisations – in the form of stock price movements – has been very 
encouraging (Aggarwal 2002: 113). 
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4.3.2.2 Degree of organisation and technicalisation 
In this subsection two aspects of stock exchange success which are closely linked 
are discussed: on the one hand technicalisation, which refers to automation in 
trading, and on the other hand, organisational integration, which describes the 
degree of integration of clearing and settlement systems. Technicalisation is a 
prerequisite for integrating clearing and settlement efficiently so that straight 
through processing becomes possible. The fact that both of these factors are very 
important for stock exchanges is highlighted by the fact that "investment has been 
channelled aggressively into improving settlement and trading systems" (Moore 
1990: 53). 
 
The advantages of automated trading versus floor trading are a frequently 
discussed topic. The increased competition among international stock markets 
forces exchanges to search for ever more efficient trading systems with low cost, 
such as in the case of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, which was the first one to 
introduce electronic trading in the 1980s (Jensen and Natorp 2000). Even minimal 
differences in market liquidity and fees determine the attractiveness of a market or 
trading system (Gerke and Hamann 1991: 14). The main advantage of electronic 
trading systems is their speed and higher cost efficiency compared to floor trading 
(Breuer 1993: 12). Trading floors cost a lot more money than electronic systems. 
For this reason many exchanges abandon them, which they expect to save them up 
to 40 percent of their cost ("Good-bye to all that" 1999). Apart from cost savings, 
automated trading offers the following advantages: 
§ Higher predictability of market reactions due to a more orderly and consistent 
market as the system rigorously adheres to market rules. This is also due to 
the high transparency of information concerning the trading process, i.e. 
timely information on prices and quantities of both potential and executed 
orders for each trader. If stock exchanges merge, the amount  of information 
available even increases. 
§ More fairness, equality, and market transparency, as information can be 
accessed by all market participants at the same time since geographical 
barriers are removed. As a result, information and search costs are lower. Due 
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to the reasons mentioned above, this argument also increases the pressure on 
stock exchange to merge.  
§ More market participants, because there is no need for physical presence. 
This factor also contributes to the trend towards mergers and alliances.  
§ Cost reductions and lower market risk, since trades are matched and 
forwarded directly to the clearing system for settlement. 
§ Direct access to the trading system by all market participants, which makes 
markets cheaper to enter. 
§ Possible efficiencies from consolidation (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 30, 
37, Peacock 1992: 83 and Von Rosen 1992: xviii). 
 
But in how far do automation and investments in new technology really 
pay off for exchanges? According to Domowitz and Steil (1999), automation has 
significantly reduced trading costs to the benefit of investors. Moreover, Hasan 
and Malkamäki (2001) found considerable economies of scale and scope to be 
exploited by stock exchanges. In order to estimate cost savings from the switch 
from floor to automated trading, several studies have been conducted. The 
switchover from floor-based to automated trading leads to higher efficiency 
whereas remote access is positively associated with cost inefficiency. This is due 
to the fact that exchanges incurred high establishment costs for remote 
membership access. There are no short-term efficiency gains here though 
inefficiencies are expected to decrease in the long run. Furthermore, a study by 
Schmiedel (2001: 22) came to the conclusion that the age of an exchange is 
negatively correlated to its efficiency. As far as market quality is concerned, 
traditional exchanges clinging to the floor system claim that they are better able to 
absorb large orders without market impact. This is questionable, however, as floor 
traders are suspected of benefiting from their knowledge of such deals ("Good-
bye to all that" 1999). Domowitz and Steil (1999: 22) found that "market quality 
is roughly equalized across automated and floor technologies". Although much 
has improved, there are still considerable revenue and cost inefficiencies among 
exchanges. North American exchanges are perceived to be the most efficient in 
terms of both cost and revenue. European exchanges, on the other hand, have 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
improved most in terms of cost efficiency (Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel 
2002: 7). In general, technicalisation will increase the pressure on stock 
exchanges to cooperate, since automated trading platforms increase the potential 
for economies of scale and since it permits the linking of trading platforms. 
 
A second very important competitive factor for stock exchanges linked to 
technicalisation is better and quicker clearing and settlement (Breuer 1993: 8). 
Clearing denotes the confirmation of the type and quantity of a financial 
instrument traded, the date of transaction, as well as the price and the identities of 
buyer and seller. Settlement means the fulfilment of the obligations arising from 
the transaction (Scarlata 1992). The clearing house, which places itself between 
the buyer and the seller, compares trades between parties and removes the risk 
from the settlement process. It ensures that the buyer receives the instrument 
purchased and that the seller receives payment by becoming the counterparty to 
all trades. In this way the clearing house guarantees every trade.  
 
"Each participant has a net obligation with the clearinghouse to buy or sell 
the security based on his or her net position with other participants in the 
clearinghouse. A third institution – the depository – is an organization (not 
necessarily part of an exchange) that holds stocks and bonds for 
safekeeping on behalf of their owners. It has a computerized accounting 
system to record and transfer ownership of securities between participants 
by integrating a book-entry system with a money transfer system" (Scalata 
1992).  
 
The degree of organisation of a stock exchange determines the number of steps 
involved in order to "produce" the products and services of stock exchanges. The 
aim is STP ("straight though processing"), which means that trading is automated 
to such a degree that from the placing of the order over trading to clearing and 
settlement, no human intervention is necessary. In view of the globalisation of 
markets, institutional investors demand the standardisation of transaction 
processes on a global basis (Loistl 2000: 101-102). This factor further adds to 
stock exchange cooperations.  
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In the area of clearing and settlement, a high degree of consolidation can 
be observed. The efficiency of clearing and settlement has substantial influence on 
transaction costs. In Europe, clearing and settlement institutions are nationally 
fragmented so that cross-border trading is quite costly. In 2001 there were 21 
settlement systems in the 15 EU countries, in contrast to only two in the US. In 
the meantime, clearing and settlement institutions have already begun to 
consolidate and form alliances, which was mainly due to the introduction of the 
euro. Since CSDs and settlement houses are already relatively highly integrated 
on a national level, the stress has to be on reforms in cross-border settlement, 
particularly as there are significant economies of scale available to such 
institutions. With steadily rising cross-border activity, institutional investors and 
broker/dealers put pressure on clearing and settlement institutions to bring down 
the cost and complexity of cross-border trades. The main concern is the high 
transaction fees for the clearing and settlement of cross-border trades (on average 
42 percent higher than for comparable domestic trades), which is due to the 
complexities of EU international securities and settlement systems and differences 
in the underlying scope of ICSD services (Gaa et al 2001: 55 and De Carvalho 
2004). 
 
A study by Schmiedel and Malkamäki (2002: 29) reports the existence of 
considerable economies of scale for both depository and settlement activities. The 
centralised US system is the most cost efficient; for this reason it can be 
considered a cost-saving benchmark. According to estimates, clearing and 
settlement costs are nine to ten times higher for European transactions than for US 
transactions. The cost of cross-border transactions in Europe can be ten times as 
much as domestic trades in Europe, and can even be up to an unbelievable forty-
six times higher than in the US (London Stock Exchange 2001). Settlement 
institutions in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region therefore have a higher potential 
for cost savings per unit. The results of the study clearly support mergers and 
alliances among smaller settlement institutions. Regulation plays a crucial role in 
improving the effectiveness of the operative infrastructure of the settlement 
industry. "In the regulated and centralised US market settlement is carried out at 
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almost optimal scale compared to the corresponding systems in Europe and Asia-
Pacific regions" (Schmiedel and Malkamäki 2002: 29-30). Therefore, the 
formation of a pan-European central counterparty – similar to the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation in the US – has to be encouraged and similar 
efforts would have to be taken in regard to settlement operations and central 
securities depositories (McAndrews and Stefanadis 2002). The EU also considers 
the establishment of efficient clearing and settlement structures to be of prime 
importance as the number of cross-border transactions is increasing and as both 
exchanges and new types of trading platforms are increasingly dependent on 
consolidated clearing houses and central counterparty facilities (Committee of 
Wise Men 2001: 80). 
 
There is also some progress to be reported, however. For example, 
Deutsche Börse Clearing and Cedelbank Luxembourg have merged to become 
Clearstream International. In 2002 Clearstream was acquired by Deutsche Börse. 
The purpose of this merger was a vertical integration of trading, clearing, and 
settlement services within a single institution. In September 2002 CrestCo, a UK-
based clearing and settlement institution, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Euroclear, the largest European clearing and settlement institution, which 
constituted a horizontal merger and in 2003 the London Clearing House and 
Clearnet, two leading CCPs, merged. Both cooperations are considered a step 
towards an integrated European capital market (Schmiedel and Malkamäki 2002: 
7-8 and De Carvalho 2004). Euronext currently attempts to integrate the 
settlement system of each of its members under LCH.clearnet, but has not yet 
finished conversion to the new clearing platform. Schmiedel and Malkamäki 
(2002: 30) expect further collaboration and consolidation among existing CSDs in 
Europe in the near future. If clearing and settlement bodies start to integrate, the 
pressure on exchanges to consolidate could increase even further (Skeete 2000).  
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4.3.2.3 Integration of derivatives markets 
Derivatives markets grew significantly at the beginning of the nineties and 
derivatives have become an important product of exchanges (Breuer 1993: 8). The 
merger between equity and derivatives exchanges is just a logical continuation of 
consolidation among regional stock exchanges and of strategic advantage (Loistl 
2000: 112). According to Williamson (1997: 407), the following are reasons for 
equity/derivative mergers:  
§ Economies of scale. Exchanges can, for example, integrate such functions as 
product development or marketing, or move to one building. The advantage 
for members is that rules are harmonised and that they only have to deal with 
one exchange. Furthermore, the development of cross-market products 
becomes easier.  
§ The potential gains from a merger are enhanced further as technology 
progresses. Equity and derivatives markets can be electronically integrated, 
which is cheaper than operating two separate markets. The same applies to 
clearing and settlement, where substantial synergies could be derived. 
§ As competition is becoming fiercer, the independent survival of some 
exchanges might be threatened and the pressure to reduce costs is increased. 
This also eventually leads to cross-border consolidation. In order to enhance 
their bargaining position in a cross-border merger, exchanges try to 
consolidate as far as possible on a national level.  
 
Examples of mergers between equity and derivatives markets within 
countries can be found in Switzerland in 1993, Germany in 1994, the Netherlands, 
Finland, France, and Austria in 1997, Sweden in 1998, Hong Kong in 1999, 
Singapore in 2000, and Greece in 2002. In 2002 LIFFE was acquired by Euronext 
forming Euronext.liffe. The aim of this step was to provide an integrated 
derivatives market for the UK, Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris. The Milan 
stock exchange acquired the Italian options and futures exchange in the same year. 
Derivatives exchanges have also recently started to team up across countries. A 
prominent example is GLOBEX, a strategic alliance between the derivatives 
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markets of Euronext, Spain (MEFF), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Montreal, 
Sao Paolo Commodities and Futures Exchange, and the Singapore Exchange, 
providing the world's first electronic trading network for futures and option 
contracts (FESE 2004). According to Williamson (1999), merge rs between equity 
and derivative exchanges within countries are one of the most common forms of 
linkages and will become even more frequent in future. The integration of 
derivatives markets will not necessarily increase the pressure on stock exchanges 
to merge or form alliances. 
4.3.2.4 Market segmentation 
As has become obvious in previous sections, there is a strong trend towards the 
concentration of trading facilities at a single geographic location. Consolidation 
among exchanges within a country seems to be inevitable, and even supranational 
exchanges are becoming more and more common. For some  observers, a central 
worldwide trading platform is even imaginable. One reason is that product 
differentiation is difficult in relation to the provision of trading facilities (Loistl 
2000: 110). It is unlikely, however, that one stock exchange will really be able to 
gain a real monopoly position (on the one hand due to regulator barriers, on the 
other institutional investors will not risk becoming captive to a single exchange.  
 
The lesson to be learned from the US is that far fewer exchanges are 
required and secondly that the major stock markets concentrate on different types 
of trading: the NYSE focuses on liquid titles offering an auction market system, 
whereas NASDAQ provides a dealer market for less heavily traded shares. In 
Europe, on the other hand, the big stock exchanges copy each other instead of 
differentiating themselves. This is due to the desire of all exchanges to meet the 
needs of the biggest clients: pension funds and mutual funds. At the same time, 
"the risk in what European exchanges are now seeking to do is that by aping each 
other, they could undermine the strengths they already have" ("Shaping up"). 
Instead traditional stock exchanges have to ask themselves whether they offer up-
to-date services or if certain market segments are missing. One option would be 
the introduction of a segment which allows block trading (such as the upstairs-
market of the NYSE). Such a segment is strongly supported by a study by 
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Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) who found that over two-thirds of the 
block-sized trades in their sample were completed in the upstairs market. The 
question might also be if there is demand for hit-or-take segments or matching or 
crossing systems similar to those offered by ATSs (Von Rosen 1994: 1217). 
 
Many small exchanges have to seek out niches in order to survive. At the 
same time, they must try to provide better service and incur lower costs through 
technological advantages. One niche would be to offer innovative financial 
products. If they try to compete on price with the large exchanges, they will fail 
(Brennan 1993). The strategy of the Vienna Stock Exchange, for example is to 
invest in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2004, for example, the Vienna Stock 
Exchange acquired a 24 percent stake in the Budapest Stock Exchange ("Austro-
Banken raufen um Börse Budapest" and Wiener Börse: "Beteiligungen"). The 
need for offering a wide range of market segments is likely to increase to pressure 
on exchanges to cooperate. 
4.3.2.5 Supervision of trading 
Stock exchanges are self-regulatory bodies in most countries. Self-regulation 
denotes "the way in which the securities industry monitors itself to create a fair 
and orderly trading environment" ("New York Stock Exchange-Glossary"). That 
means that exchanges (no matter whether they are profit-oriented or not) need to 
be able to carry out self- regulatory duties concerning listing requirements, 
assurance of fair and equitable treatment of customers, market-manipulation, and 
surveillance of member firms (Aggarwal 2002: 109). Some fear that self-
regulation might be under threat if exchanges demutualise.  
 
"A demutualised exchange, focused on profits, may not take its self-
regulatory role seriously. The benefits of effective regulation are not 
visible, while the expenditure on regulation is" (Ramaseshan 2002: 5). On 
the other hand, "with intense competition, any exchange that compromises 
on self-regulation and which is perceived to be lax in enforcement may 
eventually lose the patronage of investors. Thus in a competitive 
environment, self-regulation is expected to be stronger" (Ramaseshan 
2002: 6). 
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As a result of demutualisation, the interest of exchange owners may substantially 
diverge from those of its main customers. Demutualisation leads to the profit-
maximisation goal becoming more evident and explicit. This raises the question of 
conflicts of interest in connection with the regulatory function of exchanges, 
especially in regard to primary market regulation, secondary market regulation 
and member regulation. Is there a need for a special regime to protect the public 
interest, such as corporate governance rules or restrictions on share ownership? 
Will the regulatory function of the exchange be backed by adequate funding? 
Although there are also a number of potential conflicts of interest in a member-
owned exchange (some even argue that a for-profit exchange might conduct its 
regulatory duties more diligently than traditional exchanges since they do not 
want to put the reputation of the exchange at risk and since fines may be a source 
of potential revenue) most experts express concern that the profit-orientation of 
demutualised exchanges adds to the scope of conflicts of interest. One argument is 
that "the benefits of good regula tion are harder to quantify and therefore may not 
be given full weight" (IOSCO 2000: 5). Furthermore, the exchange might be 
reluctant to commit the necessary resources strict self-enforcement would require. 
Profit-oriented exchanges might be hesitant to enforce action against customers or 
users who constitute a major source of income. For the same reason of generating 
investment returns for its shareholders, a for-profit exchange may be less willing 
to suspend trading in liquid securities if transaction fees are lost through this 
measure (IOSCO 2000: 2-6). The problem of self-regulation becomes even more 
difficult when the exchange lists its shares on itself. In this case, the exchange has 
to self-regulate. Listed exchanges basically have three options to proceed in this 
matter: 
1. The exchange can continue to perform all of its regulatory functions in the 
same way as before arguing that demutualisation and self- regulation do not 
conflict with each other. A case in point is the Swedish OM Group. 
2. The exchange can establish a separate entity which takes over the regulatory 
function in order to reduce conflict of interest issues. An example of this 
model is NASDAQ. "One chance might be to keep SROs within exchanges, 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
but in a subsidiary with a 'Chinese Wall' separating trading and member 
surveillance from day-to-day operations" ("For-Profit Stock Markets").  
3. The exchange can leave the regulatory function to a completely independent 
third party. On the one hand, this helps avoid conflicts of interest, on the other, 
it must be ensured that the third-party regulator can be held liable and 
performs its functions properly so that the reputation and brand name of the 
exchange does not get harmed (Aggarwal 2002: 109-110). The ASX, for 
example, has transferred the administration of listing rules to the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission. When the LSE demutualised in 1999, 
the regulatory role was transferred to the Financial Services Authority.  
 
In order to remedy the potential dangers from a stock exchange regula ting itself, 
several measures can be taken by financial services authorities. These measures 
include the requirement for public directors, rigorous regulatory oversight, stricter 
transparency rules regarding decisions of the exchange, or a functional separation 
of the regulatory function of the exchange from its commercial activities. The last 
requirement is one reason why the NYSE has not demutualised yet, namely the 
fact that the SEC requires the establishment of an independent regulatory body 
first. However, the NYSE considers the regulatory function of the exchange an 
integral part of its reputation and branding (which it considers more important for 
the survival of the exchange in a demutualised environment than demutualising 
itself) and has therefore backed away from demutualisation. If regulatory agencies 
(no matter whether the exchange itself or third parties) fail to ensure supervision 
of trading, markets will dry out because investors lose trust. Therefore only 
markets with a transparent and efficient supervision will survive (Loistl 2000: 
100). Supervision has been a task of most stock exchanges for decades, therefore 
it will not have significant influence on their cooperative strategy. Young 
exchanges might be an exception. 
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4.3.2.6 Transaction costs 
Securities trading rests on three pillars: research, portfolio management, and 
trading. In times of ever reducing margins and higher information efficiency, the 
third pillar is becoming more and more important. For this reason cost efficiency 
of exchanges is crucial for customers (investors, in particular institutional 
investors). Institutions that continuously try to decrease transaction costs will win 
over customers from those which fail to do so (Loistl 2000: 100-101). 
 
Transaction costs consist of four components: first, the commission cost 
(the broker's basic fee for purchasing or selling securities as an agent), second, the 
bid-ask spread, third, the market impact cost of trade execution, and fourth, the 
cost of clearing and settlement (administrative cost). Market impact refers to a 
possible price concession plus (for buys) or minus (for sells) the equilibrium price 
to be able to execute a trade immediately (Berkowitz, Logue and Noser 1988: 88). 
The cost of market impact depends on the patience of investors and on brokers. If 
investors trade large amounts of illiquid stocks or whole blocks of heavily traded 
stocks, they can create substantial market impact. Therefore, it is quite important 
to understand the nature and magnitude of market impact costs and their 
correlation with commission costs (Berkowitz, Logue and Noser 1988: 88). In 
order to keep clearing and settlement costs down settlement systems have to be 
integrated, since otherwise administrative costs will increase (for more details 
please see Section 4.3.2.2) (Amati 2001: 11). According to Gerke and Rapp 
(1994: 16), stock exchanges can make use of economies of scale by increasing 
their order volumes, which in turn permits a reduction in transaction costs per 
order. At the same time, increased liquidity also reduces implicit costs (the market 
impact) of a transaction. For this reason an increasing trend towards mergers and 
alliances can be observed, as the critical mass of single exchanges is frequently 
not large enough to ensure competitive, cost-efficient, and liquid trading. In 
Europe, for example,  
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"the fragmentation of European exchanges has been identified as one 
source of high transaction costs. Mergers between exchanges and the joint 
use of trading systems are considered to be part of the solution" (Kasch-
Haroutounian and Theissen 2003: 1). 
 
In an indirect way, taxes are also part of transaction costs which cannot be 
influenced by the stock exchange directly. Taxes have significant impact on the 
level of trading and are therefore a major policy tool of stock market competition 
and integration (Licht 1997: 64). 
 
The amount of transaction costs to be borne by investors depends not only 
on the characteristics of the traded security, but also on the structure of the market 
as well as the order placement strategies of market participants. In quote-driven 
markets, market makers continuously post bid and ask prices, whereas in order-
driven markets the buy and sell orders of final clients are matched directly. 
Therefore, in the latter case it is investors themselves and not intermediaries that 
keep the market liquid, this reduces transaction costs, since market makers do not 
have to be reimbursed for providing liquidity. Today, blue chips are traded in an 
electronic order book almost all over the world (Gajewski and Gresse 2003: 3). 
Electronic trading also has a positive impact on transaction costs. It reduces them 
by making markets more transparent, which in turn reduces the risk premium. 
Moreover, it allows cheaper order processing and lower overheads. Market impact 
costs are reduced as well, for example through pre-trade non-transparent systems. 
Studies by Vila and Sandman (1995) and Pirrong (1996) show that prices are less 
sensitive to large orders in automated than in traditional markets. It also improves 
the price dynamics, as electronic orders reach the market faster than manually 
processed orders. For this reason, prices incorporate new information more 
quickly, whereas volatility remains about the same (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 
2001: 43). According to Abraham and Pirard (2002: 17-18), most exchanges in 
developed countries have materialised significant reductions in transaction costs 
in the past few years. Transaction costs generally reached similar levels between 
25 and 35 basis points in 2000. The U.K. on the buying side (due to its stamp 
duty) and Spain were the only outstanding exceptions with 72.7 basis points on 
the buying side in the U.K. and over forty basis points in Spain.  
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Table 3: The cost of executing trades in different countries11. 
 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Euroland (main centres)       
Germany 39.3 27.6 28.7 29.3 30.7 30.1 
France 29.9 26.6 24.9 33.8 37.0 31.9 
Italy 36.1 30.4 34.2 39.0 37.2 33.5 
Spain 47.1 43.0 42.3 41.2 38.5 49.9 
Belgium 37.1 33.9 27.9 35.1 28.3 35.2 
Other EU (main centres)       
UK buying 73.7 71.0 71.1 72.7 69.0 72.5 
UK selling 32.8 34.2 30.5 38.8 35.9 31.6 
Sweden 36.1 30.9 31.5 30.4 41.0 34.5 
USA       
NYSE 34.1 23.6 24.6 28.4 32.2 29.3 
NASDAQ 51.9 29.9 33.3 36.3 38.6 40.4 
Japan buying 30.6 18.2 35.1 n.a.12 n.a. n.a. 
Japan selling  56.0 36.3 25.1 22.1 19.9 21.8 
Source: Degryse and Van Achter (2002) based on Elkins/McSherry data "The cost of executing 
trades in 42 countries" published yearly in the Institutional Investor. Figures from 2000 onwards 
were directly taken from this journal. 
 
Abraham and Pirard (2002: 18) consider these reductions to be the result of both 
automation and competition. In continental Europe the switch from open outcry to 
electronic trading also decreased costs. Furthermore, in bearish markets the 
pressure towards cost efficiency tends to increase even further. Since the potential 
for reductions in trading costs is considered to be relatively limited on European 
exchanges, more attention will be paid to the efficiency of clearing and settlement 
(the back-office components of transaction costs) in future. The need of stock 
exchanges to reduce their costs in order to be able to offer competitive transaction 
costs and the existence of economies of scale will make stock exchanges pursue 
cooperative strategies. 
                                                 
11 The Elkins/McSherry analysis measures total trading costs as execution commissions and fees 
plus market impact of trades. 
12 From 2000 on, there is are no separate figures given for buying and selling in Japan.  
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4.3.2.7 Transparency regulations 
Transparency regulations on orders before and after settlement are an important 
criterion for the attractiveness of an exchange.  
 
"Transparency is the ability of market participants to observe information 
about the trading process – pre-trade information concerns order sizes and 
quotes, while post-trade information centres on prices and quantities of 
executed trades. Other considerations include the timeliness of the 
information, which (subset of) participants can observe certain aspects, 
and pre and post-trade anonymity (when identities are revealed)" (Allen 
and Hawkins 2002: 53). 
 
The pricing mechanism at a stock exchange is left to the free interplay of supply 
and demand. However, one must not neglect the fact that the price and extent of 
the counter-bid is influenced by the price of the bid. As traders know about this 
correlation, they want to place large orders anonymously. Investors favour 
transparency when they are looking for market information, otherwise they prefer 
to remain anonymous. Third parties are not supposed to get information about 
transactions, since they could otherwise take a "free-rider" position by imitating 
the behaviour of a block trader without sharing the costs of research (Von Rosen 
1994: 1214 and Gomber 2000: 46). 
 
That is why traders try to avoid entering block trades into the order book. 
All major exchanges have reduced transparency requirements for block trades, 
such as by delayed publication. Some exchanges even offer special market-
segments for block trades, such as the upstairs-market of the NYSE. In this 
segment, larger orders can be traded anonymously over the phone among 
specialised block trading departments of stock exchange members. Those orders 
which are not matched in the upstairs-market are executed on the floor of the 
NYSE (Gomber 200: 46). As absolute anonymity is usually not granted by large 
exchanges, however, block traders have switched to new systems such as ATSs 
which offer anonymity vis-à-vis the counterparty. Electronic trading provides a 
high potential for varying degrees of transparency across the whole trading 
process. Systems can disseminate real-time pre- and post-trade information 
market-wide. They also provide minimal information leakage to a degree which 
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trading based on personal contact could never achieve. The advantage of 
anonymous trading is that it might lead to a better price, especially in the case of 
large transactions (Jensen and Natorp 2000). Investors particularly want pre-trade 
information leakage to be eliminated. On the other hand, block orders do not 
automatically imply the desire for anonymity. In cases where traders trade large 
blocks of funds but want to signal that they do not have superior information it 
might be more sensible to reveal not only the order but also the identity of the 
trader to the market to explicitly document that there is no private information 
involved (Gomber 2000: 45). The ultimate form and degree of transparency of a 
trading system depends on market-specific factors, keeping in mind the ultimate 
goal of attracting liquidity (Allen, Hawkins and Sato 2001: 41). In retail markets, 
for example, greater transparency is desired by investors in order to guarantee 
consumer information and protection (Allen and Hawkins 2002: 53 and Loistl 
2000: 105). Transparency regulations will not have substantial influence on the 
merger and alliance activity of stock exchanges. 
4.3.3 External growth of stock exchanges 
Just like any other company, stock exchanges need to grow in order to survive. 
Facing competitive pressure, European exchanges pursue different strategies to be 
successful. Some try to grow organically, while others look to far-reaching 
alliances or even mergers (Committee of Wise Men 2001: 81). External growth is 
a very important success factor for stock exchanges, since most of them will not 
be able to survive without growing externally in future.  
 
Factors underlying the development of financial centres can be broadly 
divided into centripetal and centrifugal forces. Economies of scale (see Section 
5.4.1) are, together with information spillovers or market liquidity, considered the 
most important centripetal force in payment and settlement and trading systems 
(Kindelberger 1974 and Gehrig 1998). The main centrifugal forces are market 
access costs (transportation costs and transaction costs) and information 
localisation. In markets where price information relies on complex local 
information (such as in stock or derivative markets), centrifugal forces are quite 
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strong. For this reason the trading of such instruments is more likely to take place 
in local rather than in global financial centres or electronic trading systems. The 
fact that there is an increasing trend towards cooperation also among stock 
exchanges shows, however, that the competitive situation strengthens centripetal 
forces. 
 
The creation of linkages with firms that possess complementary 
capabilities or similar capabilities is one way to respond to the challenges of 
competition and globalisation. Linkages lead to economies of scale and scope, 
reduce risk, and strengthen the competitive position of a firm. At the same time 
firms have the chance to learn new or improve existing capabilities (Porter and 
Fuller 1986 and Kogut 1988). Empirical studies show that the above-mentioned 
factors are indeed the major reasons for strategic linkages in practice (Nohria and 
Garcia-Pont 1991: 107). In order to further boost this trend, several prerequisites 
need to be fulfilled on an EU-wide basis. One important factor to be mentioned in 
this context is the necessary harmonisation of companies' financial reporting in 
order to safeguard the interest of investors. Financial information has to be 
relevant, timely, reliable and comparable. The International Accounting 
Standards, which were developed in 1995, and also the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), which listed companies will have to adopt for their 
consolidated financial statements by 2005, leave ample scope for interpretation 
(Amati 2001: 23). Another prerequisite is a common trading and also settlement 
system of cooperating entities ("One market or many?": 33). In addition, different 
national regulatory and tax schemes have to be taken into consideration. All in all 
further harmonisation is required in all the areas mentioned above as these barriers 
can result in unfair advantages to institutions in certain countries (Johnson 1996: 
171). 
 
On the other hand, one must not neglect the fact that external growth and 
cooperation between stock exchanges are difficult, as they are competing with 
each other. The buzzword in today's stock exchange world is coopetition. It 
describes the two parallel trends of increasing cooperation and competition among 
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exchanges, which will eventually lead to concentration of exchanges in Europe 
(Schmiedel 2001: 12). That means that competing players cooperate in certain 
areas while remaining competitors. If both benefit from cooperation it might be a 
successful option. In general, however, cooperation is still going slowly. Stock 
exchanges are very reluctant to merge and even alliances are hard to pull off 
despite obvious benefits: they could offer their customers a wider range of 
probably cheaper products ("Farewell to the floor?" 1999). The big players in 
investment banking are trying to develop their own trading platforms. One 
important point in this context is the question of the headquarters of a merged 
stock exchange, as each exchange wants to retain its national identity. Even an 
electronic trading system does not really solve this question (Loistl 2000: 109).  
4.3.3.1 The forms of external stock exchange growth 
Exchanges have different options to expand. The most obvious ones are mergers 
and alliances. According to Williamson (1997: 406), cross-border cooperation 
between exchanges is taking new forms. Alternatives to the cross- listing of 
products emerge, such as shared electronic trading platforms or remote trading 
terminals. The goal is to reach larger markets, but this also changes the notion of 
the location of a market: trading can be effected at a place distinct from where the 
market is based. One option is global expansion, the strategy NASDAQ is 
currently pursuing. The idea is that NASDAQ Europe, NASDAQ Japan, and 
NASDAQ Canada are used via a common technology and will ultimately be 
linked to create a global electronic trading platform. In 2003 however, NASDAQ 
Europe had to close down its operations. The main reason was that demand was 
and still is still mainly regional, therefore NASDAQ Europe, with its 
supranational strategy, was not able attract enough trading volume. A second type 
is based on the generation of economies of scale through mergers, such as in the 
case of Euronext, the merger between Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Lisbon. 
The third way is to make an attempt at a hostile take-over, as the Swedish OM 
Group did in its efforts to take over the London Stock Exchange. The fourth 
strategy is that pursued by the NYSE. It attempts to interconnect leading equity 
exchanges through a shared common electronic interface in a Global Equity 
Market (for more details see Section 4.3.3.1.2) (Schmiedel 2001: 12). More 
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details on the current European Exchange Landscape will be given in the 
following subsections.  
4.3.3.1.1 Mergers 
The wave of stock market mergers is one of the major recent developments in the 
financial market. The aim of mergers is to create added value for shareholders. 
One potential benefit for investors, issuers, and intermediaries is lower spreads 
due to increased liquidity (Amati 2001: iii). Arnold et al. (1999: 1092-1094, 1100-
1101) show that mergers between US regional exchanges led to a substantial 
increase in trading volume compared to regional exchanges that did not merge. In 
the short term, merging exchanges increased their dollar volume and over time 
their market share rose at the expense of other, non-merging exchanges. 
Moreover, the ability of the merged regional exchanges to compete with the 
NYSE improved. The conclusion is that mergers are able to improve performance. 
Arnold et al. (1999) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) confirm that 
investors benefit from mergers. The wave of mergers has increased the battle for 
market share and led to narrower bid-ask spreads as well as lower cost and quality 
of trading. Amati (2000: 8) mentions the following benefits of a merger:  
§ Cost savings. 
§ More efficiency in the finalisation of the transactions, especially through time 
savings. 
§ Higher market liquidity. 
§ Better transparency of the price formation process. 
§ Better publicity of the information provided. 
§ Continuous trading. 
§ Fair governance and regulations performed by a single body of regulation. 
§ Proper stratification of the market by size and sector rather than geography. 
§ A common trading platform to support the stratified market structure and the 
inclusion of the relevant derivatives. 
§ Rationalisation, integration, and in some cases even mergers of clearing and 
settlement systems. 
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In the past few years, several mergers have taken place in Europe. 
Probably the most successful example is Euronext, which was created in 2000 
through a merger of the stock exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels. A 
short while later the Lisbon Stock Exchange also joined in. A very current 
example is the merger between the Swedish OM-Group and the stock exchanges 
of Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius in 2003. The new exchange, OMX, is 
listed on both the Stockholm and the Helsinki exchanges and provides an 
integrated Nordic and Baltic marketplace (OMX: "The OMX Way"). One of the 
most prominent examples was the planned merger between the London Stock 
Exchange and the German Stock Exchange with the purpose of setting up a 
common trading platform form for European stocks under the name of iX (Jensen 
and Natorp 2000). In January 1999, a cooperation was started to allow the 
members of both exchanges access to each exchange's electronic trading platform. 
In the second stage common rules and regulations, in a third stage a single 
centralised trading platform, and finally a merger between the two exchanges 
were planned. The three latter stages never came into effect though, mainly due to 
the hostile takeover bid by the OM-Group for the London Stock Exchange 
(Williamson 1999). The bid was refused, however, by the shareholders of the 
London Stock Exchange. Other interesting example  is the acquisition of a 24 
percent stake in the Budapest Stock Exchange by the Vienna Stock Exchange in 
May 2004. The creation of Bolsas y Mercados Espanolas is an example of a 
merger of regional exchanges within a country (the stock exchanges of Madrid, 
Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia merged together with MEFF, the Spanish 
Derivatives Exchange) (FESE 2004).  
 
Despite some successful examples, many planned stock exchange mergers 
have failed to be implemented in the past. The fact that in a merger the identities 
of the participating exchanges may disappear can cause significant political 
problems (Lee 2003: 10). "The failures are especially due to difficulties in 
harmonising national regulations and the tendency to preserve the national stock 
exchange position and its idiosyncratic characteristics" (Amati 2001: iii). The 
main problems of harmonisation arise in the areas of common listing procedures 
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and governance structure. It is not possible to simply divide supervision of 
markets between two centres, as this would open up the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage behaviour, meaning that companies shift listings from one centre to the 
other in order to benefit from a competitive regulatory advantage (Amati 2001: 
iii). Moreover, linguistic and cultural differences, or implicit rules against foreign 
institutions, despite the Single Market Programme and the European Monetary 
Union, might turn out to be major barriers to stock exchange mergers (Berger, 
DeYoung and Udell 2001).  
 
If one looks at the geographical distribution of mergers, the majority of 
merger-related deals are to be found in Europe (Cybo-Ottone, Di Noia and Murgia 
2000). Erich Obersteiner, CEO of the Vienna Stock Exchange, estimates that only 
three leading exchanges will emerge in Europe in the near future: the German 
Exchange, Euronext, and either the London Stock Exchange or the Swedish OM 
Group ("Mutter aller Schlachten" 2001: 52). On the other hand, many planned 
mergers have failed so far, for this reason it is difficult to make any reliable 
forecasts. In the mid-nineties, the planned merger between Paris and Frankfurt 
failed, just like the merger between London and Frankfurt in 2000 and the hostile 
takeover attempt of the LSE by the Swedish OM-Group ("Mutter aller Schlachten 
2001: 50). So despite many efforts, a pan-European stock exchange has remained 
an illusion so far (Group of Ten 2001: 61). 
4.3.3.1.2 Alliances 
The second, generally more popular option of cooperation between exchanges is 
alliances. The trend towards alliances is a result of competitive pressure and the 
pressure from investment banks, who try to keep their costs down by avoiding the 
payment of membership fees to many different European stock exchanges in order 
not to have dozens of different terminals for trading and settlements. So the real 
gain from stock exchange alliances for investors is the reduction in membership 
fees for investment banks (Shy and Tarkka 2001: 9). Another motive behind 
alliances is to give international companies the chance to be listed on several 
exchanges around the world, so that their shares are traded 24 hours a day (Gaa et 
al. 2001: 54). In a second step, the purpose is to provide a common trading 
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platform among exchanges. In this way they open up to each others' markets for 
cross listing and trading. This gives traders the opportunity to operate across 
markets (Hasan and Schmiedel 2003: 7). Other benefits of alliances are the 
possibility of remote membership and lower transaction costs. In order to achieve  
an increase in liquidity, stock exchanges have to increase efficiency and 
transparency, speed up executions, and lower costs (Hasan and Schmiedel 2003: 
9). According to Lee (2003: 7), opportunities for the sharing of functions among 
stock exchanges include marketing, listing, order routing, information 
dissemination, order execution, matching, clearing, settlement, and administration 
services. In the past, cross-border cooperation mainly took the form of cross-
listing of products. This permitted access to a wider user base (across time zones). 
At the same time, the product range was widened. Electronic trading platforms 
have changed this pattern, as they allow the simultaneous trading of securities 
from multiple exchanges and remote trading terminals. From a technical point of 
view, cooperating exchanges need compatible electronic trading systems in order 
to establish a common trading platform. Moreover, it is important that they have 
distinct markets and products to create new opportunities from innovative 
products.  
 
The advantage of an alliance over a merger is that exchanges can retain a 
certain degree of autonomy (Williamson 1997: 410). That is one main reason why 
Malkamäki and Topi (1999: 22-23) believe that stock exchange cooperation in 
Europe will rather be based on alliances than on mergers in the short term, in 
particular due to such factors as heterogeneous language, culture, accounting 
principles, or bankruptcy legislation.  
 
"One advantage of an alliance is that it is better able to accommodate 
European diversity regarding for example habits, languages and 
legislation. Furthermore, alliances can ensure that stock-exchange trading 
continues to have a national dimension" (Jensen and Natorp 2000). 
 
Another advantage of alliances over mergers is that they do not imply conversion 
costs. However, alliances are also costly as they require even more effort to 
standardise procedures. At the same time, synergies cannot be fully exploited. For 
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stock exchanges it is disadvantageous if liquidity is not concentrated on a single 
platform. Price transparency and price information are more difficult in the case of 
alliances. As a result, alliances frequently do not exploit the full economies of 
scale in trading systems. This is of particular importance, however, as ATSs have 
already taken away liquidity from traditional exchanges. (Lee13, quoted in 
Schmerken 1999: 82). 
 
There are numerous examples of stock exchange alliances in Europe. The 
most prominent example of a stock exchange alliance is NOREX, which 
originally comprised the Copenhagen Stock Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen in 
1998. In 2000, the Iceland Stock Exchange and the Oslo Börs joined in. Finally, in 
2003, the Helsinki Stock Exchange as well as the exchanges of Tallinn, Riga and 
Vilnius joined by merging with the Swedish OM-Group. In 1999, 8 European 
exchanges (Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris and 
the Swiss exchange) agreed to form an electronic market on which European blue 
chips would be traded. The market was to come into being by November 2000. 
The basis would have been a common market model, a harmonised rulebook, and 
common functionality based on the following seven features: 
1. Continuous electronic order-driven trading. 
2. Harmonised access rules. 
3. Pre-and post-trade anonymity and a central counterparty. 
4. Harmonised functionality for continuous trading (order types, sizes, tick sizes, 
etc.) 
5. Functional support for block trades. 
6. Common approach to the prevention of market or index manipulation. 
7. Fair and equal market access (Hasan and Malkamäki 2000: 12). 
As it was not possible to agree on a common integrated trading system however, 
the project failed. In March 2000 three members of the alliance – Amsterdam, 
Paris, and Brussels announced that they would form Euronext as a result of their 
merger. Today, Luxembourg and Warsaw are also linked to Euronext via strategic 
alliances through a cross-trading and cross-membership agreement. In September 
                                                 
13 Lee R.: Interview. 
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2002, Euronext also signed a general cooperation agreement with the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.  
 
In 1999, Euro.NM was created, linking five new market exchanges, which 
included Neuer Markt (Germany), Nouveau Marché (France), Nieuwe Market 
(The Netherlands), the Nuovo Mercato (Italy), and Euro NM Belgium. The goal 
of Euro.NM was to gain critical mass to attract both investors and capital-seeking 
companies. For this purpose, listing and disclosure requirements as well as trading 
procedures had to be harmonised. Furthermore, it was attempted to establish 
connections between the markets with the aim of simplifying joint trading and 
data dissemination. Thirdly, it aimed to articulate the shared interests of its 
members as an institutionalised body to European and other authorities (Hasan 
and Schmiedel 2003: 10). Euro.NM closed down its operations in October 2000 
however, following the merger of the Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam exchanges 
forming Euronext. Another reason was that European second-tier markets (STMs) 
suffered most when the dotcom bubble burst. From its peak in March 2000 to 
October 2002, the index of the Neuer Markt, which used to be the largest 
European STMs, lost more than 95 percent in value. In 2003 the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange finally closed down Neuer Markt (Audley 2004).  
 
Smaller-scale alliances include the alliance between the German Stock 
Exchange and the stock exchanges of Vienna, Ireland, and Budapest. Equity 
trading of the Viennese and the Irish exchange are conducted via Xetra, and 
Budapest has a Xetra link providing direct access (Deutsche Börse: "Technical 
cooperations" and Budapest Stock Exchange: "Xetra Contact").  
 
The London Stock exchange also pursues several linkages which involve 
the joint use of trading systems, for example with Johannesburg (for which the 
LSE provides the new trading system), Singapore, and the Australian Stock 
Exchange (London Stock Exchange: "Our technology goes live in 
Johannesburg"). Other very loose alliances include Athens, Istanbul, Belgrade, 
and Cyprus as well as the launch in 2003 of the FTSE Med 100 index by the 
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Cyprus, Athens, and Tel Aviv stock exchanges in association with Financial 
Times International Ltd. (Cyprus Stock Exchange). Another interesting project is 
SEM-ON.NET, an information platform of the stock exchanges of South-Eastern 
Europe (Banja Luka Stock Exchange, Belgrade Stock Exchange, Ljublijana Stock 
Exchange, Macedonian Stock Exchange, Montenegro Stock Exchange, New 
Securities Exchange Montenegro, Sarajevo Stock Exchange, and Varazdin Stock 
Exchange) ("SEM – The Stock Exchange Monitor"). Furthermore, the Stock 
Exchanges of Bratislava, Budapest, Ljublijana, Prague, and Warsaw hold regular 
working meetings with the purpose of coordinating listing, trading, and clearing 
and settlement rules. Moreover, these exchanges established the CESI Index, the 
joint index of Central European Stock Exchanges ("Co-operation with Central 
European Stock Exchanges"). In 2001, an alliance between SWX Swiss Exchange 
and the UK Tradepoint Financial Networks plc. started trading all pan-European 
blue-chips included in major indices. Virt-x provides an efficient and cost-
effective means of trading pan-European blue chips based on integrated trading, 
clearing and settlement models which facilitate the process of trading and 
significantly reduce the costs of cross-border trading (Hasan and Schmiedel 2003: 
12). In 2003, virt-x became a wholly-owned subsidiary of SWX following a 
takeover. Finally, a slightly different strategy is pursued by the NYSE. It is 
attempting to create a Global Equity Market (GEM). Currently, the agreement 
comprises 11 exchanges. In this alliance, the existing local exchanges maintain 
their identities but join a common electronic trading web. In this way order flows 
of the largest companies can be combined (Gaa et al. 2001: 54). However, since 
the announcement of the intention to create a 24-hour global equity market, not 
much has been heard of the project. Apart from regulatory matters, there also 
seems to be a lack of commitment from the participants (Jones 2003).  
 
In the second half of the 1990s, mergers and alliances were mostly 
domestic or regional. The most recent mergers however, have been more on a 
pan-European basis. It is generally believed that a good time to consider a linkage 
between exchanges is when new technology has to be implemented, as the 
development of new technology is frequently very costly (Lee 2003: 8). This 
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might be the reason why the majority of the deals were done between 1997 and 
2002, a period in which many stock exchanges invested heavily in technology. 
Others believe, however, that technology will decrease the need for alliances, as a 
screen can be easily put up abroad and business can be done via the Internet 
which would ultimately stop the current trend of stock exchange cooperation in 
the way it is pursued today (Lee14, quoted in Schmerken 1999: 82). For a further 
outlook on the future of stock exchanges please see Section 6. 
 
In the next section, 14 different management theories of mergers and 
alliances will be introduced and applied to stock exchanges. In order to find out if 
they are suitable for explaining stock exchange mergers and alliances, their main 
conditions and their fit with success factors as well as with the changes in the 
environment of stock exchanges will be analysed.  
                                                 
14 Lee R.: Interview. 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
 
PART II: ANALYSIS 
5 TESTING THE EXPLANATORY VALUE OF SELECTED MANAGEMENT 
THEORIES FOR STOCK EXCHANGE MERGERS AND ALLIANCES 
In this section, an attempt will be made to apply 14 theories of mergers and 
alliances to stock exchanges. The criteria used for analysing the theories are the 
critical success factors of stock exchanges identified in Section 4.3.2 plus 
European integration and ATSs. An initial investigation will consider any 
preconditions or general settings of theories that directly conflict with the specific 
characteristics of stock exchanges. The method of analysis used will be 
judgmental analysis. "Judgmental evaluation is based on a logical analysis 
conducted by interested people" (Jamieson and Chapelle 2004: 180). The value of 
judgmental analysis is to define and operationalise variables (which are in this 
case the success factors of stock exchanges) to determine if there is a link between 
the theories and the variables (Jamieson and Chapelle 2004: 180). All the criteria 
for success (from corporate governance and ownership structures to transparency 
regulations) plus the effects of European integration and ATSs will be analysed. 
In order to get a better overview of the suitability of the different theories, a point 
system has been introduced. Each factor that is positively related to a theory (as 
indicated in the text) is awarded a point. For each success factor that conflicts 
with the theory, one point will be subtracted (also indicated in the text). Two 
success factors – supervision of trading and transaction costs – are weighted by a 
factor of two, due to their special importance. Markets that are not properly 
supervised will soon dry out due to a lack of trust from investors. Furthermore, a 
lack of supervision could even endanger the stability of the whole financial 
system since investors lose trust in capital markets in general. Low transaction 
costs are probably the most important factors for attracting order flow. Many 
investors choose the marketplace with the lowest transaction costs. All other 
factors are easier to compensate for. Furthermore, one point is subtracted in the 
category "preconditions" if there are one or more factors specific to the nature of 
stock exchanges that do not fit with the assumptions or preconditions of the 
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theory. Finally, in the category "other factors" a plus or minus point can be given 
for factors that show a significant positive  or negative  relationship between the 
theory and stock exchanges, but are not directly linked to the criteria of success.  
5.1 Overview of theories of mergers and alliances 
The table below once again sums up the main characteristics of the different 
theories discussed in this section. 
 
Table 4: Overview of theories of mergers and alliances. 
Theoretical paradigm Main features Rationale for mergers and alliances  
Transaction cost economics  Deals with how an organisation 
should organise its exchange 
activities to minimise transaction 
costs. 
Integrating external partners in the hierarchy 
of the firm saves governance costs, reduces 
uncertainty, and leads to economies of scale. 
Partnering helps avoid the cost s of 
opportunism and monitoring. Hierarchy 
costs are assumed to be smaller than 
coordination costs on markets.  
Efficiency theories The main concern is the exploitation 
of synergies to reduce financial, 
operational, and managerial costs.  
Mergers and alliances lead to basically three 
types of synergies, i.e. financial synergies by 
risk reduction and access to cheaper capital, 
operational synergies by generating 
economies of scale, scope, and experience, 
and managerial synergies by making use of 
superior knowledge of the management of 
merging or allying companies.  
Resource dependence All organisations must engage in 
exchanges with their environment in 
order to gain access to the necessary 
resources. 
A lack of critical resources leads to 
cooperation. Mergers and alliances are 
entered into in order to reduce dependency 
on firms with critical resources and increase 
dependency of other firms by gaining 
control over important resources. 
Resource-based view In order to gain sustainable 
competitive advantage resources 
have to be unique, i.e. rare, valuable, 
hard to imitate and not substitutable. 
In rapidly changing environments 
dynamic capabilities, i.e. the firm's 
ability to continuously adapt to the 
environment, are the necessary 
prerequisites for competitive 
advantage. 
Mergers and alliances can help develop 
unique resources by combining the know-
how of several firms as well as their market -
power and prestige. Acquiring embedded 
knowledge from a partner is frequently a 
motivation for entering into 
interorganisational relationships. 
Strategic choice Firms try to exploit opportunities to 
increase competitiveness and market 
power. The main objectives of firms 
are profit and growth, which also 
drive their strategic decisions. 
The main reasons for entering into a merger 
or alliance are an increase in market power, 
political power or efficiency, as well as 
product or service differentiation. Firms will 
enter into interorganisational relationships if 
they are able to realise financial benefits. 
Reduction of income 
uncertainties 
Deals with the avoidance of income 
uncertainties, i.e. a gap between the 
desired level of income and its 
desired usage and the actual 
realisation of goals with hindsight. 
Institutions aim to increase 
predictability by taking over income 
uncertainties of individuals for a 
period of time by guaranteeing a 
fixed level of income for certain job 
performance. 
Mergers and alliances lead to a reduction in 
income uncertainties by reducing or 
eliminating one of its sources, i.e. 
competitive pressure. This is achieved by 
cooperation across different markets, 
concentration of market power or risk 
sharing. 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
Stakeholder theory When making decisions, 
organisations have to take into 
account the interests of multiple 
stakeholders, as they help the firm to 
achieve its goal.  
Mergers and alliances help firms to align 
their interests with those of stakeholders and 
develop and achieve common goals. At the 
same time, environmental uncertainty is 
reduced. 
Organisational learning Deals with the processes that lead to 
organisational learning, as a better 
competitive position can only be 
achieved through superior 
knowledge. 
Mergers and alliances provide excellent 
learning opportunities, particularly to 
acquire tacit knowledge, which is part of 
organisational routines, skills, and culture. 
Moreover the partners have the opportunity 
to gain process knowledge, i.e. skills to 
manage interfirm cooperations. 
Institutional theory Concerned with the pressures 
imposed on organisations by the 
institutional environment to be 
legitimate and conform to social 
norms.  
Institutionalisation stimulates the 
engagement in interfirm relationships, 
particularly of young companies, which can 
benefit from a well-established partner. On 
the other hand, isomorphic pressures also 
lead to mergers and alliances, as firms 
mimic the behaviour of successful firms 
with already established cooperations. 
Population ecology theory Deals with the demographic and 
structural features of total 
populations of organisations. The 
causes for organisational behaviour 
can be found in the environment. 
Organisational change is not effected 
through adaptation but through 
selection.  
The theory explains mergers and alliances 
indirectly by considering them as one form 
of organisational mortality. The density rate 
is believed to have high influence on the 
merger rate within a population. 
Theoretical paradigm Main features Rationale for mergers  
Monopoly theory 
 
The goal is to increase market power 
and in this way profitability through 
a high market share and entry 
barriers to the market.  
Mergers are a very common way of 
increasing market power. The most popular 
strategy is engagement in horizontal 
mergers, but also vertical or conglomerate 
mergers are used to deter potential entrants.  
Tax theory The main concern is the exploitation 
of tax savings, which are a major 
source of synergies. 
Mergers can lead to substantial tax savings, 
which are a form of financial synergies, by 
increasing the depreciation base, by 
purchasing companies with an unutilised tax 
loss carryforward, or by increasing tax-
deductible interest payments.  
Theories referring to capital 
market inefficiencies 
Deal with imperfections of the 
capital market which lead to superior 
information and differences in 
expectations of market participants.  
Mergers are the result of superior 
information of managers who spot 
undervalued firms or of economic 
disturbances, such as technological changes, 
which lead to a change in expectations of 
market participants, with owners of assets 
becoming relatively more pessimistic 
compared to non-owners. 
Agency theories Agency theories deal with the 
problem of ensuring that an agent 
pursues his or her principal's interests 
instead of his or her own. Agency 
theory assumes that human 
behaviour is self-interested, risk -
averse and subject to bounded 
rationality. There is a conflict of 
goals of the organisation's members 
and information asymmetry between 
principals and agents in favour of the 
agents.  
Agency theories explain mergers by several 
factors: 
§ Hubris of agents, i.e. agents 
overestimate synergy effects, the possession 
of superior information, or their abilities to 
integrate and manage the target firm. 
§ Risk-aversion of management, i.e. 
managers try to spread their risk through 
diversification of the business. 
§ The management's desire to maximise 
turnover instead of shareholder wealth. 
§ The existence of a market for corporate 
control, which leads to the takeover of firms 
by competing management firms.  
§ The attempt of management to keep as 
much free cashflow as possible within the 
company by, for example, investing it in 
external growth in stead of paying it out to 
shareholders. 
 
Source: Adapted from Barringer and Harrison 2000: 370. 
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5.2 Theories explaining mergers and alliances 
5.2.1 Transaction cost economics 
5.2.1.1 Content  
The term "transaction costs" was first created by Arrow in 1969. Transaction costs 
are costs incurred  
 
"in arranging, managing, and monitoring transactions across markets, such 
as the costs of negotiation, drawing up contracts, managing the necessary 
logistics, and monitoring accounts receivable" (Child and Faulkner 1998: 
20).  
 
Although the theory of transaction cost economics is frequently mentioned 
in connection with Oliver Williamson and his book "Markets and hierarchies" of 
1975, the founder was Ronald Coase in 1960 in his article “The Problem of Social 
Cost” (1960). The Coase theorem states that under perfect competition and if 
income effects and transaction costs are assumed to be zero, voluntarily 
negotiated agreements among private parties which involve externalities will lead 
to the same allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of property 
rights among parties. Most real world problems involve positive transaction costs, 
however. Under this assumption, the initial distribution of rights does matter. As a 
result, also the decision between market and hierarchy becomes important. 
Williamson picked up Coase’s ideas and extended it to its theory of transaction 
costs. He defines transaction costs as the costs of the strategic behaviour of the  
partners to the transaction, which to a great extent determine the organisational 
form (Williamson 1985: 20-21). Transaction cost theory assumes pre-given, 
technologically separate units. These units are characterised by mutual exchange, 
which must be organised. Exchange leads to a certain amount of transaction costs, 
i.e. the  costs of organising resource allocation, which are a result of fraction and 
which are mainly due to five factors:  
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§ Opportunism, which is defined as "self- interest seeking with guile" 
(Williamson 1985: 47). Opportunism plays a very important role in 
transaction cost theory. Without opportunism all transactions would be 
conducted via the market. There would be no reason for coordinating an 
exchange within a hierarchy (Williamson 1985: 31). 
§ Bounded rationality refers to the fact that there are limits to the exercise of 
rationality in the form of lack of information and other factors. The reason is 
that human beings are not capable of processing and using all information 
available to them and at the same time they are unable to identify all possible 
states of the world and cause-effect relationships to calculate probability. 
§ Small numbers recognise the fact that there are only a limited number of 
transaction partners to choose between. 
§ Information impactedness, which reflects that precise information relevant to 
the transaction is not freely accessible by all parties involved. Some parties 
might have to incur considerable cost to obtain certain pieces of information 
(Williamson 1975: 20-32). 
 
The goal of transaction cost theory is to establish governance structures 
which permit the minimisation of transaction costs, the two extremes being either 
the market or the hierarchy of the organisation. Market transactions cause 
governance costs, hierarchies bureaucratic costs (Williamson 1979 and 
Williamson 1985: 90-91). Williamson identified the following three aspects as 
being relevant for the decision between internal transactions and market 
exchanges: 
§ Asset specificity, which is the extent to which "an asset cannot be redeployed 
to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive 
value" (Williamson 1991: 281). The higher the share of specific assets in a 
firm, the more likely transactions will be organised within a hierarchy.  
§ Frequency of transaction, which refers to the fact that if a transaction occurs 
with increased frequency, the costs of a transaction within the hierarchy are 
lower than those of a market transaction.  
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§ Uncertainty, more specifically behavioural uncertainty, refers to the 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviour of the parties involved in a transaction. 
A high degree of behavioural uncertainty leads to high costs of safeguarding a 
contract. Therefore, the transaction is often internalised (Williamson 1991: 
281). 
Williamson (1985: 30) argues that if bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset 
specificity did not exist, transaction costs would be zero. 
 
Jarillo (1988) extended the use of transaction cost theory by applying it to 
alliances. Apart from the two extremes make or buy, there is a third alternative, 
namely partner. Partnering refers to interorganisational relationships, such as 
strategic alliances. Interorganisational relationships provide ownership incentives 
which help avoid the costs of opportunism and monitoring inherent in market 
transactions. Jarillo (1988) and Osborn and Baughn (1990) even argue that 
networks or alliances are more efficient than markets or hierarchies in minimising 
transaction costs. 
5.2.1.2 Critical review 
Transaction cost economics has been used to explain a wide range of topics in 
connection with mergers and alliance formation, such as entry modes into foreign 
markets, alliance structures, or the creation of new ventures. Transaction cost 
economics focuses particularly on the motives of the partners, their investment, 
and the transaction form they use. It further stresses the efficiency and cost-
minimizing motives for cooperations (Child and Faulkner 1998: 21-22). 
 
There are numerous points of criticism, however: 
§ Francis, Turk and Willman (1983: 15) criticise Williamson for disregarding 
the influence of power on the decision between market and hierarchy.  
§ Granovetter (1985) states that there are many more factors than those of 
transaction cost theory which influence corporate success, such as the 
involvement of government, taxation laws, competition, as well as socio-
cultural norms and beliefs. Perrow (1986) and Goshal and Moran (1996) 
criticise transaction cost theory for neglecting the so-called "socially derived 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
internal transaction costs". These transaction costs derive from social- level 
phenomena making the internalisation of transactions generally inefficient. 
Examples of such internal transaction costs are problems involved with 
integrating a newly acquired firm within existing hierarchical structures, 
synergies expected to result from a merger between two firms which often do 
not accrue due to intra-unit fraction, or the loss of internal legitimacy by the 
employees of the company.  
§ Transaction cost economics deals with the choice between market and 
hierarchy only with regard to efficiency by taking a static view. In this way it 
does not have anything to say about how growing trust between partners can 
lead to a lower risk of opportunistic behaviour and the reduction of the 
boundedness of rationality through growing information exchange between 
the partners over time. It therefore does not take account of such questions as 
fairness or trust in transaction management (Parkhe 1993). 
§ According to Hill (1990), the invisible hand of the market will, in the long 
run, select actors which are cooperation oriented. As transaction cost theory 
does not take this into account, it overstates the motives for integration. 
§ Transaction cost theory assumes that managers are subject to bounded 
rationality. As a result they have difficulties in implementing optimally 
efficient transactions. At the same time these managers are assumed to be 
able to precisely calculate relative transaction costs and to implement the 
transaction in an optimally efficient way. That would mean that "managers 
are boundedly rational at the individual level, yet economically rational in the 
aggregate" (Martinez and Dacin 1999: 81). 
§ The most convincing point of criticism was brought forward by Faulkner 
(1995), who conducted multiple case studies examining whether transaction 
cost economics matters to executives who had been involved in alliance 
formation. None of the decision-makers indicated that transaction costs had 
played any role in the decision of alliance formation.  
§ Dieter Schneider (1995a: 265-273) criticises that even if managers had 
perfect knowledge about the transaction costs of organisation via the market 
compared to hierarchy costs, they would not be able to take a decision based 
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on them, as the choice between the organisational form also changes revenues 
as well as the perception of risks. At the same time, costs always have to be 
determined via the market. The same is true for the costs of hierarchy. 
Therefore the choice between hierarchical costs and costs of a market 
transaction is not a suitable approach, as the costs of hierarchy are only 
measurable via the market, which makes their measure dependent on one of 
the variables – the market.  
5.2.1.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
First, it is necessary to highlight an important distinction between two types of 
transaction costs relevant to stock exchanges: Generally, transaction costs in the 
area of financial markets are referred to as the costs of trading which are to be 
borne by investors. When analysing how transaction cost theory can explain stock 
exchange mergers and alliances however, it is necessary to define transaction 
costs as those costs incurred by a stock exchange in entering into transactions with 
other parties with the goal of providing a market. The two forms are linked, 
however, as the transaction costs of the exchange are finally shifted to the investor 
in the form of fees, which are one component of transaction costs of trading.  
 
When analysing stock exchange mergers and alliances from the point of 
view of transaction cost theory, the question is therefore who the transaction 
partners of stock exchanges are and in how far stock exchange mergers and 
alliances are able to contribute to a reduction in transaction costs of stock 
exchanges. On the customer-side, the transaction partners of stock exchanges are 
their members, or if membership has been abandoned, the brokers and dealers 
trading on the exchange as well as the companies listed, on the supply-side there 
are, apart from transactions that would occur in any firm, such as consulting or 
telecommunications services, the sourcing of office supplies etc., two main types 
of suppliers: other stock exchanges and clearing and settlement institutions. Since 
no transaction costs accrue for stock exchanges from transactions with their 
customers, this side will not be analysed any further. Analysis will therefore 
concentrate on the reduction of transaction costs with other stock exchanges and 
clearing and settlement institutions through mergers and alliances between stock 
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exchanges. Although derivatives markets also offer complementary products to 
those of stock exchanges, there are no transactions between stock exchanges and 
derivatives exchanges. Since transaction partners are also stakeholders of a firm, 
there is a link to stakeholder theory. 
 
Transaction cost theory assumes pre-given, technologically separate units 
which are characterised by mutual exchange. This is clearly the case, with 
different exchanges as well as with clearing and settlement systems. According to 
Williamson (1985: 291), the reason for transaction costs are: 
§ Opportunism, which seems to be relevant for both transactions between stock 
exchanges and transactions between stock exchanges and clearing and 
settlement institutions, especially as most stock exchanges have recently 
become profit-oriented. Stock exchanges are struggling for survival and as 
products and services of stock exchanges are highly standardised, this further 
enhances competition. At the same time, clearing and settlement institutions 
are under immense cost pressure, which might also make them more prone to 
opportunistic behaviour.  
§ Bounded rationality, which is an important factor in financial markets due to 
their complexity.  
§ Small numbers, which recognise the fact that there is only a limited number 
of transaction partners to choose between. This seems to be particularly 
relevant, since there is in many cases only one exchange and one clearing and 
settlement institution per country.  
§ Information impactedness, which reflects that precise information relevant to 
the transaction is not freely accessible by all parties involved (Williamson 
1975: 20-32). The fact that stock exchanges operate in a highly regulated 
environment might lead to an above-average degree of information 
impactedness. Some governments might try to protect national institutions in 
the exchange business, which might make information more difficult to 
obtain in many cases.  
According to this analysis, all four preconditions for the existence of transaction 
costs of stock exchanges seem to apply.  
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Furthermore, Williamson identified the following three aspects as being 
relevant for the decision between internal transactions and market exchanges: 
asset specificity, frequency of transaction, and degree of behavioural uncertainty. 
§ Asset specificity does not seem to be extraordinarily high due to the high 
standardisation of products as well as the increasing assimilation of trading 
processes. According to Williamson's view (1991: 281), low asset specificity 
is an argument against mergers and acquisitions, since the higher the share of 
specific assets in a firm, the more likely transactions will be organised within 
a hierarchy. result: negative 
§ Frequency of transactions is relatively high, since most stock exchanges pay a 
regular fee to clearing and settlement institutions and also to stock exchanges 
for using their trading infrastructure (the Vienna Stock Exchange, for 
example, pays a regular fee to the German Stock Exchange for using Xetra 
and to the OMX-Group for using their technology for derivatives trading). 
These facts support stock exchange mergers and alliances on the basis of 
transaction cost theory.  
§ The degree of behavioural uncertainty (the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviour of the parties involved in a transaction) can be assumed to be 
relatively high, particularly due to the fact that many stock exchanges (but 
also clearing and settlement institutions ) are under immense cost pressure and 
are struggling to survive, which increases the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviour. This would be an argument in favour of stock exchange 
consolidation.  
 
Two of the three factors relevant for the decision between market and 
hierarchical organisation of transactions speak in favour of organisation of 
transactions within a hierarchy and only one against it, which supports the 
advantageousness of stock exchange mergers and alliances compared to their 
independent existence.  
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5.2.1.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: The trend towards 
demutualisation of stock exchanges is a move towards the organisation of 
transactions via the market, due to the separation of customers, who are the 
transaction partners of stock exchanges on the demand side, and owners of 
exchanges. The fact that member-owners want low exchange costs 
(transaction costs) and high exchange profits, whereas outside owners only 
seek high profits, as Hart and Moore (1996) state, is another argument against 
transaction cost theory. On the other hand, this step can be considered neutral,  
since there are no transaction costs for stock exchanges in dealing with 
customers. ATSs seem to have chosen the opposite direction, as many ATSs 
are owned by their main customers (large investment banks). Although 
demutualisation makes mergers and alliances among exchanges easier, it does 
not explain them from a transaction-cost point of view. result: neutral 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As was seen in Section 4.3.2.2, 
technicalisation, i.e. automation of trading, can reduce transaction costs for 
exchanges, e.g. by sharing trading platforms with others, which makes cross-
access easier and cheaper. Furthermore, it makes mergers and alliances more 
easily realisable. This success factor is therefore supported by transaction cost 
theory. The integration of clearing and settlement  institutions can also be 
explained by transaction cost theory, since exchanges pay clearing and 
settlement institutions a regular fee for the provision of their services. 
Additional charges for clearing and settlement are borne by investors. The 
fact that clearing and settlement institutions are suppliers of stock exchanges 
explains their integration into stock exchanges from the point of view of 
transaction cost theory. Moreover, stock exchange mergers and alliances can 
be justified, since larger exchanges (through mergers and/or alliances) might 
have more market power and generate more volume, which might result in a 
reduction in fees to clearing and settlement institutions. result: positive. 
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§ Integration of derivatives markets: Since derivatives markets are not suppliers 
of stock exchanges, their integration will not lead to a reduction in transaction 
costs. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation has no influence transaction costs 
borne by stock exchanges. result: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: There is no link between supervision of trading and 
transaction costs of stock exchanges, since supervision is done by stock 
exchanges themselves and not by customers or suppliers of stock exchanges. 
result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: If stock exchange mergers and acquisitions reduce 
transaction costs of exchanges, the cost of trading for investors will also 
decrease, since a reduction in cost incurred by the stock exchange for 
providing a market place can be handed on to investors by lowering the fees 
charged. Low transaction costs for investors are perhaps the most important 
success factor of stock exchanges and the fact that it is supported by stock 
exchange mergers and alliances from the viewpoint of transaction cost theory 
is a decisive factor for its applicability to stock exchanges. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Transparency regulations have no influence on 
transaction costs borne by stock exchanges. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: The introduction of the euro rather seems to decrease 
the incentives for stock exchange cooperation from a transaction-cost point of 
view, since transactions have become less risky due to the elimination of 
currency risk. This means that advantages resulting from intragroup 
transactions are reduced compared to market transactions. Furthermore, 
access to foreign markets is simplified as exchanges recognised in one 
member state have unrestricted access to other member states, i.e. they are 
free to set up terminals in any member country so that local participants are 
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granted free access. These factors rather tend to lower the motivation for 
stock exchange mergers and alliances, since foreign markets are accessible 
without cooperating with local partners. On the other hand, European 
integration has also increased competition, making opportunism more likely. 
This would support transaction cost theory. result: neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Although there are no direct transactions 
between ATSs and traditiona l stock exchanges, ATSs force stock exchanges 
to reduce their transaction costs by putting competitive pressure on them. 
Stock exchanges therefore need to try to lower their transaction costs in order 
to be able to hand these savings on to their customers. At the same time, as 
seen in the case of European integration, an overall increase in competition 
increases the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour by transaction partners. 
result: positive 
5.2.1.5 Conclusion 
When assessing the explanatory value of transaction cost theory for stock 
exchange mergers and alliances it could be seen that all four preconditions for the 
existence of transaction costs of stock exchanges seem to apply. Furthermore, two 
of the three factors relevant for the decision between market and hierarchical 
organisation of transactions speak in favour of organisation of transactions within 
a hierarchy, which supports the advantageousness of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances compared to their independent existence. However, there is not really a 
large number of suppliers for stock exchanges to depend on. Stock exchanges do 
not enter into many transactions with suppliers in their core business. For this 
reason transaction cost theory covers general interesting aspects but  is somewhat 
limited in its significance for explaining stock exchange mergers and alliances.  
 Table 5: Evaluation of transaction cost economics. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factor
s 
positive   x    x   x  
negative x          x15 
result            
 
 
Source: A. 
                                                 
15 The negative point results from the small number of transaction partners of stock exchanges. 
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5.2.2 Efficiency theories 
5.2.2.1 Content  
Efficiency theorists believe that the main goal of mergers and alliances is the 
exploitation of synergies. One can distinguish between three basic types of 
synergies: 
1. Financial synergies 
The outcome of financial synergies is lower cost of capital. There are several 
ways to achieve this: Firstly, by reducing the systematic risk of a company by 
investing in unrelated businesses. Secondly, by enlarging the firm and 
creating monopoly-type strucutres, as larger companies usually have access to 
cheaper capital. Thirdly, by establishing an internal capital market in which 
the firm may exploit superior information and in this way raise capital more 
efficiently (Trautwein 1990: 284). 
2. Operational synergies 
Operational synergies comprise economies of scale, scope and experience. 
Economies of scale can again be plant-specific or product-specific. Plant-
specific economies of scale are derived if a firm' s size is below its minimum 
efficient size and cost can be saved through a merger by increasing the 
output. This may also permit the use of more efficient production 
technologies. Product-specific economies of scale result from reduced cost 
per unit with increasing output volume. They are achieved through the 
allocation of fixed costs, such as for administration, advertising, or R&D, to a 
larger number of products, thus reducing the cost per unit of output. 
Economies of scope derive from mergers which expand a company's product 
portfolio. Existing product and marketing resources can in many cases also be 
used for new products such as distribution channels, a company's brand image 
or its customer base. Learning curve effects can also be realised through the 
transfer of management know-how between the partner companies. 
Economies of experience refer to a reduction in cost of new products over 
time as firms gain experience in making them better and cheaper through 
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"learning by doing" (Scherer and Ross 1990: 163-166). The result of 
operational synergies is lower costs of certain business units or the 
development of unique products or services (Porter 1985: 311). 
3. Managerial synergies 
Managerial synergies are in some way similar to economies of experience. 
They occur when the management of one of the merging or allying 
companies possesses superior abilities from which the other company can 
benefit (Jensen and Murphy 1988). A change in ownership can sometimes 
also reduce managerial overheads (Scherer and Ross 1990: 166). 
5.2.2.2 Critical review 
Synergy motives are those merger motives most frequently given by managers in 
interviews or case studies as the most important merger explanation (Trautwein 
1990: 285, Scherer and Ross 1990: 174 and Huemer 1990: 26, 50-51). However, 
the expected synergies often do not materialise. Statistical evidence paints a bleak 
picture of postmerger profitability and gains: on average, a merger results in 
reduced efficiency. Operational and managerial synergies in particular are hardly 
ever realised in practice (Porter 1987a, Trautwein 1990: 285 and Scherer and Ross 
1990: 174). As evidenced by several event studies by Weston and Chung (1983) 
or Jensen (1984), many mergers lead to an increase in the stock price of the target 
company. However, the bidder usually gains nothing. Managers frequently 
overestimate their ability to exploit synergies. This factor links efficiency theories 
with the hubris hypothesis. 
 
Another argument is that the concept of financial synergies is in opposition 
to capital market efficiency, which states that no financial synergies can be 
achieved through lower systematic risk or a superior internal capital market. This 
point of criticism was also confirmed by empirical studies on this subject (Rumelt 
1986: 114-119, 149-159 and Montgomery and Singh 1984). Furthermore, also 
negative synergies may emerge. Synergies are generally defined as any potential 
complex effects that are derived from the combination of existing resources and 
abilities of different companies. They can influence the efficiency, the 
performance, and the value of the combined firms positively as well as negatively 
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so that the new overall performance can be better or worse than the sum of that of 
the single enterprises (Schaper-Rinkel 1998. 73). Negative synergies lead to the 
overall performance of the combined enterprise being worse than the performance 
of the single independent enterprises (Sandler 1991: 164 and Thomaschewski 
2004: 20). According to Funk and Sigle (1993: 147), negative synergies can also 
include unrealised positive synergies and positive synergies that came into effect 
later than expected. Negative synergies are basically as likely as positive 
synergies, they are often neglected, however (Thomaschewski 2004: 21).  
5.2.2.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
The necessary prerequisite for the exploitation of synergies is the existence and 
identification of inefficiencies. Several studies have already been conducted for 
this purpose in the past, all of which have confirmed inefficiencies.  
 
Efficiency theories distinguish between three types of synergies: 
§ Financial synergies: Although there is no explicit mention in relevant 
literature of stock exchanges forming mergers or alliances for the purpose of 
financial synergies, this motive cannot be rejected outright. The reason is that 
stock exchanges demutualise and get listed since they are in urgent need of 
capital – in particular due to the high costs involved in the development of 
electronic trading platforms. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that stock 
exchanges also enter mergers or alliances to derive financial synergies and 
obtain access to cheaper capital. On the other hand, this motive is probably 
not strong enough to actually trigger cooperation. 
 
§ Economies of scale, scope and experience: According to a study by 
Schmiedel (2001: 8, 25), numerous stock exchanges are still operating at 
quite a low efficiency level. Large exchanges tend to outperform their smaller 
competitors (please see Section 4.3.1.3. for more details). A positive 
relationship between exchange size and efficiency strongly hints at efficiency 
theories being an explanation for stock exchange cooperation, in particular 
since cost-efficiency of exchanges is crucial for customers and, as a result, 
also for the survival of exchanges. Gerke and Rapp (1994: 54) also come to 
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the conclusion that the regional fragmentation of stock exchanges results in 
pricing inefficiencies and high cost of providing the same service several 
times. For this reason an international tendency towards centralisation of 
securities trading can be observed.  
- Economies of scale: Economies of scale are mentioned in literature as the 
most important centripetal force in financial markets. The competitive 
situation stock exchanges are facing strengthens centripetal forces even 
further, as stock exchanges need to become as efficient as possible. A 
study by Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel (2002: 12, 35-36) reports both 
substantial revenue and cost inefficiencies among exchanges and suggests 
that, provided there are the necessary conditions for free competition 
among stock exchanges, economies of scale are major drivers of 
competitive pressure in the stock exchange environment. Data on the US 
securities industry also suggests that there are substantial economies of 
scale, albeit mainly among smaller exchanges. The largest economies of 
scale can be exploited in connection with the trading function. Economies 
of scale in equity trading are due to the high costs of setting up a trading 
system in contrast to the low costs of increasing trading volume or adding 
further participants (Jensen and Natorp 2000). The major advantage of 
stock exchange consolidation would therefore be compatible trading 
platforms. As many systems have a similar basic architecture, mergers – 
or at least the  sharing of a common trading platform – would substantially 
improve efficiency (McAndrews and Stefanadis 2002). Other options of 
sharing functions among stock exchanges can be found in the areas of 
marketing, listing, order routing, information dissemination, order 
execution, matching, clearing, settlement, and administration services 
(Lee 2003: 7). Several empirical analyses confirm the existence of 
economies of scale in exchange operations and market making. Demsetz 
(1986) found that bid-ask spreads decline as transaction volume increases, 
indicating economies of scale in market making (Arnold et al. 1999: 
1084). According to Doede (1967), the average operating costs of stock 
exchanges are indirectly correlated to trading volume, which is also 
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confirmed by study by Schmiedel (2001: 22). At the same time, market 
concentration and market quality are directly correlated to efficiency. 
According to Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel (2002: 35-36) alliances, 
networks, mergers, and a higher degree of automation help to enhance 
efficiency, as exchanges benefit from increased economies of scale.  
- Economies of scope: Although the focus of empirical research has been 
on economies of scale so far, there is also evidence of economies of scope 
which can be exploited by stock exchanges:  
"The economic background to vertical consolidation is primarily 
economies of scope, including easier access to use Straight Through 
Processing (STP), whereby a transaction is automatically forwarded for 
clearing and settlement" (Arnt and Pedersen 2003).  
Stock exchanges can derive economies of scope most easily by offering 
more than one security, since incremental costs are low due to the 
existing network of buyers and sellers. On the other hand, users also 
benefit from the bundling of trading activities on only few market places, 
since they are able to save access and back-office costs to different 
trading infrastructures (Serifsoy and Weiss 2003: 7). A second area in 
which there are economies of scope is regulation. It must be noted, 
however, that compared to economies of scale, economies of scope are 
smaller in size and therefore not quite as important (Group of Ten 2001: 
5). On the other hand, they lead to cost savings, which are crucial for 
exchanges struggling for survival.  
- Economies of experience: In the literature on this subject there is no hint 
at any economies of experience among stock exchanges. Economies of 
experience could exist, however, in areas such as the development and 
implementation of trading platforms or regulation. However, such 
synergies are probably not main drivers of stock exchange cooperation, 
since these tasks do not have to be carried out repeatedly at short regular 
intervals. The fact that, despite the recent introduction of automation to 
stock exchanges, most functions of stock exchanges have not undergone 
substantial changes in the past also does not really favour the existence of 
economies of experience. 
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§ Managerial synergies: Up to now, no studies on managerial synergies have 
been conducted. There is only one side-result of a study by Schmiedel related 
to managerial synergies, namely that demutualisation has a direct effect on 
the management of a company. Unfortunately, Schmiedel does not give more 
details on this relationship. It can be assumed that managerial synergies are 
not a major driver of stock exchange mergers and alliances, in particular since 
countries try to protect the national identity of their exchanges, which means 
that they would try to ensure adequate influence by keeping as many 
managers of their exchange in important positions of the newly formed 
corporation. This might pose an obstacle to fully exploiting managerial 
synergies.  
 
Finally, the risk of negative synergies has to be mentioned. Stock 
exchange mergers and alliances will not necessarily result in higher efficiency. 
Schmiedel (2001: 22) suggests that in some cases (e.g. in connection with cross-
border trading facilities) cooperations might also lead to higher inefficiencies.  
5.2.2.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: As has been discussed in 
previous sections, demutualisation is one requirement for stock exchange 
mergers and alliances and consequently also for the exploitation of synergies 
derived from cooperation. According to a survey by FIBV, demutualisation 
itself also enhances efficiency, since the operating costs of demutualised 
exchanges in 2000 rose by only 8 percent compared to 12 percent of others. 
This is also a reason for going public: companies which are listed on the stock 
exchange and which have multiple owners are forced to work efficiently 
("Mutter aller Schlachten" 2001: 52). Furthermore, the governance and 
management structure becomes more flexible through demutualisation, which 
might hint at managerial synergies. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Competition forces exchanges to 
search for ever more efficient trading systems at low cost. The main 
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advantage of electronic trading systems is their speed and higher cost 
efficiency compared to floor trading (Breuer 1993: 12). Trading floors cost 
far more money than electronic systems. For this reason, many exchanges 
abandon trading floors, which they expect to create cost-savings of up to 40 
percent ("Good-bye to all that" 1999). Furthermore, only electronic trading 
platforms allow cross-access and common trading platforms, which permits 
stock exchanges to save considerable costs if they team up, in particular due 
to the high set-up costs of such platforms. At the same time, straight through 
processing, for which electronic trading platforms are a precondition, is 
expected to render substantial economies of scope. A high degree of 
consolidation can be observed in the area of clearing and settlement, since 
there are significant economies of scale to be exploited. This is backed by a 
study by Schmiedel and Malkamäki (2002: 29). At the same time, the 
efficiency of clearing and settlement has substantial influence on transaction 
costs. The integration of clearing and settlement institutions into stock 
exchanges is also expected to lead to economies of scale and scope. By 
merging with other stock exchanges, partners might also trigger further 
consolidation among clearing and settlement institutions. result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: The integration of stock and derivatives 
markets is expected to yield economies of scale. Exchanges can, for example, 
integrate such functions as product development or marketing, or relocate to 
premises where all functions can be housed in one building. Most 
importantly, however, trading platforms might be electronically integrated 
(Williamson 1997: 407). Again, stock exchange mergers and alliances can 
also indirectly lead to links with derivatives markets, for example if one of 
the partners of the cooperation has already teamed up with a derivatives 
market. result: positive. 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation rather reduces efficiency, since 
synergies might decline due to more complicated and diverse regulations. 
Technical requirements might also be different for trading in the different 
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market segments. The potential for synergies therefore becomes smaller. By 
merging with other stock exchanges, these negative effects can be 
compensated for by synergies resulting from an increase in size. result: 
neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: In the area of supervision, cooperation between 
exchanges can lead to synergies, in particular economies of scope and 
experience (Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel 2002: 35-36). result: positive 
 
§ Transaction costs: According to Gerke and Rapp (1994: 16), stock exchanges 
can make use of economies of scale by increasing their order volumes, which 
in turn permits a reduction in transaction costs. The easiest way to decrease 
transaction costs is to team up with other exchanges. Increased liquidity also 
lowers the implicit costs (market impact) of a transaction. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Transparency regulations can have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of an exchange if stock exchanges offer different 
market segments with different transparency standards. If transparency is 
standardised throughout the exchange, no effects are to be expected. result: 
neutral 
 
§ European integration: The introduction of the euro has played an important 
role in widening the potential of synergies by eliminating currency risk and in 
this way encouraging investors to trade assets not by geographical but rather 
by sectoral criteria and to put more emphasis on liquidity (Allen, Hawkings 
and Sato 2001: 38). result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: The emergence of ATSs has increased 
competitive pressure on stock exchanges, which forces them to exploit all 
potential economies of scale. At the same time, they take away liquidity from 
traditional exchanges. This reduces the size of the exchange, which in turn 
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lower the potential for economies of scale. For this reason, stock exchanges 
team up in order to regain liquidity and size. result: positive 
5.2.2.5 Conclusion 
As can be seen from the elaborations above and as empirical studies also confirm,  
economies of scale and scope are indeed the major reasons for strategic linkages 
in practice (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991: 197). According to Malkamäki and 
Topi (1999: 11), there are not only production-side economies of scale, but also 
demand-side economies of scale through network externalities. For this reason 
critical mass in terms of customer base must be gained so that the market grows 
under its own momentum due to network effects. The easiest strategy to gain 
critical mass is cooperation. The result would be only very few markets because 
nobody is willing to use a new market with lower liquidity. The results of 
Malkamäki and Topi are in line with those of a study by Arnold et al. (1999: 
1084) which reveals that merging exchanges were better able to attract order flow 
and narrow bid-ask spreads. According to Hasan and Malkamäki (2000: 12), the 
most significant economies of scale can be expected from standardised functions 
based on very simple information, such as limit orders and market orders and the  
processing of this information. Therefore standardisation in such areas is more 
likely throughout Europe than with complex information which requires face-to-
face contact (such as listing procedures, news releases, and communication with 
companies). Centralisation in the latter field may lead to transportation costs and 
for this reason it is suggested that functions in that field be left with national 
exchanges.  
 
Sometimes it is claimed that alliances do not permit synergies to be fully 
exploited, since they frequently do not make use of the economies of scale in 
trading systems, as the partners frequently cannot agree on a common trading 
platform16. The example of NOREX shows, however, that this is possible within 
any alliance and does no t necessarily require a merger. 
 
                                                 
16 Lee R. (Interview) quoted in Schmerken 1999: 82. 
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Economies of scale have by far the largest potential for cost savings for 
stock exchanges. The other types might also hold some potential, but are, taken 
alone, probably not large enough to be able to serve as explanations of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances. On the other hand, economies of scale are highly 
dependent on harmonised regulations which are however lacking in many areas. 
Nevertheless efficiency theories can be seen as having very significant 
explanatory power for stock exchange mergers and alliances. Apart from the 
evidence presented above, this is also backed by the fact that by far the largest 
number of studies in the area of stock exchange cooperation has been conducted 
on exchange inefficiencies and the potential benefits of linkages. This suggests 
that many researchers consider this field to be extremely fruitful. 
 Table 6: Evaluation of efficiency theories. 
 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x x  x x  x x x17
negative           x18
result            
 
 
Source: A 
 
                                                 
17 A point is firstly awarded for the fact that a large number of studies has already been conducted in this area, and secondly for the importance of cost reductions 
which can be achieved through synergies.  
18 The negative point is given for the risk of negative synergies.  
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5.2.3 Resource dependence 
5.2.3.1 Content  
According to Wernerfelt (1984: 172), resources are "those (tangible or intangible) 
assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm". Das and Teng (1998: 22), 
classify the relevant firm-specific resources into four basic categories:  
§ Financial resource (i.e. capital). 
§ Technological resource (e.g. high research and development capability or 
superior know-how). 
§ Physical resource (i.e. production and distribution capacity or raw materials). 
§ Managerial resource (i.e. upper- level executives with superior management 
skills). 
The competitive advantage of a firm is built on the combination of these 
resources.  
 
The main problem of firms is how to handle uncertainties about the supply 
of resources and human competences. Resource dependence assumes that a firm 
can only obtain the necessary resources by entering into exchanges with its 
environment, leading to dependencies. The goal of the organisation must be to 
manage these dependencies in a way to ensure that 
§ dependency on other firms is reduced by acquiring control over critical 
resources and 
§ dependency of other firms on the organisation is increased by gaining control 
over strategically important resources.  
Bearing this in mind, the main concern of the resource dependence theory is the 
negotiation of arrangements between external stakeholders, such as suppliers, 
competitors, governmental agencies, or creditors which provide the necessary 
resources, and a company. Many firms try to combine their resources with 
complementary or supplementary ones from other firms, hoping to create synergy 
(Child and Faulkner 1998: 34). A situation in which resources are not readily 
available will in many cases lead to cooperation instead of competition. The lack 
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of critical resources is therefore a strong argument for organisations to cooperate 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 131). 
5.2.3.2 Critical review 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 140), there is significant empirical 
support for resource dependence theory. Studies show that many mergers are 
effected between firms that are highly interrelated in terms of resources.  
 
Pfeffer and Salancik's results are criticised by other researchers, however, 
for not having been replicated by other studies and for lacking statistical control 
procedures to rule out other merger theories (Davis and Powell 1992: 325). At the 
same time resource dependence is said to lack the ability to explain why many 
firms decide on other options than mergers or alliances to gain access to critical 
resources, such as raising additional capital to purchase a resource through a 
market transaction or recruiting key personnel from competitors (Child and 
Faulkner 1998: 76). 
5.2.3.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
Resource dependence distinguishes between the following categories of resources: 
 
§ Financial resources: Many stock exchanges are in urgent need of capital, 
which is proven by the fact that they demutualise and get listed in order to 
ensure access to additional capital. A major reason, as already mentioned, is 
the high cost involved in the development of electronic trading platforms. 
According to resource dependence theory, stock exchanges would have to 
enter directly into cooperations with their providers of capital in order to 
ensure access to financial resources. However, up to now no such case has 
occurred in practice. On the other hand, stock exchange mergers and alliances 
might also contribute to easier and cheaper access to capital, since larger 
corporations are generally at an advantage in this respect compared to smaller 
ones.  
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§ Technological resources: Technological resources are very important 
competitive factors for stock exchanges in today's environment. Almost all 
stock exchanges have switched from floor to electronic trading, since 
advances in information technologies contribute to a reduction in trading 
costs and allow quicker access to financial services (Hasan, Malkamäki and 
Schmiedel 2001). Investors also rely heavily on techno logy to increase the 
efficiency of transactions (Loistl 2000: 100). Technicalisation is furthermore 
a prerequisite for integrating clearing and settlement efficiently so that 
straight through processing becomes possible (Moore 1990: 53). Since 
electronic trading has mainly been introduced in the past decade, exchanges 
were lacking the technological resources for electronic trading platforms. 
Some exchanges developed platforms themselves, others, such as for example 
the Vienna Stock Exchange, linked to other exchanges (in this case via an 
alliance with the German Stock Exchange) to obtain access to existing trading 
platforms.  
 
§ Physical resources: Stock exchanges do not depend on a large number of 
physical resources (apart from resources any average firm would need, such 
as office space, office equipment, etc.), in particular since they do not offer a 
physical product but a service. Dependence on physical resources has been 
further reduced with the abolishment of trading floors. result: negative 
 
§ Managerial resources: Since the problem of stock exchanges finding adequate 
managerial resources has not yet been dealt with in the literature relating to 
this topic, it can be assumed that it is not one of the main drivers of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances. Moreover most stock exchanges were until 
recently run as mutual organisations and therefore the for-profit-orientation of 
stock exchanges was not very pronounced. This also meant that it was more 
difficult to measure the success of stock exchange managers. This might 
change, however, in the future and result in stricter performance measurement 
and more frequent changes in the management of exchanges. Montealegre 
(2002) puts the main emphasis on managerial resources when analysing the 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
introduction of a technical trading platform to a stock exchange in Ecuador 
from a resource perspective. One key resource is in his opinion the image of 
an exchange. Obtaining resources from the environment of the firm leads to 
dependencies on stakeholders, such as on suppliers, competitors, 
governmental agencies, or creditors. This links the theory to stakeholder 
theory.  
5.2.3.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: The main motives for stock 
exchanges demutualising are to bring technology up-to-date and make 
governance and management structures more flexible in order to be able to 
respond to changes in the industry or in market conditions. Both factors are 
supported by resource dependence theory. The fact that stock exchanges even 
change their governance structure in order to be able to introduce electronic 
trading shows how important they consider technological resources and how 
much they depend on them. Furthermore, the need for increased flexibility in 
management is also highlighted by the tendency towards demutualisation.  
Demutualisation also facilitates cooperations by enabling partners to obtain a 
stake in partner-exchanges. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As mentioned, a technical 
trading platform is one very important factor in the success of an exchange, 
since it reduces trading costs, allows more efficient clearing and settlement 
systems, and adds to the positive image of an exchange. Electronic trading 
platforms also reduce the dependency of stock exchanges on physical 
resources (the trading floor). At the same time, the high costs of developing 
electronic trading platforms make access to financial resources even more 
important. Moreover, the services of clearing and settlement institutions can 
also be considered as assets of stock exchanges. Clearing and settlement 
institutions are very important for stock exchanges providing an intangible 
product, as otherwise stock exchanges would not be able to operate an orderly 
market. For this reason, stock exchanges are dependent on them. In order to 
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reduce dependency, stock exchanges frequently integrate them into their 
structure or form alliances with them. On the other hand, stock exchange 
mergers and alliances might also be motivated by access to other, cheaper, or 
more reliable clearing and settlement systems. result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: Derivatives complete the product portfolio 
of stock exchanges, since they are frequently used for hedging purposes. For 
this reason, the services of derivatives exchanges can also be seen as an 
attractive resource of an exchange, since derivatives markets offer 
complementary products to the products offered by stock exchanges. As in 
the case of clearing and settlement systems, this explains why stock 
exchanges team up with derivatives exchanges. Mergers and alliances among 
stock exchanges might also be triggered by the desire to ensure access to 
adequate derivatives markets. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Exchanges need know-how, technical capabilities, and 
appropriate financial resources in order to offer companies that are getting 
listed a market segment which suits their expectations and requirements. 
Larger exchanges might be able to offer a wider range of market segments 
than smaller ones, which, on the other hand, might seek out a small niche 
suiting a particular type of company in which they can be highly successful. 
result: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Adequate supervision of trading is tremendously 
important in order to ensure liquidity, since badly supervised markets would 
soon dry out due to a loss in trust by investors and listed companies (Loistl 
2000: 100). Furthermore, it would significantly harm the image of an 
exchange. The NYSE considers the know-how on regulation of the exchange 
to be such an important managerial resource and such a central part of its 
reputation and branding (which it considers more important for the survival of 
the exchange in a demutualised environment than demutualising itself) that it 
has backed away from demutualisation (since it would otherwise have to 
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outsource supervision). Know-how on adequate supervision of trading might 
be a motive for young exchanges in particular (for example the recently 
emerging exchanges in South-Eastern Europe) to team up with others, either 
in order to work out adequate regulations together with other new exchanges 
(such as in the case of SEM-ON.net, the cooperation between South-Eastern 
European exchanges), or with more established exchanges which have more 
experience in this field. result: positive 
 
§ Transaction costs: Stock exchanges need sufficient financial resources in 
order to be able to develop and operate an electronic trading platform, as it 
decreases transaction costs. In order to get cheaper access to financial 
resources, many stock exchanges team up. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Offering transparency regulations which suit 
investors is mainly a question of know-how and technical resources. Young 
exchanges in particular might team up for this purpose, for others this factor 
will be less important. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: European integration has increased competition in 
financial markets. On the one hand, the abolishment of market entry barriers 
makes access to resources in other markets easier and permits stock 
exchanges to tap a larger fountain of resources, on the other hand, it also 
gives other stock exchanges and ATSs access to resources that previously 
were exclusively owned by one or more stock exchange. result: neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Today, ATSs can replace stock exchanges in 
many areas, except for the price-finding function and listing. This is fulfilled 
most efficiently by stock exchanges. For this reason, stock exchanges need to 
make sure they possess the necessary know-how and technological resources 
to provide these services effectively. Furthermore, stock exchanges benefit 
most from their image, which is heavily influenced by the diligent fulfilment 
of regulatory duties (that is the reason why for example the NYSE is hesitant 
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to outsource this function) and supervision of trading (Breuer 1993: 12). 
Stock exchanges require financial, technological, and in particular managerial 
resources in order to protect and improve their image, fulfil the price-finding 
function, and provide listing services efficiently. result: positive 
5.2.3.5 Conclusion 
The creation of linkages with firms that possess complementary or similar 
capabilities is one way to respond to the challenges of competition and 
globalisation and in particular to ensure access to technological resources. 
Financial and managerial resources play a less important role, and physical 
resources are of only very minor importance. Although most success factors 
support mergers and alliances from the viewpoint of resource dependence, the fact 
that stock exchanges do not depend on a greater variety of (in particular physical)  
resources reduces the explanatory power of resource dependence theory compared 
to its application to mergers and alliances of other firms which depend on a wider 
range of resources. 
 Table 7: Evaluation of resource dependence. 
 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x   x x   x  
negative x          x19 
result            
 
 
Source: A. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The minus point is due to the fact that stock exchanges depend on fewer (physical) resources than many other firms. 
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5.2.4 Resource-based view 
5.2.4.1 Content  
The resource-based view was developed by Barney in his article of 1991 "Firm 
Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage". Another author that is assumed 
to have substantially influenced the resource-based view is Edith Penrose (1959, 
1971). Her work on the growth of domestic and international firms substantially 
anticipated the resource-based view. Contrary to the resource dependence theory, 
the resource-based view adopts a more internal view. This means it looks at 
phenomena within a company as well as its competitive environment. According 
to the resource-based view the firm is considered to be a collection of tangible and 
intangible assets as well as capabilities which determine the efficiency of a 
company. The resource-based view rests on two assumptions: 
§ The resource profiles of firms are heterogeneous. 
§ Not all resources are perfectly transferable between firms (Barney 1991). 
As a result not only industry structures, but also differences in resources may be 
responsible for superior profits. The company with the resources most suitable for 
its strategy will be most likely to succeed (Collins and Montgomery 1995: 120). 
 
In order to lead to sustained competitive advantage, resources have to be 
unique, i.e. rare, valuable in the market, imperfectly imitable, and impossible to 
substitute (Dyer and Singh 1998). Evaluating resources requires looking at them 
in the context of market forces. A valuable resource in one market may have no or 
less value in a different market or at a different time. For a resource to be valuable 
it must pass several tests:  
§ It must add to the production of something demanded by customers.  
§ Inimitability: If the resource is hard to copy, it generates more sustainable 
profits.  
§ The resource should not depreciate too quickly, as only a longer- lasting 
resource can guarantee competitive advantage over a longer time.  
§ Appropriability: all the profits from the resource should benefit the company 
that owns it. Although the value the resource creates is always to a certain 
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extent distributed among customers, distributors, suppliers, employees, and 
other players, the degree to which the profit remains in the company is 
important (Collins and Montgomery 1995: 120-122). 
 
Barney (1991) and Hall (1992) place special emphasis on creating 
sustainable competitive advantage. Valuable intangible assets are particularly 
suitable for adding to sustainability. A positive reputation, for example, can 
replace direct experience with a partner, thus reducing the fear of adverse 
selection or moral hazard. While Barney focuses on sustainable competitive 
advantages, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) and Fiol (2001) believe that sustainable 
competitive advantages do not exist in a dynamic, rapidly changing environment. 
Competitive advantages can only be achieved because of the ability of firms to 
continuously adapt to the environment. This ability, which can be described as 
certain processes firms use to alter their resource base, is referred to as dynamic 
capabilities.  
 
"To the extent that that some firms in a rapidly changing market are more 
nimble, more able to change quickly, and more alert to changes in their 
competitive environment, they will be able to adapt to changing market 
conditions more rapidly than competitors, and thus can gain competitive 
advantage" (Barney, Wright and Ketchen 2001: 638). 
 
The reason why the above mentioned factors can be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage is that these abilities are costly for others to imitate. They 
remain economically valuable as long as the competitive environment continues 
to change quickly (Barney, Wright and Ketchen 2001). 
 
Interorganisational relationships can help develop such unique resources 
by, firstly, bringing together more know-how than a single firm, which is 
particularly important in the case of networks built for the purpose of research, 
and secondly, through the combination of firms with extraordinary market power 
and prestige (Dyer and Singh 1998). One resource that drives firms into strategic 
alliances is embedded knowledge, as alliances are usually faster and cheaper ways 
for accessing it (Lei 1993 and Forrest 1992: 28). 
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5.2.4.2 Critical review 
Barringer and Harrison (2000: 374) criticise the resource-based view for not 
explaining how organisations develop their competencies. Instead of dealing with 
the crucial question of how competencies are developed and how competencies 
are actually transferred within the firm, the theory concentrates on the importance 
of unique resources and social exchange.  
 
Another concern raised about the resource-based view is its testability. As 
many resources are intangible, they are hard to measure (Godfrey and Hill 1995). 
The second methodological problem is related to the time period of analysis. As 
the sustainability of competitive advantages can only be measured over a long 
period of time, financial and time costs must not be underestimated and deter 
many researchers from becoming active in this field (Barney, Wright and Ketchen 
2001). 
5.2.4.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
In order to determine what valuable resources of stock exchanges are, one first 
needs to recall the most important resources of stock exchanges: technology, 
managerial resources (in particular know-how), the services of clearing and 
settlement institutions and derivatives markets, the image of the exchange, etc. In 
contrast to resource dependence theory, Barney (1991) explicitly mentions the 
image of a firm as a potential unique resource. For this reason it will be tested as a 
separate resource in the analysis below. 
 
According to Collins and Montgomery (1995: 120-122), a valuable 
resource needs to fulfil the following requirements: 
§ Lead to the production of something demanded by customers: 
- Technology: Technology permits the creation and operation of electronic 
trading platforms, something investors consider very important, since they 
generally reduce transaction costs.  
- Managerial resources: The fact that investors tend to leave markets which 
are not organised and supervised properly (e.g. due to a lack of know-how 
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in this field), makes managerial resources crucially important and shows 
that these functions of stock exchanges are valued by customers.  
- The services of clearing and settlement institutions and derivatives 
markets: Stock trading would not be possible without clearing and 
settlement of trades, for this reason it is a very important asset of stock 
exchanges. At the same time, derivatives markets also offer 
complementary products to stocks. In mature markets, derivatives are 
heavily traded.  
- Image: The image of an exchange plays a very important role, in 
particular since many investors still rely on traditional stock exchanges 
because of their reputation. A good reputation signals reliability, which is 
something investors are seeking in stock exchange trading.  
 
§ Inimitability (hard to copy): 
- Technology: The problem of technology is that it is relatively easy to 
copy, even though it requires large financial resources to do so. The 
electronic trading platforms are not only similar among stock exchanges, 
ATSs also imitate stock exchanges by providing electronic trading 
themselves (and in many cases at lower costs). result: negative 
- Managerial resources: These resources are much harder to copy, in 
particular due to fact that the know-how consists of substantial implicit 
and process knowledge.  
- Services of clearing and settlement institutions and derivatives markets: 
Clearing and settlement institutions are just as willing to clear orders from 
ATSs as from traditional stock exchanges. Most ATSs employ the same 
clearing and settlement institutions as traditional exchanges. The same 
applies to derivatives exchanges. The purchase of derivatives is in no way 
linked to the purchase of stocks at a particular exchange. Therefore the 
investors on all stock exchanges and trading systems have equal access to 
derivatives. result: negative 
- Image: The asset most difficult to copy is the image of an exchange, 
particularly since it has to be built up over a long period of time.  
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§ Slow depreciation: 
- Technology: Due to the pace of technological developments, 
technological resources generally tend to depreciate very quickly. 
Although the bulk of the investment  needs to be made in the development 
stage, existing trading platforms need to be maintained and upgraded in 
order to keep them technologically up-to-date. Furthermore, a 
technological revolution, which would require the development of 
something totally new, cannot be ruled out. result: negative 
- Managerial resources: Managerial resources, of which know-how is one 
important factor, tend to depreciate very quickly, in particular due to the 
steadily decreasing half- life of knowledge. result: negative 
- Services of clearing and settlement institutions and derivatives markets: 
Although these services are generally not expected to lose value quickly, 
both clearing and settlement institutions and derivatives markets will have 
to continue to invest in technology in order to make trading as efficient as 
possib le. The challenge of derivatives markets is furthermore to find ever 
new creative instruments for hedging.  
- Image: The image of an exchange is an asset that, if properly cultivated, 
will not depreciate at all. On the one hand, the development of ATSs has 
harmed the image of large exchanges to some extent since ATSs are 
substantially more cost-effective. On the other hand, stock exchanges still 
hold a monopoly on listing and are also considered to be most effective in 
terms of price-finding.  
 
§ Appropriability (the whole resource should benefit the company that it owns):  
- Technology: The group benefiting most from technology is investors, 
since cost advantages are passed on to them in the form of transaction 
costs. In times of fierce competition, low transaction costs are a very 
important competitive factor for stock exchanges. Technology also 
benefits stock exchanges, however: first, it allows them to avoid a loss in 
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market share, and secondly they can sell their technology on to other 
exchanges.  
- Managerial resources: Compared to other resources, managerial resources 
and know-know, in particular tacit knowledge, seem to show a high level 
of appropriability as long as managers do not hand on their knowledge to 
other companies.  
- Services of clearing and settlement institutions and derivatives markets: 
Profits from clearing and settlement institutions as well as derivatives 
markets will mainly stay with these institutions, which is not surprising in 
the case of derivatives markets, since stock exchanges do not pay 
derivatives exchanges for the provision of their services. Stock exchanges 
can benefit from derivatives trading, however, since some investors might 
decide to turn away from shares on which no derivatives are offered. 
Stock exchanges might therefore benefit from higher trading volume if 
there is a derivatives exchange offering products on the underlyings 
traded on the exchange. On the other hand, stock exchanges pay a regular 
fee to clearing and settlement institutions. If the clearing and settlement 
system is outstandingly cost-efficient, a stock exchange might be able to 
attract more liquidity on this basis, which also benefits exchanges.  
- Image: The resource which shows the highest degree of appropriability is 
certainly the image of an exchange. The only institutions that might also 
benefit from a good reputation of an exchange are derivatives markets 
which offer derivatives on stocks traded on the exchange and secondly 
clearing and settlement institutions through which trades are cleared. As 
can be frequently observed in order to avoid a spillover of profits, it 
makes sense to integrate these institutions.  
 
As can be seen from the elaborations above, the only resource that passed 
all the tests in order to qualify as unique was the image of an exchange. Since 
most resources of stock exchanges are not sustainable, they have to merge or form 
alliances. Furthermore, stock exchanges will have to focus on strengthening their 
image.  
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Apart from the aspects analysed above, there is also a more dynamic 
variant of the resource-based view which stresses the ability of firms to 
continuously adapt to the environment. This seems to be a very important 
resource in the fast-changing environment of stock exchanges today, since 
ownership structures, technical requirements, regulatory matters, market 
conditions (entry of new competitors, cooperation among competitors, European 
integration) etc. are currently undergoing substantial change. According to 
Montealegre, the most important dynamic capabilities are managerial. 
5.2.4.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Demutualisation is one of 
the prerequisites for stock exchange mergers and alliances and also helps to 
foster the  reputation of an exchange by giving it a more up-to-date image. 
Furthermore, it also improves flexibility, which is in line with the dynamic 
capabilities version of the resource-based view. On the other hand, sometimes 
concerns are raised about the impact of profit-orientation on the ability of the 
exchange to provide a public good, to act as a self-regulatory institution, and 
to ensure adequate supervision of trading. The last point, for example, is one 
of the reasons why the NYSE has not demutualised yet. Young exchanges are 
most likely to enter into cooperations in view of this aspect. result: neutral 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Although technicalisation as 
such does not constitute a unique resource, it also adds to the image of an 
exchange, making it appear more up-to-date and price-efficient. Moreover, 
technical trading platforms allow cooperations with other exchanges more 
easily. The image-argument can also be used to justify the integration of 
clearing and settlement structures. result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: Cooperation between stock exchanges will 
have no influence on the creation of unique resources by integrating 
derivatives markets. result: neutral 
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§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation is generally viewed positively by 
the financial community, since it allows the exchange to tailor standards to 
the needs of different companies in a more sophisticated way. Large 
exchanges find it easier to offer a larger variety of market segments. On the 
other hand, it might also have negative effects if, such as in the case of the 
Neuer Markt of the German Stock Exchange, a whole market segment has to 
be closed down. Market segmentation might also help exchanges to adapt 
more easily to new market conditions by keeping exchanges flexible. result: 
neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: As already mentioned above, supervision of trading is 
one very important, if not the most important factor for the image of an 
exchange. If investors lose trust, the market will dry out. For this reason, 
many exchanges do not want to outsource this function to other institutions. 
Mainly young exchanges will team up in order to make sure to provide 
adequate supervision. result: positive 
 
§ Transaction costs: If stock exchanges manage to create a unique image (by 
benefiting from cooperation with other exchanges), investors might be willing 
to accept slightly higher transaction costs, if e.g. the stock exchange has the 
reputation of offering extremely quick clearing and settlement, or strict 
supervision, etc. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Stock exchange mergers and alliances will not be 
of great help to stock exchanges to create unique resources in terms of 
transparency regulations. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: The effects of globalisation and European integration 
make it harder for firms to retain a competitive advantage based on physical, 
financial, or technological assets, as competitors can easily acquire similar 
assets or even jump to new technologies. For this reason, stock exchanges 
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need to concentrate on developing capabilities which are more difficult to 
imitate, such as a good image, for example (Barney 1997 and Wernerfelt 
1984). Furthermore, according to Williamson (1997: 410), the EMU 
decreases the distinctions between exchanges from the investors' point of 
view. In the past, equity markets had always been subject to nationalism in 
terms of regulation, accounting standards, and protectionism of the national 
exchanges as financial centres. Currency risk also played a decisive role. All 
in all location will gradually lose some of its importance for marketplaces 
(Malkamäki and Topi 1999: 7-8). For this reason stock exchanges will 
obviously have to enter into cooperations. result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems : Alternative Trading Systems copied many of 
the capabilities exchanges had previously considered unique. In this way they 
made it more difficult for exchanges to develop unique resources. The 
resource that, apart from liquidity, probably distinguishes traditional stock 
exchanges most from ATSs is their image. The problem of young exchanges 
is frequently a lack of positive image, therefore they might benefit 
substantially from cooperation with long-established exchanges in the course 
of competition with ATSs. result: positive 
5.2.4.5 Conclusion 
As can be seen above, the critical resource stock exchanges need to focus on is 
their image, since it is the only truly unique resource. If one looks at the 
development of stock exchanges over time, this has to be confirmed. Those 
financial centres (such as the NYSE, the LSE) that have historically been 
important, have managed to gain even more importance. Although lacking 
empirical support, this can be assumed to be, apart from the high liquidity these 
exchanges offer (which is certainly the most important factor), also to a 
considerable extent due to their good image. Other exchanges find it very hard to 
challenge their supremacy. This is also in line with the resource-based view 
explaining mergers and alliances by the ability of firms to benefit from a larger 
know-how base and to benefit from the combination of firms with extraordinary 
market power and prestige (Dyer and Singh 1998).  
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It is difficult for stock exchanges to build up unique resources based on 
physical, financial, techno logical, or managerial resources. However, explaining 
competitive advantages of stock exchanges in terms of their image and explaining 
stock exchange mergers and alliances as means to create a unique image (through 
the combination of extraordinary market power and prestige) and to benefit from 
positive network externalities seems to serve as a good explanation for stock 
exchange mergers and alliances. On the other hand, the resource-based view 
explains stock exchange mergers by the fact that these organizations have to 
merge due to the fact that they have not managed to develop resources that meet 
the requirements of the resource-based view. Therefore they have to cooperate in 
order to survive. At the same time, it must be said that since physical or 
technological resources do not lead to valuable unique resources, some factors 
very important to the survival of stock exchanges are neglected. The most 
important success factor not considered is transaction costs, for example, since 
stock exchanges today compete heavily on transaction costs.  
 
 Table 8: Evaluation of the resource-based view. 
 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive   x   x x  x x x20
negative x           
result            
 
 
Source: A. 
 
                                                 
20 This point is awarded for the fact that stock exchange mergers and alliances can be explained by the fact that stock exchanges have not managed to create unique 
resources.  
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5.2.5 Strategic choice 
5.2.5.1 Content  
According to the strategic choice view the strategic reasons for entering into an 
alliance are manifold. Barringer and Harrison (2000: 375-376) suggest grouping 
them into four categories: 
§ Increasing market power by erecting entry barriers or creating monopoly-type 
influence. 
§ Increasing political power, i.e. the influence on domestic or international 
governing bodies. 
§ Increasing research, production, marketing, or other efficiency. 
§ Achieving product or service differentiation. 
 
Choice is available in terms of organisational design and the company's 
environment. The environment can thus be manipulated by the top management to 
fit its goals. Managers are believed to have a proactive role, shaping the company 
and its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Lorange 1980, Astley and Van de 
Ven 1983: 249). The strategic cho ice perspective suggests that the choices made 
by top managers have significant influence on the design and performance of a 
firm. Management is therefore an important source of competitive advantage 
(Schoemaker 1990). 
 
Child (1997) places more emphasis on the environment as a given factor 
which influences management decisions and cannot be significantly shaped. The 
reason is that the environment creates threats and opportunities for the firm which 
influence or even determine the strategic choices available to managers. As a 
result, managers make their choices in response to the environment of the 
corporation, trying to optimise the company's strategy in the given environment. 
Child considers fitness to the environment the most important prerequisite for 
corporate success. 
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5.2.5.2 Critical review 
The strategic choice perspective argues that the main goal of interorganisational 
cooperation is to improve market power and competitiveness. In practice, many 
alliances are formed for these reasons. One of the main advantages, which is also 
a disadvantages however, is that the strategic choice perspective is very broad. 
Participation in almost any alliance or merger can be justified. Strategic choice 
also integrates many motivations derived from other theoretical paradigms 
described in this section. The breadth of this theory is probably one of the reasons 
why research is fragmented and only few conclusions could be validated. 
Moreover, the success of a strategy is substantially influenced by the 
environmental context, which makes it hard to measure (Kent 1991, Barringer and 
Harrison 2000: 375-376). 
5.2.5.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
§ Increasing market power by erecting entry barriers or creating monopoly-type 
influence: The central incentive for stock exchanges to gain as much market 
power and trading volume as possible is economies of scale and scope, which 
are of significant size, as has been analysed above. The existence of large-
scale exchanges per se poses a substantial market entry barrier, since smaller 
exchanges will find it difficult to compete on price with larger ones benefiting 
from economies of scale.  
 
§ Increasing political power: In former times, national stock exchanges had 
substantial influence on their national regulators. That was one reason why 
stock exchanges were shielded from competition in the past. In the course of 
European integration, however, this has changed significantly. Since the 
control exerted by stock exchanges over regulators is vanishing today, they 
try to team up in order to remain influential. This can be done either by 
forming mergers or alliances or via trade associations (such as FESE, for 
example).  
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§ Increasing efficiency: As has already been discussed under the heading of 
efficiency theories, economies of scale  and scope are a major reason for stock 
exchange cooperation. This is not only true for the trading function itself, but 
also for side-activities. Stock exchanges can, for example, combine product 
development or marketing, listing, order routing, information dissemination, 
order execution, matching, clearing, settlement, and administration services 
or move to one building. Studies have shown that mergers and alliances bear 
substantial cost-savings. The hypothesis of Schmiedel (2001: 8) is that there 
is still a high degree of inefficiency among stock exchanges. For this reason, 
provided there are the necessary conditions for free competition among stock 
exchanges, economies of scale and cost efficiency are major drivers of 
competitive pressure in the stock exchange environment (Hasan, Malkamäki 
and Schmiedel 2002:12).  
 
§ Achieving product or service differentiation: The lesson to be learned from 
the US is that far fewer exchanges are required and secondly that the major 
stock markets concentrate on different types of trading: the NYSE focuses on 
liquid titles offering an auction market system, whereas NASDAQ provides a 
dealer market for less heavily traded shares. In Europe, the big stock 
exchanges copy each other instead of differentiating themselves. This is due 
to the desire of all exchanges to meet the needs of the biggest clients: pension 
funds and mutual funds. At the same time, "the risk in what European 
exchanges are now seeking to do is that by aping each other, they could 
undermine the strengths they already have" ("Shaping up"). Instead, 
traditional stock exchanges have to ask themselves whether they offer up-to-
date services or if certain market segments are missing (Von Rosen 1994: 
1217). Stock exchange mergers and alliances can in some cases be pursued 
for the purpose of differentiation, such as in the case of the Vienna Stock 
Exchange acquiring a stake in the Budapest exchange in order to gain a 
foothold in markets for Eastern European stocks. In the majority of cases, 
however, stock exchange mergers and alliances are rather pursued to 
strengthen market power in already established areas of the exchange.  
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As can be easily recognised, strategic choice view combines core aspects 
of many other theories, such as monopoly theory, efficiency theory, the theory of 
reduction of income uncertainties, etc. Being strategically oriented, however, 
strategic choice view rather takes on a long-term view. In practice, however, it 
will be difficult to apply the distinction between steps taken mainly for strategic 
or other purposes.  
5.2.5.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Demutualisation permits 
stock exchanges to increase their market power by supporting cooperations 
and technicalisation of trading, which might create market entry barriers for 
new competitors. This is due to economies of scale and scope resulting from 
mergers and alliances which can be passed on to investors in the form of 
lower transaction costs (with which new entrants might not be able to 
compete due to their smaller size). Demutualisation also speeds up decision-
making, which enhances the overall efficiency of exchanges. Moreover, 
getting listed might increase the efficiency of stock exchanges even further 
due to increased outside pressure from shareholders. On the other hand, stock 
exchanges might lose political power, since they might have to outsource 
supervision if they demutualise or even get listed. result: neutral 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Just like demutualisation, 
technicalisation also fosters mergers and alliances, since integrated trading 
platforms can be formed and cross-access permitted. As technicalisation 
requires high initial investment, new potential competitors might be deterred. 
It also leads to higher efficiency, since the introduction of electronic trading 
brings about substantial cost savings. The same applies to straight through 
processing, which is only possible in connection with electronic trading and 
which speeds up and facilitates clearing and settlement for investors and 
which might also constitute an entry barrier. By teaming up with clearing and 
settlement institutions (and also derivatives exchanges), stock exchanges 
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might try to achieve monopoly-type influence, however, this does not explain 
stock exchange mergers and alliances directly. result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: By teaming up with derivatives exchanges, 
stock exchanges might try to achieve monopoly- type influence, however, this 
does not explain stock exchange mergers and alliances directly. result: 
neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation is the best means to achieve 
product differentiation by offering different segments tailored to the needs of 
different companies. By covering all demands, stock exchanges might be able 
to create monopoly- type structures by erecting entry barriers, since new 
competitors would not know which segment to serve. Market segmentation is 
obviously easier for larger exchanges, nevertheless it might reduce efficiency 
due to a loss in synergies. result: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: In the field of supervision of trading stock exchanges 
can most easily increase political power by establishing linkages with other 
exchanges to exert more influence on domestic or international governing 
bodies. The reason is that a lot of coordination with official regulatory bodies 
is necessary in this area. In this way stock exchanges might try to increase 
their influence by keeping the supervisory function inhouse. This becomes 
more difficult, however, if a stock exchange demutualises or even gets listed 
on itself. In this case, supervision must frequently be left to other institutions. 
For some exchanges, this is a reason for deciding against demutualisation 
(such as for the NYSE). result: positive 
 
§ Transaction costs: Low transaction costs are an important factor for investors 
when deciding on which exchange to trade. Large exchanges can exploit 
economies of scale and scope and in this way achieve monopoly-type 
structures and erect entry barriers. Studies have shown that mergers and 
alliances increase the efficiency of exchanges and tend to reduce transaction 
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costs. On the other hand, if an exchange decides to increase its product and 
service portfolio for strategic reasons, this will rather result in higher 
transaction costs, since synergies are lost. result: neutral 
 
§ Transparency regulations: There is no incentive for stock exchanges to team 
up from the viewpoint of transparency regulations for strategic reasons. 
result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: European integration makes influence on governing 
bodies more difficult since regulations are stipulated on an EU-wide instead 
of a national level. At the same time, the EU also abolished market entry 
barriers for providers of financial services and stock exchanges. For this 
reason, large exchanges are at an advantage, since they will firstly have a 
better chance of influenc ing regulators and secondly, as they are more likely 
to be able to set up market entry barriers by creating monopoly-type market 
structures. result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: ATSs are new competitors of stock exchanges. 
This fact increases the likelihood of exchanges entering mergers or alliances 
for strategic reasons, since they must try to fend off competition by increasing 
market power, increasing efficiency, and enlarging product or service 
differentiation. New ATSs must be prevented from entering the market 
through entry barriers. result: positive 
 
Finally, large stock exchanges also benefit from positive network 
externalities, as already mentioned. This fosters convergence towards only few 
central trading platforms, which again leads to monopoly-type market structures 
and substantial entry barriers.  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
 
5.2.5.5 Conclusion 
The creation of linkages is certainly an appropriate way for stock exchanges to 
respond to the challenges of competition and globalisation from the viewpoint of 
strategic choice theory. Linkages lead to economies of scale and scope, reduce 
risk, and strengthen the competitive position of a firm (Porter and Fuller 1986 and 
Kogut 1988). From the point of view of exchanges, the main goal is to reduce 
competitive pressure by increasing market share to such an extent that new market 
entrants are fended off due to the high sunk costs of market entry and exit. Since 
there are substantial economies of scale (and also scope) inherent to stock 
exchange trading, stock exchange mergers and alliances can be satisfactory 
explained by the strategic desire to gain size and at the same time increase 
efficiency. The same is true for increasing the political power of an exchange, 
since small exchanges have a hard time enforcing their interests on a pan-
European basis. Finally, the integration of clearing and settlement institutions as 
well as derivatives markets and the search for new sources of revenue (such as by 
selling technology for example) shows that stock exchanges are looking to 
differentiate their products and services. Mergers and alliances can also make 
differentiation easier. All in all strategic choice theory can be viewed as a good 
theory for explaining stock exchange mergers and alliance, despite the fact that it 
is very broad covering aspects of several other perspectives, as already mentioned 
above. On the other hand, as long-term strategic planning is the main prerequisite 
for success of stock exchanges according to Monteallegre (2002), strategic choice 
perspective can be considered suitable to exp lain stock exchange cooperation. 
 Table 9: Evaluation of the strategic choice view. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive   x   x   x x x21
negative           x22
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
21 One extra point is awarded for positive network externalities which are strategically very important. 
22 The minus point is due to the fact that strategic choice view is very broad including core ideas of many other theories. 
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5.2.6 Reduction of income uncertainties 
5.2.6.1 Content  
Income uncertainty is defined as the problem that people frequently do not 
manage to fully realise the level of income they desire and to use it in the way 
they desire. This is due to imperfection in and unequal distribution of knowledge. 
Income uncertainty therefore denotes the difference between the desired income 
and its usage at a definite planning time and the actual realisation of goals with 
hindsight. Such a difference is unwanted. For this reason the theory of reduction 
of income uncertainties is intended to reduce, and if possible prevent, these 
differences as far as possible. There are different reasons for the occurrence of 
income uncertainties of firms, such as the surprising market entry of new 
competitors, the dropping out or sloppiness of employees, insufficient quality of 
parts sourced from suppliers which can only be remedied after several weeks, or 
exchange or interest rate changes. Income uncertainties can be reduced by 
collecting and analysing all knowledge on facts, theories, trends and expected 
events available at a certain planning time. Institutions aim at a better 
predictability, i.e. a reduction in income uncertainties (Schneider 1995a: 14-15, 
1995b: 47). 
 
Enterprises take over income uncertainties of individuals for a certain 
period of time by guaranteeing a certain level of remuneration for certain job 
performance. Cooperations between firms aim at reducing or eliminating one 
reason for uncertainty, which is competitive pressure. This is achieved by 
cooperating across different markets (such as in the case of a supplier–customer 
cooperation), by concentration of market power (in the case of cooperation 
between competitors), or by risk sharing of expensive research and development 
projects (Schneider 1995b: 47-48, 430). 
5.2.6.2 Critical review 
Cooperations also increase uncertainties, which derives from the delegation of 
decisions or the need to reach group decisions (Schneider 1995b: 430). 
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5.2.6.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
The first question before starting with a more detailed analysis is if stock 
exchanges suffer from income uncertainties. Schneider (1995a: 14-15) mentions 
competitive pressure as well as the surprising market entry of new competitors as 
one of the main reasons for income uncertainties. Both factors are clearly relevant 
for stock exchanges, mainly due to European integration and the market entry of 
ATSs. Moreover, stock exchanges usually suffer from a loss of turnover in times 
of economic downturn.  
 
A reduction of income uncertainties can be basically achieved in three 
different ways: 
§ Cooperation across different markets: In the context of stock exchanges, 
cooperation across different markets can either take place between different 
national stock markets, which is common practice already today, or vertically 
across firms. Typical examples of the latter type are the integration of 
derivatives markets or of clearing and settlement institutions. Furthermore, 
some stock exchanges have also begun to sell technology or research. The 
advantage is that the streams of income are diversified, which spreads the risk 
of stock exchanges.  
 
§ Concentration of market power: Stock exchanges try to achieve as much 
market power as possible, in particular due to the cost pressure from large 
institutional investors and due to economies of scale and scope inherent to 
stock exchange operations. Furthermore, positive network externalities also 
encourage concentration in the stock exchange industry, since stock 
exchanges offer a liquid form of investment at low cost by providing a 
meeting place. When the market is geographically fragmented, traders may 
have to waste time seeking counterparties and bid-ask spreads are therefore 
likely to be wider as a result. That concentration of market power is a decisive 
factor is further underlined by the fact that small stock exchanges have come 
under increasing pressure since they are unable to compete with large 
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exchanges due to their higher costs and lower liquidity. This goal of 
Schneider’s theory links it to monopoly theory.  
 
§ Risk sharing of expensive research and development projects: Risk sharing 
among stock exchanges takes mainly place in connection with the 
development of electronic trading platforms. Since this is very capital-
intensive, many stock exchanges either join forces in developing them or 
purchase their technology from other exchanges, which has the additional 
potential advantage of access to both exchanges via a single trading screen.  
5.2.6.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Demutualisation facilitates 
the reduction of income uncertainties by permitting with greater ease 
cooperation among exchanges, since equity can be sold to cooperation 
partners. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As already mentioned above, the 
internalisation of clearing and settlement institutions leads to a spread of risk 
by generating new and partly independent sources of income, as a clearing 
and settlement institution cooperating with a certain exchange can also carry 
out clearing and settlement activities for other stock exchanges or ATSs. 
Partnering exchanges can also benefit from such a move. Furthermore, 
technicalisation also increases the likelihood of stable income, since it helps 
to ensure a fair, orderly, and efficient market which attracts liquidity. Stock 
exchange mergers and alliances are triggered by the desire of stock exchange 
to share the costs and risks of developing automated trading platforms. 
result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: The integration of derivatives markets can 
also add to a spread of risk, since turnover in derivatives is not directly linked 
to turnover in stocks. Furthermore, the derivatives exchange could also offer 
products on underlyings other than those traded at the stock exchange they 
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are linked to. As in the case of clearing and settlement institutions, partners of 
a cooperation can benefit from integrated derivatives markets, if one of the 
partners spreads its risk in this way.  It does not, however, provide a direct 
explanation for stock exchange cooperation. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation also leads to a spread in risk, 
since decreases in turnover in one market segment can be balanced out by 
other market segments. Furthermore, it might lead to less competitive 
pressure, as new entrants or competitors might be discouraged by the fact that 
all market segments are sufficiently served already. Mergers and alliances 
make exchanges larger, which helps them to provide a wide range of market 
segments more easily. result: positive 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Risks resulting from supervision of trading would, if 
at all, only be minimised by very young exchanges through a merger or 
alliance. result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: Cooperations between exchanges lead to lower transaction 
costs due to economies of scale and scope. In view of the cost pressure 
exchanges are facing, this is one of the most important competitive factors in 
increasing market power and detering potential market entrants, since they 
would not be able to operate profitably under a certain size. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: 
There is no significant link between income uncertainties resulting from 
transparency regulations that could be optimised through stock exchange 
cooperation. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: By encouraging cooperations between stock exchanges 
from different countries, financial market integration provides more 
possibilities of risk-pooling. Concentration of market power becomes more 
difficult, due to the elimination of entry barriers, which speaks in favour of 
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stock exchange cooperation. On the other hand, European integration has also 
fostered equity culture and eliminated currency risk, which makes streams of 
revenue not only larger but also more stable. For this reason, stock exchanges 
would have fewer incentives to team up than before. Despite the fact that 
cooperation across markets can diversify the risk of shocks, it cannot remedy 
the consequences of international shocks. result: neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: As mentioned above, the entrance of new 
competitors (ATSs) is one important reason for income uncertainties among 
established market players. Stock exchanges have reacted by trying to 
increase market power through cooperations and diversification of risk across 
different markets and activities. result: positive 
5.2.6.5 Conclusion 
The emergence of ATSs is a major source of uncertainty for established 
exchanges. Furthermore, turbulent world markets add to this problem, as is 
evident when one looks at the number of shareholders, which has decreased again 
in Europe after the economic downturn in 2000/2001. Stock exchanges react by 
trying to increase their market power through mergers and alliances. The sharing 
of research and development costs can also be observed in many cases. 
Cooperations between exchanges can also open access to new streams of revenue 
(if partners have teamed up with the national clearing and settlement institution or 
a derivatives exchange, or are engaged in other commercial activities such as 
selling research or technology). For this reason Schneider's theory of reduction of 
income uncertainties serves as a valuable explanation for stock exchange 
cooperation. 
 Table 10: Evaluation of the theory of reduction of income uncertainties. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x  x  x   x  
negative            
result            
 
Source: A. 
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5.2.7 Stakeholder theory 
5.2.7.1 Content  
Freeman (1994) defines stakeholders as all those people who are affected by or 
who can affect the organisation. Examples are suppliers, employees, customers, 
investors, competitors, regulatory and governmental agencies, or the local 
communities in which the firm operates. The corporation is a network with 
multiple participants with multiple interests, with each stakeholder making 
contributions to and receiving rewards from corporate activity (Donaldson and 
Preston 1998: vii). 
 
Stakeholders are very important for a firm as they help it to achieve its 
goals. Therefore, stakeholder relationships must not be put at risk and a firm has 
to consider the legitimate interest of all relevant stakeholders when making 
important decisions (Freeman 1984, Donaldson and Preston 1995). Brenner and 
Cochran (1991) summarise the essence of stakeholder theory in six propositions:  
1. A minimum set of stakeholder needs must be fulfilled by a firm in order to 
ensure its further existence. For this reason, it is important that 
management finds out which stakeholders matter most, as it will be 
impossible to satisfy the interest of all groups to the same extent.  
2. In order to understand the main needs of the stakeholders, it is of great 
help to look at the most important values and interests of the firm's 
stakeholders. 
3. The choice processes among stakeholders involved in managing a firm are 
a function of the stakeholders' values and their influence. 
4. Understanding the behaviour of a firm requires careful examination of the 
organisation's stakeholders, the relative importance of their different 
values and interests, as well as the relative influence of each stakeholder. 
5. The firm must balance the different needs of the various stakeholders 
using economic, legal, and moral criteria.  
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6. Organisational management which follows the concepts of stakeholder 
theory will produce superior results in the long run. 
 
In order to coordinate stakeholder interests, organisations tend to form 
coalitions, such as strategic networks with stakeholders to achieve common 
objectives. These coalitions help the firm to align stakeholder interest and to 
reduce environmental uncertainty (Freeman 1994, Jarillo 1988, Harrison and St. 
John 1996). 
5.2.7.2 Critical review 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), there is a lot of descriptive evidence 
for stakeholder theory. By the mid-1960s about 80 percent of upper- level 
managers had already recognised the need to not only behave in the interest of 
shareholders but also take the needs of other stakeho lders into consideration. 
Today most mangers believe in practicing stakeholder management  and are 
believed by others to do so. Although they may not use the term stakeholder 
theory, most managers act according to its central thesis, namely to satisfy the 
needs of a wide range of stakeholders, not only that of stockowners.  
 
One of the weaknesses of stakeholder theory is its lack of empirical 
testing. Another limitation is the concern raised by many critics that a very large 
firm, such as IBM or GM, can put stakeholder theory into practice having 
thousands of stakeholders. Moreover, stakeholder theory is not very prescriptive, 
but of a rather descriptive nature, i.e. hardly any advice is given about the form 
cooperations should take (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 377). 
5.2.7.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
Since all corporations have stakeholders, this precondition does not have to be 
tested. In the case of stock exchanges, the main stakeholders are investors 
(private, institutional), intermediaries (brokers, dealers), listed companies, 
national and EU regulatory bodies, clearing and settlement institutions, 
derivatives exchanges, employees, other exchanges and ATSs (competitors), 
banks, and the public in general (since stock exchanges are frequently considered 
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to produce a public good). The most important stakeholders of stock exchanges 
are listed firms (since they provide the basis for stock exchange business), 
investors (since they bring order flow), and regulators. One popular strategy for 
coordinating stakeholder interests with greater ease is to enter into different forms 
of networks with them. Thus in order to explain stock exchange mergers and 
alliances from the viewpoint of stakeholder theory, the interests of other stock 
exchanges must be analysed in order to find out why stock exchanges might 
cooperate among themselves. Furthermore, the interests of other stakeholders in 
cooperations among stock exchanges have substantial influence. Since it would be 
almost impossible to find and evaluate all the pros and cons from the viewpoint of 
the different groups, primarily the interests of those stakeholders identified above 
as most important to the exchange will be analysed. 
5.2.7.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
In the context of analysing the interests of other stock exchanges, it may generally 
be said that other stock exchanges do not want their competitors to become too 
powerful or even hold a monopoly-type position, since this would result in a loss 
of business for them. Therefore, they will only favour stock exchange cooperation 
if they are one of the participants or can draw other advantages from it. This will 
not be mentioned separately under each analysis point. 
 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Stock exchanges welcome  
demutualisation of competitors, since this makes cooperation easier, but it is 
also supposed to make competitors more efficient, which is less desirable. The 
other important stakeholders favour demutualisation, since it is expected to 
reduce transaction costs by making exchanges more cost-efficient and by 
permitting cooperations. Another aspect is the problem of for-profit exchanges 
operating a fair and orderly market. Since inadequate regulation and 
supervision of markets would result in a general loss in trust in capital 
markets, all members of the financial community are interested in avoiding 
such problems. For this reason, demutualisation might be viewed sceptically. 
The group most opposed to demutualisation are intermediaries, as from their 
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point of view there will be a loss of control over the exchanges and of long-
established rights. At the same time, demutualisation also leads to a shift in 
the structure of important stakeholders. The influence of politics is reduced, 
whereas shareholders gain in importance. Exchanges members become less 
influential and other stakeholders investing in the exchange (and in this way 
becoming shareholders) will gain more influence. result: neutral 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Technicalisation makes 
cooperations easier by permitting cross-access to trading platforms or by 
merging trading platforms. In this way the partner-exchanges can benefit 
from technologically advanced systems and other stakeholders from increased 
efficiency. The integration of clearing and settlement institutions will lead to 
substantial synergies, which is welcomed by the most important stakeholders. 
In contrast to technicalisation, integration of clearing and settlement 
institutions cannot be explained directly by stock exchange mergers and 
alliances from the point of view of transaction cost theory. result: neutral 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: The integration of derivatives markets is 
expected to result in reduced costs for customers, and is therefore welcomed. 
However, as in the above case, it also cannot directly explain stock exchange 
cooperation from the stakeholder view. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: In many cases the aim of cooperation is to cover as 
many market segments and niches as possible. This is welcomed by all 
stakeholders (except competitors), since it suits the needs of a large client 
base as long as it does not increase transaction costs. result: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Proper supervision of trading is welcomed by all 
stakeholders of an exchange, even competitors, since otherwise the image of 
capital markets in general might suffer. Young exchanges in particular team 
up to ensure proper supervision. result: positive 
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§ Transaction costs: Stock exchange mergers and alliances lower transaction 
costs, as an increase in size results in cost savings, which is obviously 
welcomed by investors, listed companies, and regulators. Investors generally 
tend to choose the exchange offering the most favourable trading conditions, 
with transaction costs being one of the main factors. Listed companies mainly 
benefit from higher liquidity. result: positive  
 
§ Transparency regulations: Transparency regulations are a delicate issue for 
stock exchange, since on the one hand institutional investors want relaxed 
regulations for the trading of large blocks, on the other hand, private investors 
favour greater transparency in order to guarantee consumer information and 
protection (Allen and Hawkins 2002: 53 and Loistl 2000: 105). Therefore 
stock exchanges will not be able to fully balance the interests of all groups. 
That is one reason why young exchanges will pursue cooperations with more 
established exchanges in this field. result: positive 
 
§ European integration: Cooperation among stock exchanges is welcomed by 
European authorities, since it is believed to make them more efficient. At the 
same time, European integration increases competition, which might make 
other stock exchanges more willing to cooperate. result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Alternative Trading Systems have substantially 
added to the intensity of competition among trading systems and pose a 
serious threat to traditional exchanges. Therefore it might increase their 
willingness to cooperate in order not to lose business to ATSs. result: 
positive 
5.2.7.5 Conclusion 
Stakeholder theory covers many aspects of stock exchange mergers and alliances. 
In this analysis the interests of other stock exchanges as well as the three major 
stakeholders are primarily taken into account when analysing the drivers behind 
cooperations among stock exchanges. This of course limits the view, on the other 
hand, taking into account all the different groups of stakeholders would not be 
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feasible within the scope of this analysis. Since cooperation decreases competition 
and allows exchanges to become more efficient, it is welcomed by exchanges as 
the main stakeholders. The only fear sometimes mentioned in this context is a loss 
of national identity through stock exchange cooperations. In general it may 
therefore be concluded that stakeholder theory is able to explain stock exchange 
mergers and alliances. A major weakness of stakeholder theory for stock 
exchange cooperations is, however, that since institutional investors, listed firms, 
and regulators are the most important stakeholders of stock exchanges, 
stakeholder theory would require stock exchanges to team up with these 
stakeholders, which has not been the case yet, mainly due to restrictions in 
ownership after demutualisation (this is in contrast to ATSs, whose majority 
owners are frequently their biggest customers).  
  
Table 11: Evaluation of stakeholder theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervis ion 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive      x x x x x  
negative           x23 
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
23 The minus point is for the fact that the theory is so broad that it is almost impossible to take into account all stakeholder interests and secondly for the fact that 
stakeholder theory would actually require stock exchanges to directly enter into cooperations with their most important stakeholders (listed firms, investors, and 
regulators). The fact that many investors are at the same time shareholders of ATSs, constitutes another problem. By investing in listed exchanges, investors might also 
become shareholders in exchanges themselves. 
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5.2.8 Organisational learning 
5.2.8.1 Content  
Learning theory assumes that the main motivation for organisations to form 
interorganisational relationships is capitalising on opportunities for organisational 
learning. The reason is that one of the main factors for improving the competitive 
position is superior knowledge (Hamel 1991, Kogut 1988, Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman 1996:79). According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), a firm's need to 
learn is defined as  
 
"the amount of new knowledge to be acquired from a target firm in a 
particular strategic combination context for the purposes of building new 
firm capabilities, or facilitating the exploitation of existing firm 
capabilities" (Cohen and Levinthal 1990: 135). 
 
The type of knowledge firms most urgently want to learn in an alliance is 
tacit knowledge. The transfer of such knowledge  across organisational boundaries 
is difficult, however, as it is part of organisational routines, skills and culture 
(Nelson and Winter 1982: 77-78). Due to this fact Kogut (1988: 323) argues that 
markets and contractual mechanisms are no t suitable means for the transfer of 
tacit knowledge. In order to be able to capitalise on the learning opportunities a 
cooperation between firms provide, a firm must have the intent to learn and the 
ability to learn (Hamel 1991). Particularly in times of ever increasing 
development costs and risks and simultaneously shrinking product life cycles, 
rapid market penetration is becoming more and more important, especially in 
technology- and therefore also knowledge- intensive industries (Mowery, Oxley 
and Silverman 1996: 79). Firms try to learn in order to create unique resources, 
which links the theory of organisational learning to Barney’s resource-based view.  
For this reason an organisation's learning capability has become an important 
competitive factor (Stata 1989: 64). Tha t is the reason why one of the assets 
transferred most frequently across firms is technical knowledge (Hamel 1991, 
Kogut 1988, Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996:79).  
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Chen and Mingfang (1999) add another dimension to interfirm learning by 
distinguishing between two types of knowledge a firm can learn through an 
alliance: content and process knowledge. Whereas content knowledge refers to 
skills in functional areas, process knowledge denotes the skills to manage 
interfirm cooperations, such as effectively negotiating cooperative contracts or 
managing inter-partner relations.  
5.2.8.2 Critical review 
The importance of interfirm learning is backed by surveys conducted in 2001 
which show that in 40 percent of all alliances learning is a critical goal. This 
figure is expected to rise to over 50 percent in the next few years (Palmer 2001: 
35). A study by Deeds and Hill (1996) shows that the rate of product innovation is 
positively correlated to the number of strategic alliances a firm is involved in.  
 
A difficulty that might arise with interfirm learning is that knowledge is 
frequently not easily accessible, as partners may protect their knowledge 
resources. Particularly when the partners are competitors or potential competitors, 
firms may be reluctant to share knowledge that could possibly create a new 
competitor. This protectiveness may be mitigated, however, by increasing trust 
between the alliance partners after some time (Inkpen 1998). There is a second 
darker side to the concept of organisational learning, as partners might try to 
exploit a naïve partner by gaining access to proprietary technology or knowledge 
(Hamel 1991). The theory of organisational learning does not account for the risk 
of inadvertently losing privileged information which is not part of the alliance 
agreement. Moreover the theory neglects the costs involved in learning. Of course 
it is possible for a firm to increase its ability to learn through training. However, 
such measures are costly. Therefore, a cost/benefit analysis would have to be 
conducted first. This is almost impossible, however (Barringer and Harrison 2000: 
380). 
5.2.8.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
Organisational learning is one main motivation for inter-firm cooperations. Firms 
want to capitalise on opportunities for organisational learning, since this is a 
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major factor in times of ever increasing development costs and risks and 
simultaneously shrinking product life cycles, in particular in the area of technical 
knowledge. According to a study by Palmer (2001: 35), 40 percent of firms 
mentioned organisational learning as a critical goal of alliances. Before starting 
the analysis, it must first be established if stock exchanges have a need to learn. 
Many functions of stock exchanges have not changed considerably over time in 
terms of the requisite know-how, therefore the need for stock exchanges to learn 
is focused mainly in the area of technology. 
5.2.8.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance: Demutualisation provides an important prerequisite 
for stock exchanges to be able to form mergers and alliances. In this way it 
also indirectly encourages organisational learning. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Technical knowledge is very 
important for stock exchanges. This is particularly true concerning the switch 
to electronic trading platforms, which are costly to develop. For this reason 
mergers and alliances are frequently entered into with the purpose of 
acquiring technical knowledge. Stock exchanges can also learn technical 
know-how from clearing and settlement institutions, possibly also indirectly 
via another stock exchange (that has linkages to clearing and settlement 
institutions). result: positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: As in the case of clearing and settlement 
institutions, knowledge could also be indirectly acquired from derivatives 
exchanges, in particular since the system behind trading platforms is in many 
cases similar. result: positive 
 
§ Market segmentation: Young exchanges in particular might have an incentive 
to enter into cooperations in order to acquire knowledge on proper market 
segmentation from more experienced exchanges. Since this is not a motive 
for larger, long-established stock exchanges, it cannot be viewed as generally 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
valid. The same is true for supervision of trading and transparency 
regulations. result: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Supervision of trading is no major area of learning for 
stock exchanges. result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: Acquiring technical know-how might lead to reductions in 
transactions costs, since technical trading platforms are generally considered 
to be more cost-effective than floor trading. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Stock exchanges will not cooperate mainly for 
learning purposes in the area of transparency regulations. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: European integration makes learning more important 
for stock exchanges, because it encourages the market access of competitors, 
which increases the need of exchanges to remain up to date and to introduce 
technical trading platforms. result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Alternative Trading Systems were the pioneers 
of electronic markets and stock exchanges had to follow in order to remain 
competitive. For this reason, ATSs have created an incentive for stock 
exchanges to learn. result: positive 
5.2.8.5 Conclusion 
The field in which there is the greatest need for stock exchanges to engage in 
organisational learning is certainly technical know-how. Therefore many mergers 
and even more frequently alliances are started with this goal. Many of the 
functions of stock exchanges have remained unchanged for decades, despite 
dramatic changes in the environment. As such in many respects stock exchanges 
do not demonstrate a need for organisational learning in many areas. Young stock 
exchanges are an exception, however, since they may also seek to acquire 
experience in other fields, such as market segmentation, supervision of trading, 
etc.  
 Table 12: Evalua tion of organisational learning. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x x   x  x x  
negative           x24
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
24 The minus point is for the fact that with the exception of technology there are few areas in which established stock exchanges need to learn. 
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5.2.9 Institutional theory 
5.2.9.1 Content  
Institutional theory takes on a social view to explain organisation–environment 
relations by examining the context of organisations. Institutionalisation refers to 
"the processes by which societal expectations or appropriate organisational form 
and behaviour come to take on a rule- like status in social thought and action" 
(Martinez and Dacin 1999: 78). According to institutional theory, the institutional 
environment of a firm puts pressure on an organisation to conform to social 
norms, which leads to legitimacy-seeking behaviour on the firm's side, i.e. firms 
attempt to organise themselves in a way that fits with their institutional 
environment and social norms (Granovetter 1985 and Powell 1991). Since the 
social environment is strongly influenced by its stakeholders, institutional theory 
and stakeholder theory are linked. As a result, these pressures determine to a large 
extent the organisational form of a firm, so that efficiency considerations or the 
process of competition have less influence than institutional pressures (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). 
 
On a firm level, institutionalisation stimulates the engagement in 
interorganisational relationships of many firms. Particularly young and small 
firms can benefit from an alliance with a larger, well-established partner in terms 
of visibility, reputation, image, prestige, as well as access to resources and 
expertise. Institutional theory serves as an explanation for many other forms of 
cooperation as well, for instance memberships in a social organisation, trade 
association, or consortium (Crawford and Gram 1978). 
 
Institutionalisation can, however, also be seen in the broader context of an 
organisational field, which is a large nonstatic network of firms that consider each 
other relevant. Within the field, the different actors continuously adapt their 
behaviour to the pressures and values of the field, with each organisation 
contributing to the development of pressures and values at the same time. The 
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result is increasing similarities among organisations within organisational fields. 
This can be due to three mechanisms: 
· Coercive isomorphism: The organisation is formed by pressures by 
organisations (stakeholders) upon which the firm is dependent as well as by 
the society's cultural expectations. Examples of such pressures are government 
regulations, consumer expectations, or the pressure from the parent 
corporation of a subsidiary company.  
· Mimetic isomorphism: In times of uncertainty firms tend to imitate the 
behaviour of other firms. This strategy of imitating industry norms and 
acquiescing to the environment is very common. As a result the strategies of 
successful firms are consciously or unconsciously imitated by managers of 
other firms in the same industry. This also involves entering into alliances or 
mergers simply because other successful firms have done so. According to the 
resource-based view, strategies of other firms can only be imitated if they are 
not unique. By making their strategies unique, firms try to prevent other from 
imitating them and to gain a sustainable competitive advantage.  
· Normative isomorphism: Increasing similarities are due to the fact that the 
organisational routines are influenced by professionally trained employees 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
5.2.9.2 Critical review 
A study by Wiewel and Hunter (1985), who found a direct relationship between a 
new firm's ability to increase its legitimacy and its participation in 
interorganisational relationships, confirms the assumption that institutionalisation 
fosters engagement in cooperative relationships. The idea of mimetic 
isomorphism was confirmed by a study by Powell, Kogut and Smith-Doerr 
(1996), who made investigations into the biotech industry. They found out that 
firms not engaged in any form of interorganisational relationship are becoming 
rare. A typical firm is involved in multiple partnerships. Atler and Hage (1993: 
272-279) extended these findings into a population ecology explanation for the 
popularity of cooperation in certain industries. In populations in which alliance 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
formation has become a norm, firms will try to adapt to this norm by also 
engaging in interfirm cooperations. 
 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) criticise institutional theory for lacking 
definitive boundaries, which limits its explanatory power of organisational 
phenomena. Institutional theory is further criticised for not taking into account 
motivating factors for the establishment of organisational forms outside the 
boundaries of the legitimacy argument. Such factors include power (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978), control (Ouchi 1977), interest and agency (Powell 1991), and the 
efficiency motive of transaction cost theory. On the other hand, institutional 
theory is frequently criticised for being too narrow and behaviourally oriented. It 
cannot explain, for example, why alliances and networks take particular forms 
(Barringer and Harrison 2000: 381). Moreover, as every firm imitates the other 
firms it is almost impossible to gain sustainable competitive advantage, which is 
in sharp contrast to Barney's concept of uniqueness of resources (Osborn and 
Haagedoorn 1997). 
5.2.9.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
The increasing similarities between firms resulting from institutional pressure can 
be put down to three mechanisms: 
 
§ Coercive isomorphism: Cooperations are due to pressures by organisations 
upon which the firm is dependent. In the context of European stock 
exchanges, these include regulators, listed companies, and investors. Stock 
exchanges are facing greatest pressure in the areas of cost efficiency and high 
liquidity. Since institutional theory does not deal with efficiency and 
competitive pressures, these factors have to be omitted. As far as legitimacy 
issues and social norms are concerned, the environment expects stock 
exchanges to provide a fair and orderly market, which means that from this 
point of view supervision and regulation are most important. This is 
particularly true with respect to young exchanges however, since more 
established exchanges have already proved themselves able to organise a fair 
and efficient market.  
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§ Mimetic isomorphism: Cooperations are formed as firms tend to imitate the 
behaviour of other firms in times of uncertainty. Due to the numerous 
changes in the stock exchange environment, uncertainty has increased 
substantially for stock exchanges in the past decade. At the same time, some 
of the large European exchanges have begun to team up, for example Paris, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon forming Euronext or the Nordic exchanges 
forming NOREX. Although not all cooperations have been as successful as 
these two examples, many other exchanges, particularly young exchanges in 
South-Eastern Europe, might strive to imitate the behaviour of the larger, 
longer-established exchanges.  
 
§ Normative isomorphism: Stock exchange cooperations are due to the fact that 
employees are trained more professionally. Although there are not many 
arguments in favour of this mechanism, demutualisation could have some 
normative isomorphic effect, since the management of for-profit exchanges 
might be better trained than that of mutual exchanges in former times, as the 
performance of the management of for-profit exchanges is followed more 
closely.  
5.2.9.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: The change to for-profit 
structures paves the way for stock exchange cooperation, which made 
isomorphic tendencies possible in the first place. As mentioned above, 
demutualisation might also trigger normative isomorphism. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Technology is considered one of 
the most important success factors of stock exchanges. Exchanges imitate the 
behaviour of others by entering into mergers and alliances in order to bring 
their technology up to date. Apart from efficiency considerations, technical 
trading is also an important image factor. result: positive 
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§ Integration of derivatives markets: From the viewpoint of institutional theory 
there is no direct link between integration of derivatives markets and stock 
exchange cooperation. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: If stock exchanges merge, they might be able  to offer a 
larger variety of market segments. Since this is in many cases desirable for 
the institutional environment, it might be a motive for stock exchange 
cooperation from the viewpoint of institutional theory. result: positive 
 
§ Supervision of trading: As already mentioned, the environment expects stock 
exchanges to provide a fair and orderly market. This is mainly an incentive 
for young exchanges seeking legitimacy to enter into mergers and alliances 
with longer-established partners. result: positive 
 
§ Transaction costs: Although transaction costs are an important success factor 
for stock exchanges, they are only related to efficiency arguments and 
therefore not relevant in the context of institutional theory. result: neutral 
 
§ Transparency regulations: As in the case of supervision of trading, young 
exchanges might team up with more established ones in order to justify 
transparency regulations. result: positive 
 
§ European integration: According to Harrison (1995: 99-100), the creation of a 
unified securities market in Europe has been pursued for more than 40 years 
now. European regulators welcome consolidation in the stock market sector, 
since it is, apart from enhancing the efficiency of European capital markets, 
expected to improve investor protection and lower cost of capital through 
competition and choice. The resulting pressure on stock exchanges might lead 
to coercive isomorphism and as a result stock exchange mergers and 
alliances. result: positive 
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§ Alternative Trading Systems: ATSs have substantially contributed to stock 
exchanges losing their "natural right to exist", since it has been shown that it 
is possible to replace them with other institutions. For this reason they might 
contribute to the search for a new identity by stock exchanges. result: 
positive 
5.2.9.5 Conclusion 
The strong trend towards concentration of trading facilities at a single geographic 
location is not only due to efficiency considerations, as postulated by many other 
theories, but also due to the fact that stock exchanges need to find a new identity. 
In other words, they are seeking a strategy that permits them to ensure long-term 
survival. This feature of institutional theory strongly links it to strategic choice 
theory. Stock exchanges are no longer the only institutions providing trading 
facilities. As isomorphism is in general not a desirable feature of stock exchanges 
(since by copying each other they undermine their strengths), they need to team 
up. The most likely explanation is mimetic isomorphism, as stock exchanges 
struggling for their survival might tend to copy the behaviour of other exchanges 
that have pursued successful cooperation strategies. This is particularly true for 
young exchanges in emerging markets seeking to benefit from an alliance with a 
larger, well-established partner in terms of visibility, reputation, image, prestige, 
as well as access to resources and expertise. Furthermore, the behaviour of other 
industries, in which mergers and alliances have become increasingly common, 
might be copied. Normative isomorphism and coercive isomorphism seem to be 
of relatively little importance, however.  
 Table 13: Evaluation of institutional theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x  x x  x x x   
negative           x25
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The minus point is for the fact that the theory mainly explains cooperations of young exchanges. 
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5.2.10 Population ecology theory 
5.2.10.1 Content  
Population ecology theory does not deal with single organisations  but with the 
demographic and structural features of total populations of organisations (Astley 
and Van de Ven 1983: 249). A population is defined as an "aggregate of relatively 
homogeneous" (Hannan and Freeman 1977) organisations. According to 
population ecology theory, the causes for the behaviour of organisations can be 
found in the environment. The environment consists to a large part of stakeholders 
of the firm, which links population ecology theory to stakeholder theory. The 
focus is on the effects of changes in the social, economic, or political environment 
on the forms organisations take, with the goal to investigate the distributions of 
firms across different environments and the capabilities of different organisational 
structures under different environmental conditions (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 
929-936). Autonomous strategic choice is possible only to a certain degree and 
environmental resources exist in the form of niches, with the distribution of these 
niches across society not being manipulable by single firms (Aldrich 1979: 138). 
 
In contrast to many other theories, e.g. strategic choice view, population 
ecology theory postulates that organisational change is not effected through an 
adaptation process but through a selection process. Although adaptation is 
possible according to population ecologists, selection is the core mechanism of 
organisational change. As firms have only limited possibilities to change their 
structure due to structural inertia, variations in organisational structures are caused 
by the creation of new and the demise of old structures. It is the environment 
which selects the mixture of organisations which survive, managers have only 
limited and temporary influence on the fate of the firm. As a result, their role is 
considered inactive and in the long run they have hardly any power (Astley and 
Van de Ven 1983: 256 and Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 263). 
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Although population ecology theory does not explain mergers and 
alliances directly, it does so indirectly by considering mergers as one form of 
organisational mortality. The density rate, a major figure of population ecology, 
which explains the number of organisations in a given population, is believed to 
have strong influence on the merger rate within a population. The higher the 
density rate, the more potential partners are available and the higher the merger 
rate will be. The formation of alliances can be seen as a similar mechanism, a 
change in structure brought about by the environment as a way of survival for 
firms which would otherwise die (Hannan and Freeman 1989: 139). 
5.2.10.2 Critical review 
Even population ecologist themselves admit that their model of natural selection 
is much more suitable for small, powerless organisations with resources being 
distributed unequally in their environment than for large, politically influential 
organisations with easy access to resources. At the same time, the structural 
inertia argument necessary to explain the selection process is also related to the 
size of an organisation. The larger organisations are, the higher their structural 
inertia and the higher the degree of control the organisation can exercise over its 
environment (Aldrich 1979: 111-112). Referring to this Perrow (1979: 241) 
argues that large organisations are often not the result of adaptation to the 
environment, but that they create a new environment. Empirical evidence of 
population ecology is also not very convincing. The results of a study by Oliver 
(1988: 557) raise serious doubts about the assumption that organisations are as 
strongly coupled to their environment as assumed by population ecology theory.  
5.2.10.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
According to population ecology theory it is the environment which selects the 
mixture of organisations which survive. It explains mergers and alliances as one 
form of selection (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 263). The more potential partners 
there are in a given population, the higher the merger rate will be. In the context 
of this theory, stock exchanges can be analysed like any other firm, since their 
natural monopoly has been abolished, which has led to the emergence of 
competitors and therefore a certain degree of population density. In the analysis 
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below, all factors that influence the density rate will be considered relevant. At the 
same time, one has to consider the factors which lead to the death of stock 
exchanges. Stock exchanges have to close down if they are unable to attract not 
enough order flow or an insufficient number of companies willing to list on the 
exchange, with the two factors being very strongly interrelated. The criteria of 
success identified in this thesis will help stock exchanges to avoid such a 
situation. Furthermore, indices can be seen as subsystems of stock exchanges. 
Therefore the death of an index (which serves a certain market segment) can be 
considered as the death of a partial death of a stock exchange. 
5.2.10.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Demutualisation has opened 
up the possibility of preventing organisational death by giving stock 
exchanges the option to enter into alliances. In this way managers can to a 
certain degree influence their environment. Mergers are not considered to 
prevent death, they are just a different form of it. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: Technicalisation is an important 
success factor in preventing outselection by the environment by making stock 
exchanges more efficient. It also helps managers to influence the selection 
process of the environment. In order to share the high development costs of 
electronic trading platforms, stock exchanges frequently team up. result: 
positive 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: The desire to integrate derivatives market 
is no incentive for stock exchanges to merge or form alliances since there is 
no link to the density rate. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: As has already been stated in previous sections, there is 
a strong trend towards concentration of trading facilities at a single 
geographic location. Consolidation among exchanges within a country seems 
to be inevitable, and even supranational exchanges are becoming more and 
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more common (in order to lower the density rate). For some, even a central 
worldwide trading platform is imaginable. One reason is that product 
differentiation is difficult in relation to the provision of trading facilities 
(Loistl 2000: 110). The result is that high density rates (the number of 
organisations in a given population) will inevitably lead to high mortality 
rates, since there is no demand for a large number of exchanges by the 
environment. This tendency was already observed in the US many decades 
ago, when regional stock exchanges merged. The major stock markets need to 
concentrate on different types of trading in order to make the population more 
diverse and in this way reduce the density rate. Particularly for small 
exchanges the only options are to either seek out niches, team up, or be 
outselected. In Europe, however, the big stock exchanges imitate each other 
instead of differentiating themselves, which helps to contribute to 
organisational death. result: positive 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Changes in the quality or practice of supervision of 
trading has no effect on the density rate. result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: Transaction costs do not directly influence the density rate. 
result: neutral 
 
§ Transparency regulations: There is no direct link between transparency 
regulations and the density rate. result: neutral 
 
§ European integration: European integration has substantially added to higher 
competitive pressure among European stock exchanges. On the one hand, the 
density rate has increased tremendously though the abolition of entry barriers 
of competitors and protectionism by national regulators, on the other hand, 
the introduction of the euro has decreased the distinctions between exchanges 
from the investors' point of view (Williamson 1997: 410). The higher the 
density rate, the higher the rate of mergers and alliances will be. By entering 
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into cooperations, stock exchanges try to decrease the density rate. result: 
positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: The emergence of Alternative Trading Systems 
has also increased the density rate since they offer the same services as stock 
exchanges in many areas. This is a further reason why stock exchanges need 
to team up in order to reduce the density rate. result: positive 
5.2.10.5 Conclusion 
The increase in the density rate of stock exchanges due to European integration 
and globalisation in general seems to be a good explanation for the increasing 
trend towards mergers and alliances. Before the removal of market entry barriers, 
there were no real populations, since each stock exchange was unique offering 
only the stocks of its country to the investors of its country. As already mentioned 
in Section 4.1.10, the model of natural selection is much more suitable for small, 
powerless organisations than for large, politically influential organisations 
(Aldrich 1979: 111-112). Perrow (1979: 241) argues that large organisations are 
often not the result of adaptation to the environment, but that they create a new 
environment. Although this does not really seem to be the case for most large 
exchanges, since they are also threatened by competition, it seems reasonable that 
population ecology theory is most suitable for smaller stock exchanges. 
 
Table 14: Evaluation of population ecology theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x  x    x x  x26
negative           x27
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
26 The extra -point is given since all the criteria of success will help stock exchanges survive.  
27 The minus point is for the fact that the theory mainly explains cooperations of small, powerless exchanges. 
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5.3 Additional management theories explaining mergers only 
5.3.1 Monopoly theory 
5.3.1.1 Content  
Monopoly theory is the oldest explanation for mergers that can be found in 
literature. According to monopoly theory, the main goal of mergers is to increase 
market power, which is achieved through a high market share and entry barriers to 
the market. This is in line with economic theory, which postulates that the higher 
market share and entry barriers, the higher the profitability of a firm will be, as it 
can set prices at its discretion and in this way increase its profits. 
 
The most popular way to increase monopoly power is through horizontal 
mergers. Vertical or conglomerate mergers can also deter potential entrants. One 
advantage of vertical or conglomerate mergers is the possibility to cross-subsidise 
products. The profits of one product can be used for another product in a highly 
competitive market with no or very low profit margins. Both vertical mergers and 
conglomerate mergers can create entry barriers by requiring new competitors to 
invest in all markets in which the vertically or concentrically integrated firm is 
already active to compete successfully. This strategy is frequently pursued by 
market leaders using concentric mergers (Hughes, Mueller and Singh 1980:30 and 
Trautwein 1990: 286). 
5.3.1.2 Critical review 
The monopoly motive played an important role in the past, today it is frequently 
assumed to be of limited significance. The main reason is that today's antitrust 
laws aim at restricting activities of a firm which lead to a monopoly position, as 
mergers intended to create market power are not beneficial for the economy as a 
whole but only for the firms involved (Scherer and Ross 1990: 174). On the other 
hand, there are certain industries, such as the computer industry or the airline 
industry, which are still characterised by monopoly-type structures.  
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Empirical evidence for the monopoly theory is also quite weak. According 
to managers, the idea behind a merger is hardly ever monopoly power. It may be 
argued, however, that managers are not likely to admit unpopular motives behind 
a merger. In most cases the market shares involved are negligible. As stated 
above, one reason is probably that large horizontal mergers are under intense 
scrutiny of antitrust authorities (Trautwein 1990: 286 and Ravenscraft and Scherer 
1987: 211). 
5.3.1.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
According to monopoly theory, firms enter into mergers in order to increase 
market power by achieving a high market share and erecting entry barriers to the 
market. One popular means of obtaining monopoly power is horizontal mergers. 
The theory that stock exchanges are seeking to regain the monopoly position they 
once held (at least on a national level) seems to show a logical desire. This is 
further substantiated by the existence of synergies for stock exchanges as well as 
positive network externalities for investors, which both foster the tendency 
towards monopoly structures. The fact that achieving a monopoly position is also 
one goal of strategic choice view strongly links monopoly theory to strategically-
oriented explanations of stock exchange mergers. 
5.3.1.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Demutualisation changes 
governance structures in a way that allows stock exchanges to achieve a 
monopoly position by permitting mergers among exchanges. Mergers are the 
easiest way for stock exchanges to increase their market power. result: 
positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As with demutualisation, 
technicalisation also enhances the chances of stock exchanges becoming 
monopolists, since it makes it easier to integrate trading on a single technical 
platform. This would have been almost impossible with floor trading due to 
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distance costs. Technicalisation is therefore one of the most important 
prerequisites for allowing stock exchanges the possibility of becoming 
monopolists in a market larger than the ir national borders. On the other hand, 
technicalisation has also made it more difficult for stock exchanges to remain 
or become monopolists, since entry barriers are much lower, due to lower 
back-office costs related to automated trading and the lower costs of setting 
up an electronic trading platform compared to a trading floor. result: neutral 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: Stock exchanges might gain access to 
derivatives markets by merging with other exchanges. This link is very vague 
however, therefore no correlation can be assumed. result: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation is an important prerequisite for 
achieving monopoly power, since it avoids the exploitation of market niches 
by other exchanges. By merging with others, exchanges stock exchanges 
become larger, which makes it easier for them to cover the whole market. 
result: positive 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Stock exchanges will not achieve a monopoly-type 
position by focusing on optimising supervision of trading. result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: As can be seen from the elaborations above, transaction 
costs are highly dependent on synergy effects exploited in a merger. Mergers 
therefore help exchanges to reach a monopoly position via lower transaction 
costs, since transaction costs are a very decisive factor for investors and their 
choice of exchange. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: A merger between exchanges will not be of great 
help to change transparency regulations in a way to achieve a monopoly 
position, since transparency regulations do not depend on the market power 
or the size of an exchange. result: neutral 
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§ European integration: European integration has put an end to the former 
national monopoly position of stock exchanges by removing entry barriers to 
national markets. In order to regain market power, they need to team up. 
result: positive 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Alternative Trading Systems will make it very 
difficult for stock exchanges to regain the monopoly position they once had. 
This is mainly due to the low entry costs of new companies. Larger stock 
exchanges have better chances than smaller ones of course, which supports 
the idea of using mergers to gain a monopoly position. It may be argued that 
it is a fallacy to believe that stock exchanges are able to regain the position 
they once had, since competition in a global market is too fierce. On the other 
hand, ATSs are not as strong in Europe as in the US since most European 
stock exchanges have switched to electronic trading, which shows that it is 
possible to successfully challenge competitors. result: positive 
5.3.1.5 Conclusion 
The goal of reaching a true monopoly position is much more difficult to achieve 
for stock exchanges today than it was in the past. Firstly, stock exchanges used to 
be nationally fragmented due to market entry barriers, secondly, technology has 
created a global stock market, as the location of stock exchanges has lost 
importance, and thirdly, technicalisation has also substantially lowered entry 
barriers for stock exchanges. On the other hand, synergies and positive network 
externalities are factors that favour large, monopoly-type structures in stock 
markets. At the same time, monopolists tend to reduce output and increase prices, 
something that is not desirable. This fear was negligible as long as the owners of 
the exchange were also its members (and most important customers). Since it is 
considered that stock exchanges deliver a public good, regulators would probably 
try to prevent such a situation.  
 
Table 15: Evaluation of monopoly theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x   x  x  x x x28
negative           x29
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
                                                 
28 The extra point is awarded for the positive network externalities which support the tendency towards monopoly structures. 
29 The minus point is for the fact that European regulators will prevent stock exchanges from behaving like typical monopolists increasing prices and reducing output. 
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5.3.2 Tax theory 
5.3.2.1 Content  
Tax savings are an important source of synergies. For this reason tax savings are a 
frequent motive for mergers. Tax savings are most frequently realised through: 
§ the purchase of companies which show a substantial difference between the 
book value and the current market value of their assets. By writing up the 
value of these assets to the current  market value, the depreciation base can be 
increased considerably. 
§ the purchase of companies with an unutilised tax loss carry forward, which 
can offset parts of the profits of the bidding firm so that the overall tax 
expenses are reduced. 
§ an increase in tax-deductible interest payments due to a rise in debt financing 
(Roll 1988). 
The fact that tax authorities and legislators are stakeholders of companies links tax 
theory to stakeholder theory.  
5.3.2.2 Critical review 
According to a study conducted by Auerbach and Reihus (1988: 78), mergers are 
hardly ever motivated by major tax savings. Even in those cases where 
considerable tax savings were found, there is no evidence that they played a 
decisive role for the realisation of the merger. On the other hand, the major 
importance of tax laws and the numerous arguments over taxation policies would 
rather suggest that tax motives are of major importance to firms.  
5.3.2.3 The theory in the context of stock exchanges 
The first question one has to ask is how stock exchanges are taxed and if there are 
any differences to the taxation of other companies. Up to now, there are no studies 
of any sort on taxation as an important factor for stock exchanges, let alone on tax 
theory as a possible merger motive. Demutualised stock exchanges are taxed like 
any other public limited company. For this reason there do not seem to be any 
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more incentives for stock exchanges to merge for tax reasons than for other 
companies. Since the general evidence for tax theory is very weak, it can also be 
assumed that it does not play a major role for stock exchanges.  
§ There are no obvious reasons why stock exchanges might show a substantial 
difference between the book value and the current market value of their 
assets. result: negative 
§ The only hint at a possible unutilised tax loss carry forward might be the high 
development costs of an electronic trading platform.  
§ Debt financing: There is no example yet where a stock exchange has risen 
cash via debt financing. result: negative 
 
5.3.2.4 The theory, the main criteria for the success of stock exchanges, 
and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: By giving stock exchanges 
the possibility to merge or form alliances, demutualisation is also a 
precondition for the exploitation of potential tax savings. result: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: The high development costs of 
electronic trading platforms might result in a tax loss carry forward. result: 
positive 
 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: If a stock exchange mergers with another 
one that has a favourable tax structure due to the integration of a derivatives 
market (e.g. an unutilised tax- loss carry forward resulting from a takeover of 
a derivatives exchanges), tax theory might be a motive for a merger. result: 
positive 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation will generally have no influence 
on the tax structure of stock exchanges. result: neutral 
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§ Supervision of trading: There is no link between supervision of trading and 
the tax structure of a stock exchange. result: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: Tax savings might increase the efficiency of an exchange 
and in this way transaction costs. result: positive 
 
§ Transparency regulations: No relationship (see supervision of trading). 
result: neutral 
 
§ European Integration: European integration itself has not lead to major 
changes in the tax structure of stock exchanges up to now. result: neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: Also the emergence of ATSs had no impact on 
the tax structure of stock exchanges. Since stock exchanges have come under 
immense cost pressures, however, they might be urged to merge in order to 
exploit tax savings in order to improve their financial situation. result: 
positive 
5.3.2.5 Conclusion 
Since there does not seem to be a higher incentive for stock exchanges than for 
other companies to merge for tax reasons, and as general evidence for tax theory 
is very weak, it can also be assumed that tax theory does not play a serious  role 
for stock exchanges. Savings are too small in scale in to act as a motivation for 
stock exchange mergers and alliances. Therefore tax savings will at best be a side-
effect. 
 
Table 16: Evaluation of tax theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quis ites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x x   x   x  
negative x          x30
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
 
                                                 
30 The minus point is given for the fact that tax savings usually relatively small in scale. 
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5.3.3 Theories referring to capital market inefficiencies 
5.3.3.1 Content  
According to the market efficiency hypothesis by Fama (1970: 383-387), capital 
markets are informationally efficient, which means that stock prices are assumed 
to reflect all relevant information. This is true for the strong form of the 
hypothesis. Under the semi-strong form, securities' prices are assumed to enclose 
all publicly available information, under the weak form only information that may 
be contained in the past history of the stock price itself is reflected. If market 
efficiency prevails, arbitrage profits are eliminated, as no market participant has 
access to superior information. The theories described below deny the existence of 
efficient capital markets, at least in the strong form, which leads to differences in 
expectations of the market participants.  
 
§ Information or valuation theory  
Following this theory, mergers are the result of superior information (insider 
knowledge) held by managers about the value of the target. The acquirer 
believes that he has superior information on the true value of the firm, that he 
might be better able to manage it successfully than the existing management, 
that he has detected an undervalued company which can be sold in pieces at a 
profit, or that the combination of the manager's firm with the target's 
businesses will lead to higher profits. This means that at least in the opinion 
of the manager of the bidding firm, the target is undervalued by the stock 
market due to asymmetric distribution of information, i.e. imperfections in 
the capital market. The low price results from a lack of publicly available 
information, i.e. from insider knowledge held by certain market participants. 
The premium paid by the acquirer does therefore not reflect his or her 
expectations regarding increased operative efficiency, but can be seen as the 
arbitrage profit between the valuation of the market and his or her own 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987: 7-8, Trautwein 1990: 286, Steiner 1975: 130 
and Holderness and Sheehan 1985). 
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§ Disturbance theory 
This theory, developed by Gort (1969), is based on the assumption that 
merger waves are caused by economic disturbances. The most common 
disturbances are technological changes and security price movements. It is 
interesting to note that under information theory, security price movements 
were the result of information imbalances and uncertainty, whereas under 
disturbance theory they are their cause. Disturbances result in a higher level 
of general uncertainty and lead to changes in the expectations of the 
individual market participants. The merger wave is caused by the fact that 
previous non-owners of assets now value assets more highly than their 
owners, and vice-versa. In other words, outsiders, for example managers of 
potential acquiring firms, become relatively more optimistic and insiders, i.e. 
current stockholders, become relatively more pessimistic. This greater spread 
in expectations leads to mergers, which are expected both in times of falling 
as well as rising share prices. The reason why information can be spread 
asymmetrically is that people evaluate available information differently or 
that some are more optimistic than others.  
5.3.3.2 Critical review 
§ Information or valuation theory  
Valuation theory is very common to justify mergers and managers often 
quote it as a merger motive (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987: 14 and Trautwein 
1990: 287). However, statistical evidence is relatively weak. Secondly, 
valuation theory is not compatible with capital market efficiency. Ravenscraft 
and Scherer (1987) argue, though, that this must not necessarily be the case as 
capital market efficiency, at least in its weak form, requires only the 
reflection of all publicly available information in the stock price. If the bidder 
has insider knowledge about the target, he or she reveals it in the bid. As a 
result the stock price will rise, reflecting the new information with the effect 
that the bidder will not capitalise on the private information (Wensley 1982). 
However, studies have shown that stock prices in many cases fell back to pre-
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merger-announcement levels when the merger did not take place. According 
to the theory, the stock price would have been expected to remain at its higher 
level due to the private information of the bidding firm revealed in the bid. 
Since disbelief in the efficiency of capital markets is very common, however, 
the theory is still widely accepted (Trautwein 1990: 287). 
 
§ Disturbance theory 
There is not much evidence for disturbance theory. It fails to explain, for 
instance, why the oil crises in 1973/74 did not result in a merger wave or why 
the merger boom in the 1960s was not triggered by major disturbances. In 
addition, as most disturbances affect only certain sectors of the economy a 
sectoral pattern of mergers would be expected to prevail, which in fact can 
only be observed in the minority of cases. This theory is therefore considered 
rather implausible (Trautwein 1990: 290). Moreover, as in the case of 
valuation theory, disturbance theory is not compatible with the assumption of 
an efficient capital market, under which the expectations of stockholders and 
non-stockholders are expected to be the same, as changes in expectations 
would have to cause immediate adaptations of the market price and the 
portfolios of investors (Hughes, Mueller and Singh 1990: 33-34). 
5.3.3.3 The theories in the context of stock exchanges 
Theories referring to capital market inefficiencies are only applicable to stock 
exchanges that have already gone public, since otherwise no valuation through the 
capital market takes place.  
 
§ Information or valuation theory 
Up to now, no empirical studies have been conducted on this phenomenon in the 
area of stock exchanges. The only example might have been the hostile takeover 
bid by the Swedish OM-Group for the London Stock Exchange, where the OM 
Group considered the LSE to be undervalued due to the  fact that the good image 
of the LSE was not adequately reflected in the stock prices (Fairlamb 2000). All 
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motives of valuation theory can be assumed to be applicable to exchanges to the 
same degree as to other companies.  
 
§ Disturbance theory 
Several disturbances have occurred in the environment of stock exchanges lately, 
such as the introduction of technical trading, the consolidation of institut ional 
investors, the liberalisation of national financial markets and consequently the 
entry of new competitors, an overall slump in securities prices in the past four 
years, a general economic downturn, etc. For this reason disturbance theory is a 
possible explanation for stock exchange mergers and alliances.  
 
5.3.3.4 The theories, the main criteria for the success of stock 
exchanges, and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Changes in corporate 
governance structures were the crucial prerequisite for stock exchanges to be 
able to become listed companies in the first place. Thus without 
demutualisation, all theories relating to capital market inefficiencies would 
have to be ruled out. The fact that many stock exchanges have listed only 
recently might be an argument in favour of valuation theory, since it might be 
more difficult for the market to correctly estimate the value of newly listed 
companies (and especially since the market has no experience with valuing 
stock exchanges in general) than of more established companies. result: 
valuation and disturbance: positive 
 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As mentioned above, technical 
revolutions are the major argument for disturbance theory. On the other hand, 
the integration of clearing and settlement institutions might support valuation 
theory, since the market might not be able to correctly estimate the additional 
value arising from integrated clearing and settlement (since this is also a 
relatively new trend). result: valuation and disturbance: positive 
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§ Integration of derivatives markets: As in the case of clearing and settlement, 
the market might also have problems in estimating the true value of 
derivatives markets integrated into stock exchanges. However, the tradition of 
integrated derivatives markets is certainly longer than that of clearing and 
settlement. On the other hand, technicalisation has added a new feature in this 
context, since stock exchanges and derivatives markets might be operated 
from and be accessible via a single electronic trading platforms, resulting in 
synergies for both exchanges and investors. result: valuation: positive, 
disturbance: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Proper market segmentation also enhances the value of 
stock exchanges. The de facto increase in value of a stock exchange through 
such a measure however might also be difficult to estimate for the market. 
result: valuation: positive, disturbance: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: The question in connection with supervision of 
trading concerns any change in value of the exchange due to the fact that 
listed exchanges almost always have to outsource this function. It is 
frequently viewed as one of the core functions of an exchange on which stock 
exchanges had a monopoly and in which they had unique knowledge. This 
factor might lead to inaccuracies in valuation. result: valuation: positive, 
disturbance: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: Electronic trading leads to synergies which can be passed 
on to investors in the form of lower transaction costs. For the market it might 
however be difficult to estimate the correct amount of cost savings. result: 
valuation: positive, disturbance: neutral 
 
§ Transparency regulations: Transparency regulations that fit the market very 
well might attract more investors and therefore lead to a higher value of the 
exchange. The effect of changes in transparency regulations on the market 
value of an exchange will in most cases be very hard to measure, however. 
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Changes in transparency regulations are frequently the result of a technical 
revolution, i.e. the introduction of an automated trading platform. result: 
valuation and disturbance: positive 
 
In all the above areas, stock exchanges might have superior knowledge on 
the true value of other exchanges, since they have gone through the same 
processes and changes as other exchanges and can therefore better estimate their 
financial impact. This argument strongly supports valuation theory.  
 
§ European integration: European integration has indirectly led to an economic 
disturbance by opening up the market for new competitors and by permitting 
ATSs. European integration is therefore an argument in favour of disturbance 
theory. result: disturbance: positive, valuation: neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: The emergence of ATSs caused a large 
economic disturbance, since stock exchanges had to cope with new 
competitors for the first time. Therefore it was probably very difficult for the 
market to estimate the negative effects of the emergence of ATSs on 
traditional stock exchanges, in particular since they had proved to be 
extremely successful in the US. The fact that ATSs would not play such a 
significant role in Europe was almost certainly not really recognised from the 
beginning. Therefore, disturbance theory is particularly well suited for 
explaining earlier mergers and alliances among stock exchanges. result: 
disturbance: positive, valuation: neutral 
5.3.3.5 Conclusion 
Theories referring to capital market inefficiencies are only applicable to stock 
exchanges that have already gone public, since otherwise no valuation through the 
capital market takes place. This, of course, limits the applicability of these 
theories. Although demutualisation is generally considered a prerequisite for stock 
exchange mergers, they do not necessarily have to be listed in order to team up 
with others. Stock exchange mergers between non-listed stock exchanges can 
therefore not be explained by theories referring to capital market inefficiencies. 
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Based on the arguments mentioned above, valuation and disturbance theories 
seems to be most significant for early stock exchange mergers and alliances, since 
at that time the estimation of the true value of changes in stock exchanges and 
their environment was most difficult. Stock exchanges which have themselves 
been through such processes therefore have access to superior information. Thus 
stock exchange mergers among listed exchanges can be well justified on the basis 
of theories referring to capital-market inefficiencies. On the other hand, there is a 
strong argument aga inst theories referring to capital market inefficiencies: it is the 
task of stock exchanges to provide a fair, orderly, and efficient market. By 
justifying mergers on the basis of valuation theory, they undermine their own 
business.  
 
 
Table 17: Evaluation of valuation theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x x x x x x    
negative           x31
result            
Source: A. 
 
 
Table 18: Evaluation of disturbance theory. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x     x x x  
negative           x32 
result            
Source: A. 
                                                 
31 The minus point is for the fact both theories are only applicable to listed exchanges and that justifying mergers on the basis of valuation theory undermines the 
business of stock exchanges themselves. 
32 See footnote no. 31. 
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5.3.4 Agency theories 
5.3.4.1 Content  
Agency theories deal with ensuring that a principal's objectives are fulfilled 
through an agent. Agents are, however, frequently guided by their self- interests to 
a greater extent than by the objectives they are supposed to fulfil. Agency theory 
assumes that human behaviour is self- interested, risk-averse, and subject to 
bounded rationality. Further, there is a conflict of goals of the organisation's 
members and information asymmetry between principals and agents. Agents 
possess more specific information about the context in which they act. Principals 
have the possibility to enhance their knowledge about the conduct of their agents 
by spending more money on information, as information is a purchasable 
commodity. Agency theory therefore tries to identify governance mechanisms, 
such as control and incentive mechanisms, which prevent agents from self-serving 
behaviour (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Agency theory is relevant to cooperative ventures where each partner 
becomes an agent for the other. The question is therefore how self-seeking, 
opportunistic behaviour of one partner at the expense of the other can be 
prevented. In order to avoid suspicion and to foster trust between the partners, 
they should determine the basis on which information is shared between them and 
how returns are distributed (Child and Faulkner 1998: 24-25). Within the scope of 
agency theory, different hypotheses of the reasons for mergers have been 
developed. 
 
§ Hubris hypothesis 
If a firm seeks a potential target firm it undertakes a valuation of the equity of 
the target. This valuation is based on public and perhaps also non-public 
information. It also contains estimated synergy effects or discounts included 
in the current market price due to weak management. The value derived from 
this valuation is compared to the current market price. If the market price is 
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below valuation the bid is made, otherwise it is abandoned as the 
shareholders of the target firms would not sell below market price. Even 
though there are sometimes no synergies or other sources of takeover gains, 
some bids are made because the bidding firms believe in the existence of 
gains. In such a case the takeover premium is a mistake made by the bidding 
firm. This mistake is due to hubris, i.e. overbearing presumptions of bidders 
that their valuations are correct and that the market does not reflect the full 
economic value of the firm or the combined firm. In many cases managers 
simply overestimate their abilities to integrate and manage the target firm. In 
some cases, gains do exist, but at least part of the takeover premium is caused 
by hubris (Roll 1986: 121, 198-200). 
 
§ Risk-aversion of management 
Coffee (1988: 80-85) believes that the conflict of interest between the 
management and shareholders derives from different attitudes towards risk. 
Managers are mainly risk-averse while shareholders are risk-neutral. The 
reason why managers are generally more risk-averse than stockholders is that 
by working for the firm, managers rent a significant part of their wealth – 
their human capital – to the firm. The rent for their human capital depends to 
a high degree on the success or failure of the firm, as the success or failure of 
the firm gives information about the manager's talents, which influences his 
or her future wages. Their own career is therefore closely linked to the 
existence of the firm, which does not only determine their current and future 
income but may even lead to legal consequences resulting from the manager's 
personal liability in case of insolvency. For this reason the manager tries on 
the one hand to diversify into different lines of business and on the other hand 
to keep his or her risk as low as possible by maintaining the firm's 
independency through paying out low dividends and stressing internal 
financing. Shareholders can spread their risk by investing in different titles. 
According to portfolio theory, the optimal portfolio for any investor is 
diversified across stakes in many firms in order to avoid being too dependent 
on one firm. At the same time if an investor has his or her capital distributed 
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over a large number of firms, he or she will have no special interest in the 
control of the firm. That is why the gap between security ownership and 
control of a firm is widened and incentive problems arise when managers 
who are not the shareholders of the firm are those who take decisions (Coffee 
1988: 80-85, Amihud and Lev 1981: 605-608 and Fama 1980: 288-292). 
 
§ Turnover maximisation model 
This theory is the oldest explanation for mergers in literature. Baumol and 
Marris argue that managers' main target is to maximise sales and growth rates 
of revenues and assets. This, however, need not necessarily also imply the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. The reason why managers focus on the 
above-mentioned goals is that they try to pursue their personal interests, 
which are in many cases prestige and power and which are more strongly 
related to a company's size or growth rate than to its profitability. "Executive 
salaries appear to be far more closely correlated with the scale of operations 
of the firm than with its profitability" (Baumol 1967: 47). Also Marris states 
that "measures of size, in contrast, for example, to measures of profitability, 
explain a lion's share of the interfirm variance of executive compensation 
rates" (Marris 1963: 187). The growth goal is also in accordance with other 
non-monetary goals of managers, which consider the growth of their 
organisation as "one of the best methods for satisfying personal needs and 
ambitions, an attitude which is reinforced by psychological tendencies to 
identify the ego with the organisation" (Marris 1963: 187-188).  
 
§ Corporate control 
According to a hypothesis by Jensen and Ruback (1983: 6), a market for 
corporate control, which is defined as "a market in which alternative 
managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources" 
(Jensen and Ruback 1983: 6), is in many cases responsible for mergers. The 
assumption behind this model is that the main task of management is the 
maximisation of shareholder value, expressed by the market valuation of the 
company. If managers fail to do so, competing management teams will try to 
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take over the firm and replace the current management. In this way 
management inefficiencies will be eliminated. The competition among 
managerial teams provides a correction mechanism which ensures that 
economies of scale or other synergies resulting from the combination or 
reorganisation of firms are realised. In this way mergers have the function of 
a disciplinary force in the capital market, substituting the lack of internal 
control by shareholders (Jensen and Ruback 1983: 6). 
 
§ Free cashflow hypothesis 
Based on agency theory, one explanation of mergers is the free cashflow 
hypothesis by Jensen (1986: 322). According to this model, managers try to 
retain as much free cashflow as possible within the company instead of 
paying it out to shareholders in the form of dividends. The reason is that 
payouts reduce the influence and independence of management and lead to a 
higher degree of control by shareholders when new capital has to be raised at 
a later point. At the same time, free cashflow is also employed to even out 
earnings fluctuations. Moreover, management uses free cashflow to make 
investments which are not necessarily profitable, but rather increase their 
income and power, both of which are in many cases dependent on the 
company size. Prominent examples are investments in external growth, 
mainly expansion into new industries, which often do not develop favourably 
however, due to a lack of industry-specific expertise (Jensen 1986: 322). 
5.3.4.2 Critical review 
According to Kootz (1996: 26), agency theories are a widely accepted explanation 
for mergers and frequently used in the business press. But although there is 
considerable empirical support, managerial hypotheses cannot fully explain 
mergers. First of all, the assumption that all managers are selfish does not hold 
true in all cases. Furthermore, the remuneration of top-managers is frequently 
linked to the financial performance of the firm, which decreases the explanatory 
value of agency theories. In most studies agency theories were only used if 
efficiency or other economic theories did not hold true, arguing that if efficiency 
motives could not be proven, there obviously must have been managerial ones 
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behind the merger. Agency theories can explain single cases, but they do not serve 
as a justification for different merger rates over time. Managerial motives have 
also been criticised for not taking into account the effects of the market for 
corporate control, the existence of a labour market for managers, and managerial 
behaviour. They also neglect the fact that the remuneration of many corporate 
leaders is at least partly linked to the company's stock price (Bühner 1990a: 314, 
Bühner 1990b: 1290, Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987: 212, 214, Steiner 1975: 143, 
Jensen and Ruback 1983: 45-47 and Huemer 1990: 33). 
 
Hubris hypothesis is backed by a study of takeovers in the United 
Kingdom conducted by Firth (1980) which strongly suggests the presence of 
bidding errors. The bidding firm's shares showed a loss around the takeover 
period which was related to the premium paid to the target firm. "This supports 
the view that the stock market expects zero benefits from a takeover, that the gains 
to the acquired firm represent an 'over-payment' and that the acquiring company's 
shareholders suffer corresponding losses" (Firth 1980: 254). An objection against 
the hubris hypothesis frequently mentioned is that it implies that managers 
consciously act against shareholder interests. If the motive behind all takeovers 
was hubris, shareholders could prevent them by forbidding bids (Roll 1986: 213-
214). 
 
The corporate control hypothesis has a rather unfavourable empirical 
record. Numerous analyses confirm that in a majority of cases returns dropped to 
below average after a change in management (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). 
According to a study by Arthur D. Little, about 50 percent of all mergers resulted 
in below-average returns for the following three years (Behrens 1998: 55). 
Another argument against this theory is the fact that one condition for a takeover 
for many companies is that the existing management stays for at least another two 
years to ensure continuity. According to Fama (1980: 293), the market for 
corporate control fails if top managers decide that collusion and expropriation of 
security holder wealth are better than competition among themselves. This risk 
might be lowered by the inclusion of outside directors, however. In contrast, the 
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free cashflow hypothesis tested by Jensen was supported empirically. He came to 
the conclusion that the strategy of retaining free cashflow is one of the main 
causes for the development of conglomerates in the US (Jensen 1986: 328). 
5.3.4.3 The theories in the context of stock exchanges 
Before starting with the analysis of agency theories, it first must be assessed 
whether agency relationships are relevant within stock exchanges. This is clearly 
the case, as the owners are different from the managers of a stock exchange.  
 
§ Hubris hypothesis 
One reason for hubris  might be the argument presented above, namely that stock 
exchange managers might consider themselves in a superior position to estimate 
the true value of changes in and around other stock exchanges, since their own 
institutions have been going through similar developments. On the other hand, it 
is the ultimate increase in liquidity and order flow that reflects the true value of 
changes. Since the investors on the stock exchange (those generating liquidity) are 
the same as those estimating the value of the exchange, the two figures should not 
really diverge a lot in the longer-run. Therefore hubris might be the reason behind 
differences in valuation.  
 
§ Risk-aversion of management 
One expression of the risk aversion of management might be investment in 
derivatives exchanges as well as clearing and settlement institutions. Mergers 
among stock exchanges are less likely under this motive, since financial markets 
are highly interlinked nowadays and economic shocks are in most cases 
worldwide. Therefore diversification across countries can only absorb domestic 
but not international shocks. Unfortunately there are no studies on payout-rates of 
stock exchanges or the degree of internal financing. Therefore this theory is hard 
to evaluate, however it can be assumed to play a similar role as in other 
companies.  
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§ Turnover maximisation model 
In the case of stock exchanges, one has to assume that turnover maximisation also 
maximises shareholder value due to positive network effects, since there are 
significant synergies for both exchanges and investors. For this reason stock 
exchanges cannot be compared one-to-one with other firms in this respect, since 
larger size can be assumed to also lead to higher efficiency. Therefore the 
turnover maximisation model seems to be less significant for exchanges. result: 
negative 
 
§ Corporate control 
In many cases it is probably difficult to assess if mergers have been conducted on 
the basis of the corporate control hypothesis or for other motives. In the course of 
demutualisation and for-profit orientation, however, the efficiency of management 
has become more important. For this reason the corporate control hypothesis 
might have some relevance for stock exchanges with management teams that have 
not really managed the switch to for-profit orientation.  
 
§ Free cash flow hypothesis 
There are no empirical studies of any sort on this theory, therefore its relevance 
for stock exchanges is hard to evaluate. It can be assumed to play a similar role as 
in other companies, however.  
5.3.4.4 The theories, the main criteria for the success of stock 
exchanges, and the stock exchange environment 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: Changes in corporate 
governance structures might result in managers being over-optimistic on the 
efficiency gains involved. Moreover, as already mentioned, stock exchanges 
with management teams that have not really managed the switch to for-profit 
orientation might be taken over in order to eliminate inefficiencies in 
management, which speaks in favour of the corporate control theory. result: 
hubris hypothesis and corporate control: positive, rest: neutral 
 
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
§ Degree of organisation and technicalisation: As in the case of corporate 
governance and ownership structures, managers might overestimate the 
efficiency gains from electronic trading or the integration of clearing and 
settlement institutions. result: hubris hypothesis: positive, rest: neutral 
 
§ Integration of derivatives markets: As in the above examples, managers might 
overestimate the efficiency gains from the integration of clearing and 
settlement institutions. result: hubris hypothesis: positive, rest: neutral 
 
§ Market segmentation: Market segmentation might be linked to the turnover 
maximisation model. Stock exchange managers might try to increase the 
turnover of an exchange by creating a larger range of market segments (e.g. 
by merging with other exchanges). Some segments might not be profitable, 
however, since the additional administrative costs and lost synergies might 
more than outweigh the additional turnover. result: turnover maximisation 
model: positive, rest: neutral 
 
§ Supervision of trading: Managers might overestimate the positive effects of 
proper supervision of trading on the image of an exchange. result: hubris 
hypothesis: positive, rest: neutral 
 
§ Transaction costs: As in the above examples, managers might overestimate 
the efficiency gains from mergers resulting in a reduction of transaction costs 
and therefore an increase in turnover, since the image of an exchange also 
plays an important role. The turnover maximisation model can be ruled out in 
this context due to positive network externalities. result: hubris hypothesis: 
positive, rest: neutral 
 
§ Transparency regulations: There is no obvious link between transparency 
regulations and agency theories, since changes in transparency regulations do 
not bring about any significant benefits to managers. result: neutral 
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§ European integration: Managers are also likely to overestimate the synergy 
effects from the introduction of the euro or additional business being taken 
away from banks due to Basel II. result: hubris hypothesis: positive, rest: 
neutral 
 
§ Alternative Trading Systems: In view of the threat by ATSs, European stock 
exchange managers might be too risk-averse, overestimating the potential of 
ATSs in Europe. result: risk-aversion: positive, rest: neutral 
5.3.4.5 Conclusion 
The theory that is supported most by the success factors of stock exchanges is  
hubris hypothesis. There are also some – relatively weak – arguments for risk-
aversion, turnover maximisation, and corporate control. In general agency theories 
can be considered relevant, however, taken separately, only hubris hypothesis 
seems to really serve as a possible explanation for stock exchange mergers.  
Table 19: Evaluation of hubris hypothesis. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x x x  x x  x   
negative            
result            
 
Source: A. 
 
Table 20: Evaluation of agency theories other than then hubris hypothesis. 
 
weight 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
 prere-
quisites 
corporate 
coverance 
organisation & 
technicaliation 
derivatives 
markets 
market seg-
mentation 
supervision 
of trading 
transaction 
costs 
transparency 
regulations 
European 
Integration  
ATSs other 
factors
positive  x   x     x  
negative x           
result            
 
Source: A. 
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5.4 Results 
Based on the point system for evaluating the different theories, the maximum 
score a theory could theoretically achieve was 12 points. Comparing the scores of 
the different theories, the following ranking can be observed:  
1. Efficiency theories (9 points) 
2. Hubris hypothesis, valuation theory (8 points) 
4. Institutional theory, resource-based view, (7 points) 
6. Stakeholder theory, monopoly theory, income uncertainties, organisational 
learning (6 points) 
10. Resource-dependence, strategic choice, population ecology theory (5 points) 
13. Disturbance theory, tax theory (4 points) 
15. Transaction cost economics, agency theories other than the hubris hypothesis 
(2 points) 
 
This ranking is to be viewed ordinally, i.e. if a theory scores twice as many 
points as another that does not mean that it explains a theory twice as well. The 
points are to be seen primarily as an orientation. Building three categories of 
quality of explanation, theories ranking between position 1 and 5 can be 
considered as very good explanations for stock exchange mergers, positions 6 to 
11 as of medium suitability for stock exchanges, and positions 14 to 16 as not 
really applicable to stock exchange cooperations. That fact that efficiency theories 
seem to be highly significant for stock exchange mergers and alliances is not 
surprising in view of the cost pressure stock exchanges are facing due to 
competition from other stock exchanges as well as ATSs. On the other hand, the 
weakness of the explanatory power of transaction cost theory seems to result from 
the small number of transaction partners of stock exchanges. The main problem of 
tax theory is that tax savings are usually so small in scale that they will not serve 
as a sole explanation for stock exchange mergers, but can at best be viewed as a 
side-effect.  
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It becomes obvious that there are numerous theories which serve as good 
explanations of stock exchange mergers and alliances. At the same time, none of 
the theories was linked to all the criteria of success as well as European 
integration and the influence of ATSs. The reason is that none of the theories is 
holistic. Each of them explains corporate cooperation from a relatively narrow 
point of view. Therefore a combination of theories, a so-called eclectic approach 
is necessary to fully explain stock exchange mergers and alliances. Unfortunately 
there is still a lack of integration of theories to be observed in literature. In the 
course of the analysis it was attempted to create links between the theories. 
Numerous hints at possible connections between theories were made. Two 
theories that lend themselves beautifully to being merged are efficiency theories 
and hubris hypothesis. Synergies are very important for companies and a very 
strong merger motive. At the same time, expected synergies do not always fully 
come into effect. Some managers might overestimate their ability to exploit 
synergies and therefore hubris might be, together with efficiency motives, a strong 
driver of mergers and alliances.  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
 
6 THE VISION OF A CENTRAL TRADING PLATFORM FOR THE GLOBAL 
STOCK MARKET: CHANCES AND LIMITIONS FROM TODAY'S 
VIEWPOINT 
The question of whether a single global exchange or at least trading platform is 
realistic and beneficial is commented very diversely by different experts across 
literature. Some authors (e.g. Dixon 1999), believe that the ultimate solution will 
be a single global exchange which trades continuously, others (e.g. Behos and 
Crouhy 1996) claim that a monopoly position of one stock exchange is neither 
realistic nor beneficial for financial markets in general. Many authors (such as 
Gaa et al. 2001, Benos and Crouhy 1996, Lee 1994, etc.) can agree, however, that 
large-cap stocks are very likely to be traded worldwide on a few trading networks, 
whereas smaller firms will remain listed on national exchanges.  
 
In the following table the main arguments in favour and against the 
concentration of trading on a single worldwide platform will be presented. 
 
Table 21: Arguments for and against a central worldwide trading platform. 
CENTRAL TRADING PLATFORM NATIONAL EXCHANGES 
 
A large centralised trading platform 
will be characterised by high liquidity 
and security. This would ensure trading 
confidence and is highly appreciated by 
institutional investors (Dixon 1999 and 
Gaa et al. 2001: 53). 
 
The big institutional investors will not 
risk becoming captive to a single 
monopoly exchange. According to 
Andre Cappon33 of CBM, a 
consultancy, the emergence of two or 
three competing global networks of 
exchanges is much more likely 
("Good-bye to all that" 1999). 
 
                                                 
33 Cappon, A. (Interview) quoted in "Good-bye to all that" (1999). 
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Technological progress in the area of 
telecommunication creates a kind of 
"natural monopoly" for the largest 
exchanges, in national markets as well 
as on a global scale, due to positive 
network externalities. Exchanges or 
trading systems are analogous to a 
communication network, as the benefit 
to one trader increases when other 
traders join in. According to 
Economides (1993), liquidity concerns 
limit the number of markets. For this 
reason networks are by nature self-
reinforcing and show a positive critical 
mass (Herring and Litan 2002). 
 
 
Shy and Tarkka (2001: 8) argue that 
there is not only one single worldwide 
telephone company, or mail carrier, or 
commercial bank. For this reason it is 
also unlikely that a single equity 
market will emerge.  
 
According to Hasan, Malkamäki and 
Schmiedel (2002: 11), a single market 
will come into being when regulatory 
barriers (such as accounting standards 
or unequal tax treatment) that prevent 
the formation of a single market are 
abandoned and when 
telecommunication technologies are 
appropriately advanced, i.e. when the 
market is no longer dependent on 
physical location. 
 
Apart from the factors mentioned by 
Hasan, Malkamäki and Schmiedel 
(2002: 11), there are many more 
aspects that hamper worldwide stock 
exchange consolidation: 
§ Language and cultural differences. 
§ Different currencies. 
§ Insufficient knowledge about 
foreign investment opportunities 
due to high information costs. 
§ Widespread fragmentation of 
Europe's clearing and settlement 
systems.  
§ Government policies which favour 
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home-country investment through 
the requirement of pension funds 
to invest largely in domestic 
government secur ities (Gaa et al. 
2001: 44). 
 
 
The switch to a single trading platform 
is technically simple. It is merely a 
question of which computer servers are 
linked to which basement  (Dixon 
1999). 
 
 
National stock exchanges are highly 
resistant to giving up their trading 
platforms, having spent a lot of money 
on creating them (Dixon 1999). 
 
According to Bröker (1989), 
competition among financial exchanges 
does not make much long-term sense. 
For a financial market to be efficient, 
scale is absolutely crucial and liquidity 
is almost all.  
 
Domestic markets will continue to 
exist, as there will always be relatively 
illiquid products and agents desiring to 
trade them (Gaa et al. 2001: 68). There 
is still a very strong home-country bias 
among investors. In developed 
countries, 92 percent of equity 
investment was still domestic in 1999 
(Lewis 1999). Furthermore, according 
to Blume (2000), investors show 
different preferences regarding speed 
of execution and anonymity. 
 
 
A simulation by Gerke and Hamann 
(1991: 19-20) shows that if a market is 
split up into several sub-segments, the 
number of cleared transactions is 
 
Competition will be based on trading 
costs and service to clients. Different 
exchanges will cater to the needs of 
different clienteles by trying to exploit 
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diminished. The result is diverging 
share prices within the same economic 
setting. This diverging development 
rests on the assumption of the 
submarket developing independently. 
If this assumption is lifted, arbitrage 
processes start, which even out the 
difference in share prices between 
different market places. The possibility 
of arbitrage suggests that substantial 
cost savings can be achieved by 
establishing a central trading system. 
 
their comparative advantage. Narrower 
spreads will be the result (Behos and 
Crouhy 1996: 47-48 and Herring and 
Litan 2002). 
 
 
Even the NYSE, the largest market 
player, has already explored the 
possibility of a Global Equity Market 
(GEM) toge ther with the Australian 
Stock Exchange, Euronext, Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing, The Bolas 
Mexican de Valores, the Bolas de 
Valores de Sao Paulo, The Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, and the Toronto Stock 
Exchange 34 (Skeete 2000). 
 
Baker (2000) believes that before a 
single European stock exchange is not 
fully established, the possibility of a 
global stock exchange is not realistic. 
Apart from that GEM has made hardly 
any progress since the agreement has 
been signed. 
 
 
Source: A. 
                                                 
34 The goal is an interconnection of the exchanges' trading systems and the development of a 
global market structure based on transparency, self-regulation, and auction price discovery. All 
three main time zones would be involved, which would allow around-the-clock trading 
mechanisms for the world's global companies and in this way increase their liquidity. GEM would 
be accessed through the domestic stock exchanges of investors so that the exchanges' brand and 
individual standing would remain intact. On the other hand, a single global pool of liquidity could 
be created. All stock exchanges adhering to the principles of transparency, self-regulation, and the 
auction model will be invited to participate in GEM. Furthermore, GEM will try to achieve 
economies of scale to lower transaction costs for investors and intermediaries (Skeete 2000). 
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Most experts agree that consolidation among stock exchanges is set to 
continue. The question is what form it will take. According to Seifert (1999: 25), 
there are two options for European stock exchanges in future: there might be one 
large European exchange or an oligopoly characterised by fierce competition 
might survive and eventually lead to efficiency. Lee (1994: 89) believes that 
finally a hub-and-spokes system with four major marketplaces, namely New 
York, a European centre, Tokyo, and a Chinese marketplace, will emerge. These 
main trading centres will be interconnected electronically. Furthermore, there will 
be several subsidiary markets which will also be linked to the main centres by 
electronic networks. Jensen and Natorp (2000) distinguish between the trading 
and the listing function of stock exchanges. They expect the trading function to 
become centralised, whereas listing will remain with national exchanges. 
 
"The trading function, which is characterised by economies of scale, will 
probably be centralised in a small number of large stock exchanges, if not 
in one single European stock exchange. On the other hand, it is likely that 
the stock-exchange listing of small companies in particular, which is best 
achieved on a regional basis, will continue to be decentralised" (Jensen 
and Natorp 2000).  
 
McAndrews and Stefanadis (2002), compare the situation of European 
stock markets today to that of its US counterparts in the first part of the 20th 
century. European national exchanges show a number of similarities with US 
regional exchanges. They mainly trade local, country-specific stocks and the 
emergence of an equity culture and the removal of barriers to cross-country 
trading will increase competition, just like technological and regulatory changes 
brought about competition among the US exchanges. Looking at the US example, 
consolidation might be a lengthy process, with economies of scale being utilised 
only slowly over the years. On the other hand, unlike in the US, European 
consolidation does not face technological constraints. For this reason, the 
obstacles in Europe are mainly of regulatory and financial nature. As they can be 
resolved faster than technological innovation usually occurs, the European 
consolidation process can be expected to proceed with more speed than it did in 
the US. In order to ensure fair competition, regulation will have to be undertaken 
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at the EU level, as different local regulations would turn customers to markets 
where regulatory costs are lower. What is conceivable to many experts is a central 
electronic exchange for blue chips, small and medium-sized companies will 
continue to be traded on local stock markets. 
 
In conclusion of this section, Jean-Francoise Theodore, CEO of Euronext 
is quoted: 
 
"Is a single European exchange the future of tomorrow's European 
financial markets? I wouldn't cast a strong prediction but I do not think so. 
I do not wish so. If we, market minded people, don't believe that 
competition is the best policy, producing the best model, who will do?" 
(Theodore 2002).  
 
This argument becomes even stronger when considering the emergence of a single 
worldwide platform. In view of the facts that even consolidation within Europe is 
marked by a large number of failing mergers and alliances and that the GEM 
project of the NYSE has made hardly any progress so far, the notion of a single 
worldwide trading platform is not realistic at the moment. 
 
This outlook to the future of stock exchanges concludes the part of the 
thesis describing and analysing the phenomenon of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances itself. The remaining part of the thesis will deal with terminological 
research in this field.  
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7. Glossary 
The changes in the stock exchange world described in this paper and the 
phenomenon of mergers and alliances in this industry also go hand in hand with a 
number of terminological developments in this field, in particular due to the 
emergence of new, private trading systems, for which new terms had to be 
created. The intention of this section is to provide a comprehensive glossary of 
technical terms relevant to stock exchange mergers and alliances. Before, 
important technical terms which do not have clear boundaries will be looked into 
and defined and contrastive aspects between English and German technical terms  
will be highlighted.  
 
Terminology is defined as the totality of terms and the concepts behind 
them in their respective scientific field. Terminology science can be divided into 
general terminology and special terminology. Special terminology comprises the 
terminology of different scientific fields, whereas general terminology deals with 
basic principles and methods of terminology (Felber 1995: 12). The main focus of 
special terminology is on the technical terms of different scientific fields. In 
contrast to non-technical communication, technical language is highly dependent 
on the accuracy of definitions. For this reason, technical terms have to be well-
defined. In the case of non-technical communication, the content of a term (the 
entirety of its characteristics) is not precisely specified and can vary from speaker 
to speaker and even with the same speaker across time. Non-technical terms adapt 
to the communicative setting in which they are used, whereas technical terms are 
bound to a system of terms which remains unchanged as long as the artefacts 
behind the term do not change (Felber 1995: 27-28).  
 
Technical communication can only be described meaningfully in the 
context of technical information, technical knowledge, and terminology. 
Therefore technical communication is interdisciplinary and polycentric (Budin 
1996: 3). That is also the reason why the compilation of the glossary would not 
have been possible without the preceding analysis of literature on stock exchange 
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mergers and alliances. Without technical knowledge, technical information, 
technical communication, and terminology would be without content. The linkage 
between technical knowledge and language becomes obvious from the fact that 
without technical information no new knowledge would be created, without 
communication all systems would die due to a lack of information, and without 
terminology the whole system would not have any structure (Budin 1996: 83). 
 
Terminology therefore helps to improve the organisation of knowledge: 
the definition of technical terms through their discoursive usage in dictionaries, 
papers, monographs, etc. does not only serve the purpose of transmission of 
information, but also the dynamics of knowledge: technical terms are related to 
each other by metaphors, analogies, or new hypotheses, which leads to the 
establishment of new theories or their modification. The dynamics of terminology 
is the intrinsic driver of the dynamics of theories and knowledge (Budin 1996: 
121). Technical communication and streams of information are therefore an 
integral part of any scientific research. The scientific knowledge, which is steadily 
advancing, is characterised by the creation of new terms, which give this 
knowledge a distinctive structure. This is only possible, if the new terms are used 
in scientific discourse and recorded in terminological information systems (Budin 
1996: 1).  
 
When looking at bilingual aspects of terminology another interesting 
feature is added: the comparability of concepts across different languages and 
cultural contexts. This is the focus of this section. A lack of contrastive aspects 
across different languages emerges when most terms and also the concepts behind 
them did not develop in parallel in the two languages, but were adopted one-to-
one by one of the languages. This problem is particularly obvious in the context of 
financial markets. Investment managers in a German-speaking country translate 
hardly any technical terms into German. Instead, English terms are used either as 
foreign words (the pronunciation and the word form, e.g. the ending, such as in 
the case of scannen, are adapted to the language in which communication is 
taking place) or, even more frequently, as a guest word (the word and the 
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pronunciation remain unchanged) (Adaktylos and Halper 2000: 127). The same is, 
to a large extent, true for the field of mergers and alliances. Many terms in this 
glossary can be assumed to be primarily used as foreign or guest words. 
Furthermore, there are a large number of terms with a German translation, but 
with the concepts behind them being taken over one-to-one from English-
speaking countries. For these reasons, it is relatively hard to find differing 
concepts in such fields as financial market terminology or the language of mergers 
and acquisitions. Nevertheless, those divergent concepts tha t exist will be 
presented in this section.  
7.1. Important ambiguous terms and contrastive aspects of 
terminology of stock exchange mergers and alliances  
§ Hedge fund 
This term is terminologically interesting, since it is highly misleading. A hedge 
fund is a type of unregulated investment fund which uses long and short positions 
in commodity and financial instruments to maximise financial performance.  
 
"The name is undoubtedly a complete misnoma [sic!] since it is generally 
an investment company which takes aggressive positions involving 
significant risk in many different markets as its fundamental investment 
strategy. Managers of such funds are normally remunerated on a 
percentage of profits and have an incentive to take such risks, which is the 
opposite of hedging, which aims at risk reduction" (Moles and Terry 1997: 
269).  
 
In German, Hedge-Fund is equally confusing, which is why Schäfer (1996: 372) 
prefers to translate it by "stark spekulierender Investmentfonds". Even German 
definitions frequently stress the fact that the affinity to the term hedging is 
deceptive: "Die Nähe des Begriffs zum Hedging darf also nicht zu der Vorstellung 
führen, hier handele es sich um relativ risikolose Geschäfte" (Jungblut 2001: 
236). 
 
§ Best execution 
Best execution denotes the duty of a broker-dealer to execute orders to the 
advantage of the customer.  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
 
"While there is no specific definition of 'best execution' under the 
securities laws, a broker-dealer has a duty to ensure that customers receive 
best execution on their orders by taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding a customer order. Factors a broker-dealer may 
consider include, among other things, the price of an order, the size of an 
order, and the trading characteristics of the security involved" (Investment 
Company Institute).  
 
The problem with this term is, however, that the perception of best execution 
varies in the context of each individual trade and is highly dependent on 
individual preferences (Gerke 2002: 106). This becomes evident in the following 
quotation: 
 
"There is no legal definition of best execution…The most important 
conceptual obstacle is that best execution should be defined relative to 
investor intentions and expectations, which are hard to observe and 
quantify. A 'patient' investor, for example, may want to wait to get a better 
price while an 'impatient' investor may want immediate execution and may 
be willing to forego the possibility of a better price. So should the broker 
send all orders to the faster market?" (Baciodore, Ross and Sofianos 1999: 
1).  
 
 
§ Merger 
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The English term merger covers, at least when used in the wider sense of the word, 
a broader concept than the German Fusion, since forms in which the cooperating 
corporations do not legally amalgamate are also included (A). 
 
merger 
 
In the strictest sense of the word, 
"a true merger takes place when 
two corporations combine so 
thoroughly that neither of the 
participants survives legally. What 
emerges is an entirely new entity, 
with a new name, structure, line of 
products and services, culture, and 
so on" (Arsenault 1998: 84). The 
term merger sometimes refers 
even to a much wider range of 
activities in connection with the 
buying and selling of a company, 
such as classical mergers, 
acquisitions, management buy-
outs or management buy- ins, 
minority equity purchases, 
divestitures, spin-offs, and joint 
ventures. Additionally, some 
authors use the term for other 
forms of cooperation, such as 
strategic alliances or networks. 
(Frank 1993: 6-7, Bressmer, 
Moser and Sertl 1989: 35-36 and 
Gösche 1991: 11)  
Fusion, Unternehmens- 
verschmelzung 
"Der Zusammenschluss zweier oder 
mehrerer Unternehmen erfolgt in der 
Weise, dass sie nach Vollzug der Fusion 
eine rechtliche Einheit bilden…Die 
Fusion kann dabei in Form einer 
aufnehmenden Verschmelzung oder einer 
Fusion durch Neugründung erfolgen" 
(Hopfenbeck 1996: 155).  
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§ Initial Public Offering 
Initial Public Offering 
 
An Initial Public Offering, or IPO, 
means that shares are offered to the 
public for the first time in order to 
raise cash for a company (Brealey and 
Myers 2000: 410). According to 
Saunders (2000: 52), IPOs can 
include equity issues and debt 
contracts. 
Initial Public Offering, öffentliche 
Erstemission 
Ein Initial Public Offering liegt vor, 
wenn ein Unternehmen erstmals eine 
Aktie öffentlich auflegt (Scott 2000: 
271). 
In contrast to the English terminology (at least when one follows Saunders' 
definition), the term Erstemission in German is only used in connection with 
shares (A). 
 
 
§ Institutional investors  
institutional investors  
Institutional investors are "non-
personal holders of blocks of 
securities: mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds, banks, 
universities, etc." (Lesly 1991: 842).  
institutionelle Investoren 
Institutionelle Investoren sind 
"Großanleger mit regelmäßigem 
Kapitalbedarf: Pensionskassen, 
Versicherungen, Anlagefonds, 
Banken, Stiftungen" (Zimmermann 
1999: 297). 
It should be noted that different authors offer different definitions of the term. 
Banks, for example, are not always considered to be institutional investors 
(Fabozzi, Modigliani and Ferry 1998: 8). Therefore, the term institutional investor 
is not clearly defined. German definitions are more likely to include banks than 
those from English sources, which might be due to the fact that the Glass-Steagall 
Act separates the functions of banks and securities firms in the US (Financial 
Times and University of Chicago and Wharton School 1998: 444).  
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§ Market maker 
market-maker 
 
Market-makers are in a position to 
buy and sell on stock exchanges for 
their own accounts if public supply 
and demand are insufficient to 
provide a continuous and liquid 
market. Thereby, they narrow the bid-
ask spread. Market-makers match buy 
and sell orders, handle limit orders, 
and are assigned to market-making in 
specific stocks. In doing so, they are 
expected to buy when there is an 
excess of sell orders, and to sell 
whenever buy orders are prevailing. 
By knowing the current supply and 
demand situation, they can profit from 
their trading even if they have to buy 
and sell occasionally against market 
forces. Moreover, their profit derives 
from the difference between buying 
and selling prices. Another main 
advantage is that they have a much 
better picture of the future market 
direction (Reilly 1992: 124-126).  
Market Maker, Marktmacher 
(Routledge 1997: 725) 
Market Maker sind eine spezielle 
Gruppe von Börsenteilnehmern, die 
verpflichtet sind, auf Anfrage für die 
einschlägigen Papiere An- und 
Verkaufspreise (Geld- und 
Briefkurse) zu nennen und Geschäfte 
zu diesen Kursen abzuwickeln. Der 
Verdienst des Market Makers liegt in 
der Differenz zwischen Geld- und 
Briefkursen, nicht in der explizit 
erhobenen Vermittlungsprovision. 
Market Maker stellen die Transparenz 
und ordnungsgemäße Funktion des 
Handels sicher (Loistl 1992: 315).  
Although the basic idea of the function of market-makers may be similar on 
various national exchanges, it is obvious that the specific definitions of their 
obligations will differ. The above definitions serve as examples and apply to the 
U.S. stock market and the Deutsche Terminbörse only (A). Frequently, the 
English term market-maker is also translated by Kursmakler. This is not correct, 
however, since a Kursmakler is only a broker who does not trade for his own 
account, in contrast to a market-maker. Very similar to the function of a market 
maker is that of a specialist, which can be described as a market-maker on the 
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NYSE. In contrast to other exchanges, there is only one market-maker per security 
on the NYSE (called specialist) (Gomber 2000: 21). 
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§ Specialist 
specialist 
 
The term specialist denotes "a 
member of an exchange who makes 
an orderly market in one or more 
specific issues on a stock exchange. 
The specialist undertakes two 
functions:  
§ buying and selling for his own 
account to meet temporary 
swings in the two-way flow of 
transactions and 
§ executing limit orders and stop 
orders placed by floor brokers 
when market conditions are 
appropriate" (Moles and Terry 
1997: 508). 
Spezialist, monopolistischer 
Market-Maker 
Spezialisten sind Handelsmakler und 
fungieren als zentrale 
Ordersammelstellen für bestimmte 
Wertpapiere, bei denen sie einem 
Kontrahierungszwang unterliegen 
(Büschgen 1998: 558). "Der 
Spezialist konzentriert seine 
Tätigkeit auf eine oder mehrere 
bestimmte Gesellschaften. Seine 
wichtigste Funktion ist, in diesen 
speziellen Aktien einen fairen und 
ordentlich Marktverlauf zu 
gewährleisten" (Siebers and Weigert 
1997: 336).  
Market-makers operate a dealer market where "many dealers, called Market 
Makers, use their own capital, research, retail, and/or systems resources to 
represent a stock" and where  
 
"many Market Makers can represent the same stock; thus, they compete 
with each other to buy and sell that stock. Auction markets [such as the 
NYSE] have only one person, a specialist, who in a centralized location or 
'floor' matches incoming orders to buy and sell each stock. Specialists are 
not allowed to provide research or retail sales support, and are limited to 
only one firm's available capital. The average Nasdaq stock has eleven 
Market Making firms that risk and invest their capital" (NASD-Glossary). 
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§ Mutual fund 
mutual fund 
 
Mutual funds, legally known as open-
end companies, are one of three types 
of investment companies that pool the 
financial resources of individuals and 
companies and invest those resources 
in diversified portfolios of assets. The 
notion "Open-end company" refers to 
the fact that the number of shares in 
the fund is variable. New shares can be 
issued on a continuous basis. On the 
other hand, in contrast to a closed-end 
fund, the fund is obliged to buy back 
shares any time. In Britain, mutual 
funds are referred to as unit trusts 
(Cornett and Saunders 1999: 127, 
Saunders 2000: 372 and O'Neal 1999).  
offener Investmentfonds, 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft 
Offene Fonds sind Investmentfonds 
(d.h. Sondervermögen einer 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft), deren 
Anteile anzahlmäßig variabel sind. Es 
können somit kontinuierlich neue 
Anteile (= Investmentzertifikate) 
ausgegeben werden, und die 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft ist 
verpflichtet, diese jederzeit 
zurückzunehmen (Jansen 1999: 171-
172 and Eilenberger 1997; 134).  
In Austria and Germany closed-end funds are not allowed, which implies that all 
investment funds are mutual funds (Eilenberger 1997: 134). 
 
 
§ Portfolio strategy 
portfolio strategy 
The goal of this strategy is to achieve a 
reasonable balance and stability within 
the firm by combining a set of 
interrelated businesses. The portfolio 
strategy may refer solely to the 
financial basis or also take into 
account technological, market know-
how, or product-market niche 
relationships (Lorange, Kotlarchuk and 
Singh 1987: 4). 
Portfoliostrategie 
Portfoliostrategie beschreibt die 
"Diversifikation eines Portfolios von 
Wertpapieren zum Zweck der 
Risikostreuung" (Scott 2000: 423).  
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The German term Portfoliostrategie is almost exclusively used in the context of 
securities. However, it can also be used in connection with other risks, such as the 
risk of an enterprise, which is spread by entering into cooperations with others 
(A). 
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§ Alternative Trading System 
Alternative Trading System 
An Alternative Trading System is 
officially defined by the SEC as any 
system that "(1) constitutes, 
maintains, or provides a marketplace 
or facilities for bringing together 
purchasers and sellers of securities or 
for otherwise performing with respect 
to securities the functions commonly 
performed by a stock exchange under 
Exchange Act Rule 3b-16 and (2) 
does not set rules governing the 
conduct of subscribers other than the 
conduct of such subscribers' trading 
on such organization, association, 
person, group of persons, or system, 
or discipline subscribers other than 
by exclusion from trading" (SEC 
1998). 
Alternatives Handelssystem 
Der Begriff des Alternativen 
Handelssystems wird als 
Oberbegriff für verschiedene 
ausserbörsliche elektronische 
Handelssysteme verwendet 
(Neubauer 2001: 104-105 and Groß 
2002: 41). Gemäß der Definition 
eines Alternativen Handelssystems 
durch FESCO ist „ein ATS 
(Alternative Trading System)…ein 
Unternehmen, das, ohne als Börse 
zugelassen zu sein, ein 
automatisiertes System betreibt, das 
Kauf- und Verkaufsinteressen 
zusammenbringt. Dies erfolgt 
gemäß den Regeln, die durch den 
Systembetreiber festgelegt werden 
und in einer Weise, die zu einem 
unwiderruflichen Vertrag führt.“ 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den 
Wertpapierhandel 2000: 36).  
In contrast to the US, where most ATSs can choose between being regulated as an 
exchange or a broker-dealer, ATSs are generally regulated as investment firms in 
Europe. Virt-x or Tradepoint also started out as ATSs but have become exchanges 
in the meantime (at the request of their owners). One important factor is that stock 
exchanges do not only have to comply with securities regulations but also with the 
Stock Exchanges Act. The basic difference between stock exchanges and 
investment firms is the self-regulatory status of exchanges (FESCO 2000: 12, 
Börsensachverständigenkommission 2001: 7-8). 
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§ Electronic Communication Network 
Electronic Communication 
Network 
ECNs are usually defined as "trading 
systems that automatically distribute 
participants' orders to third parties and 
permit full or partial execution of 
those orders. Hence most of them 
could be categorised as order-driven 
automated trade matching systems" 
(Korhonen 2001: 16). ECNs are 
purely order-driven, i.e. no participant 
undertakes to provide liquidity for the  
securities traded. Their main strength 
is effective price formation, therefore 
crossing-systems do not qualify as 
ECNs. Some ECNs act as destination-
only markets, i.e. trades are matched 
internally, while others scan the 
market with high-speed 
communications technology to find 
the best prices. The participants of 
ECNs are usually professional 
financial intermediaries, only some 
systems have started to accept orders 
from institutional investors directly. 
Orders have to be sponsored by a 
professional intermediary, though, i.e. 
a broker-dealer takes the 
responsibility for trades executed by 
the investor (Korhonen 2001: 16-17 
and Financial Internet Working 
Group: "Glossary") 
Electronic Communication 
Network 
Gemäß der europäischen Definition 
sind Electronic Communication 
Networks alternative Handelssysteme, 
über die Wertpapiere direkt von 
Emissionshäusern erworben werden 
können (Groß 2002: 41).  
The terms Electronic Communication Network  and Alternative Trading System 
are often used interchangeably, with ECNs more frequently being a class of ATS 
used for US equities, notably those listed on NASDAQ. More precisely, all ECNs 
are ATSs but not vice versa. Whereas in the US ECNs are defined as all non-
exchange trading systems which fulfil a price-finding function within the system, 
i.e. except Crossing Systems, the European definition includes only those 
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Alternative Trading Systems which permit the purchase of securities directly from 
issuing houses (Korhonen 2001: 16). 
 
§ Out-bound routing ECN 
out-bound routing ECN 
 
 
Some ECNs take market orders 
(orders to buy or sell a stock 
immediately at whatever is currently 
the best available price) and limit 
orders and, if an internal match is not 
available, route them to the NASDAQ 
in search of the optimal price. These 
outbound-routing ECNs actively seek 
outside liquidity. If the national best 
bid or offer, the best price available 
across all markets, is from another 
market, an out-bound routing ECN 
sends its orders there. Interestingly, 
out-bound routing ECNs are some of 
the best customers of destination-only 
ECNs (Hendershott 2003: 12-13).  
ECN, das Aufträge auch zu 
anderen Handelssystemen umleitet 
(A) 
There is no proper German translation of this term, nor is it used in German, since 
this concept of re-routing orders to other trading places is unknown. One reason 
might be that in Europe ATSs are far less developed and widespread than in the 
US, which is mainly due to the relatively high efficiency of European exchanges 
and the fact that almost all of them have switched to electronic trading already 
(A).  
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§ Hit-or-take system 
hit-or-take system 
 
 
 
Hit-or-take systems are a special 
type of matching systems. Under 
these systems, buy-and-sell offers 
are shown on a screen and clients 
can simply execute a transaction by 
clicking on an offer ("FESCO's 
attempts", Gaa et al. 2000, 
Financial Services Authority 2000 
and Securities Law Institute: 
Glossary). 
elektronisches Handelssystem mit 
fixen durch (Eigen-) Händler 
gestellten Kauf- und 
Verkaufskursen (A) 
Bei diesen Systemen wird eine 
Transaktion einfach durch das 
Anklicken eines Angebots ausgelöst. 
Hit bedeutet "ein Wertpapier zu 
einem Geldkurs verkaufen, der von 
einem (Eigen-)Händler geboten 
wird", während take bedeutet den 
Kurs zu akzeptieren, zu dem ein 
Händler ein Wertpapier anbietet 
(Scott 2000: 253, 552, A). 
Whereas the term hit-or-take system does not turn up in German texts, like the 
above-mentioned out-bound-routing ECN, there are German definitions of hit and 
take, which makes it possible to create a meaningful translation of this term (A).  
 
Now that the most interesting terms have been highlighted and explained, 
the next section will contain the full English-German glossary of terms relevant to 
stock exchange mergers and alliances. 
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7.2. English – German Glossary  
acquisition 
 
Acquisition denotes the purchase of 
a majority of shares of one 
company by another (Arsenault 
1998: 84). 
Akquisition, Erwerb eines 
Unternehmens  
Der Begriff der 
Unternehmensakquisition beschreibt 
die Übernahme eines vormals 
rechtlich selbständigen Unternehmens 
durch den Erwerb einer Mehrheit von 
gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
Unternehmensanteilen (Oehlrich and 
Laux 1999: 47).  
active bulletin board 
Active bulletin boards "simply 
display invitations to make offers 
to the system operator. 
Communication takes place 
typically from one service provider 
to many potential (normally pre-
registered) clients. The system 
informs as to whether submitted 
offers have been accepted or 
not…It is crucial that the system 
[sic!] also establish rules or operate 
a trading facility by which 
subscribers can agree to the terms 
of their trades… It is questionable 
[however,] whether systems that 
simply instruct suitable 
counterparties to contact each 
other, should be considered trading 
systems, ie ATSs" (Korhonen 
2001: 14).  
Active Bulletin Board 
Bulletin Boards ermöglichen 
Investoren, ihre Gebote zu 
veröffentlichen und Verhandlungen zu 
führen. Diese Systeme unterstützen 
jedoch nicht den Handelsabschluss 
selbst. Aufgrund dieser 
eingeschränkten Funktionalität ist es 
fraglich, ob sie als Alternative 
Handelssystem eingestuft werden 
können (Von Rosen 1994: 1214-
1215).  
 
Gomber (2000: 57) suggests considering as ATSs only those systems which 
provide automated order matching. Bulletin boards, which only collect and 
display information and potential parties of transaction and which do not match 
orders. are therefore not regarded as ATSs. 
administrative cost(s) Kosten für Clearing and Settlement 
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The costs of clearing and 
settlement are also referred to as 
administrative cost (Berkowitz, 
Logue and Noser 1988: 88). 
Dies sind all jene Kosten, die im Zuge 
einer Wertpapiertransaktion für das 
Clearing und Settlement anfallen. Sie 
bilden einen Teil der 
Transaktionskosten (Europäisches 
Parlament 2001: 11). 
adverse selection 
 
Adverse selection describes "the 
tendency for people to enter into 
agreements in which they can use 
their private information to their 
own advantage and to the 
disadvantage of the less- informed 
party". A typical example is the 
insurance market, where people 
who take out insurance are more 
prone to accidents than others 
(Parkin 2000: G1).  
Antiselektion, Gegenauslese, 
adverse Selektion 
Adverse Selektion ist ein Problem der 
asymetrischen Information. Als 
Beispiel dient ein Markt mit 
Teilnehmern unterschiedlicher 
Qualitätsmerkmale (z.B. 
Versicherungsmarkt). Das Problem 
der adversen Selektion entsteht, wenn 
zwar das einzelne Individuum über 
seinen Risikograd Bescheid weiß, der 
Versicherer aber keine Möglichkeit 
hat, diese Informationen vollständig 
zu erlangen. Der Versicherer muss 
daher Durchschnittsprämiensätze 
schätzen, wodurch es nur für Personen 
einer höheren Risikoklasse rational 
ist, sich zu versichern. Es kommt 
daher zur Kumulierung schlechter 
Risiken (Nowotny 1991: 52).  
after-hours trading 
After-hours trading is defined as 
transactions which are executed in 
"the period outside the regular 
trading session" (Schurr 2000).  
Nachbörse, nachbörslicher Handel 
Die Nachbörse umfasst den Handel 
nach Schluss der offiziellen 
Börsenzeit (Kurzawa 1990: 154).  
agent 
An agent is a person or company 
authorised to act on behalf of 
others (Johanssen and Page 1980: 
14). 
Vertreter 
Ein Vertreter ist eine Person, die 
befugt ist, für andere 
rechtsverbindliche Erklärungen 
abzugeben und/oder 
entgegenzunehmen ("Vertreter"). 
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agency broker 
see broker 
 
alliance 
In a very general meaning, 
alliances are "associations to 
further the common interests of the 
members" ("Alliance"). One 
characteristic feature of strategic 
alliances most researchers agree 
upon is their linkage to a 
company's long-term strategic 
plan. As the goal is to improve a 
company's competitive position, a 
strategic alliance can be defined as 
a close, long-term, mutually 
beneficial agreement between two 
or more parties with the intent to 
improve the competitive position 
of each partner. At the same time, 
the partners remain financially 
independent. The strategic 
objectives of the alliance are 
achieved by combining 
complementary strengths as well as 
sharing resources, knowledge, and 
capabilities. Frequently, the 
partners will be actual or potential 
competitors (Spekman et al. 1998: 
748, Schaper-Rinkel 1997: 26 and 
Devlin and Bleackley 1988: 18). 
Allianz 
Allianzen oder strategische Allianzen 
sind Koalitionen von zwei oder mehr 
selbständigen Unternehmen, die mit 
dem Ziel eingegangen werden, die 
individuellen Stärken in einzelnen 
Geschäftsfeldern zu vereinen. Die 
Partner geben ihre Autonomie partiell 
auf, bleiben jedoch hinsichtlich ihrer 
gesamten Unternehmenspolitik und 
vor allem finanziell weiterhin 
selbständig (Backhaus 1990: 2).  
all-or-none order  
 
All-or-none orders are either 
entirely executed or not at all 
(Korhonen 2001: 30).  
All-or-None Order, Alles-oder-
Nichts Order (A) 
"All-or-None Order werden 
vollständig ausgeführt oder bleiben im 
Orderbuch bestehen" (Kraus 2000).  
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Alternative Trading System 
An Alternative Trading System is 
officially defined by the SEC as 
any system that "(1) constitutes, 
maintains, or provides a 
marketplace or facilities for 
bringing together purchasers and 
sellers of securities or for 
otherwise performing with respect 
to securities the functions 
commonly performed by a stock 
exchange under Exchange Act 
Rule 3b-16 and (2) does not set 
rules governing the conduct of 
subscribers other than the conduct 
of such subscribers' trading on 
such organization, association, 
person, group of persons, or 
system, or discipline subscribers 
other than by exclusion from 
trading" (SEC 1998). 
Alternatives Handelssystem 
Der Begriff des Alternativen 
Handelssystems wird als Oberbegriff 
für verschiedene ausserbörsliche 
elektronische Handelssysteme 
verwendet (Neubauer 2001: 104-105 
und Groß 2002: 41). Gemäß der 
Definition eines Alternativen 
Handelssystems durch FESCO ist "ein 
ATS (Alternative Trading 
System)…ein Unternehmen, das, ohne 
als Börse zugelassen zu sein, ein 
automatisiertes System betreibt, das 
Kauf- und Verkaufsinteressen 
zusammenbringt. Dies erfolgt gemäß 
den Regeln, die durch den 
Systembetreiber festgelegt werden 
und in einer Weise, die zu einem 
unwiderruflichen Vertrag führt" 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für den 
Wertpapierhandel 2000: 36).  
In contrast to the US, where most ATSs can choose between being regulated as an 
exchange or a broker-dealer, ATSs in Europe are generally regulated as 
investment firms. Virt-x or Tradepoint also started out as ATSs but have become 
exchanges in the meantime (at the request of their owners). One important factor 
is that stock exchanges do not only have to comply with securities regulations but 
also with the Stock Exchanges Act. The basic difference between stock exchanges 
and investment firms is the self- regulatory status of exchanges (FESCO 2000: 12, 
Börsensachverständigenkommission 2001: 7-8). 
arbitrage profit 
 
The term arbitrage profit describes 
risk-free profit realised by 
purchasing a security or 
commodity in one market at one 
price while simultaneously selling 
it in another market at a more 
advantageous price (Eiteman, 
Stonehill and Moffet 1995:674).  
Arbitragegewinn, risikoloser 
Gewinn 
Marktteilnehmer versuchen durch 
Arbitrage risikolose Gewinne durch 
Ausnutzung von Kursunterschieden in 
verschiedenen Märkten zu machen 
(Stewart 1992:32). 
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asset specificity 
Asset specificity is "the degree to 
which the assets needed to perform 
the activity are not transferable to 
other activities i.e. are unique to 
certain activities, including human 
expertise and knowledge of 
sources of competitive advantage" 
(Widener and Selto 1999).  
Faktorspezifität 
Diese beschreibt das Ausmaß der 
allgemeinen Verwendbarkeit eines 
Inputproduktes und ist damit ein 
entscheidender Faktor, ob eine 
Hierarchie oder ein Markt die 
günstigere Organisationsform in einer 
Branche darstellt (Janko 1995). 
auction market 
see order-driven system 
 
auction matching 
 
 
In the case of auction matching, 
orders are executed on stock 
exchanges "on the basis of a 'free 
auction market' in the sense that 
every transaction involves a double 
competition, i.e. buyers compete 
with one another and stock is sold 
to the highest bidder, and sellers 
simultaneously compete with one 
another and stock is purchased 
from the lowest offer" (Woelfel 
1994: 15). 
(Matching von Orders nach dem) 
Auktionsprinzip (Siebers and 
Weigelt 1998: 31, A)  
Dies ist ein "Verfahren, durch das an 
der Börse…der unter den gegebenen 
Voraussetzungen höchste Geldkurs 
bzw. niedrigste Briefkurs realisiert 
wird"(Siebers and Weigelt 1998: 31). 
auction system 
see order-driven system 
 
backward vertical merger 
 
compare vertical merger 
vertikale Fusion nach rückwärts 
(Hopfenbeck 1996: 148) 
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Basel I 
"The 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel I) was introduced by the 
Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in response to 
concerns by the Governors of the 
G10 central banks that the capital 
of the world's major banks was 
being dangerously eroded. Basel I 
essentially required internationally 
active banks to measure their credit 
risk and hold capital to at least 8% 
of their assets…But Basel 
I…offers only a 'one size fits all' 
approach, it lacks risk sensitivity, it 
ignores firms' own internal risk 
management methodologies and it 
does not sufficiently recognise 
credit risk mitigation techniques" 
(Egnsystems). 
Basel I 
Die ersten Eigenkapitalrichtlinien 
wurden 1988 veröffentlicht. Nach 
diesen Regeln, auch Basel I genannt, 
müssen Banken ihre vergebenen 
Kredite pauschal mit 8 % Eigenkapital 
als Sicherheit unterlegen. Ist das 
Eigenkapital der Bank durch diese 
Rücklage aufgezehrt, darf es keine 
weiteren Kredite ausgeben. Dabei 
bietet Basel I nur wenig 
Möglichkeiten einer Differenzierung. 
So wird z. B. nach verschiedenen 
Staaten differenziert. Unternehmen 
bilden eine eigene Gruppe, in der 
jedoch keine weitere Differenzierung 
vorgesehen ist (Reichling 2003: 416). 
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Basel II 
Basel II is one of the latest 
regulations of the EU in the area of 
financial services and is to come 
into force by the end of 2007. The 
fundamental objective of Basel II 
is to set a framework that enhances 
the stability of the international 
banking system. At the same time, 
it is meant to provide consistent 
capital adequacy regulation in 
order to avoid competitive 
inequality among internationally 
active banks. The framework is 
supposed to promote stronger risk 
management practices by the 
banking industry in order to reduce 
the risk of an international bank 
crisis. To account for the systemic 
risk of an international banking 
crisis, regulatory institutions 
stipulate a minimum equity to be 
held by banks. The three pillars are 
minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review, and market 
discipline ("Basel II"). Pillar one 
entails modified regulations for 
calculating the minimum equity 
required for a certain level of credit 
risk; pillar two introduces a 
Supervisory Review Process under 
which the correct calculation of the 
amount of equity to be held by 
banks is supervised. Pillar three is 
meant to strengthen market 
discipline by forcing banks to 
disclose any information which 
might help market participants in 
estimating the specific risk of a 
bank (Buchmüller and Macht 
2003). 
Basel II 
"Ziel ist es, durch bankenrechtliche 
Standards die Solvenz der 
Kreditinstitute zu sichern und so zur 
Stabilität des internationalen 
Bankenwesens beizutragen…  
Aufgebaut ist es in drei 'Säulen': 
1. Säule: 
Mindestkapitalanforderungen 
2. Säule: Aufsichtliches 
Überprüfungsverfahren 
3. Säule: Marktdisziplin 
…Dabei ist der Baseler 
Bankenausschuss [in Säule 1] nicht 
von der Mindesteigenkapitalquote von 
8 % [von Basel I] abgewichen. Sie 
wird jedoch mit weiteren Faktoren 
verknüpft, die diese Quote senken 
oder erhöhen können. Zu diesen 
'Stellschrauben' gehören neben dem 
Kreditrisiko auch das Marktrisiko und 
das operationelle Risiko" (Reichling 
2003: 416. 418). Jedes Kreditinstitut 
muss die Ausfallswahrscheinlichkeit 
eines Kredits aufgrund komplizierter 
Berechnungsverfahren, denen 
insbesondere die Eigenkapitalquote 
zugrunde liegt, errechnen" (Reichling 
2003: 416. 418). 
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batch run 
In a batch run a large number of 
orders for securities are executed at 
a certain reference price (Korhonen 
2001: 15). 
Massendisposition 
Bei der Massendisposition werden 
eine Vielzahl von Aufträgen, die bis 
zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt gültig 
erteilt wurden, in einem Zyklus 
verarbeitet (Clearstream 2004: 9).  
best execution 
"While there is no specific 
definition of 'best execution' under 
the securities laws, a broker-dealer 
has a duty to ensure that customers 
receive best execution on their 
orders by taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a customer order. 
Factors a broker-dealer may 
consider include, among other 
things, the price of an order, the 
size of an order, and the trading 
characteristics of the security 
involved" (Investment Company 
Institute). The problem with this 
term is, however, that the 
perception of best execution varies 
in the context of each individual 
trade and is highly dependent on 
individual preferences (Gerke 
2002: 106). "The most important 
conceptual obstacle is that best 
execution should be defined 
relative to investor intentions and 
expectations, which are hard to 
observe and quantify. A 'patient' 
investor, for example, may want to 
wait to get a better price while an 
'impatient' investor may want 
immediate execution and may be 
willing to forego the possibility of 
a better price. So should the broker 
send all orders to the faster 
market?" (Baciodore, Ross and 
Sofianos 1999: 1).  
best Execution, beste Ausführung 
Nach diesem Prinzip haben die mit 
der Verwaltung von Effektendepots 
beauftragten Anlageberater die 
Verpflichtung gegenüber ihren 
Kunden, "für deren Aufträge eine 
bestmöglich Ausführung am Markt zu 
erzielen. Probleme ergeben sich in der 
Praxis oftmals dadurch, dass sich die 
einheitliche Definition des Begriffs 
'best-möglich' als sehr schwierig und 
von den individuellen Einschätzungen 
und Interessen abhängig erweist" 
(Gerke 2002: 106).  
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bid-ask spread 
The bid-ask spread is the 
"difference between the price that a 
dealer pays for the security (the bid 
price) and the price at which the 
dealer sells the security (the asking 
price) (Kidwell, Peterson and 
Balckwell 1993: 816). 
Bid-Ask Spread, An-
/Verkaufsspanne  
Die An-/Verkaufsspanne (Bid-Ask 
Spread) ist auf Händlermärkten die 
Differenz zwischen dem Kurs für eine 
Kauforder und dem Kurs für eine 
Verkaufsorder (Lahmann 1994: 118-
119). 
block trade 
"A block sale, trade or transaction 
is a trade in a specific security (or 
portfolio of securities) which is 
larger than normal for the 
particular market given the ruling 
market conditions" (Moles and 
Terry 1997: 32).  
Pakethandel 
Unter Pakethandel versteht man den 
Handel von großen Aktienmengen in 
einer einzigen Transaktion 
(Europäisches Parlament 2001: 24).  
blue chip 
A blue chip is a type of equity that 
is considered to be of the highest 
quality, which involves little risk 
of a sharp decline in either 
income/earnings or capital value. 
The common stock of ordinary 
shares of companies that are 
regarded a stable investment in 
terms of capital gains and dividend 
payments are referred to as blue 
chips. The term comes from the 
colour of the best diamonds or the 
colour of the highest value poker 
chips (Moles and Terry 1997: 49).  
Blue Chip, Spitzenwert 
Spitzenwerte und Favoriten unter den 
Wertpapieren werden als Blue Chips 
bezeichnet. Darunter fallen Aktien 
von großen, international bekannten 
und weltweit bedeutenden 
finanzkräftigen Unternehmen (Siebers 
und Weigert 1997: 42). Obwohl der 
Begriff ursprünglich aus den USA 
kommt, werden heute auch 
Spitzenwerte in anderen Ländern als 
Blue Chips bezeichnet (A).  
book value 
The book value is the amount at 
which an item is being carried in 
the accounts. For depreciable 
assets the book value equals cost 
minus accumulated depreciation 
(Meigs and Meigs 1990: 158).  
Buchwert 
Der Buchwert ist der Wertansatz von 
Aktiv- bzw. Passivposten in der 
Bilanz. Er ergibt sich aus der 
Buchführung aufgrund 
handelsrechtlicher oder steuerlicher 
Bewertungsvorschriften 
(gegebenenfalls abzüglich 
Abschreibungen) (Mandl 1994: 23).  
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broker 
 
A broker is an agent who buys and 
sells securities on behalf of others 
(Graves 1982: 99).  
Broker, Makler (Büschgen 1998b: 
169) 
Broker ist die angloamerikanische 
Bezeichnung für einen 
Wertpapierhändler, der (im Gegensatz 
zu einem Trader oder Dealer) für 
fremde Rechnung, d.h. im Auftrag 
eines Kunden, Börsengeschä fte 
ausführt (Wiener Börse 2000: 35). 
broker-dealer 
 
 
Broker-dealers are often part of 
larger organisations such as 
securities and futures firms. 
Broker-dealers can be any 
individual or firm acting as a 
principal in a securities transaction, 
either buying or selling securities 
for itself and/or others (Downes 
and Goodman 1998: 135).  
Broker mit der Berechtigung, als 
Eigenhändler tätig zu werden 
(Sischka 2002: 104) 
Unter einem Broker-Dealer versteht 
man einen Wertpapierhändler, der 
sowohl als Broker (Makler) als auch 
als Dealer (Eigenhändler) handelt 
(Cramer 1999: 276 and Sischka 2002: 
104).  
business element strategy 
 
At this level the firm focuses on its 
main competitor or competitors. 
The challenge is to formulate a 
product/market strategy that is 
competitive in regard to winning a 
particular customer (Lorange, 
Kotlarchuk and Singh 1987: 4). 
Fusionsstrategie zur Abwerbung 
eines bestimmten Kunden (A) 
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business family strategy 
 
 
The strategy at this level is to 
develop related new business 
activities by combining business 
activities based on a common 
technology or know-how. This 
allows the firm to exploit synergies 
in technology, product markets or 
distribution. It might also result in 
new businesses being set up by 
combining existing units (Lorange, 
Kotlarchuk and Singh 1987: 4). 
Fusionsstrategie zur Erweiterung 
der Geschäftsaktivitäten durch 
Synergien (A) 
Buttonwood Agreement 
The Buttonwood Agreement was a 
forerunner to the New York Stock 
Exchange. Twenty-four brokers 
organised a stock market at the 
Buttonwood tree in what is Wall 
Street today (Havens, Shteyman 
and Saber 2000: 9). 
Buttonwood Agreement 
Im Jahr 1792 legten 24 Broker und 
Makler mit dem Buttonwood 
Agreement, welches unter dem 
Buttonwood Baum in der Wall Street 
geschlossen wurde, den Grundstein 
für die Gründung der New York Stock 
Exchange. Der Vertag besagte, dass 
die Aktien nur privat und 
untereinander getauscht werden 
konnten ("Infoportal New York City – 
Wall Street") 
capital market 
Capital markets are markets that 
trade equity and debt instruments 
with maturities of more than one 
year (i.e. medium-to- long term) 
(Cornett and Saunders 1999: 29).  
Kapitalmarkt 
Der Kapitalmarkt im engeren Sinne ist 
ein organisierter Markt, auf dem 
Beteiligungsrechte und langfristige 
Obligationen gehandelt werden 
(Büschgen 1998b: 196).  
capital market efficiency 
compare market efficiency 
hypothesis 
Kapitalmarkteffizienz  
(Lahmann 1994: 119) 
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central counterparty 
When transactions are executed the 
central counterparty automatically 
becomes "the buyer for each seller 
and the seller for each buyer" 
(Eurex 2002)  
zentrale Gegenpartei 
Die zentrale Gegenpartei wird 
gegenüber "jedem Verkäufer zum 
Käufer und gegenüber jedem Käufer 
zum Verkäufer" (SIS x-clear n.d.). 
Dadurch kommt es zu einem 
"Ausgleichmechanismus, der vor 
allem die Minimierung des Risikos 
von Gegenparteien mit 
unterschiedlichen Bonitäten 
bezweckt" ("SWX-Glossary"). 
Central Securities Depository 
 
Central Securities Depositories 
(CSDs) are entities that hold 
securities, either in certificated or 
uncertificated form, to facilitate the 
transfer of ownership of securities. 
They are responsible for 
registering and settling security 
transactions (United States 
Department of the Treasury 2004). 
Central Securities Depository, 
zentrale Wertpapierverwahrstelle 
Dies ist eine nationale bzw. 
internationale Organisation für die 
Abwicklung des Wertpapiergeschäftes 
und die Verwahrung von Effekten (SIS 
Swiss Financial Services Group) 
Chinese Wall 
Chinese Walls are internal barriers 
(usually within banks) that prohibit 
internal information transfer to 
ensure the independence of 
departments (Saunders 2000: 501 
and "Living in leaner times": 58).  
Chinese Walls, Chinesische Mauern 
Chinesische Mauern dienen v.a. im 
Bankbereich dazu, die 
Unabhängigkeit von Abteilungen zu 
sichern, indem sie Informationsfluss 
zwischen diesen verhindern (Brunner 
and Lanni 2002: 6).  
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clearing 
 
 
Clearing denotes the confirmation 
of the type and quantity of a 
financial instrument traded, the 
date of transaction, the price, and 
the identities of buyer and seller 
(Scarlata 1992).  
Clearing, Clearance, Abrechnung 
(Picot, Bortenlänger and Röhrl 1996: 
72) 
Beim Clearing geht es um die 
Berechnung der Verpflichtungen, die 
sich für jede der betroffenen Parteien 
aus abgeschlossenen Geschäften 
ergeben – dabei handelt es sich um 
den Prozess der Berechnung, der 
Netto- oder Bruttoverpflichtungen 
zum Ergebnis haben kann 
(Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften 2002b: 5).  
clearing house 
A clearing house is a division of an 
exchange that verifies trades, 
guarantees the trade against default 
risk, and transfers margin amounts, 
if involved. Legally, a market 
participant makes a transaction 
with the clearing house (Daigler 
1993: 380).  
Clearinghaus, Liquidationskasse 
Dies ist eine einer Börse 
angeschlossene Institution die  
garantiert, dass jeder Kontrakt erfüllt 
wird. Sie ist damit für den Schutz der 
Käufer und Verkäufer vor finanziellen 
Verlusten verantwortlich, indem sie 
Transaktionen überprüft and zum 
rechtlichen Transaktionspartner wird 
(Fuhrmann und Fritz 1990: 77).  
coercive isomorphism 
The organisational form of a 
company is determined by 
pressures from organisations upon 
which the firm is dependent as well 
as by the society's cultural 
expectations. Examples of such 
pressures are government 
regulations, consumer 
expectations, or the pressure from 
the parent corporation of a 
subsidiary company. The result is 
increasing similarity between firms 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
erzwungener Isomorphismus  
Ähnlichkeiten zwischen 
Organisationen können durch 
erzwungenen Isomorphismus, d.h. die 
externe Setzung verbindlicher 
Standards, entstehen (Jann und 
Franzke 2001).  
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coinsurance effect 
 
Coinsurance effects result from the 
fact that increased volume 
decreases the margin of fluctuation 
of streams of revenue from high-
risk activities. That is why 
coinsurance effects are especially 
important in technology-intensive 
or extractive industries, where 
risks are particularly high. 
Coinsurance effects are a major 
motive for alliances, as through a 
network of alliances the risk can be 
spread much more broadly than 
through a merger (Gullander 1976: 
104-105). 
Coinsurance-Effekt, wechselseitiger 
Versicherungseffekt 
Wechselseitige Versicherungseffekte 
(Coinsurance-Effekte) stellen eine Art 
von Volumeneffekt dar. Sie führen zu 
einer Verringerung der 
Schwankungsbreite von 
Ertragsströmen aus risikoreichen 
Aktivitäten und sind daher vor allem 
in technologieintensiven oder auch 
rohstoffnahen Branchen von großer 
Bedeutung, da hier hohe Risiken bei 
der Entwicklung von Produkten bzw. 
der Erschließung von Bodenschätzen 
bestehen (Schaper-Rinkel 1998: 80).  
co-marketing 
The term co-marketing denotes "a 
partnership between two or more 
companies in which both 
companies jointly market each 
other's products" ("CCI-
Glossary"). 
Co-Marketing, Mitvertrieb  
Co-Marketing bedeutet, Angebots-
Pakete aus verbundenen Produkten 
und Dienstleistungen verschiedener 
Anbieter (z.B. eine Zeitschriften-Abo 
plus Zugang zu einer 
kostenpflichtigen Online-Datenbank 
plus Hard- und Software für den 
Online-Zugang, plus...) zu schnüren 
und off- wie online gemeinsam zu 
vertreiben (Co-Marketing) (lb-
medien: "Cross- und Co-
Marketing/Co-Branding"). 
commission 
compare transaction costs 
Provision, Courtage  
(Becker 1994: 614) 
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concentric merger 
Concentric mergers are formed for 
the know-how potentials of the 
companies concerned. The result is 
an extension of product lines, 
market participations, or 
technologies. The main focus is on 
technology or research and 
development activities (Hermsen 
1994: 35-36 and Lorange, 
Kotlarchuk and Singh 1987: 5-6). 
konzentrische Akquisition  
Bei einer konzentrischen Akquisition 
versucht ein Unternehmen, ein 
Geschäftsfeld zu erschließen, welches 
zwar markt- oder produktseitige 
Verwandtschaft zum Stammgeschäft 
aufweist, jedoch einer völlig anderen 
Branche zugerechnet werden muss. 
Vielfach werden konzentrische 
Akquisitionen in technologie- oder 
forschungs- und 
entwicklungsintensiven Branchen 
vorgenommen (Schaper-Rinkel 1998: 
47).  
conglomerate merger 
see diversification merger 
 
consortium 
A consortium, also called 
management group or syndicate, 
combines a number of firms 
working together on a specific 
project too large and capital-
intensive for a single firm (Goede 
1996: 113).  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft, Konsortium 
Unter Konsortium versteht man 
Unternehmensverbindungen auf 
vertraglicher Basis zur Durchführung 
bestimmter, genau abgrenzbarer 
Aufgaben. Ziele sind die 
Risikoverteilung und besonders die 
Stärkung der Finanzkraft (Jung 1999: 
127).  
content knowledge 
Content knowledge refers to the 
knowledge of facts and to skills in 
functional areas (Chen and 
Mingfang 1999).  
Fachwissen, Faktenwissen 
Fachwissen bezeichnet das Wissen 
von Fakten auf einem bestimmten 
Wissensgebiet (Haun 2002: 64).  
continuous matching 
 
compare order-driven system 
fortlaufendes Matching (Gomber 
2000: 21) 
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co-option 
Co-option is one purpose of a 
strategic alliance. Potential 
competitors are neutralised by 
integrating them in an alliance 
(Doz and Hamel 1998: 5). 
Kooption, Kooptation 
Dies bedeutet die "partielle 
Integration von Mitgliedern 
bedeutender externer Organisationen 
in den eigenen Entscheidungsprozess. 
Dadurch werden Verflechtungen 
zwischen Organisationen geschaffen" 
(Weigert and Pepels 1999: 301). 
Kooption ist oft ein Ziel von 
strategischen Allianzen (A).  
coopetition 
"Coopetition refers to 
simultaneously cooperative and 
competitive behavior. A common 
form of coopetition is knowledge 
sharing among competitors" (Tsai 
2002).  
Koopetition 
Koopetition beschreibt die Strategie 
des Zusammenschlusses mit einem 
Partner, der gleichzeitig Konkurrent 
ist (Weibel 2002).  
corporate governance 
 
The term corporate governance 
"refers to the role of the board of 
directors, shareholder voting, and 
to other actions taken by the 
shareholders to influence corporate 
decisions…Economists use the 
term governance more generally to 
cover all mechanisms by which 
managers are led to act in the 
interest of the corporation's 
owners" (Brealey and Myers 2000: 
976). 
Unternehmensverfassung, 
Corporate Governance 
"Der auf dem systemtheoretischen 
Ansatz der Unternehmensverfassung 
begründete Informations- und 
Interessensaustausch zwischen 
Unternehmen und Umwelt wird im 
angloamerikanischen Bereich als 
Corporate Governance bezeichnet". 
Der Begriff der 
Unternehmensverfassung zielt dabei 
auf die Abhängigkeiten und 
Wechselwirkungen der betrieblichen 
Organisationsverfassung 
(Grundsatzfragen betreffend die 
Organisationsform der 
Unternehmung), der Marktverfassung 
(Beziehungen des Unternehmens zum 
beschaffungs- und absatzseitigen 
Markt) sowie der Finanzverfassung 
(Finanz- und Rechnungswesen) ab 
(Lechner, Egger and Schauer 1999: 
198). 
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corporate growth 
Corporate growth can be defined in 
many different ways, such as by an 
increase in sales or market share. 
Corporate growth can be the result 
of an internal or external growth 
strategy ("Corporate growth": 326 
and Schaper-Rinkl 1997: 65).  
Unternehmenswachstum 
"Unternehmenswachstum ist definiert 
als eine langfristige positive 
Änderung der Unternehmensgröße". 
Dazu wird am häufigsten die 
Umsatzgröße als Kennzahl 
herangezogen. 
Unternehmenswachstum kann intern 
oder extern erfolgen (Lück 2004: 
687).  
co-specialisation 
Co-specialisation is one purpose of 
a strategic alliance. Synergies are 
created through the combination of 
previously separate resources such 
as skills or knowledge (Doz and 
Hamel 1998: 5). 
Ko-Spezialisierung 
Ko-Spezialisierung beschreibt die 
Schaffung von Synergieeffekten durch 
die Zusammenführung 
komplementärer Kernkompetenzen im 
Zuge von strategischen Allianzen 
(Eggs, Englert and Schoder 1999).  
counterparty risk 
"Counterparty risk is the potential 
exposure any individual firm bears 
that the second party to any 
financial contract will be unable to 
fulfil its obligations under the 
contract's specifications" (Eiteman, 
Stonehill and Moffett 2001: 286).  
Gegenparteirisiko 
Dies ist das "Risiko, dass die 
Gegenpartei eines Finanzkontraktes 
die Kontraktbedingung nicht einhält" 
(Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht 
1993: 40).  
 
credit risk 
This is the risk that a counterparty 
to a transaction will fail to perform 
its financial obligations according 
to the terms and conditions of the 
contract, thus causing the holder of 
the claim to suffer a loss 
(Abteilung für Finanzmarktanalyse 
1993: 60).  
Bonitätsrisiko 
Das ist das Risiko, dass eine 
Vertragspartei ihre finanziellen 
vertraglichen Verpflichtungen nicht 
erfüllen kann (Basler Ausschuss für 
Bankenaufsicht 1994: 13).  
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crossing 
Crossing involves the trading of 
securities by crossing systems at 
prices based on those of another 
(frequently the primary) market, 
which are in many cases the mid-
point of the bid-ask spread at the 
time of order matching or at the 
opening or closing price of the 
primary market (Korhonen 2001: 
15). 
Crossing 
Crossing bedeutet die 
Zusammenführung von Kundenorders 
auf Basis der an einer regulären Börse 
festgestellten Kurse, wobei der Preis 
in der Mitte des höchsten Kauf- und 
niedrigsten Verkaufsgebotes 
festgesetzt wird (Gerke 2002: 207).  
crossing system 
Crossing systems accept orders for 
securities which are executed in a 
batch run at a reference price from 
another market (usually the 
primary market where the security 
is listed). Orders entered do not 
contain a specified price, but 
clients agree to trade at prices 
based on the primary market, in 
many cases the mid-point of the 
bid-ask spread at the time of order 
matching or at the opening or 
closing price of the primary 
market. These systems therefore do 
not engage in price discovery and 
are thus also referred to as price-
taking systems, or as passive or 
derivative pricing systems 
(Korhonen 2001: 15). 
Crossing-System 
Crossing-Systeme sind eine 
"Unterform von Alternativen 
Handelssystemen. Im Gegensatz zu 
Electronic Communication Networks 
(ECN) verzichten Crossing-Systeme 
auf ein eigenes Orderbuch, sondern es 
werden die Kundenorders auf Basis 
der an einer regulären Börse 
festgestellten Kurse 
zusammengeführt, wobei der Preis in 
der Mitte des höchsten Kauf- und 
niedrigsten Verkaufsgebotes 
festgesetzt wird. Crossing-Systeme 
agieren demnach als 'Trittbrettfahrer'. 
Da ausgeführte Transaktionen für die 
anderen Marktteilnehmer nicht zu 
sehen sind, unterbleibt eine 
Beeinflussung des Marktes" (Gerke 
2002: 207).  
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cross-listing 
Cross-listing denotes the practice 
of listing shares in a company on 
different stock exchanges (usually 
in different countries) "in order to 
create a larger market for the 
shares. This is a necessary 
procedure because the securities 
houses and stock brokers of one 
country cannot normally deal 
through the exchanges of another. 
The practice has led to the creation 
of multinational securities houses" 
(Butler 1993: 72).  
Cross-Listing 
Cross Listing ist eine 
Wettbewerbsstrategie von Börsen und 
bedeutet, dass Unternehmen an 
mehreren bzw. auch an anderen als 
ihren Heimbörsen notieren. Dadurch 
versuchen Börsen, ihr 
Transaktionsvolumen zu erhöhen, 
indem sie ihre Produktpalette 
erweitern. Der Vorteil für 
Unternehmen ist, dass eine größere 
Anzahl von Investoren Zugang zu den 
Aktien hat ("Europas Börsen im 
Wettstreit").  
cross-matching 
see matching 
 
currency risk 
The currency risk, or exchange 
risk, is the uncertainty in the return 
on a foreign financial asset due to 
the unpredictability regarding the 
rate at which the foreign currency 
can be exchanged into the 
investor's own currency 
(Alexander and Sharpe 1990: 801) 
Wechselkursrisiko 
Unter dem Wechselkursrisiko versteht 
man die Gefahr eines Verlustes an 
Geldbeträgen, die in ausländischer 
Währung festgelegt sind, aufgrund 
von Veränderungen der Devisenkurse 
zwischen der inländischen und der 
ausländischen Währung im Zeitablauf 
(Moser 1985:73)  
current account 
The current account is a record of a 
country's exports and imports of 
goods and services along with 
unilateral transfers. In other words, 
the current account consists of the 
balance of trade (exports and 
imports of goods), the invisible 
account (exports and imports of 
services) and unilateral transfers 
(Moles and Terry 1997: 222). 
Leistungsbilanz 
Die Leistungsbilanz erfasst die Güter-, 
Dienstleistungs- und 
Transferleistungstransaktionen 
zwischen Inländern einer 
Volkswirtschaft und dem Rest der 
Welt (Dornbusch und Fischer 1992: 
180).  
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day-trader 
 
Day-traders are floor traders who 
"buy and sell a stock within the 
same day, seeking to profit from 
very short-term fluctuations in 
supply and demand – an activity 
known as day trading" 
(Houthakker and Williamson 1996: 
113). 
Day Trader, Tagesspekulant 
(Schäfer 1996: 213) 
Day Trader versuchen, "äußerst 
kurzfristig, mit hohen Volumina selbst 
kleinste Kursschwankungen" 
innerhalb eines Tages auszunutzen 
(Obst und Hintner 2000: 1081).  
dealer 
"Dealers link buyers and sellers by 
buying and selling securities at 
stated prices", thus acting as 
market makers and providing a 
liquid market (Mishikin and Eakins 
2000: 17). Dealers are individuals 
or institutions which buy and sell 
financial instruments which they 
own for their own account 
(Coopers & Lybrand 1987: 145).  
(Eigen-) Händler 
Händler haben die Aufgabe, "für die 
von ihnen betreuten Werte auf eigenes 
Risiko Kauf- und Verkaufskurse zu 
stellen" (Obst und Hintner 2000: 
1081). Händler treten dabei selbst als 
Käufer und Verkäufer auf und stellen 
damit sicher, "dass ein Anbieter oder 
Nachfrager jederzeit eine Gegenpartei 
am Sekundärmarkt findet (Obst und 
Hintner 2000: 1081). Ein 
Eigenhändler ist ein 
Wertpapierhändler, der nicht nur 
Wertpapierkäufe und -verkäufe 
vermittelt, sondern auch auf eigene 
Rechnung Wertpapiere übernimmt 
und direkt an Kunden weiterverkauft 
(Klaus 1986: 193).  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
dealer market 
This is a market where "many 
dealers, called Market Makers, use 
their own capital, research, retail, 
and/or systems resources to 
represent a stock" and where "many 
Market Makers can represent the 
same stock; thus, they compete 
with each other to buy and sell that 
stock. Auction markets [such as the 
NYSE] have only one person, a 
specialist, who in a centralized 
location or 'floor' matches incoming 
orders to buy and sell each stock. 
Specialists are not allowed to 
provide research or retail sales 
support, and are limited to only one 
firm's available capital. The average 
Nasdaq stock has eleven Market 
Making firms that risk and invest 
their capital" ("NASD-Glossary"). 
Handelsbörse 
An den Handelsbörsen kommen 
Abschlüsse nach dem Market-Maker-
Prinzip zustande. Market-Maker sind 
dafür zuständig, An- und 
Verkaufspreise zu stellen, zu denen 
sie abzuschließen bereit sind, in denen 
sie also selbst einen ständigen Markt 
aufrechterhalten. Beispiele für 
Handelsbörsen sind die NASDAQ 
und EUREX (Hielscher, Singer and 
Grampp 2002: 84). 
dealer structure  
see dealer market 
 
demand-side economies of scale 
see network effect 
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demutualisation 
 
The fact that the marginal cost of 
adding a new member to an 
electronic trading network declines 
toward zero leads to the 
phenomenon of demutualisation. 
The central concept of 
demutualisation is the separation of 
ownership and membership. 
("Mutter aller Schlachten" 2001: 
52). 
Demutualisierung, Abschaffung der 
Gegenseitigkeitsstrukturen 
Unter Demutualisierung (Abschaffung 
der Gegenseitigkeitsstrukturen) 
"versteht man die Umwandlung einer 
Börse in ein am Profit orientiertes 
Unternehmen, das selbst Anteile 
ausgibt, die von Mitgliedern, 
Finanzinstitutionen und der 
Öffentlichkeit erworben werden 
können. Unter diesen Bedingungen 
hängt die langfristige Rentabilität und 
das Überleben einer Börse vom Wert 
ihrer eigenen gehandelten Anteile 
ebenso ab, wie die der anderen bei ihr 
geführten Unternehmen" (Shahira 
2002).  
depreciation base 
The depreciation base of an asset is 
equivalent to its residual book 
value (Rosenberg 1993a: 102).  
Abschreibungsbasis 
Bei der Abschreibungsbasis handelt es 
sich um jenen Wert, der als Grundlage 
für die Ermittlung der 
periodenbezogenen Abschreibung 
dient (Zentrums für Informations- und 
Facility-Mangement der TU-Wien: 
"BWL-Glossar") 
deregulation 
Deregulation is the process of 
removing restrictions on prices, 
product standards and entry 
conditions. Deregulation has been 
introduced where the existing 
regulation is thought to cause a 
barrier to entry in a market (Parkin, 
Powell and Matthews 1997: 467). 
In the context of stock exchanges, 
this term denotes mainly free 
capital flows and access to foreign 
markets (A).  
Deregulierung 
Darunter versteht man "die 
Zurücknahme staatlicher Regulierung, 
worunter alle direkten 
wirtschaftpolitisch motivierten 
Eingriffe des Staates zur Beseitigung 
von Marktmechanismen oder zur 
Übernahme von Markfunktionen bei 
fehlendem Markt verstanden werden 
können…Weltweit ist seit den 80er 
Jahren eine Deregulierung auf den 
nationalen Kapital- und Geldmärkten 
beobachtbar" (Siebers and Weigelt 
1998: 94).  
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derivative pricing systems  
see price-taking system 
 
disintermediation 
 
Disintermediation is defined as the 
process of cut ting intermediaries – 
middlemen – out of existing 
industry value chains (Interactive 
Media in Retail Group 1997: 10). 
Abbau der Mittlerrolle (Admiralty 
Investments ), Disintermediation 
Der Begriff Disintermediation 
bezeichnet die Umgehung oder 
Ausschaltung etablierter Absatzmittler 
(Fritz 1999: 114).  
distance costs 
In the context of stock exchanges, 
distance costs are the costs 
associated with the distance from 
the trading centre. They are small 
or non-existent in connection with 
automated trading services, they 
increase, however, with distance 
from the customer in connection 
with access to floor systems 
(Domowitz and Steil 1999).  
Distanzkosten 
Distanzkosten bezeichnen jene 
Kosten, die durch die räumliche 
Trennung von Akteuren anfallen 
(Staubhaar 2004: 411). Im 
spezifischen Kontext von Börsen 
bedeutet dies die räumliche Distanz 
zwischen Handelsplatz und Händler 
(A).  
diversification 
 
 
 
Diversification is a strategy for 
company growth by starting up or 
acquiring businesses outside the 
company's current products and 
markets (Kotler and Armstrong 
1999: 42). 
Diversifizierung, Diversifikation 
(Hagemann 1996: 34), 
Sortimentsausweitung (Quelch and 
Kenny 1995) 
Diversifizierung ist eine Strategie, bei 
der zwecks Risikostreuung in andere 
Branchen expandiert wird (Kotler 
1999b: 131).  
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diversification merger 
Cases where there is no obvious 
connection between the buyer and 
the seller firm are subsumed under 
the term conglomerate or 
diversification merger. The reason 
for these mergers is in most cases a 
diversification strategy, and they 
are intended to enhance the firm's 
overall stability (Hermsen 1994: 
35-36 and Lorange, Kotlarchuk 
and Singh 1987: 5-6). 
konglomerater Zusammenschluss 
Der konglomerate Zusammenschluss 
ist durch keinerlei Produkt- oder 
Marktbeziehung charakterisiert 
(Paprottka 1996: 125).  
divestiture  
"A divestiture involves the sale of 
a portion of a company. Two 
popular means of divestiture are 
spin-offs and equity carve-outs" 
("An overview of mergers and 
acquisitions").  
Entflechtung, Zerschlagung 
Unter Entflechtung versteht man die 
"Auflösung von Großunternehmen 
oder Konzernen" (Hielscher, Singer 
and Grampp 2002: 152). 
economies of experience 
Economies of experience refer to a 
reduction in cost of new products 
over time, as firms gain experience 
in making them better and cheaper 
through learning by doing (Scherer 
and Ross 1990: 163-166). 
Erfahrungseffekte  
Erfahrungseffekte führen zu einer 
Senkung der Kosten pro hergestellter 
Produktionseinheit mit zunehmender 
Erfahrung (Lück 2004: 195).  
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economies of scale  
 
 
 
Economies of scale are cost 
advantages which lead to a 
reduction in cost per unit resulting 
from a higher number of units 
produced, since fixed costs are 
distributed over a larger number of 
items. Therefore, larger companies 
usually have cost advantages 
compared to smaller competitors. 
This is a major motivation for 
cooperation, leading to higher 
production volumes (Gullander 
1976: 104-105). 
Economies of Scale, 
Größendegressionseffekte  
("economies of scale": 1339), 
Skaleneffekte  (Schäfer 1996: 267) 
Größendegressionseffekte liegen vor, 
wenn die langfristigen 
Durchschnittskosten bei einer 
Steigerung der Ausbringungsmenge 
fallen. Die Kostendegression kommt 
allein dadurch zustande, dass der 
Fixkostenanteil auf eine größere 
Stückzahl verteilt wird (Oehlrich and 
Laux 1999: 18).  
economies of scope  
If existing resources or abilities 
(such as management know-how, 
customer relations) can be used for 
new activities, economies of scope 
may be derived. In other words, the 
cost of performing different 
activities concertedly is lower than 
their isolated performance (Panzar 
and Willig 1981: 269-271).  
Verbundeffekte, Verbundvorteile 
"Verbundvorteile liegen vor, wenn 
mehrere verschiedene Güter [von 
einem Unternehmen] erzeugt werden 
und zwischen ihnen externe Effekte 
auftreten, die die Produktionskosten 
verringern" (Tirole 1999: 33). 
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Electronic Communication 
Network 
ECNs are usually defined as 
"trading systems that automatically 
distribute participants' orders to 
third parties and permit full or 
partial execution of those orders. 
Hence most of them could be 
categorised as order-driven 
automated trade matching systems" 
(Korhonen 2001: 16). ECNs are 
purely order-driven, i.e. no 
participant undertakes to provide 
liquidity for the securities traded. 
Their main strength is effective 
price formation, therefore crossing-
systems do not qualify as ECNs. 
Some ECNs act as destination-only 
markets, i.e. trades are matched 
internally, while others scan the 
market with high-speed 
communications technology to find 
the best prices. The participants of 
ECNs are usually professional 
financial intermediaries, relatively 
few systems have started to accept 
orders from institutional investors 
directly. Orders have to be 
sponsored by a professional 
intermediary, though, i.e. a broker-
dealer takes the responsibility for 
trades executed by the investor 
(Korhonen 2001: 16-17 and 
Financial Internet Working Group: 
"Glossary"). 
Electronic Communication 
Network 
Gemäß der europäischen Definition 
sind Electronic Communication 
Networks Alternative 
Handelssysteme, auf denen 
Wertpapiere direkt von 
Emissionshäusern erworben werden 
können (Groß 2002: 41).  
Whereas in the US ECNs are defined as all non-exchange trading systems which 
fulfil a price-finding function within the system, i.e. except Crossing Systems, the 
European definition includes only those Alternative Trading Systems which 
permit the purchase of securities directly from issuing houses (Korhonen 2001: 
16). 
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EU Securities Committee 
 
The establishment of the EU 
Securities Committee (ESC) is 
proposed by the Committee of 
Wise Men. It would primarily have 
regulatory power in the securities 
field and advise the Commission in 
securities issues. Member States 
will nominate members to the 
ESC, which will be chaired by the 
Commission, i.e. by the European 
Commissioner responsible for 
securities matters (Committee of 
Wise Men 2001: 28-29). 
Wertpapierkomitee der 
Europäischen Union (A) 
 
EU Securities Regulators 
Committee 
 
The establishment of an EU 
Securities Regulators Committee 
has been recently suggested by the 
Committee of Wise Men. It would 
mainly have an advisory function 
and be concerned with ensuring a 
more consistent implementation of 
Community Law, and act as an 
advisor to the Commission. The 
ESRC should consist of one 
representative from each Member 
State, who is designated by the 
national supervisory authority 
(Committee of Wise Men 2001: 
28-29). 
Komitee europäischer 
Wertpapierregulierungsbehörden 
(A) 
exchange-traded option 
An exchange-traded option is a 
contract traded on an exchange 
which gives the holder, in return 
for paying a premium to the option 
seller, the right to buy or sell a 
financial instrument or commodity 
during a given period. Options can 
be either call or put options (Carew 
börsengehandelte Option  
Eine Option verbrieft das Recht, aber 
keine Verpflichtung, innerhalb der 
Optionslaufzeit jederzeit zum 
Basispreis ein bestimmtes Objekt zu 
kaufen oder zu verkaufen. 
Börsengehandelt bedeutet, dass die 
Option an einer (Options-)Börse 
jederzeit ge- oder verkauft werden 
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1995: 40). kann (Becker U. 1994: 471).  
execution costs 
 
Execution costs are "the difference 
between the execution price of a 
security and the price that would 
have existed in the absence of a 
trade, which can be further divided 
into market impact costs and 
market timing costs" ("Trading-
Glossary"). 
Execution Costs, implizite 
Transaktionskosten 
Execution costs, auch implizite 
Transaktionskosten genannt, sind die 
Abweichung des bezahlten Preises 
vom Gleichgewichtspreis 
(Auckenthaler 2002: 3).  
external growth  
External growth is defined as 
growth through cooperation 
between companies which allows 
them to get access to 
complementary resources 
necessary for growth (Wittek 1980: 
120). 
externes Wachstum 
Externes Wachstum erfolgt durch 
Übernahme eines fremden 
Unternehmens oder durch das 
Eingehen von Allianzen mit einem 
eben solchen (Thommen und 
Achleitner 1998: 77).  
external resources 
External resources are defined as 
assets of which the firm has no 
direct ownership (Stevenson and 
Gumpert 1985 and Jarillo 1989: 
135).  
externe Ressourcen 
Externe Ressourcen sind solche, die 
eine Firma nicht selbst generieren 
kann bzw. über welche sie nicht selbst 
verfügt. Daher müssen andere Quellen 
zu deren Akquisition herangezogen 
werden. Dazu eignen sich die 
verschiedenen Wege des externen 
Wachstums (Bea and Haas 2001: 
421).  
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Federation of European Stock 
Exchanges 
The Federation of European Stock 
Exchanges (FESE) is a trade 
association with 26 members, the 
largest stock exchanges in the 25 
EU member states plus 
Switzerland and Norway. Its 
purpose is mainly to serve as a 
forum for information exchange 
and a means of joint presentation 
vis-à-vis other bodies, such as the 
European Commission (Licht 
1997: 55). 
Vereinigung europäischer 
Wertpapierbörsen (Grass 2001) 
financial market 
The financial market comprises the 
money market (for short-term 
credit instruments) and the capital 
market (for long-term credit and 
equity instruments) of an economy 
and matches supply of, and 
demand for, capital (Rosenberg 
1993b: 128).  
Finanzmarkt 
Am Finanzmarkt werden 
Kapitalanbieter und Kapitalnachfrager 
zusammengeführt (Zimmermann 
1999: 21). 
Financial Services Action Plan 
The Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) was passed at the Lisbon 
European Council in March 2000 
and is to be implemented by 2005. 
The FSAP was developed in order 
to decrease the high level of both 
the economic and the legislative 
fragmentation of financial services 
in Europe (Amati 2001: vii). 
Finanzdienstleistungsaktionsplan 
Der Finanzdienstleistungsaktionsplan, 
welcher bis 2005 umzusetzen ist, hat 
als vorrangiges Ziel die 
"Erleichterung des Zugangs zu den 
Kapitalmärkten" und "die 
Verbesserung der Stabilität des 
Finanzsystems" und will generell vor 
allem eine weitere Integration der 
europäischen Finanzmärkte erreichen 
(Europäische Kommission 2000: 8). 
Financial Services Authority 
The Financial Services Authority is 
the British body equivalent to the 
SEC in the US (Bank of England 
1999: 2). 
Britische Finanzmarktaufsicht  
Die Britische Finanzmarktaufsicht 
erfüllt die selben Aufgaben wie die 
SEC in den USA ("Kosten der 
Regulierung"). 
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financial synergies 
The outcome of financial synergies 
is lower cost of capital. There are 
several ways to achieve this: 
firstly, by reducing the systematic 
risk of a company by investing in 
unrelated businesses; secondly, by 
enlarging the firm, as larger 
companies usually have access to 
cheaper capital; thirdly, by 
establishing an internal capital 
market in which the firm may 
exploit superior information and in 
this way raise capital more 
efficiently (Trautwein 1990: 284). 
finanzwirtschaftliche Synergien  
Finanzielle Synergien ergeben sich 
aus den Veränderungen der 
Risikopositionen der Aktionäre und 
aus der gestiegenen Finanzkraft von 
fusionierten Unternehmen. Durch 
Diversifikationseffekte sinkt das 
Konkursrisiko des Unternehmens, 
wodurch sich die Risikoposition der 
Aktionäre verändert. Mit steigender 
Unternehmensgröße wird es auch 
zunehmend leichter, finanzielle Mittel 
über die Geld- und Kapitalmärkte zu 
beschaffen. Die Unternehmensgröße 
beeinflusst auch die Bonität des 
Unternehmens positiv, wodurch 
Fremdkapital zu günstigeren 
Konditionen aufgenommen werden 
kann (Güttel 2002: 94).  
floor system 
If an exchange operates a floor 
system, the brokers and dealers are 
physically present, trading on the 
exchange floor (Houthakker and 
Williamson 1996: 113).  
Parketthandel, Präsenzhandel 
Parketthandel bedeutet, dass der 
Handel zwischen Händlern und 
Maklern, welche physisch anwesend 
sind, am Börsenparkett stattfindet 
(Willberger and Tack 2002: 167).  
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floor trader 
 
"Floor traders buy or sell only 
against their own portfolio rather 
than on behalf of either a customer 
or another broker. Essentially they 
are speculators seeking to profit 
from their instant access to market 
information by virtue of being on 
the trading floor, along with the 
fact that they avoid paying 
commissions by acting directly for 
themselves. Often floor traders buy 
and sell a stock within the same 
day, seeking to profit from very 
short-term fluctuations in supply 
and demand – an activity known as 
day trading" (Houthakker and 
Williamson 1996: 113).  
Floor Trader, Parketthändler 
(Schäfer 1996: 328) 
Floor Trader sind berufsmäßig 
Spekulanten, die sich in eigenem 
Namen und auf eigene Rechnung am 
Parketthandel beteiligen. Nach der 
zeitlichen Dauer und dem Umfang 
ihrer Engagements lassen sie sich n 
Scalper, Day Trader und Position 
Trader einteilen (Imo 1988: 412).   
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Forum of European Securities 
Commissions  
In 1997 the FESCO was created by 
the chairmen of EU Securities 
Commissions. It currently 
comprises the 17 statutory 
securities commissions of the EEA 
and is chaired by a representative 
of one of its members. It 
concentrates on the development of 
common regulatory standards and 
the enhancement of cooperation 
between members on enforcement 
and market surveillance matters. 
According to the FESCO charter, 
the members have committed 
themselves to supporting the fair 
and efficient realisation of a single 
European financial market through 
close cooperation, to developing 
common regulatory standards for 
supervision of financial services 
and markets, and to improving 
market surveillance and 
enforcement by mutual assistance 
and cooperation. The three 
priorities of FESCO are investor 
protection, market integrity, and 
market transparency. These goals 
are pursued by developing 
common regulatory standards and 
fostering cooperation on 
enforcement and market 
surveillance. (European 
Commission 2000a: 32, 39). 
Forum europäischer 
Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörden (A) 
forward vertical merger 
compare vertical merger 
vertikale Fusion nach vorne  
(Hopfenbeck 1996: 148) 
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free cash flow 
 
"Free cash flow is generally 
defined as cash flow from 
operations (as reported in the 
statement of cash flows) minus 
capital expenditure (Hart and 
Zaima 2001: 350-351).  
 
 
Free Cashflow, frei verfügbarer 
Cashflow 
Der Free Cashflow stellt die 
Differenz, die sich zwischen dem 
Brutto Cashflow abzüglich der 
Investitionen in das Anlagevermögen 
und Umlaufvermögen ergibt, dar. 
Beim Free Cashflow handelt es sich 
um denjenigen 
Finanzmittelüberschuss eines 
Unternehmens nach Steuern, der 
durch den Geschäftsbetrieb 
erwirtschaftet wird und den 
Kapitalgebern dieses Unternehmens – 
sowohl seinen Aktionären als auch 
seinen Fremdkapitalgebern – zur 
Verfügung steht (Drill 1995: 26-27).  
FTSE Med 100 
The FTSE Med 100 index is an 
index launched by FTSE "in 
partnership with the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange, Tel-Aviv Stock 
Exchange and Athens Exchange. 
The tradable index is the first to 
cover this region and has been 
designed to allow the introduction 
of derivative products and to 
attract new investment to the 
region. The FTSE Med 100 Index 
consists of the 100 largest stocks 
from the three stock exchanges" 
(FTSE 2003).  
FTSE Med 100 Index (A) 
good-till cancelled order 
Good-till cancelled orders are valid 
until they are executed or cancelled 
(Korhonen 2001: 30).  
Good-till cancelled Order 
"Eine Good-till-Cancelled Order gilt 
solange, bis sie entweder ausgeführt 
oder vom Marktteilnehmer gelöscht 
wird (bzw. vom Börsenbetreiber bei 
Ablauf eines maximalen Zeitraums)" 
(Kraus 2000; emphasis added).  
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hedge fund 
 
A hedge fund is a type of 
unregulated investment fund which 
uses long and short positions in 
commodity and financial 
instruments to maximise financ ial 
performance. "The name is 
undoubtedly a complete misnoma 
[sic!] since it is generally an 
investment company which takes 
aggressive positions involving 
significant risk in many different 
markets as its fundamental 
investment strategy. Managers of 
such funds are normally 
remunerated on a percentage of 
profits and have an incentive to 
take such risks, which is the 
opposite of hedging, which aims at 
risk reduction" (Moles and Terry 
1997: 269).  
Hedge-Fund, stark spekulierender 
Investmentfonds (Schäfer 1996: 372) 
"Hedge-Funds sind Investmentfonds, 
die bezüglich ihrer Anlagepolitik 
keinerlei gesetzlichen oder sonstigen 
Beschränkungen unterliegen. Sie 
streben unter Verwendung sämtlicher 
Anlageformen eine möglichst rasche 
Vermehrung ihres Kapitals an. Hedge-
Funds bieten die Chance auf eine sehr 
hohe Rendite, bergen aber auch ein 
entsprechend hohes Risiko des 
Kapitalverlusts. Die Nähe des Begriffs 
zum Hedging darf also nicht zu der 
Vorstellung führen, hier handele es 
sich um relativ risikolose Geschäfte" 
(Jungblut  2001: 236; emphases 
added).  
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High Level Securities 
Supervisors Committee 
 
The HLSSC is an informal group 
of high level representatives of 
member states' securities 
supervisory authorities, finance 
ministries, and central banks. It is 
chaired by the Commission, and its 
main function is to advise the 
Commission on policy issues 
related to securities markets and 
the development of the relevant 
European legislation. It is, 
however, not concerned with 
detailed technical questions. Being 
an informal committee, it has no 
formal tasks. Apart from the 
functions mentioned above, it also 
examines problems or disputes 
between member states regarding 
the implementation of existing 
legislation (European Commission 
2000a: 32-33). 
Komitee hoher Vertreter 
europäischer 
Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörden (A) 
hit-or-take system 
compare order-driven system 
elektronisches Handelssystem mit 
fixen durch (Eigen-)Händler 
gestellten Kauf- und 
Verkaufskursen (A) 
horizontal merger 
Horizontal mergers refer to cases 
when the partner firms are active in 
the same market segment. As a 
result, a horizontal merger leads to 
economies of scale in production 
and distribution, and frequently to 
an increase in market share or an 
extension of the companies' 
product line (Hermsen 1994: 35-36 
and Lorange, Kotlarchuk and 
Singh 1987: 5-6). 
horizontale Fusion, horizontaler 
Zusammenschluss 
Bei einer horizontalen Fusion 
verbinden sich Unternehmen 
desselben Wirtschaftszweiges 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998: 395).  
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hostile takeover (Schnitzer 1994: 
37) 
In a hostile takeover, a raider 
makes a tender offer directly to the 
shareholders of the target 
company, without consulting the 
incumbent management, in order 
to take control of the company by 
acquiring a majority interest in the 
outstanding shares of that 
company. Sometimes a company 
being taken over is broken up and 
sold off in pieces, and at other 
times it is kept as a division of the 
acquiring company (Schnitzer 
1994: 37 and Sheimo 1998: 1036). 
feindliche Übernahme 
Als feindliche Übernahme wird der 
Erwerb der Kapitalmehrheit eines 
Unternehmens bezeichnet, wenn der 
Vorstand, der Aufsichtsrat oder die 
Belegschaft nicht zuvor von der 
geplanten Übernahme informiert oder 
um ihre Zustimmung gebeten wird. 
Oft finden feindliche Übernahmen 
gegen den erklärten Willen von 
Management und Belegschaft des 
angegriffenen Unternehmens statt. 
Das Unternehmen wird dabei durch 
Aufkauf seiner Aktien erworben und 
dann in der Regel in eine andere 
Konzernstruktur eingebracht oder 
zerschlagen (Jungblut 2000: 151).  
index 
An index is "any comprehensive 
measure of market trends, intended 
for investors who are concerned 
with general stock market price 
movements". A stock market index 
displays the average performance 
of stocks within a certain industry 
or at a certain market ("New York 
Stock Exchange-Glossary"). 
 
Index 
Ein Index ist eine "statistische 
Kennzahl, mit der Veränderungen 
gegenüber einem früheren Zeitpunkt 
(Preis-, Kurs- und 
Konjunkturbewegungen) sichtbar 
gemacht werden können. Ein 
Aktienindex ist ein Preisindex oder 
ein Performanceindex, der die 
durchschnittliche Kursentwicklung 
des Aktiensektors insgesamt oder 
einzelner Branchen darstellt" (Wiener 
Börse 2000). 
information costs 
Information costs are the 
"opportunity cost of economic 
information – the cost of acquiring 
information on prices, quantities, 
and qualities of goods and services 
and resources" (Parkin 2000: G5).  
Informationskosten 
Dies sind die "Kosten, die im Zuge 
der Entscheidungsfindung aufgrund 
der Ermittlung notwendiger 
Informationen entstehen" (Gerke 
2002: 415).  
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Initial Public Offering 
 
An Initial Public Offering, or IPO, 
means that shares are offered to the 
public for the first time in order to 
raise cash for a company (Brealey 
and Myers 2000: 410). According 
to Saunders (2000: 52) IPOs can 
include equity issues and debt 
contracts. 
Initial Public Offering, öffentliche 
Erstemission 
Ein Initial Public Offering liegt vor, 
wenn ein Unternehmen erstmals eine 
Aktie öffentlich auflegt (Scott 2000: 
271). 
In contrast to the English terminology (at least when one follows Saunders' 
definition), the term Erstemission in German is only used in connection with 
shares (A). 
institutional investors  
Institutional investors are "non-
personal holders of blocks of 
securities: mutual funds, insurance 
companies, pension funds, banks, 
universities, etc." (Lesly 1991: 
842).  
institutionelle Investoren 
Institutione lle Investoren sind 
"Großanleger mit regelmäßigem 
Kapitalbedarf: Pensionskassen 
Versicherungen, Anlagefonds, 
Banken, Stiftungen" (Zimmermann 
1999: 297). 
It should be noted that different authors offer different definitions of the term. 
Banks, for example, are not always considered to be institutional investors 
(Fabozzi, Modigliani and Ferry 1998: 8). Therefore, the term institutional investor 
is not clearly defined. German definitions are more likely to include banks than 
those from English sources, which might be due to the fact that the Glass-Steagall 
Act separates the functions of banks and securities firms in the US (Financial 
Times and University of Chicago and Wharton School 1998: 444). 
intermediary 
A financial intermediary is any 
person or organisation that acts as 
an agent or broker between the 
parties to a transaction in financial 
instruments (Butler 1993: 148).  
 
(Finanz-)Intermediär 
Ein Finanzintermediär ist als "ein 
Mittler zwischen Kapitalangebot und -
nachfrage definiert" (Obst und 
Hintner 2000: 202). Im speziellen Fall 
von Intermediären im Börsenhandel 
geht es vorrangig um Händler und 
Broker (A). 
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internal expansion 
see internal growth 
 
internal growth 
 
Internal growth, or internal 
expansion as it is also sometimes 
called, can be achieved by 
companies in three different ways:  
§ By creating new products 
internally. 
§ By adapting or upgrading 
existing products. 
§ By expanding into new markets 
(Duberman 1990: 24).  
The main advantage of internal 
growth is that it "is less risky and 
yields higher return on invested 
capital than acquisitions" (Gertz 
1995: 47). 
internes Wachstum, organisches 
Wachstum 
Das interne Wachstum beruht auf 
einem Ausbau der Kapazitäten 
aufgrund steigender Nachfrage oder 
eines steigenden Marktanteils. Man 
spricht deshalb auch von einem 
natürlichen Wachstum (Thommen und 
Achleitner 1998: 77).  
internal market 
The market of the member states of 
the European Union is called the 
internal market. It is characterised 
by the absence of trade barriers and 
tariffs (Goede 2003: 722).  
Binnenmarkt 
"Der Binnenmarkt bezeichnet ein 
Wirtschaftsgebiet, in dem keine Zölle 
oder andere Handelshemmnisse 
auftreten". Ein Beispiel ist der 
Binnenmarkt der EU (Thommen 
2004: 100).  
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International Accounting 
Standards  
 
The International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) are "the standards 
issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 
a committee founded in 1973 with 
the objectives of formulating and 
publishing accounting standards to 
be observed in the presentation of 
financial statements, promoting 
their  worldwide acceptance and 
observance, and of working 
generally for the improvement and 
harmonization of regulations, 
accounting standards and 
procedures relating to the 
presentation of financial 
statements" (Parker 1992: 161).  
internationale 
Rechnungslegungsgrundsätze  
Die internationalen 
Rechnungslegungsgrundsätze sind 
jene Regeln, die vom International 
Accounting Standards Committee 
festgelegt wurden. Dies ist eine 
"private Körperschaft, die sich zum 
Ziel gesetzt hat, Einheitlichkeit in den 
Rechnungslegungsgrundsätzen, die 
von Unternehmen in der ganzen Welt 
benutzt werden, zu erreichen" (Born 
1997: 30).  
International Financial 
Reporting Standards  
 
By 2005 listed companies will 
have to adopt the International 
Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) and apply them to their 
consolidated financial statements. 
The goal is to increase the 
efficiency of European capital 
markets by harmonising reporting 
guidelines (Amati 2001: 23). 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards , internationale 
Rechnungslegungsstandards  
"Durch die zunehmende 
Globalisierung der Kapitalmärkte 
gewinnen die internationalen 
Rechnungslegungsvorschriften immer 
stärker an Bedeutung…Die vom 
IASC in London entwickelten 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) verfolgen das Ziel, 
von allen Unternehmen der Welt 
angewendet zu werden. Es wird eine 
weltweite Standardisierung 
angestrebt…Durch die EU-
Verordnung 1606/2002 vom 
19.7.2002 sind die IFRS ab dem 
1.1.2005 von kapitalmarktorientierten 
Konzernunternehmen im 
Konzernabschluss verbindlich 
anzuwenden" (Buchholz 2004: 10).  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
investment bank 
Corporate clients hire investment 
banks to package and locate long-
term debt and equity funding and 
to arrange mergers and acquisitions 
of domestic and foreign firms. In 
most of the world international 
banks provide both commercial 
banking services and investment 
banking services. Until 1999, the 
1933 Glass-Stegall act restricted 
commercial banks from providing 
investment banking services in the 
United States. As a result, 
investment banking services in the 
US were supplied predominantly 
by securities firms such as 
Goldman Sachs, Salomon 
Brothers, or Merrill Lynch (Griffin 
and Pustay 1996: 183). This 
changed when the Gamm-Leach-
Bliley Act came into force in 1999, 
allowing mergers between banks, 
insurance companies, and stock 
brokerage companies ("The 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act").  
Investment Bank 
Investment Banken betreiben in den 
USA das 1933 von den sog. 
commercial banks abgespaltenen 
Emissions- und Anlagegeschäft mit 
Wertpapieren. Unter investment 
banking versteht man alle 
Bankgeschäfte, die sich auf die 
Plazierung und den Handel mit 
Wertpapieren oder 
wertpapierähnlichen 
Finanzinnovationen beziehen 
("Investment banking": 600).  
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Investment Services Directive 
The European Investment Services 
Directive (ISD), which came into 
force on 1 January 1993, was the 
first milestone in European 
financial integration by making it 
harder for regulators to protect 
their domestic exchanges 
("Shaping up" 1996). The two 
major functions of the ISD are 
regulation of investment firms and 
regulation of securities markets. Its 
most important aim is the 
harmonisation of the legal 
framework to the necessary level 
to ensure the mutual recognition of 
authorisation and supervision 
systems, so that a single 
authorisation is valid throughout 
the Community and that only 
supervision principles of the Home 
Member State are applied (Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC of May 1993 
on investment services in the 
securities field: 1-2). 
Wertpapierdienstleistungsrichtlinie 
Die ISD ist der Eckpfeiler des 
europäischen Rechtsrahmens für 
Wertpapierfirmen und -märkte. Sie 
räumt seit ihrem Inkrafttreten viele 
rechtliche Hindernisse für den 
Wertpapierbinnenmarkt aus, indem sie 
z.B. einen Europäischen Pass vorsieht 
(d.h. die Zulassung in ihrem 
Herkunftsland berechtigt 
Unternehmen ohne gesondertes 
Zulassungsverfahren in einem anderen 
Mitgliedstaat tätig zu werden). Der 
Zugang zu den geregelten Märkten 
und Börsen wurde liberalisiert und der 
europaweite Handel mit den an den 
nationalen Börsen notierten 
Wertpapieren erleichtert (Kommission 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 
2000a: 2). 
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IOSCO 
 
The IOSCO (International 
Organisation of Securities 
Commissions) is a world-wide 
organisation of securities 
regulators which issues 
authoritative recommendations on 
securities regulation and efficient 
surveillance of international 
securities transactions. Its main 
purpose is to maintain just, 
efficient, and sound markets by 
promoting high standards of 
market regulation. The three 
priorities are: 
§ To ensure effective 
surveillance of international 
securities transactions through 
common standards. 
§ To exchange information. 
§ To provide mutual assistance in 
promoting the integrity of 
markets by rigorously applying 
standards and by effectively 
sanctioning offences (European 
Commission 2000a: 32, 44). 
Internationale Organisation für 
Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörden 
"Die International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
wurde 1983 auf der Grundlage einer 
pan-amerikanischen 
Vorgängerorganisation gegründet. 
Derzeit sind 170 
Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörden aus aller 
Welt Mitglieder in dieser 
Organisation, deren Generalsekretariat 
in Madrid beheimatet ist. Ziel von 
IOSCO ist eine bessere 
Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der 
Finanzmärkte durch die Entwicklung 
weltweit akzeptierter Standards. Zu 
diesem Zweck werden vom Technical 
Committee der IOSCO 
Arbeitsgruppen eingerichtet, die sich 
unter anderem mit dem 
Informationsaustausch, 
internationalen 
Bilanzierungsstandards und der 
Regulierung der Sekundärmärkte und 
Finanzintermediären beschäftigen" 
(Finanzmarktaufsicht Österreich: 
"Internationale Gremien"). 
issuing house 
 
This is "a financial institution, 
usually a merchant bank that 
specializes in the flotation of 
private companies on a stock 
exchange. In some cases the 
issuing house will itself purchase 
the whole issue, thus ensuring that 
there is no uncertainty in the 
amount of money the company 
will raise by flotation. It will then 
sell the shares to the public" 
(Butler 1993: 154).  
Emissionshaus, Emissionsbank 
(Siebers and Weigert 1998: 131) 
Emissionen finden unter der 
Einschaltung einer auf das 
Kapitalmarktgeschäft spezialisierten 
Bank statt, um die vollständige 
Plazierung der Titel, einen 
marktgerechten Emissionskurs, 
niedrige Emissionskosten und einen 
funktionierenden Sekundärmarkt 
sicherzustellen (Obst und Hintner 
2000: 945).  
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joint venture  
 
"Joint ventures are a collaboration 
of two or more organizations for 
more than a transitory period. In 
this collaboration, the participating 
partners share assets, risks, and 
profits. Equality of partners is not 
necessary. In some joint ventures, 
each partner holds an equal share, 
in others, one partner has the 
majority of shares. The partners' 
contribution to the joint venture 
can also vary widely. 
Contributions may consist of 
funds, technology, …" (Czinkota 
and Ronkainen 1995: 452). 
Joint Venture, 
Gemeinschaftsunternehmen 
Ein Gemeinschaftsunternehmen stellt 
eine Kooperationsform zwischen zwei 
Unternehmen dar. Meist handelt es 
sich um den Zusammenschluss zweier 
selbständiger Unternehmen aus 
verschiedenen Ländern in Hinblick 
auf die gemeinsame Führung eines 
Unternehmens, an dem beide Partner 
beteiligt sind. Zu unterscheiden sind 
dabei Mehrheitsbeteiligungen, 
Minderheitsbeteiligungen und 
Gleichheitsbeteiligungen (Jahrmann 
1996: 68).  
learning curve effect 
Learning curve effects refer to the 
fact that certain activities are being 
performed more efficiently over 
time due to individual or 
organisational learning (Gullander 
1976: 104-105). Learning curve 
effects can also be realised through 
the transfer of management know-
how between partner companies 
(Scherer and Ross 1990: 163-166). 
The learning curve reflects three 
factors: 
§ The time required to complete 
a task or unit of work will 
decline with repeated 
performance of that task. 
§ The rate of reduction will 
decrease over time. 
§ This reduction in time will 
follow a general pattern (Wild 
1998: 175). 
Lernkurveneffekt 
Die Lernkurve beschreibt den 
Zusammenhang zwischen Dauer 
und/oder Häufigkeit der 
Wiederholung eines 
Produktionsprozesses und dem Input-
Output-Verhältnis dieses Prozesses. 
Die Beziehung kann arithmetisch 
oder, wie in den meisten fällen, 
geometrisch-degressiv sein 
("Lernkurve": 2440).  
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licensing agreement 
A licensing agreement is a legal 
arrangement transferring the rights 
to manufacture or to market a 
product to another firm (Stapleton 
and Hart 1987: 116). 
Lizenzabkommen, Lizenzvertrag 
Durch einen Lizenzvertrag (oder ein 
Lizenzabkommen) überträgt der 
Lizenzgeber dem Lizenznehmer das 
Recht, Patente, Markenzeichen und 
sonstiges Know-How gegen Zahlung 
einer Lizenzgebühr zu nutzen 
(Eschenbach, Horak and Plasonig 
1989: 26) 
limit order 
 
"A limit order instructs a broker to 
buy a security for no more than a 
specific price or to sell for no less 
than a specific price" (Hart and 
Zaima 2001: 135).  
Limit-Order, Auftrag mit Kurslimit 
(Zimmermann 1999: 43) 
Unter einem Limit-Order versteht man 
eine Kursbegrenzung bei 
Börsenaufträgen. "Ein Limit legt fest, 
dass ein Kaufauftrag nicht oberhalb, 
ein Verkaufsauftrag nicht unterhalb 
eines festgelegten Kurses ausgeführt 
werden soll" (Willberger and Tack 
2002: 166).  
limit order book 
This is "a book in which a market-
maker records limit orders" 
(Francis and Ibbotson 2002: G14).  
Limit-Orderbuch 
Im Limit-Orderbuch werden alle 
eingehenden limitierten Aufträge 
aufgezeichnet (Pohlmeier 2003). 
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liquidity 
Liquidity is "the ability to buy or 
sell an asset (1) quickly and (2) at a 
known price, that is a price not 
substantially different from the 
prices for prior transactions, 
assuming no new information is 
available. A component of 
liquidity is price continuity, which 
means that prices do not change 
much from one transaction to the 
next, unless substantial new 
information becomes available. A 
continuous market requires depth, 
which means that numerous 
potential buyers and sellers must 
be willing to trade at prices above 
and below the current market 
price" (Reilly 1992: 106).  
Liquidität, Marktliquidität 
"Die Sensitivität von 
Wertpapierkursen auf Veränderungen 
des Orderflusses wird als 
Marktliquidität bezeichnet. Als Maß 
für Liquidität wird die Ordergröße 
bezeichnet, die eine 
Marktpreisveränderung um eine 
Einheit erzeugt. Ein Markt verfügt 
dabei über eine größere Liquidität und 
'Tiefe' (market depth), je größer die 
Order ist, die ohne wesentliche 
Preisveränderungen ausgeführt 
werden kann" (Lahmann 1994: 119; 
emphasis added).  
liquidity risk 
Liquidity risk arises when a 
transaction cannot be effected at 
prevailing market prices due to the 
size of the position relative to 
normal trading lots (Jorion 2001: 
340).  
Liquditätsrisiko 
Unter dem Liquiditätsrisiko versteht 
man das Risiko, "dass einzelne 
Produkte nicht oder zu keinem 
vernünftigen Preis verkauft oder 
risikomäßig geschlossen werden 
können" (Obst und Hintner 2000: 
1088).  
management buy-in 
 
 
The term management buy-in 
denotes "the acquisition of a 
company by a team of managers, 
usually specially formed for the 
purpose, often backed by a 
venture-capital organization. Their 
normal target is the small family-
owned company, which the owners 
wish to sell, or occasionally  an 
unwanted subsidiary of a public 
company" (Butler 1993: 174).  
Management buy in, Übernahme 
durch externes Management (LEO 
Online Dictionary) 
Dies ist eine Form des leveraged buy 
out, bei dem ein Unternehmen durch 
ein fremdes Management 
übernommen wird (Hieschler, Singer 
and Grampp 2002: 300).  
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management buy-out 
 
 
The term management buy-out 
denotes "the acquisition of a 
company by its managers, often in 
the face of closure, after the 
acquisition of the company by 
another group that wishes to 
dispose of it, or occasionally as a 
result of its owners wishing to 
dispose of the business" (Butler 
1993: 174).  
Management buy out, Übernahme 
durch eigenes Management (LEO 
Online Dictionary) 
Dies ist eine Form des leveraged buy 
out, bei dem ein Unternehmen durch 
das eigene Management übernommen 
wird (Hieschler, Singer and Grampp 
2002: 300). 
managerial synergies 
Managerial synergies are in some 
way similar to economies of 
experience. They occur when the 
management of one of the merging 
or allying companies possesses 
superior abilities from which the 
other company can benefit (Jensen 
and Murphy 1988).  
Managementsynergien 
Managementsynergien entstehen 
durch den Transfer von allgemeinen 
Managementfähigkeiten über 
organisationale Lernprozesse (Güttel 
2002: 95).  
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market efficiency hypothesis 
According to Fama (1970: 383-
387), capital markets are 
informationally efficient, which 
means that stock prices are 
assumed to reflect all relevant 
information. This is true for the 
strong form of the hypothesis. 
Under the semi-strong form, 
securities prices are assumed to 
reflect all publicly available 
information, under the weak form 
only information that may be 
contained in the past history of the 
stock price itself is reflected. If 
capital market efficiency prevails, 
arbitrage profits are eliminated as 
no market participant has access to 
superior information.  
Effizienzmarkthypothese 
Die Effizienzmarkthypothese 
beschreibt die Kapitalmarkteffizienz, 
d.h. die Informationseffizienz des 
Wertpapiermarktes. Das heißt, sie 
beschreibt den Umfang in dem 
Wertpapierkurse verfügbare 
Informationen reflektieren. 
Halbstrenge (semi-strong) 
Preiseffizienz ist erfüllt, wenn Preise 
alle öffentlich verfügbaren 
Informationen reflektieren; strenge 
(strong) Preiseffizienz gilt als erfüllt, 
wenn die Preisbildung anhand aller 
öffentlichen und  privaten 
Informationen erfolgt; die schwache 
(weak) Form  der 
Effizienzmarkthypothese besagt, dass 
Aktienkurse nur Informationen aus 
der Vergangenheit reflektieren 
(Lahmann 1994: 119-120 und Graham 
und Dodd 1999: 24). 
market impact 
Market impact denotes the fact that 
investors might have to accept a 
price above (for buys) or below 
(for sales) the equilibrium price to 
be able to execute the trade 
immediately (Berkowitz, Logue 
and Noser 1988: 88). The cost of 
market impact depends on the 
patience of investors and on 
brokers. If investors trade large 
amounts of illiquid stocks or whole 
blocks of heavily traded stocks 
they can create substantial market 
impact. It is therefore quite 
important for money managers to 
understand the nature and 
magnitude of market impact costs 
and their correlation with 
commission costs (Berkowitz, 
Logue and Noser 1988: 88). 
Markeinfluss, Markt Impact 
Der Markteinfluss („Market Impact“) 
beschreibt die durch die eigene Order 
ausgelöste Kursbewegung. So kann 
z.B. eine größere Kauforder nur 
allmählich und zu sukzessiv 
steigenden Kursen abgewickelt 
werden (Narat 2003).  
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market-maker 
 
Market-makers are in a position to 
buy and sell on stock exchanges 
for their own accounts if public 
supply and demand are insufficient 
to provide a continuous and liquid 
market. In this way they narrow 
the bid-ask spread. On U.S. stock 
exchanges, a market-maker is 
called a specialist. These 
specialists match buy and sell 
orders, handle limit orders and are 
assigned to market-making in 
specific stocks. In doing so they 
are expected to buy when there is 
an excess of sell orders and to sell 
whenever buy orders prevail. By 
knowing the current supply and 
demand situation they can profit 
from their trading even if they have 
to buy and sell occasionally against 
market forces. Moreover, their 
profit derives from the difference 
between buying and selling prices. 
A futher main advantage is that 
they have a much better picture of 
the future market direction (Reilly 
1992: 124-126).  
Market Maker, Marktmacher 
(Routledge 1997: 725) 
Market Maker sind eine spezielle 
Gruppe von Börsenteilnehmern, die 
verpflichtet sind, auf Anfrage für die 
einschlägigen Papiere An- und 
Verkaufspreise (Geld- und Briefkurse) 
zu nennen und Geschäfte zu diesen 
Kursen abzuwickeln. Der Verdienst 
des Market Makers liegt in der 
Differenz zwischen Geld- und 
Briefkursen, nicht in der explizit 
erhobenen Vermittlungsprovision. 
Market Maker stellen die Transparenz 
und ordnungsgemäße Funktion des 
Handels sicher (Loistl 1992: 315).  
Although the basic idea of the function of market-makers may be similar on 
various national exchanges, it is obvious that the specific definitions of their 
obligations will differ. The above definitions serve as examples and apply to the 
U.S. stock market and the Deutsche Terminbörse only (A). Frequently, the 
English term market-maker is also translated by Kursmakler. This is not correct, 
however, since a Kursmakler is only a broker, who does not trade for his own 
account, in contrast to a market-maker (Gomber 2000: 21). 
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market value  
The market value is defined as "the 
current resale value of a security. 
The market value of an issue is 
easily computed as the closing 
prices multiplied by the shares 
outstanding" ("New York Stock 
Exchange-Glossary"). 
Marktwert 
Der Marktwert ist definiert als "Preis, 
der am Markt für ein Gut erzielt 
werden kann. Als Marktwert einer AG 
wird das Produkt aus der Anzahl der 
ausgegeben Aktien und dem aktuellen 
Börsenkurs bezeichnet" (Büschgen 
1998b: 596).  
market volatility 
see volatility 
 
matching 
 
Matching, or order matching as it 
is also called, involves the 
automatic matching and execution 
of buy and sell orders. Order 
matching is carried out by 
electronic trading systems 
("London Stock Exchange-
Glossary".  
Matching, Orderzusammenführung 
(Europäische Kommission 2002: 12) 
Unter Matching versteht man, dass ein 
elektronisches Handelssystem 
selbständig die besten Gegenofferte 
sucht, beide Seiten zusammenführt 
und die Abrechnung veranlasst (Lyk 
2002: 350).  
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merger 
 
In the strictest sense of the word "a 
true merger takes place when two 
corporations combine so 
thoroughly that neither of the 
participants survives legally. What 
emerges is an entirely new entity, 
with a new name, structure, line of 
products and services, culture, and 
so on" (Arsenault 1998: 84). The 
term merger sometimes refers even 
to a much wider range of activities 
in connection with the buying and 
selling of a company, such as 
classical mergers, acquisitions, 
management buy-outs or 
management buy- ins, minority 
equity purchases, divestitures, 
spin-offs, and joint ventures. 
Additionally, some authors use the 
term for other forms of cooperation 
such as strategic alliances or 
networks. (Frank 1993: 6-7, 
Bressmer, Moser and Sertl 1989: 
35-36 and Gösche 1991: 11) 
Fusion, 
Unternehmensverschmelzung 
"Der Zusammenschluss zweier oder 
mehrere Unternehmen erfolgt in der 
Weise, dass sie nach Vollzug der 
Fusion eine rechtliche Einheit 
bilden…Die Fusion kann dabei in 
Form einer aufnehmenden 
Verschmelzung oder einer Fusion 
durch Neugründung erfolgen" 
(Hopfenbeck 1996: 155).  
The English term merger covers, at least when used in the wider sense of the word, 
a broader concept than the German Fusion since forms in which the cooperating 
corporations do not legally amalgamate are also included (A). 
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mimetic isomorphism 
In times of uncertainty firms tend 
to imitate the behaviour of other 
firms. This strategy of imitating 
industry norms and acquiescing to 
the environment is very common. 
As a result, the strategies of 
successful firms are consciously or 
unconsciously imitated by 
managers of other firms in the 
same industry. This also involves 
entering into alliances or mergers 
simply because other successful 
firms have done so (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
mimetischer Isomorphismus  
In diesem Fall entstehen 
Ähnlichkeiten zwischen 
Organisationen als Reaktion auf 
Unsicherheit (Jann und Franzke 
2001).  
minority equity purchase 
(Gösche 1991: 11) 
A minority investment is the 
acquisition of less than 50 percent 
of a corporation (Rosenberg 
1993b: 220).  
Minderheitsbeteiligung 
 
"Von einer Minderheitsbeteiligung 
spricht man, wenn sich ein 
Unternehmen mit weniger als 50% am 
Kapital eines anderen Unternehmens 
beteiligt" (Thommen 2004: 425).  
monopoly 
This is a situation where one 
person or company controls all the 
market in the supply of a product 
("Monopoly": 152) 
(Angebots-) Monopol 
Dies beschreibt eine Marktstruktur, in 
der es überhaupt keinen Wettbewerb 
gibt, sondern eine einzige 
Unternehmung den gesamten Markt 
versorgt (Stiglitz 1999: 391-407).   
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moral hazard 
 
 
Moral hazard occurs when 
insurance reduces the incentives 
for individuals to avoid risk and 
expense through prudent 
behaviour. People with lots of 
medical insurance, for example, 
may spend less on preventive 
healthcare. If they get sick, they 
may make more visits to 
physicians and incur more 
expensive treatments (Mansfield 
1994: 161).  
Moral Hazard, moralisches Risiko, 
Risiko des fahrlässigen Verhaltens  
(Schäfer 1996: 510)  
Moralisches Risiko (Moral Hazard) 
liegt vor, wenn ein Akteur aufgrund 
bestehender Vertragsverhältnisse sein 
Verhalten ändert und mehr Leistungen 
in Anspruch nimmt, als dies bei 
vollständiger Information oder bei 
Nichtbestehen des Vertrages der Fall 
wäre. Im Extremfall können 
Versicherungsbetrug oder fahrlässige 
Herbeiführung eines Schadensfalles 
als Moral Hazard qualifiziert werden 
(Badelt und Österle 1998: 83).  
mutual company 
 
 
 
 
A mutual company is a corporation 
that is owned by its members and 
has no stock or shareholders in the 
conventional sense (Optima 
Investment Research 2000: 1).  
Unternehmen auf Gegenseitigkeit, 
Gegenseitigkeitsgesellschaft 
(Europäische Kommission 2003: 1), 
Genossenschaft ("Genossenschaft": 
1236) 
Dies ist "ein Unternehmen im Besitz 
seiner Kunden, und nicht in der Hand 
einer separaten Aktionärsgruppe" 
(Scott 2000: 349).  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
mutual fund 
 
Mutual funds, legally known as 
open-end companies, are one of 
three types of investment 
companies that pool the financial 
resources of individuals and 
companies and invest those 
resources in diversified portfolios 
of assets. The notion "open-end 
company" refers to the fact that the 
number of shares in the fund is 
variable. New shares can be issued 
on a continuous basis. On the other 
hand, in contrast to a closed-end 
fund, the fund is obliged to buy 
back shares any time. In Britain 
mutual funds are referred to as unit 
trusts (Cornett and Saunders 1999: 
127, Saunders 2000: 372 and 
O'Neal 1999).  
offener Investmentfonds, 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft 
Offene Fonds sind Investmentfonds 
(d.h. Sondervermögen einer 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft ), deren 
Anteile anzahlmäßig variabel sind. Es 
können somit kontinuierlich neue 
Anteile (= Investmentzertifikate) 
ausgegeben werden, und die 
Kapitalanlagegesellschaft ist 
verpflichtet, diese jederzeit 
zurückzunehmen (Jansen 1999: 171-
172 and Eilenberger 1997; 134).  
In Austria and Germany closed-end funds are not allowed, which implies that all 
investment funds are mutual funds (Eilenberger 1997: 134). 
NASDAQ's Small Order 
Execution System 
This is an "automated execution 
system for processing small order 
agency executions of Nasdaq 
securities (up to 1,000 shares)" 
("NASD-Glossary"). 
Handelssystem der NASDAQ für 
kleine Orders (A) 
national securities association 
 
 
 
A national securities association is 
an association of brokers and 
dealers registered as such with the 
SEC (SEC 2003: 3).  
Bei der SEC registierte US-
amerikanische nationale 
Vereinigung von 
Wertpapiermaklern und -händlern 
(A) 
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network effect 
"The 'network effect' describes 
numerically how exponential 
advantages are brought to each 
network participant. Each new 
member gains exponential benefits, 
and each existing member reaps 
exponential benefits from each 
new member joining" (Trepp 2000: 
3). The emergence of additional 
trading systems is therefore not 
necessarily economically logical, 
as it is generally an advantage to 
the users of a trading system if 
there are as many participants as 
possible, as system-liquidity is 
believed to increase with the 
number of participants. Other 
typical examples illustrating 
network effects is the telephone, 
since the benefit for the owner of a 
telephone increases with each new 
user (Jensen and Natorp 2000). 
Netzeffekt 
Bestimmte Märkte unterliegen sog. 
Netzeffekten oder nachfrageseitigen 
Skalenerträgen. "Dies impliziert einen 
positiven Zusammenhang zwischen 
der Bereitschaft, Netzeffektgüter zu 
adoptieren, und der Anzahl sonstiger 
Nutzer dieses Gutes. Prominente 
Beispiele sind Märkte für IuK-
Technologien oder auch das Telefon. 
Der Nutzen, ein Telefon zu besitzen, 
ist abhängig von der Anzahl der 
Personen, die hiermit erreicht werden 
können. Im Zuge der rasanten 
Entwicklung und wachsenden 
Bedeutung von IuK-Technologien in 
den letzten Jahren entstand eine 
eigene Forschungsrichtung mit dem 
Ziel, die mit positiven Netzeffekten 
einhergehenden Phänomene zu 
erklären und ihre Implikationen für 
(marktliche) Koordination und 
Effizienz zu untersuchen" (König und 
Weitzel 2003: 3). 
network externalities 
see network effect  
 
new market  
see second-tier market 
 
normative isomorphism 
Increasing similarities between 
firms are due to the fact that the 
organisational routines are 
influenced by professionally 
trained employees (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
normativer Isomorphismus  
In diesem Fall entstehen 
Ähnlichkeiten zwischen 
Organisationen "durch 
Professionalisierung im 
organisationalen Feld" (Jann und 
Franzke 2001).  
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OECD Code of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements 
The OECD Code of Liberalisation 
of Capital Movements deals with 
the liberalisation of all capital 
flows and is, apart from regional 
agreements, such as within the 
EMU, "still the single multilateral 
legal instrument that requires its 
adherents to open up their capital 
markets and refrain from 
discriminating against foreign 
investors" (Schuijer 2002). The 
Code, which was established in the 
1960s, originally covered only 
transfers related to foreign direct 
investment, trade credits and 
certain longer-term securities. It 
took until the 1990s for short-term 
capital movements of speculative 
nature to be included, which 
substantially increased its 
importance. In the meantime, most 
members have realised the benefits 
of liberalisation, such as access to 
a global pool of savings, fiercer 
competition among financial 
institutions leading to improved 
efficiency, more options of 
portfolio diversification and risk-
reduction, and the worldwide 
dissemination of proper disclosure 
and corporate governance 
standards. Without capital account 
liberalisation the globalisation and 
amalgamation of financial markets 
would not have been possible 
(Schuijer 2002). 
OECD-Kodex zur Liberalisierung 
des Kapitalverkehrs  
Der OECD Kodex zur Liberalisierung 
des Kapitalverkehrs, welcher seit über 
40 Jahren besteht, hat die schrittweise 
Liberalisierung der Kapital- und 
Leistungsströme der Mitgliedsstaaten 
zum Ziel. Heute sind in praktisch 
allen Mitgliedsstaaten derartige 
Hindernisse abgeschafft. Dies ist vor 
allem in Zeiten der Globalisierung der 
Finanzmärkte von entscheidender 
Bedeutung. Die Erfahrungen der 
Mitgliedsstaaten mit der progressiven 
Liberalisierung des Kapitalverkehrs 
ist generell positiv (OECD 2002: 2-5).  
 
oligopolistic market 
compare oligopoly 
oligopolistischer Markt 
(Pindyck und Rubinfe ld 1998: 523) 
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oligopoly 
This term denotes the "control of a 
commodity or service in a given 
market by a small number of 
companies or suppliers". The 
corresponding market form is an 
oligopolistic market ("Oligopoly": 
944).  
Oligopol 
Dies ist eine Marktstruktur, in der nur 
wenige Unternehmen miteinander im 
Wettbewerb stehen und der Eintritt 
neuer Unternehmen behindert wird. 
Die Marktform ist der oligopolistische 
Markt (Pindyck und Rubinfeld 1998: 
523).  
open outcry 
This is "a trading method where 
trading takes place in a designated 
physical area of the exchange 
within an agreed time period. 
Prices are agreed by traders on the 
floor of the exchange", by outcry 
or certain hand signals (Bank of 
England 1995: 279).  
offenes Ausrufsystem 
Dies beschreibt das System des 
offenen Ausrufes im Zuge des pit-
Handels. Alle Kauf- und 
Verkaufsangebote müssen zu einem 
bestimmten Zeitpunkt im trading pit 
durch Ausruf oder bestimmte 
Handsignale abgegeben werden (Imo 
1988: 399).  
operating costs 
Operating costs, or operating 
expenses, are those "expenses 
incurred in the course of ordinary 
activities of an entity" (Stickney 
and Weil 2000: 815).  
Betriebsaufwand 
Dies ist "derjenige Teil der 
Aufwendungen, der in Erfüllung des 
eigentlichen Betriebszwecks entsteht" 
(Weigert und Pepels 1999: 87).  
operational synergies 
Operational synergies comprise 
economies of scale, scope and 
experience (Scherer and Ross 
1990: 163). 
operative Synergien (A) 
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order book  
An order book is a record of buy 
and sell orders in a given 
instrument. "The term derives from 
the word 'notebook' which 
specialists traditionally used for the 
purpose. It also refers to the 
aggregate of sell orders left with 
the specialist " (Downes and 
Goodman 1990: 40).  
Orderbuch, Auftragsbuch 
Im Auftragsbuch werden alle noch 
nicht zusammengeführten Aufträge 
für den Handel in bestimmten Aktien 
notiert. Dies kann elektronisch 
geschehen oder auch durch den 
Spezialisten auf dem Börsenparkett 
(Siebers and Weigert 1998: 274).  
order-driven market 
see order-driven system 
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order-driven system  
 
In order-driven systems (also 
called auction markets) prices 
follow orders. There are two types, 
namely continuous matching and 
auction matching. Auction 
matching systems accept limit  
orders entered by participants; 
these are stored, and at the end of 
the auction period (usually one 
day) the single price that 
maximises the number of orders 
executed, the number of securities, 
or the total trade value is calculated 
for each security (Korhonen 2001: 
14). This, however, means that 
these systems cannot provide 
immediacy, which is the main 
advantage of large exchanges. 
Immediacy does not come for free, 
of course. Transaction costs are 
higher with large exchanges, as the 
market-makers need to be 
reimbursed. The question about the 
optimal organisation of the market 
therefore depends on the liquidity 
preference of the market 
participants. Continuous matching 
systems, in contrast, match orders 
automatically in time and price 
priority without time delay 
(Korhonen 2001: 15). Some 
matching systems are organised as 
so-called hit-or-take systems. 
Under these systems buy-and-sell 
offers are shown on a screen, and 
clients can simply execute a 
transaction by clicking on an offer. 
Matching systems enable investors 
to trade anonymously with 
multiple partners. Sometimes 
matching systems also route orders 
to other execution centres if there 
is no matching order available in 
the system ("FESCO's attempts", 
Gaa et al. 2000, Financial Services 
Authority 2000 and "Securities 
Law Institute-Glossary"). 
order-driven system, 
auftragsgesteuertes Handelssystem 
Ein auftragsgesteuertes System oder 
ein Auktionsmarkt ist ein 
"organisierter Markt, auf dem sich der 
Preis unverzüglich durch Änderung 
von Angebot und Nachfrage bildet. 
Auf Auktionsmärkten werden 
fungible bzw. standardisierte 
Waren…an den Meistbietenden 
abgegeben. Der Auktionsmarkt ist 
Modell für die vollkommene 
Konkurrenz" (Siebers and Weigelt 
1998: 31). Auktionen können 
fortlaufend stattfinden oder zu 
bestimmten über den Tag verteilten 
Zeitpunkten, bei ersteren spricht man 
von kontinuierlichem Matching, bei 
Letzterem von periodischem 
Matching (Gomber 200: 21). Weiters 
gibt es noch ein elektronisches 
Handelssystem mit fixen durch 
(Eigen-)Händler gestellten Kauf- und 
Verkaufskursen. Eine Transaktion 
wird einfach durch das Anklicken 
eines Angebotes ausgelöst. Hit 
bedeutet, "ein Wertpapier zu einem 
Geldkurs verkaufen, der von einem 
(Eigen-)Händler geboten wird", 
während take bedeutet, den Kurs zu 
akzeptieren, zu dem ein Händler ein 
Wertpapier anbietet (Scott 2000: 253, 
552, A).  
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order-driven trading 
see order-driven system 
 
Order Handling Rules 
 
The Order Handling Rules, 
adopted by the SEC in 1996, were 
the result of pressure from private 
trading platforms on the SEC to 
change its rules to encourage 
electronic exchanges. The 
competitive forces driving changes 
in financial markets also led to 
changes in regulatory oversight of 
the markets, and finally securities 
regulators have recognised the 
substantial benefits ATSs can bring 
to markets and investors. The 
adoption of Order Handling Rules 
in 1996 by the SEC was the first 
step in this direction. The aim of 
the Order Handling Rules was to 
ensure a fair and orderly 
alternative securities market by 
smoothly integrating ATSs into the 
securities market ("Good-bye to all 
that", "Internet securities" and 
Abken 1991: 19). 
Orderabwicklungsregeln der SEC 
(A) 
 
order-routing 
"Order routing is the act of sending 
orders from their originators, 
primarily investors and 
brokerdealers, to the execution 
system" (Hendershott 2003: 2). 
Order-Routing 
Durch Order Routing werden 
Handelsaufträge automatisch an eine 
Handelsplattform geleitet ("SWX-
Antrags- und Mutationsformular für 
Technische Trader an der  SWX Swiss 
Exchange"). 
organic growth 
see internal growth 
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organisational learning 
 
Organisational learning denotes 
the acquisition of knowledge by an 
organisation which consists of 
principles, facts, skills and rules 
for decision-making, behaviour 
and actions. These form the basis 
of core competences (Stonehouse 
and Pemberton 1999 and 
Stonehouse et al. 2004: 26).  
Organisationslernen (Moerke 2000: 
1) 
Organisationslernen beschäftigt sich 
mit dem Erwerb von Wissen durch 
Organisationen. Das Ziel ist, die 
Leistung der Firma ständig zu 
verbessern und jede Gelegenheit zu 
nutzen, aus Situationen, Prozessen 
und von der Konkurrenz zu lernen 
(Weigert und Pepels 1999: 334).  
out-bound routing ECN 
 
Some ECNs take market orders 
(orders to buy or sell a stock 
immediately at whatever is 
currently the best available price) 
and limit orders and, if an internal 
match is not available, route them 
to other markets in search of the 
optimal price. These out-bound 
routing ECNs actively seek outside 
liquidity. If the national best bid or 
offer, the best price available 
across all markets, is from another 
market an out-bound routing ECN 
sends its orders there. Interestingly, 
out-bound routing ECNs are some 
of the best customers of 
destination-only ECNs 
(Hendershott 2003: 12-13).  
ECN, das Aufträge auch zu anderen 
Handelssystemen umleitet (A) 
Dies sind ausgereifte 
Orderroutingsysteme, die es 
ermöglichen, eine Order parallel in 
mehreren Märkten zu plazieren wenn 
einen interne Ausführung nicht 
möglich ist. Wird eine Order auf 
einem Markt ausgeführt, wird diese 
auf den anderen Märkten automatisch 
gelöscht (Gomber 2000: 64, A).  
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passing the book 
 
 
Passing the book permits 24-hour 
trading of financial instruments by 
passing control of trading between 
traders at different exchanges 
around the world (Scarlata 1992). 
passing the book, Weiterreichung 
der Bücher mit den 
Handelspositionen (A) 
Dies bezeichnet "die Übertragung von 
Informationen über die 
Handelsposition eines Unternehmens 
von einem Büro in ein anderes. Ein 
New Yorker Börsenmakler kann 
beispielsweise am Ende des 
Börsentags die 'Bücher' an ein Büro in 
Los Angeles oder Tokio 
weiterreichen" (Scott 2000: 398).  
passive pricing system 
see price-taking system 
 
pension fund 
A pension fund is a financial 
services firm selling retirement 
plans to its customers (Rose 2000: 
150).  
Pensionsfonds  
Pensionsfonds sind 
Finanzinstitutionen, die 
Vermögenswerte verwalten und den 
berechtigten Personen nach deren 
Pensionierung ein Einkommen 
auszahlen (Scott 2000: 402).  
pit-auction system 
see open outcry 
 
plant-specific economies of scale 
Plant-specific economies of scale 
occur if a firm's size is below its 
minimum efficient size and cost 
can be saved through a merger by 
increasing the output. This may 
also permit the use of more 
efficient production technologies 
(Scherer and Ross 1990: 163-166). 
betriebsspezifische Skaleneffekte 
Betriebsspezifische Skaleneffekte 
werden durch die Konzentration der 
Produktion an einem Standort erreicht  
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Wirtschaft Österreich: "Fragen zur 
EU-Osterweiterung"). 
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population 
A population is defined as an 
"aggregate of relatively 
homogeneous" organisations  
(Hannan and Freeman 1977). 
(Organisations-)Population 
In der Population-Ecology-Theory ist 
eine Organisationspopulation als eine 
"Gruppe ähnlicher Unternehmen" 
definiert (Gerbach 2002: 17).  
portfolio strategy 
The goal of this strategy is to 
achieve a reasonable balance and 
stability within the firm by 
combining a set of interrelated 
businesses. The portfolio strategy 
may refer solely to the financial 
basis or also take into account 
technological, market know-how, 
or product-market niche 
relationships (Lorange, Kotlarchuk 
and Singh 1987: 4). 
Portfoliostrategie 
Portfoliostrategie beschreibt die 
"Diversifikation eines Portfolios von 
Wertpapieren zum Zweck der 
Risikostreuung" (Scott 2000: 423).  
In German the term Portfoliostrategie is almost exclusively used in connection 
with securities trading. However, risk spreading can also be a goal of a whole 
organisation that can be achieved through mergers and alliances (A). 
present value  
The term present value refers to 
the value "at an earlier date 
(usually now) of a given future 
sum discounted at compound 
interest" (Kieso, Weygandt and 
Warfield 2001: 298). 
Barwert 
Die Berechnung des Barwerts erfolgt 
durch "die Gewichtung der im 
Zeitablauf anfallenden 
Zahlungsströme in Form eines 
Kalkulationszinssatzes. Der so 
errechnete Wert von Zahlungen zum 
heutigen Zeitpunkt wird als Barwert 
bezeichnet" (Colbe 2000: 147).  
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price-taking system 
 
A price-taking system, which is 
also referred to as a passive, or 
derivative, pricing system, does not 
engage in price discovery but uses 
a price reference from a primary 
market. The advantage of such a 
system is that even large block 
trades cause no market impact 
(Korhonen 2001: 15). 
kursübernehmendes System 
(Europäische Kommission 2000: 2) 
In einem solchen System erfolgt die 
Ausführung korrespondierender 
Orders zum herrschenden Marktpreis 
(oftmals der Schlusskurs eines 
anderen Marktes). Diese Systeme 
nehmen also keine eigene 
Preisfeststellung vor. Der Vorteil ist 
die Vermeidung jeglichen Market-
Impacts (Schenk 1997: 56).  
primary market 
"The primary market is the market 
in which a security is sold for the 
first time…For example, if a firm 
needs to issue new bonds or stocks 
to finance investment in new 
equipment, the initial sale of these 
new securities occurs in the 
primary market. Thus, the primary 
market is where the public 
(individuals or financial 
institutions) buys newly issued 
bonds or stocks from the firms 
issuing them" (Burton, Nesiba and 
Lombra 2002: 45).  
Primärmarkt 
Am Primärmarkt werden 
ausschließlich Wertpapiere gehandelt, 
die erstmalig emittiert werden, d.h. es 
muss sich um eine Neuemission 
handeln (Müller 2000: 11).  
private trading system 
see Alternative Trading System 
 
process knowledge 
In the context of alliances, process 
knowledge denotes the skills to 
manage interfirm cooperations, 
such as effectively negotiating 
cooperative contracts or managing 
inter-partner relations (Chen and 
Mingfang 1999).  
Prozesswissen, Verarbeitungswissen 
Prozesswissen, auch 
Verarbeitungswissen genannt, 
beschreibt das Wissen über den 
Ablauf bestimmter Prozesse (Haun 
2002: 64).  
production-side economies of production-side economies of scale, 
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scale 
 
 
Production-side economies of scale 
are derived through an increase in 
the number of items of one product 
made by a firm (Panzar and Willig 
1981).  
produktionsseitige Skalenerträge 
(Sattler 1999) 
Produktion-side economies of scale 
entstehen durch eine Vergrößerung 
der Produktionsmenge eines 
Produktes in einer Firma (Sewing and 
Bronold 2003: 10). 
product life cycle 
The typical product life cycle is a 
curve marked by five distinct 
stages: product development, 
introduction, growth, maturity, and 
decline (Kotler and Armstrong 
1997: 274).  
Produktlebenszyklus  
Dies ist ein Phasenmodell der 
Marktentwicklung. Es werden 
folgende Phasen unterschieden: 
Produktentwicklung, 
Einführungsphase, Wachstumsphase, 
Reifephase und Abstiegsphase 
(Scheuch 1996: 437). 
product-specific economies of 
scale 
Product-specific economies of 
scale result from reduced cost per 
unit with increasing output 
volume. They are achieved through 
the allocation of fixed costs, such 
as for administration, advertising, 
or R&D, to a larger number of 
products, thus reducing the cost per 
unit of output (Scherer and Ross 
1990: 163-166). 
produktspezifische Skalenerträge 
Produktspezifische Skalenerträge 
liegen vor, wenn sich die Kosten pro 
Einheit eines Produktes mit der 
Erhöhung des Outputs dieses 
Produktes verringern 
("Subadditivitätsbedingung für das 
Vorliegen von Economies of Scope 
(ESC)").  
program trader 
Program traders trade securities 
automatically with the help of 
sophisticated computer programs 
following mechanistic trading 
recipes (Cox and Rubinstein 1985: 
137).  
Programmhändler 
Programmhändler kaufen oder 
verkaufen Wertpapiere mit Hilfe 
aufwendiger Computerprogramme. 
Ziel ist es, mit Hilfe von 
wissenschaftlich fundierten Techniken 
Bewertungsunterschiede in einzelnen 
Wertpapieren oder Gruppen von 
Wertpapieren (Indizes) festzustellen 
und zu verwerten (Loistl 1990: 19).  
Ulrike Thorwartl Judgmental Analysis of Literature on Stock Exchange Mergers and Alliances in Europe 
quote-driven system 
 
This term denotes "an electronic 
stock-exchange system in which 
prices are determined by the 
quotations made by market makers 
or dealers. The London Stock 
Exchange and the US National 
Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System use 
quote-driven arrangements" 
(Butler 1993: 239).  
quote driven system, 
notierungsgesteuertes System 
Bei diesem Marktsystem "sind 
Market-Maker während der gesamten 
Handelszeit verpflichtet, Quotes für 
die von ihnen betreuten 
Handelsobjekte zu stellen und 
eingehende Aufträge zu diesen Kursen 
auszuführen" (Gerke 2002: 650).  
quote-driven market 
see quote-driven system 
 
raider  
(Moles and Terry 1997: 114) 
A raider, usually referred to as a 
predator in Britain, is someone 
who attempts to take over a 
corporation (Moles and Terry 
1997: 449).  
Raider, Unternehmenshai (Van 
Bernem 1997: 187) 
Ein Raider ist ein als Großanleger 
auftretender Investor, der zunächst 
durch Käufe an der Börse eine größere 
Menge einer bestimmten Aktie 
zusammenträgt. Anschließend 
unterbreitet er den übrigen Aktionären 
ein Übernahmeangebot für die 
restlichen Aktien, um so die 
Stimmenmehrheit zu erreichen 
(Siebers und Weigert 1995: 287). 
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rating report (Standard and Poor's 
2003) 
A rating report is a report issued by 
a credit rating agency on the credit 
standing of a company. The two 
largest credit rating agencies are 
Moody's Investors Services and 
Standard and Poor's Corporation. 
"Each rating assigned to a security 
issue is a reflection of at least three 
factors: (1) the character and terms 
of the particular security being 
issued; (2) the ability and 
willingness of the issuer to make 
timely payments; and (3) the 
degree of protection [for] 
investors...if the security issuer is 
liquidated, reorganized or declares 
bankruptcy" (Roth 2003).  
Rating Bericht (E/D/E 2003: 10), 
Finanzbewertungsbericht 
Rating Agenturen bewerten die 
Zahlungsfähigkeit von 
Kapitalschuldnern. Die beiden 
bekanntesten Agenturen sind Moody's 
und Standard & Poor's. Das Rating 
enthält Informationen darüber, mit 
welcher Sicherheit 
(Wahrscheinlichkeit) Zinszahlungen 
und Tilgung durch einen bestimmten 
Schuldner fristgerecht erfolgen (Lyk 
2002: 84-85).  
replacement cost risk 
 
This is the risk that the purchasing 
price of certain assets increases, 
which makes their replacement 
more costly ("replacement cost 
risk": 1241).   
Risiko gestiegener 
Wiederbeschaffungskosten (A) 
Die Wiederbeschaffungskosten 
"bestimmen sich nach den Ausgaben, 
um einen Vermögensgegenstand zu 
ersetzen und entsprechen damit dem 
Einkaufspreis am 
Beschaffungsmarkt". Wenn dieser 
steigt, steigt auch das Risiko der 
Wiederbeschaffungskosten (Gerke 
2002: 868, A).  
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resources 
According to Wernerfelt (1984: 
172), resources are "those (tangible 
or intangible) assets which are tied 
semipermanently to the firm." Das 
and Teng (1998: 22) classify the 
relevant firm-specific resources 
into four basic categories:  
§ Financial resources (capital). 
§ Technological resources (e.g. 
high research and 
development capabilities or 
superior know-how). 
§ Physical resources (production 
and distribution capacity or 
raw materials). 
§ Managerial resources (upper-
level executives with superior 
management skills). 
The competitive advantage of a 
firm results from the combination 
of these resources. 
Ressourcen 
"Unter Ressourcen versteht man 
sämtliche materiellen und 
immateriellen Input-Faktoren wie 
Personen, Finanzen, Material, Wissen, 
Infrastruktur und Partnerschaften. Als 
natürliche Ressourcen bezeichnet man 
die aus der natürlich Umwelt 
verfügbaren Güter (Rohstoffe, 
Wasser, Energie usw.)" (Thommen 
2004: 544).  
retail broker 
Retail brokers are brokers whose 
clients are mainly small investors 
(Tomlinson 2004). 
 
Retailbroker  
"Unter einem Retailbroker versteht 
man einen Broker, der sich 
hauptsächlich auf Privatkunden 
konzentriert. Im Gegensatz hierzu gibt 
es etwa Broker, deren primäre 
Zielgruppe institutionelle 
Anleger…sind" ("Retailbroker"). 
search costs 
"Generally speaking, search costs 
refer to expenditures spent by 
customers in order to get the 
relevant information, such as 
locations and credits of the sellers, 
prices and qualities of the 
products" (Chen and Lin 2003: 
84). 
Suchkosten 
Suchkosten sind jene Ressourcen, die 
ein Kunde aufwenden muss, der ein 
bestimmtes Produkt kaufen möchte, 
um das günstigste Angebot zu finden 
(Europäische Kommission 2000b: 
12).  
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Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
The SEC is the dominant 
governing body in the US 
regarding all aspects of securities 
trading, and administers Federal 
Securities Laws under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (regulating 
the offer and sale of securities) and 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (regulating the trading of 
outstanding securities) (Weissman, 
Kane and Irimia-Casella 1990: 
842).  
U.S.-Börsenaufsicht 
Die SEC ist die U.S.-Börsenaufsicht 
und vergleichbar mit dem deutschen 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für 
Wertpapierhandel sowie der 
Österreichischen 
Bundeswertpapieraufsicht. Ihre 
Hauptaufgabe ist die Kontrolle 
sämtlicher Vorschriften im 
Zusammenhang mit dem 
Börsengeschehen (Diehl, Lo istl and 
Rehkugler 1998: 33, 114). 
secondary market 
The secondary market is defined as 
a "market where financial 
instruments are sold and purchased 
by those other than the original 
parties" (Terry 1997: 853).  
Sekundärmarkt 
Dies ist eine Bezeichnung für den 
"Markt, an dem die umlaufenden Titel 
gehandelt werden" (Bestmann 1997: 
580).  
second-tier market 
"A second tier market is a place for 
many growing businesses to be 
launched onto the public platform 
before they make their transition 
into large and profitable companies 
being listed in the prime segment" 
(Chiu 2003). 
Neuer Markt 
Dabei handelt es sich um ein Segment 
einer Börse, dessen Zielgruppe vor 
allem innovative kleine und mittlere 
Unternehmen (oft aus stark 
wachsenden Sektoren) sind, die noch 
nicht reif sind, in anderen Segmenten 
zu listen ("Dortmund-Projekt-
Glossar"). 
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Securities Contact Committee 
 
The Securities Contact Committee 
was established in 1979, and has 
since then helped in developing 
several EU directives on listing, as 
well as the directives on half-
yearly reports, major 
shareholdings, insider dealing, and 
public offer prospectuses. Its 
members are nominated on a case 
by case basis depending on the 
meeting agenda. Its primary 
function is to facilitate the 
harmonised implementation of 
directives. The Securities Contact 
Committee has three main tasks: 
§ To facilitate the harmonised 
implementation of the 
directives mentioned above by 
regularly consulting and 
solving practical problems 
arising from their application.  
§ To facilitate the establishment 
of a concerted attitude of 
member states on stringent or 
additional conditions and 
obligations which member 
states may lay down at 
national level. 
§ To advise the Commission on 
any necessary supplements or 
amendments to the above-
mentioned directives 
(European Commission 2000a : 
32, 36). 
Europäischer Kontaktausschuss für 
Wertpapierfragen (A) 
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securitisation 
Securitisation means "converting 
an asset such as a loan into a 
marketable commodity by turning 
it into securities. Any asset that 
generates an income stream can be 
securitised – e.g. mortgages, car 
loans, credit-card receivables" 
(Carew 1995:46).  
Verbriefung 
"Bei der Verbriefung von Kapital wird 
ein handelbares Papier erzeugt, das 
einen Finanzkontrakt als Inhalt 
aufweist. Als Grundlage für die 
Verbriefung kommen Hypotheken, 
Lebensversicherungen, Kredite für 
den Autokauf und andere 
nichtkündbare oder nur mit hohen 
Kosten auflösbare Engagements in 
Frage" (Franzetti 1995: 89).  
self-regulation 
Self-regulation denotes "the way in 
which the securities industry 
monitors itself to create a fair and 
orderly trading environment". In 
due course, the exchange regulates 
"the conduct and activities of its 
members, subject to oversight by a 
specified government regulatory 
agency" ("New York Stock 
Exchange-Glossary"). 
Selbstregulierung 
Unter Selbstregulierung versteht man, 
dass die Börse eine eigene, ihrer 
Tätigkeit angemessene Betriebs-, 
Verwaltungs- und 
Überwachungsorganisation 
gewährleistet, ihre Reglemente und 
deren Änderungen jedoch von einer 
Aufsichtsbehörde genehmigt werden 
müssen (Schweizerisches 
Börsengesetz 1999: Art. 4).  
settlement 
Settlement means the fulfilment of 
the obligations arising from a 
transaction (Scarlata 1992). 
Furthermore, it denotes "the 
exchange of securities or 
commodities for cash or the 
making of payments under a 
financial contract. Settlement 
normally takes the form of an 
initial notification between the two 
parties confirming the details of 
the transaction and the dates and 
the methods that will be used to 
make the exchange. The settlement 
is then completed on the settlement 
date or value date with one or both 
parties making the required 
transfers" (Moles and Terry 1997: 
454).  
Abrechnung 
Unter Abrechnung versteht man im 
Kontext des Wertpapiermarktes die 
Lieferung der beim Abschluss 
involvierten Wertpapiere an den 
Käufer sowie die entsprechende 
Zahlung an den Verkäufer 
(Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften 2002b:5). 
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shareholder value  
 
Shareholder value is defined as 
corporate value minus debt. This 
implies that, first, the total value of 
the firm or business unit must be 
determined. Corporate value 
consists of three components: the 
present value of the cash flow from 
operations during the forecast 
period; the residual value, which 
represents the present value of the 
business attributable to the period 
beyond the forecast period; thirdly, 
the current value of marketable 
securities and other investments 
that can be converted to cash and 
are not essential to operating the 
business must be added. The cash 
flow from operations represents the 
difference between operating cash 
inflows and outflows. These cash 
flows are relevant for estimating 
corporate value because they 
represent the cash available to 
compensate debtholders and 
shareholders. The cash flows are 
discounted by the cost of capital or 
the weighted average of the costs 
of debt and equity capital 
(Rappaport 1998: 32-33).  
Shareholder Value, 
Eigenkapitalwert 
Zur Ermittlung des Shareholder Value 
gibt es grundsätzlich viele 
verschiedene Methoden, jedoch 
scheint die Discounted Cash Flow 
Methode die allgemein gängigste zu 
sein. Bei der Ermittlung des 
Shareholder Value nach der DCF-
Methode wird im Allgemeinen 
zunächst der Wert des Unternehmens 
unabhängig von seiner Kapitalstruktur 
(Verhältnis von Eigen- zu 
Fremdkapital) bestimmt. 
Ausgangspunkt ist das Ergebnis vor 
Zinsen und Steuern. Durch 
Subtraktion der Ertragssteuern und 
durch Addition der Abschreibungen 
sowie der Veränderung der 
langfristigen Rückstellungen lässt sich 
der Brutto Cash Flow indirekt 
berechnen. Die Differenz, die sich 
zwischen dem Brutto Cash Flow 
abzüglich der Investitionen in das 
Anlagevermögen und 
Umlaufvermögen ergibt, stellt den 
Free Cash Flow dar. Beim Free Cash 
Flow handelt es sich um denjenigen 
Finanzmittelüberschuss eines 
Unternehmens nach Steuern, der 
durch den Geschäftsbetrieb 
erwirtschaftet wird und den 
Kapitalgebern dieses Unternehmens – 
sowohl seinen Aktionären als auch 
seinen Fremdkapitalgebern – zur 
Verfügung steht. Die Summe aller 
Free Cash Flows aus künftigen 
Perioden, die mit dem gewichteten 
Kapitalkostensatz abgezinst werden, 
stellt den (Brutto)Unternehmenswert 
dar. Der für den Investor bedeutsame 
Eigenkapitalwert bzw. Shareholder 
Value ergibt sich aus der Differenz 
zwischen Unternehmenswert und 
Fremdkapital. Zur Ermittlung des 
Shareholder Value sind die Free Cash 
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Flows künftiger Perioden zu 
prognostizieren. Zur Diskontierung 
der zukünftigen erwarteten Free Cash 
Flows wird – entsprechend der 
langfristig geplanten Kapitalstruktur – 
der gewichtete Mittelwert aus 
Eigenkapital- und durchschnittlichem 
Fremdkapitalkostensatz verwendet 
(Drill 1995: 26-27).   
As is the case with computing the cash flow, there are several different methods 
of calculating the shareholder value of a company. For this reason the methods 
described above only serve as examples (A).  
single market  
see internal market 
 
SMEs 
In 1996 the European Commission 
set out a definition of SMEs which 
was intended to be appropriate in 
all member countries. According to 
this definition, small enterprises 
must not have more than 49 
employees and the annual turnover 
must not exceed 7 million euros. 
The corresponding numbers for 
medium-sized firms are 249 
employees and 40 million euros 
(Tilley and Tonge 2003: 1-2).  
KMUs 
Gemäß der Einteilung der 
Europäischen Kommission müssen 
Kleinunternehmen weniger als 50 
Mitarbeiter und einen Jahresumsatz 
von höchstens 7 Millionen Euro 
haben, Mittelunternehmen weniger als 
250 Beschäftigte und höchstens 40 
Millionen Euro Jahresumsatz (Mugler 
1998: 31).  
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specialist 
 
The term specialist denotes "a 
member of an exchange who 
makes an orderly market in one or 
more specific issues on a stock 
exchange. The specialist 
undertakes two functions: 
§ Buying and selling for his own 
account to meet temporary 
swings in the two-way flow of 
transactions and 
§ executing limit orders and stop 
orders placed by floor brokers 
when market conditions are 
appropriate" (Moles and Terry 
1997: 508).  
Spezialist, Kursmakler, 
monopolistischer Market-Maker 
Spezialisten sind Handelsmakler und 
fungieren als zentrale 
Ordersammelstellen für bestimmte 
Wertpapiere, bei denen sie einem 
Kontrahierungszwang unterliegen 
(Büschgen 1998b: 558). "Der 
Spezialist konzentriert seine Tätigkeit 
auf eine oder mehrere bestimmte 
Gesellschaften. Seine wichtigste 
Funktion ist, in diesen speziellen 
Aktien einen fairen und ordentlichen 
Marktverlauf zu gewährleisten" 
(Siebers and Weigert 1997: 336). Im 
Unterschied zum Market-Maker 
Prinzip an europäischen Börsen gibt 
es an der New York Stock Exchange 
nur einen Market-Maker pro 
Wertpapier, welcher Spezialist 
genannt wird (Gomber 2000: 21).  
spin-off 
A spin-off is a separation of a 
subsidiary or a division of a 
corporation from its parent by 
issuing shares in a new corporate 
entity. Shareowners in the parent 
company receive shares in the new 
company in proportion to their 
original holdings, and the total 
value remains approximately the 
same ("New York Stock 
Exchange-Glossary"). 
(Unternehmens)Spaltung 
Eine Spaltung liegt vor, wenn auf 
Grundlage eines Spaltungsplanes die 
spaltende Körperschaft Vermögen in 
eine oder mehrere übernehmende 
Körperschaften einbringt und die 
Gegenleistung den Anteilsinhabern 
der spaltenden Körperschaft im 
Verhältnis ihrer Beteiligungen oder im 
Tauschwege gegen wertgleiche 
Anteile an der übernehmenden 
Körperschaft zukommt (Lechner, 
Egger und Schauer 1997: 742).  
spread 
see bid-ask spread 
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stakeholder 
 
The term stakeholder refers to 
anyone with a legitimate claim of 
any sort on a company (Emery, 
Finnerty and Stowe 1998: 10).  
Stakeholder, Interessensgruppe 
(Schäfer 1996: 752) 
Interessensgruppen bzw. Stakeholder 
sind Gruppen oder einzelne Personen, 
die Eingriffsmöglichkeiten in, oder 
Ansprüche an, ein Unternehmen 
haben. Diese können vertraglich oder 
gesetzlich verankert oder faktischer 
Natur sein (Drill 1995: 42). 
stock exchange 
According to a definition given by 
the Boston Stock Exchange, a 
stock exchange is a place where 
listed stocks are bought and sold 
(Winfield and Curry 1987: 7).  
Aktienbörse 
Eine Aktienbörse ist ein Handelsplatz, 
an dem die Aktien von Unternehmen, 
welche an der Börse notieren,  
gehandelt werden (Willberger and 
Tack 2002: 160).  
straight through processing 
 
 
Straight through processing (STP) 
means that the end-to-end 
processing of transactions of all 
financial instruments is fully 
automated. In this way "STP not 
only comprises clearing and 
settlement times but also provides 
a flexible, cost-effective 
infrastructure which enables e-
business expansion through real-
time processing and access to 
enterprise data" (Bardoloi 2003).  
Straight Through Processing, 
vollautomatische 
Auftragabwicklung 
Dies "bezeichnet eine 
vollautomatische und ohne jegliche 
Intervention ablaufende Ausführung 
von Kundenaufträgen. Dies ist für die 
Marktteilnehmer v.a. aus Gründen der 
Kostenersparnis attraktiv" (Gerke 
2002: 746).  
strategic alliance 
see alliance 
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synergy 
Synergies occur if a combination 
of single enterprises or parts of 
enterprises results in a higher profit 
in the long run than in the event of 
their isolated existence. Synergies 
can be utilised by bundling or 
exchanging resources or abilities of 
the combined companies, in this 
way decreasing costs or increasing 
profits. Synergies are a necessary 
prerequisite for a successful 
merger or alliance (Salter and 
Weinhold 1994: 117). 
Synergie 
Synergien sind immer dann zu 
erwarten, wenn sich verbundene 
Unternehmen gegenseitig in ihren 
Stärken ergänzen (Paprottka 1996: 
43).  
systematic risk 
Systematic risk, which is also 
referred to as market risk or 
undiversifiable risk, is that portion 
of total variability in return caused 
by market factors that 
simultaneously affect the prices of 
all securities. The systematic 
nature of these price changes 
makes them immune to much of 
the reduction effects of 
diversification (Francis 1991: 265). 
systematisches Risiko 
Das systematische Risiko gibt an, 
inwieweit Bewegungen der Kurse 
einzelner Aktien den Bewegungen des 
Gesamtmarktes folgen. Das 
systematische Risiko lässt sich nicht 
durch Bildung eines Portefeuilles 
ausschalten und wird daher auch als 
nichtdiversifizierbares Risiko oder 
Marktrisiko bezeichnet (Süchting 
1995: 317). 
systemic risk 
This is "the risk that a disruption 
(at a firm, in a market segment, to 
a settlement system etc.) causes 
widespread difficulties at other 
firms, in other market segments or 
in the financial system as a whole" 
(Abteilung für Finanzmarktanalyse 
1993: 61).  
Systemrisiko 
Dies ist das Risiko, dass "der Ausfall 
eines Gliedes [in einem System, z.B.  
Finanzsystem]…unter Umständen zu 
einer Kettenreaktion führen [kann], 
wodurch je nach Bedeutung des Falles 
auch Gefahren für die Stabilität des 
gesamten" Systems auftreten können 
(Dominoeffekt) (Meister 1994).  
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takeover 
see acquisition 
Although a takeover is the same as 
an acquisition, it is frequently 
referred to as a hostile acquisition 
(Gaughan 2000). 
 
tax loss carry forward 
This is "a tax benefit that allows a 
company to apply losses to reduce 
tax liability. More precisely, 
offsetting the current year's net 
operating loss against future year's 
net incomes for tax purposes" 
(Goede 2003: 1267).  
steuerlicher Verlustvortrag 
Der steuerliche Verlustvortrag ist 
derjenige Teil des Bilanzverlustes aus 
einem Jahr, der im nächsten steuerlich 
geltend gemacht werden kann 
(wodurch sich die Steuerlast mindert) 
(Thommen 2004: 259).  
technicalisation 
By technicalisation we understand 
the steady progress of investment 
methods and strategies through 
automation (the use of modern 
computer technologies) (Gerke and 
Rapp 1994: 5 and Amati 2001: 5). 
Technisierung 
Im Kontext der Finanzmärkte versteht 
man unter Technisierung den 
ständigen technologischen Fortschritt 
durch Automatisierung von 
Investmentstrategien und durch den 
Einsatz immer modernerer 
Technologien (Paulsen 1993: 5).  
trade match system 
see matching system 
 
transaction costs 
Transaction costs consist of four 
components: first, the commission 
cost (the broker's basic fee for 
purchasing or selling securities as 
an agent), second, the bid-ask 
spread, third, the market impact 
cost of trade execution, and fourth, 
the cost of clearing and settlement 
(administrative costs) (Berkowitz, 
Logue and Noser 1988: 88). 
Transaktionskosten 
Transaktionskosten sind 
Aufwendungen, die im 
Zusammenhang mit Börsengeschäften 
anfallen. Neben dem Preis, den der 
Broker abrechnet (Provision), sind der 
Bid-ask Spread, die Kosten des 
market impacts, sowie administrative 
Kosten (für Clearing und Settlement) 
zu berücksichtigen (Becker 1994: 614, 
Gerke 2002: 409 and Lüdecke 1996: 
20).  
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Treaty of Rome 
After having created the European 
Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951, the six members 
Belgium, West Germany, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands signed the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, "creating the 
European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) and the 
European Economic Community 
(EEC). The member states set 
about removing trade barriers 
between them and forming a 
'common market'" (EU: "The 
History of the European Union"). 
Vertrag von Rom 
Nachdem 1951 Belgien, Deutschland, 
Luxemburg, Frankreich, Italien und 
die Niederlande die Europäische 
Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl 
(EGKS) gegründet hatten, kamen 
diese sechs Staaten überein, "eine 
Integration weiterer Bereiche ihrer 
Wirtschaft vorzunehmen. 1957 
unterzeichneten sie den Vertrag von 
Rom und gründeten damit die 
Europäische Atomgemeinschaft 
(EURATOM) und die Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG). Ziel 
der Mitgliedstaaten war die 
Beseitigung von Handelshemmnissen 
und die Bildung eines 'Gemeinsamen 
Marktes'" (EU: "Die Geschichte der 
Europäischen Union"). 
UCITS contact committee 
 
 
The UCITS contact committee 
consists of representatives from the 
member states' competent 
authorities and Ministries of 
Finance. Its tasks are to facilitate 
harmonised implementation, to 
create a forum for consultations 
between Member States and to 
advise the commission on 
additions or amendments to the 
UCITS Directive (European 
Commission 2000a: 32). 
Kontaktausschuss betreffend 
Organismen für gemeinsame 
Anlagen in Wertpapieren 
Die Aufgaben des Kontaktausschusses 
betreffend Organismen für 
gemeinsame Anlagen in Wertpapieren 
bestehen in der "Erleichterung einer 
harmonisierten Anwendung der 
Richtlinie [betreffend Organismen für 
gemeinsame Anlagen in 
Wertpapieren] durch regelmäßige 
Abstimmung, der Erleichterung eines 
abgestimmten Vorgehens zwischen 
den Mitgliedstaaten sowie in der 
Beratung der Kommission betreffend 
etwaiger notwendiger Ergänzungen 
und Änderungen der Richtlinie" 
(Finanzmarktaufsicht Österreich: 
"OGAW-Ausschuss"). 
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underlying 
"The underlying is the physical 
instrument, commodity, currency, 
interest rate or whatever, against 
which a future [sic!] or option is 
traded" (Inglis-Taylor 1995: 123).  
Basiswert 
Der Basiswert beze ichnet "die einem 
Termingeschäft zugrundeliegende 
Ware. Es kann sich dabei um eine 
reale Ware (Aktie, Zinspapier, 
Währung, Commodity) oder ein 
künstlich definiertes Basisgut (Index, 
Korb von realen Gütern) handeln" 
(Straush 1990: 19).  
underwriting 
 
 
The term underwriting denotes the 
assistance in the issue of new 
securities (Cornett and Saunders 
1999: 97). More precisely, on an 
underwritten issue, the respective 
investment bank agrees to buy the 
entire issue and then resell it. The 
issuing company therefore has a 
guarantee that it gets the cash it 
needs. Securities underwriting can 
be undertaken through either 
public or private offerings. Private 
offerings are securities issues 
placed with one or a few large 
institutional investors (e.g. 
insurance companies and mutual 
funds), whereas public offerings 
refer to issues placed with the 
general public (Cornett and 
Saunders 1999: 97, 101 and 
Brigham, Gapenski and Daves 
1999: 507).  
Underwriting, 
Emissionsübernahme  (Goede 2003: 
1343) 
Underwriting bedeutet, dass die 
Abnehmer einer Emission die nicht 
abgesetzten Wertpapiere ganz oder 
zumindest in bestimmtem Umfang 
selbst übernehmen. Somit wird das 
Risiko einer nicht vollständigen 
Plazierung – gegen Bezahlung einer 
Underwriting-Provision – vom 
Emittenten auf den Underwriter 
übergewälzt. Eine Emission läuft 
somit zweistufig ab: zuerst erfolgt die 
Übernahme der Emission durch 
Banken (=Underwriting), und dann 
die Plazierung der Wertpapiere 
(=Selling), wobei man zwischen 
öffentlicher und privater Plazierung 
unterscheidet (Eilenberger 1996: 499-
500).  
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upstairs market 
 
Some exchanges offer special 
market segments for block trades, 
such as the upstairs-market of the 
NYSE. In this segment, larger 
orders can be traded anonymously 
over the phone among specialised 
block trading departments of stock 
exchange members. Those orders 
which are not matched in the 
upstairs-market are executed on the 
floor of the NYSE (Gomber 200: 
46). 
Upstairs Market, Brokermarkt 
(Löffler 2004) 
Dieses Marktsegment wird von 
institutionellen Investoren für große 
Transaktionen genutzt, da die 
Preisdifferenzen in diesem Segment 
geringer ausfallen (Oehler and Häcker 
2003: 26). 
venture capital 
By venture capital we understand 
investments made by one or more 
companies or wealthy individuals 
investing in a company (often an 
SME) with usually high growth 
potential and/or good profitability. 
The idea is to back risky industrial 
and commercial ventures at the 
beginning of their operations. 
Investment can be either direct or 
indirect through a fund 
(Commission of the European 
Communities 1992: 25).  
Risikokapital 
Als Risikokapital wird jene Form der 
Finanzierung bezeichnet, die im 
Wesentlichen als 
Beteiligungsfinanzierung für junge 
Unternehmen (oder 
Unternehmenszweige) auf die 
besondere Situation der hohen 
Risiken, aber auch großen 
Entwicklungschancen abgestellt ist. 
Es handelt sich dabei um eine 
Risikokapitalfinanzierung, welche 
zumeist in Form einer 
Eigenkapitalbeteiligung erfolgt 
(Lechner, Egger and Schauer 1990: 
248). 
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vertical merger 
In a vertical merger, two or more 
firms of preceding or succeeding 
stages in the production chain are 
combined, with the firms having a 
customer-supplier relationship. 
This type of merger is usually 
undertaken when the market for 
the intermediate product is 
imperfect. Depending on whether 
the acquired firm is in a preceding 
or succeeding stage one speaks of a 
forward vertical merger or a 
backward vertical merger, 
respectively. A vertical merger 
leads to a higher value added by 
the company (Hermsen 1994: 35-
36 and Lorange, Kotlarchuk and  
Singh 1987: 5-6). 
vertikale Fusion 
Bei einer vertikalen Fusion handelt es 
sich um den Zusammenschluss zweier 
Unternehmen, in denen verschiedene 
Stufen des Produktionsprozesses 
stattfinden (Samuelson und Nordhaus 
1998: 395). Dabei unterscheidet man 
zwischen der vertikalen Fusion nach 
rückwärts, der Fusion mit einem in 
der Produktion vorgelagerten 
Unternehmen zur Sicherung der 
regelmäßigen Versorgung mit 
Rohstoffen oder Fertigteilen, und der 
vertikalen Fusion nach vorwärts, der 
Fusion mit einem in der Produktion 
nachgelagerten Unternehmen zur 
Sicherung des Absatzes (Hopfenbeck 
1996: 148).  
volatility 
In the context of shares, volatility 
is the variability of movements in 
security price (Buckley 1996: 583).  
Volatilität 
Volatilität beschreibt die mittlere 
Schwankungsbreite von Aktienkursen 
(Bestmann 1997: 664). 
volume advantages 
Volume advantages occur through 
the bundling of similar resources 
and can again be split up into 
economies of scale, learning curve 
effects and coinsurance effects 
(Gullander 1976: 104-105). 
Volumenvorteile 
Der Ausdruck Volumenvorteile wird 
im Deutschen einerseits als Synonym 
für Größendegressionseffekte genutzt 
(z.B. die Verringerung der 
Transaktionskosten bei höheren 
Handelsvolumina) (Deutsche Bank 
Research 2004: 12) und beschreibt 
andererseits auch die Vorteile aus der 
Erzielung höhere Volumina durch 
rasche Marktdurchdringung (Effekt 
der Erzielung hoher Volumina) 
(RWE:  "Annual Report").  
The term Volumenvorteile is used in different ways, but not as an umbrella term 
for economies of scale, learning curve effects, and coinsurance effects, as is the 
case with the English term volume advantages. (A). 
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World Federation of Exchanges 
 
 
This organisation "maintains a 
platform worldwide where 
exchange industry professionals 
discuss issues of common interest, 
identify new solutions which 
enhance the efficiency of regulated 
markets, and develop programs 
which protect their integrity…The 
Federation is a private international 
organization comprised of the 
operators of the world's leading 
markets, which are committed to 
the highest levels of market 
quality…Its purpose is to facilitate 
the representation and  
development of organized and 
regulated markets, and to meet the 
needs of evolving capital markets 
in the best interest of their users". 
Other goals include the 
harmonisation of standards for 
business processes (particularly 
with regard to cross-border 
trading) in the exchange industry 
as well as the strengthening of 
cooperative relationships with 
supervisory authorities ("The 
World Federation of Exchanges"). 
Internationaler Börsenverband 
(Kommission der europäischen 
Gemeinschaften 2002a: 17) 
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The main goal of this thesis was to compile an English-German glossary of 
technical terms relevant to stock exchange mergers and  alliances in Europe. Since 
terminological research is only possible within the context of technical 
knowledge, the relevant literature on stock exchange mergers and alliances was 
reviewed by means of judgmental analysis. 
 
The methods used comprise deductive multi-paradigm research in 
combination with terminological research. Judgmental analysis was applied to the 
relevant literature on stock exchange mergers and alliances in order to identify 
those general theories of mergers and alliances that fit best with the situation and 
characteristics of stock exchanges. In order to avoid biases, decomposition was a 
central feature of the analysis, which means that each theory was analysed 
separately, with each success factor (which served as the criteria for the fit 
between general theories and stock exchanges) being looked into individually as 
well. This approach was intended to help avoid the biases involved in holistic 
judgment. Furthermore, all judgments were justified verbally in order to make 
them traceable. The analysis did not involve group judgment, however, which is 
justified by the fact that the main goal of the thesis was not an absolute validation 
of analysis results but the compilation of a glossary of relevant technical terms of 
stock exchange mergers and alliances based on the analysis. 
 
In the first part, the background of stock exchange mergers and alliances 
was looked into. Until a few decades ago, stock exchanges held a (regional) 
monopoly position, with each stock exchange serving its national market. This has 
changed considerably in the past decades due to such factors as globalisation, 
deregulation (capital account liberalisation), new regulations (e.g. Basle II), 
securitisation, consolidation of institutional investors, or technicalisation and 
disintermediation. All these factors increase the competitive pressures on stock 
exchanges. They are facing competition not only from other stock exchanges, but 
also from other trading venues, so-called Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), 
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which are private trading platforms at which (mainly institutional) investors can 
trade shares at low cost and in most cases anonymously. Another important factor 
that has considerably changed the environment of stock exchanges in the past few 
decades is European integration. European integration grants financial institutions 
of EU member countries free access to all financial markets within the single 
European market, and the introduction of the euro has increased competition even 
further by eliminating exchange rate risk. All these factors lead to stock 
exchanges being competing suppliers in the services industry. In order to survive 
in this highly competitive environment, stock exchanges need to concentrate on a 
number of critical success factors. The criteria for success most frequently 
mentioned in the relevant literature are appropriate corporate governance and 
ownership structures, organisation and technicalisation, the integration of 
derivatives markets, proper market segmentation, proper supervision of trading, 
low transaction costs, transparency regulations, and external growth.  
 
The phenomenon of stock exchange mergers and alliances is analysed by 
using fourteen different management theories. By judgmentally analysing in how 
far the different theories support the critical success factors of stock exchanges 
and whether they are in line with the effects of ATSs and European integration, 
the explanatory value of the different theories is assessed. By introducing a point 
system, the comparability of the outcome of the ana lyses of the different theories 
is improved. The theories that seem to contain most explanatory value are 
efficiency theories, hubris hypothesis, and valuation theory, with efficiency 
theories scoring the highest number of points. Furthermore, also institutional 
theory, stakeholder theory, he resource-based view, monopoly theory, the theory 
of reduction of income uncertainties, and organisational learning seem to serve as 
good explanations of stock exchange cooperation. Since there is more than one 
theory that is applicable to stock exchanges, and since no single theory supported 
all critical success factors and phenomena stock exchanges are facing, a 
combination of theories, a so-called eclectic approach, is necessary to fully 
explain stock exchange mergers and alliances. Unfortunately there is still a lack of 
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integration of theories to be observed in literature. In the course of the analysis it 
was attempted to create links between the theories. 
 
In the glossary the relevant terms of stock exchange mergers and alliances 
are defined. Some terms that show differences in German and English definitions 
or other ambiguities are highlighted. In general, a high degree of congruency of 
English and German terminology can be observed. This is mainly due to the fact 
that in the fields of financial markets as well as mergers and alliances most 
concepts did not develop in parallel in the two languages, but were adopted one-
to-one by one of the languages. Investment managers in a German-speaking 
country, for example, trans late hardly any technical terms into German. Instead, 
English terms are used either as foreign words or, even more frequently, as guest 
words. Furthermore, there are a large number of terms with a German translation, 
but with the concepts behind them being taken over one-to-one from English-
speaking countries.  
 
When comparing the aims of this thesis with the outcomes it can be said 
that the main goal, the compilation of a glossary of relevant technical terms for 
stock exchange mergers and alliances, could be achieved. The fact that most 
concepts do not show any differences in English and German literature limits the 
number of contrastive aspects, however. As the speed of new developments in the 
stock exchange world and financial markets will not slow down in the near future, 
and as new developments and new knowledge in many cases also trigger the 
emergence of new technical terms, new interesting terminological research 
perspectives will emerge in this field. In the area of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances in general there is still ample scope for further research. It has to be said 
that there are more theories on mergers and alliances than those examined in this 
thesis. Generally, theory-based research on the different theories of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances is to be intensified. One interesting option would 
be to apply other methods than judgmental analysis to the problem examined in 
this thesis. The field also lends itself very well to case study research. It would be 
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interesting, for example, to try to apply the different theories to practical cases of 
stock exchange cooperation. 
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7 Summary 
The main goal of this thesis was to compile an English-German glossary of 
technical terms relevant to stock exchange mergers and alliances in Europe. Since 
terminological research is only possible within the context of technical 
knowledge, first the relevant literature on stock exchange mergers and alliances 
was reviewed by means of judgmental analysis. In this way terminological 
research and research in the field of mergers and alliances were combined. A 
second goal is to identify the explanatory value of different general management 
theories on merger and alliances for the special case of stock exchange 
cooperation.  
 
In a first step, important but sometimes ambiguously used terms crucial for 
further reading were defined. Secondly, the research strategy, methods, and 
methodology were explained. The methods used comprise deductive multi-
paradigm research in combination with terminological research. Judgmental 
analysis was applied to the relevant literature on stock exchange mergers and 
alliances in order to identify those general theories of mergers and alliances that 
fit best with the situation and characteristics of stock exchanges. The criteria on 
which the analysis is based are the critical success factors of stock exchanges plus 
the effects of European integration and ATSs. In order to avoid biases, 
decomposition was a central feature of the analysis, which means that each theory 
was analysed separately, with each success factor (which served as the criteria for 
the fit between general theories and stock exchanges) being looked into 
individually as well. This approach was intended to help avoid the biases involved 
in holistic judgment. Furthermore, all judgments were justified verbally in order 
to make them traceable. The analysis did not involve group judgment, however, 
which is justified by the fact that the main goal of the thesis was not an absolute 
validation of analysis results but the compilation of a glossary of relevant 
technical terms of stock exchange mergers and alliances based on the analysis. 
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The thesis is generally split up into two main parts. In the first part, the 
background of stock exchange mergers and alliances is looked into. First, the 
theory of corporate growth is discussed. The most important decision for 
companies wishing to grow is whether to pursue internal or external growth. 
Whereas internal growth is generally considered less risky, external growth allows 
companies to grow more quickly and with fewer limitations. As mergers and 
alliances are forms of external growth strategies, the main focus was on external 
growth and its drivers. The most important drivers mentioned in the relevant 
literature are globalisation (of markets, technologies, and needs), shorter product 
life cycles, turbulent world markets, and the fact that products today rely on many 
different technologies. Furthermore, companies seek to grow in order to benefit 
from volume advantages (including economies of scale, learning curve effects, 
and coinsurance effects), economies of scope, and monopoly advantages.  
 
The second important background factor of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances is radical changes in the stock exchange world. Until a few decades ago, 
stock exchanges held a (regional) monopoly position, with each stock exchange 
serving its national market. This has changed considerably in the past decades due 
to such factors as globalisation, deregulation (capital account liberalisation), new 
regulations (e.g. Basle II), securitisation, consolidation of institutional investors, 
or technicalisation and disintermediation. All these factors increase the 
competitive pressures on stock exchanges. They are facing competition not only 
from other stock exchanges, but also from other trading venues, so-called 
Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), which are private trading platforms at which 
(mainly institutional) investors can trade shares at low cost and in most cases 
anonymously. Other advantages of ATSs are more speedy execution, new trading 
possibilities (such as matching or crossing of orders), longer trading hours, and 
the elimination of intermediaries. There are also several disadvantages, for 
example lower liquidity compared to established exchanges or the danger of 
liquidity dispersion. Furthermore, most of them free-ride on the price-discovery 
function of traditional stock exchanges by executing trades at the prices 
established on stock exchanges. Traditional stock exchanges have to bear much 
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higher costs than ATSs, apart from the costs of price discovery, also the costs of 
listing have to be mentioned. Although ATSs are most widely spread in the US, 
also European exchanges must continuously upgrade their services in order to 
fend off competition from this side. Up to now they have been quite successful, 
which is mainly due to the fact that most of them abandoned floor trading and 
switched to electronic trading platforms. Another important factor that has 
considerably changed the environment of stock exchanges in the past few decades 
is European integration. European integration grants financial institutions of EU 
member countries free access to all financial markets within the single European 
market, and the introduction of the euro has increased competition even further by 
eliminating exchange rate risk. All these factors lead to stock exchanges being 
competing suppliers in the services industry. Many of their traditional sources of 
income have come under threat, such as membership fees (as demutualisation 
involves the abolition of membership) or revenues from listing and transactions, 
since fierce competition in these areas has driven down prices.  
 
In order to survive in this highly competitive environment, stock 
exchanges need to concentrate on a number of critical success factors. The criteria 
for success most frequently mentioned in literature are the following: 
§ Corporate governance and ownership structures: This factor is reflected by 
the increasing trend towards demutualisation. The main advantage is quicker 
and more flexible decisions, since the members of the exchange are no 
longer its owners.  
§ Organisation and technicalisation: In order to provide cost-efficient and 
quick trading services, many exchanges have decided to integrate their 
clearing and settlement institutions. This allows straight-through-processing 
and the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. Technicalisation refers 
to the switch to electronic trading platforms, with the main advantages being 
lower costs, the possibility of straight through processing, and the option of 
interlinking the trading platforms of different stock exchanges. 
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§ Integration of derivatives markets: The main benefit of this move is 
economies of scale. Moreover investors appreciate having to deal with only 
one exchange. 
§ Market segmentation: Stock exchanges need to carefully choose which 
market segments they offer in order to be able to serve the diverse needs of 
companies planning to get listed. 
§ Supervision of trading: In order to avoid harm to the reputation of the 
exchange and the trust in capital markets in general, stock exchanges need to 
carefully supervise the market in order to avoid illegal behaviour of market 
participants. This is particularly important in connection with stock 
exchanges getting listed on their own market, as in this case they would 
have to regulate and supervise themselves. The ability of profit-oriented 
stock exchange to properly supervise the market is frequently questioned. 
§ Transaction costs: ATSs compete with stock exchanges mainly on 
transaction costs. Investors in many cases choose the trading venue offering 
the lowest costs. 
§ Transparency regulations: While institutional investors prefer a low level of 
transparency, private investors favour transparency. Stock exchanges need 
to find the right balance between the conflicting interests of these groups. 
§ External growth: This factor is considered necessary for many stock 
exchanges to survive. Due to positive network externalities, large stock 
exchanges are at an advantage compared to smaller competitors. Moreover 
the trading function shows considerable economies of scale. 
 
The most prominent examples of stock exchange mergers are Euronext 
(including the stock exchanges of Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Lisbon) and 
OMX (the merger between the Swedish Stock Exchange, Helsinki, as well as 
Tallin, Riga, and Vilnius). The most spectacular deal, which never came into 
effect, however, was probably the planned merger between the London Stock 
Exchange and Deutsche Börse. One reason for the failure was a hostile takeover 
bid by the Swedish OM-Group for the London Stock Exchange. Prominent 
examples of alliances are NOREX (the alliance between the stock exchanges of 
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Stockholm, Copenhagen, Iceland, Oslo, Helsinki, Tallin, Riga, and Vilnius) and 
Euro.NM, which was created in 1999 and linked five new market exchanges, 
including Neuer Markt (Germany), Nouveau Marché (France), Nieuwe Market 
(The Netherlands), the Nuovo Mercato (Italy), and Euro NM Belgium. Euro.NM 
closed down its operations again in October 2000, however. Furthermore, several 
alliances can be found among the relatively young stock exchanges of Central and 
Eastern European countries.  
 
The analysis of the phenomenon of stock exchange mergers and alliances 
is based on fourteen different management theories. By judgmentally analysing in 
how far the different theories support the critical success factors of stock 
exchanges and whether they are in line with the effects of ATSs and European 
integration, the explanatory value of the different theories is assessed. By 
introducing a point system, the comparability of the outcome of the analyses of 
the different theories is improved. The theories that seem to contain most 
explanatory value are efficiency theories, hubris hypothesis, and valuation theory, 
with efficiency theories scoring the highest number of points. Furthermore, also 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory, resource-based view, monopoly theory, 
the theory of reduction of income uncertainties, and organisational learning seem 
to serve as good explanations of stock exchange cooperation. Since there is more 
than one theory that is applicable to stock exchanges, and since no single theory 
supported all critical success factors and phenomena stock exchanges are facing, a 
combination of theories, a so-called eclectic approach, is necessary to fully 
explain stock exchange mergers and alliances. An attempt at interlinking the 
different theories is made in the analysis by trying to find connections between the 
theories. Looking to the future of financial markets, it becomes obvious that 
currently the vision of a central worldwide trading platform is not realistic, in 
particular when considering the high number of failed attempts of stock exchange 
cooperation.  
 
The glossary contains the relevant terms of stock exchange mergers and 
alliances. Some terms that show differences in German and English definitions or 
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other ambiguities are highlighted. In general, a high degree of congruency of 
English and German terminology can be observed. This is mainly due to the fact 
that in the fields of financial markets as well as mergers and alliances most 
concepts did not develop in parallel in the two languages, but were adopted one-
to-one by one of the languages. Investment managers in a German-speaking 
country, for example, translate hardly any technical terms into German. Instead, 
English terms are used either as foreign words or, even more frequently, as guest 
words. Furthermore, there are a large number of terms with a German translation, 
but with the concepts behind them being taken over one-to-one from English-
speaking countries.  
 
When comparing the main aims of this thesis with the outcomes it can be 
said that the main goal, the compilation of a glossary of relevant technical terms 
for stock exchange mergers and alliances, could be achieved. The fact that most 
concepts do not show any differences in English and German literature limits the 
number of contrastive aspects, however. As the speed of new developments in the 
stock exchange world and financial markets will not slow down in the near future, 
and as new developments and new knowledge in many cases also trigger the 
emergence of new technical terms, new interesting terminological research 
perspectives will emerge in this field. In the area of stock exchange mergers and  
alliances in general there is still ample scope for further research. It has to be said 
that there are more theories on mergers and alliances than those examined in this 
thesis. Generally, theory-based research on the different theories of stock 
exchange mergers and alliances is to be intensified. One interesting option would 
be to apply other methods than judgmental analysis to the problem examined in 
this thesis. The field also lends itself very well to case study research. It would 
also be interesting, for example, to try to apply the different theories to practical 
cases of stock exchange cooperation. 
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